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ABSTRACT 
 
The second half of the 18th century saw the formation of the first establishments 
to provide formal training to officers prior to receiving their first commission.  
The first school, the Royal Military Academy, was formed in 1741 by the Board 
of Ordnance to train Artillery and Engineer Officers.  It was 1800 before the 
army formed a similar establishment and the building blocks were in place for 
the creation of the Scientific Soldier. 
 
This thesis will look at the formation of the Royal Military Academy and look at 
the training that officers received with a focus on those officers destined to 
serve during the Peninsular War.  The complementary roles and training of the 
Royal Military Artificers and the eventual formation of the School of Military 
Engineering will be described. 
 
A thorough review will then be undertaken of the officers in the Royal 
Engineers, the numbers, their background, the locations they served in and the 
tasks they carried out. 
 
A new review of the sieges during the war will be completed using unpublished 
material.  The other roles undertaken by the Royal Engineers in the Peninsular 
War will be fully investigated and described.  These roles are more 
comprehensive than has been commonly understood and will demonstrate the 
contribution of the educated officer to the war. 
 
The thesis will conclude by looking at the impacts of the post-war peace on 
military education. 
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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Context 
The middle of the 18th century saw the establishment of the Royal Military 
Academy which introduced professional training for British officers 
commissioned by the Board of Ordnance.  By the start of the 19th century, the 
Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers were populated by ÔScientific soldiersÕ who 
received formal training and usually had to pass examinations before they 
received their first commissions.  In contrast it was not until 1800 that the British 
army established the Royal Military College to provide similar education for 
army officers.  Even the United States, which did not have the European history 
of centuries of war, established their military academy at West Point in 1802.1  
Up to this time the British army was characterised by Ôwretched negligence, lack 
of discipline, and ignorance of officers who gained commissions and 
promotions, not by military talent or good service, but by political favour, by 
money, and by intrigueÕ.2  Henry Bunbury, who was Aide-de-Camp to the Duke 
of York in Flanders in 1799, and later became Under-Secretary of State for 
War, described the army as Ôlax in its discipline, entirely without system and 
very weak in numbers. The colonels of each regiment managed it according to 
his notions, or neglected it altogether. There was no uniformity of drill or 
movement; professional pride was rare; professional knowledge still more soÕ.3  
The Adjutant-General commented even more forcefully Ôof the fifteen cavalry 
and twenty-six infantry regiments É twenty-one are commanded literally by 
boys or idiots.Õ4 
 
But was there in practice a great difference in professionalism between the 
army and the Ordnance?  Was the training of the Ordnance officers appropriate 
                                            
1
 S. Forman, ÔWhy the United States Military Academy was established in 1802Õ, Military Affairs, 
vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 16-28. 
2
 R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation : The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 
1963),  p. 117. 
3
 D. Gregory, No Ordinary General : Lt. General Sir Henry Bunbury (1778-1860) : The Best 
Soldier Historian (Cranbury, New Jersey, 1999), p. 21. 
4
 C. Barnett, Britain and her Army (London, 1970), pp. 256-257, quoted in A. Clayton, The 
British Officer (Harlow, 2006), p. 56. 
Section 1. Introduction. 
 2 
for their needs?  Were the Ordnance officers any better at their profession when 
they were faced with operational problems and difficulties?  Did the strict 
adherence to promotion by seniority strangle the Ordnance and ensure that its 
senior officers were too old to serve in the field, and too far removed from 
current demands to make appropriate decisions at home?   
 
This thesis will address two main areas.  Firstly it will consider the introduction 
of education and training in the military with a focus on military engineering.  It 
will analyse in detail the structures that were set up within the Board of 
Ordnance and compare them with what was being done in the British army.  
Whilst formal training establishments had been established in the Ordnance in 
the mid-18th century, the debate about the need for pre-commission education 
in the army raged on until the mid-19th century when formal exams were finally 
introduced for army officers.  One common error, which appears in a number of 
recent published works, is attributing the formation of the Royal Sappers and 
Miners to Wellington, usually as a result of his letter after the third siege of 
Badajoz in April 1812.5  This view is not supported by the facts and the thesis 
will describe the actions that occurred within the Board of Ordnance to address 
known problems within their organisation. 
 
Secondly, the present study will revisit the operational activities of the Royal 
Engineers during the Peninsular War and take a fresh look at their performance 
to determine how well they contributed to the war effort.  It will ask if the training 
they received was adequate and investigate if there is any evidence of learning 
through experience during the period.  It will also consider the role the Royal 
Engineers undertook in supporting the command structure of the army. 
 
A review of literature will show that when historians consider the role of the 
Royal Engineers in the Napoleonic Wars, the tendency is to think of the 
construction of the lines of Torres Vedras in 1810 and the sieges that occurred 
                                            
5
 Examples are : ed. I. Fletcher, The Peninsular War : Aspects of the struggle for the Iberian 
Peninsula (Staplehurst, 1998), p. 58; I. Fletcher, In Hell before Daylight (Tunbridge Wells, 
1984), p. 117; ed. P. Griffith, Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814  
(London, 1999), p. 111; F. Myatt, British Sieges in the Peninsular War (London, 1987), p. 117. 
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in Spain between 1811 and 1814.  All the sieges and blockades carried out by 
the British army during the Peninsular War account for less than 15% of the 
time. There was never more than a third of the total number of Royal Engineer 
officers present in the Peninsula.  This raises the question, what were the Royal 
Engineers actually doing during the Napoleonic Wars?  The thesis will show 
that much of their work involved maintaining and supporting the various stations 
in Great Britain, Ireland and across the world.  The distribution of the Royal 
Engineers around the world will be outlined in section three, but this thesis will 
concentrate on their role in the Peninsular War. 
 
This thesis will address three primary questions : 
− Were the Royal Engineer officers suitably trained and provided with the 
necessary resources to undertake their roles? 
− If a small percentage of engineer time was spent on the sieges during 
the Peninsular War, what roles did the Royal Engineer officers perform 
for the remainder of the time? 
− How well did they perform in their operational roles? 
1.2. The Military in the Age of Enlightenment 
One possible side effect of the Glorious Revolution was that the strict controls 
placed on the military stifled the growth of professionalism.  There was a 
reluctance to establish military colleges, partly because of the cost but also 
because there was uncertainty amongst the military leadership of the benefit of 
prior education.  Clayton comments that Ôprofessional zeal was not respected or 
fashionableÕ in the mid-18th century.6  The dispersion of troops at home to keep 
civil order also made practical training difficult to organise.  There was a 
growing recognition amongst enlightened officers that professionalism in the 
military had to improve and that it had to come through training and education. 
The general standard of education in the country was improving and one of the 
arguments put forward for improving officer education was that there was a real 
possibility that subordinates could be better educated that their superiors.  For 
the first time the rank and file in some infantry regiments were being taught to 
                                            
6
 Clayton, The British Officer (Harlow, 2006), p. 43. 
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think and act independently rather than wait for orders and this meant that they 
had to be trained to carry out these roles.  Their officers needed to be better 
trained in order to ensure that soldiers would have confidence in them.7  
 
The growing size of the armies in Europe meant that ad-hoc education of junior 
officers at the regimental level was becoming more difficult.  Similarly, the 
growth of the British Empire meant that troops were dispersed far and wide and 
any form of consistency or co-ordination across units was difficult.  With the 
increase in the size of the standing army, there was a greater need for staff 
officers to manage the forces both in peace and war.  There was some 
evidence of military reform in Britain through the 18th century but progress was 
very slow,8  and at the end of the 18th century none of these issues had really 
been addressed in the army and for men who wanted a military education prior 
to joining the British army, there was no alternative but to enrol at one of the 
military schools in Europe or to seek out private tutors from mainland Europe.  
Wellington, Beresford, Moore, Craufurd, Hope, Cole9, Baird and Picton10 are 
examples of officers who followed this route.    
 
In Europe the situation was different.  The greater progress of Enlightenment in 
Europe was one of the drivers of military reform, as were the more immediate 
prospects of conflict that always existed in mainland Europe. Writers such as 
Guibert, Cognazo, Morogues, Saxe, Folard and Teil were putting forth ideas on 
strategy and tactics which can be readily seen in the actions of the revolutionary 
French armies.11   
 
                                            
7
 D. Gates, The British Light Infantry Arm, c1790-1815 (London, 1987), pp. 95-99. 
8
 Clayton, British Officer, pp. 38-73. 
9
 Wellington, Royal Academy of Equitation at Angers; Beresford, Military Academy at 
Strasbourg; Moore, Craufurd and Hope through private tuition across France and Prussia; Cole 
In Stuttgart. 
10
 F. Myatt, Peninsular General; Sir Thomas Picton 1758-1815 (Newton Abbott, 1980), p. 16.  
Picton did not actually go abroad, but was taught at a private military academy in London run by 
a Frenchman, de Lachee.  A. Haley, Our Davy (Liverpool, N.D.), p. 13. David Baird appears to 
have attended the same school, his biography noting attendance at an academy run by a 
refugee called Lochie. 
11
 Ed. J. Black, European Warfare 1453-1815 (London, 1999), pp. 224-227. 
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At the start of the 19th century there was almost no military material in print in 
English.  Engineer officers remarked that most of the material they read came 
from Europe and many of the military engineering terms were French, without 
any attempt to translate them into English.  The situation was little better for 
army officers.  The only recent British writer of note was Henry Lloyd, a 
Welshman who started his military career as an engineer in the Spanish army 
as he did not have the status or personal wealth to join the British military.  
Lloyd worked as a mercenary officer across Europe, taking part in the War of 
Austrian Succession, the Seven YearsÕ War and the Russo-Turkish War.   He 
believed that war was a science and could be taught and mastered.  His 
experiences, particularly during the Seven YearsÕ War, led to the development 
of his views on military science and ultimately to the publication of his history of 
the war in 1766.  In his history he laid out his primary principles.  First, Ôanalyses 
of the political events that sparked the war as well as a geo-political survey of 
the belligerentsÕ.  Second, Ôthe limitations imposed on operations by geography 
É without geographic knowledge, Lloyd, an engineer by training, considered it 
impossible to understand the nature of warÕ.  Third, an understanding of the 
goals of the belligerents was essential.12  LloydÕs ideas on military science were 
well received both in Britain and in Europe and were certainly read by the more 
enlightened of the engineer officers.  There was a small number of publications 
designed to provide some military education, for example, SimesÕ Military Guide 
for Young Officers, published in 1772, but generally there was a dearth of 
material available for officers who wanted to improve themselves. 
 
The very end of the 18th century and the start of the 19th century saw the first 
steps to speed up military reform in Britain.  The appointment of the Duke of 
York as Commander-in-Chief was significant in that for the first time in many 
years the head of the army was committed to improve standards and eradicate 
the abuses that had been occurring.  This was partly driven by the Duke of 
YorkÕs personal experiences in the Low Countries where he was let down by 
almost all components of the military.  DundasÕ regulations of 1792 formed the 
                                            
12
 P.J. Speelman, Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth Century Europe 
(Westport, New Jersey, 2002), pp. 123-128. 
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first serious attempt to standardise the drill across the army.  The experiments 
at Shorncliffe with light infantry led to what were probably the best trained and 
most effective soldiers in the British army, the Light Division.  Le Marchant 
published his Rules and Regulations for the Sword Exercises of Cavalry in 
1796, and established the Royal Military College in 1800. The Senior Staff 
College had been established under Jarry a year earlier.  
 
These changes are not attributable to one particular event.  There had been no 
step change in the technologies used.  Battlefield tactics had evolved but were 
still centred on the basic building blocks of manoeuvring masses of men armed 
with smoothbore muskets.  Enlightenment drove the review of past policies and 
the search for a more efficient mode of war.  The differences in the Napoleonic 
War were twofold.  First, the scale of operations was much larger than in 
previous wars13 and second, the realisation from the British perspective that the 
war with Napoleon was a war to the end.  Previous wars throughout the 18th 
century had never seriously threatened the British mainland.  BritainÕs survival 
depended more than ever before on the performance of its army and the first 
engagements in the 1790Õs were not encouraging.   John BrewerÕs work on the 
Fiscal-Military state describes the changes in Great Britain that allowed more 
effective generation of government income than other states in Europe.  Whilst 
most European powers elected to keep large standing armies, Britain chose to 
keep its army as small as possible as a direct result of the fear of the military 
which had arisen from the civil war and the Glorious Revolution and also to free 
funds to maintain its powerful navy which protected home shores and trade 
routes.  Britain also used some of this wealth to hire mercenaries and support 
foreign armies rather than expand its own land forces.14  The consequence of 
these actions was that experience and specialist skills were limited within the 
British military. 
 
Over this period there were no material changes in the structure of the 
education that had been given to the Ordnance Corps cadets since the 
                                            
13
 Ed. L. Stone, An Imperial State at War 1689-1815 (London, 1994), p. 9. 
14
 Stone, An Imperial State at War, p.10; Also J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power, War, Money and 
the English State, 1688-1783 (London, 1989), p. 31. 
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formation of the Royal Military Academy.  It was 1811 before the most effective 
changes began with respect to the training of junior officers and artificers.  The 
officers of the Ordnance were, however, much more proactive than their 
predecessors.  The Royal Engineer, Captain Charles William PasleyÕs military 
experiences in the early years of the 19th century led him to believe that there 
were some fundamental flaws in the way Britain was conducting its defence.  
Following his injury during the Walcheren campaign he concentrated on his 
writing and in 1810 published his Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of 
the British Empire, Part 1.  The book was very well received and ran to four 
editions over the next few years.  PasleyÕs original intention was to publish a 
second part, which would describe what was wrong with the Board of 
Ordnance, an action that was sure to cause great anger amongst his superiors.  
In the end this was never published as Pasley obtained approval to establish 
the School of Military Engineering in 1812, that remedied many of his 
complaints.  Captain John Birch R.E. a peer engineer of Pasley had previously 
published the less well known Memoir on the National Defence, in 1808.  What 
is remarkable about these works is that they were not accounts of military 
campaigns but works of a more strategic nature.  Their authors were not senior 
generals but relatively junior captains in the Royal Engineers who were showing 
an attention and appreciation of the challenges that lay ahead for Britain.  Apart 
from these published works the officers were freely discussing these issues and 
forming opinions on what needed to be done. 
 
The demand for better education and information led to informal arrangements 
like the formation of the Society for Procuring Useful Information in the Royal 
Engineers but also to more formal responses for the military in general.  1810 
saw the publication of the Royal Military Chronicle, which was published 
monthly through the Napoleonic Wars and was a predecessor to the long 
running United Service Journal, which was first published in 1829.  The 
dedication in the first issue of the Royal Military Chronicle was ÔTo the real and 
permanent good of the British army É being an anxious effort É to infuse into 
the younger officers a professional zealÕ.15   The focus of this publication was to 
                                            
15
 Royal Military Chronicle (London, 1810), vol. 1, Nov 1810, Dedication. 
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inform the military on the progress of the war, to provide information that would 
be of use to officers who were to embark on operations (the first issue had two 
maps of Portugal and contained a description of the Portuguese army) and to 
provide military education to junior officers.  For the first time in English there 
were military manuals being printed, although it should be noted that the first 
course on tactics was a translation of material used Ôin the Polytechnic School 
of FranceÕ.16  The course was described as having three parts : 
− Course of Tactics covering field and permanent fortifications 
− Practical Engineering covering military surveys, planning, taking up 
ground and artillery 
− Strategy covering general details of war, duties of generals and staff 
officers, principals of military movements etc.17 
 
In the May 1813 edition a new series of articles began, entitled ÔElements of the 
art of warÕ.  The focus was once more heavily on the military engineering side, 
being a translation from the French of the work of St Paul, the French Chief 
Engineer.18  The dedication stated that the translation had been done for the 
use of the officers of the Foot Guards.   
 
The easy access to these journals made large amounts of information readily 
available to officers for the first time.  As there were no official manuals for 
officers in the British army, the printing of such educational information must 
have been extremely valuable.  Equally valuable was the current information on 
the ÔSeat of the WarÕ, which provided officers (probably French as well as 
British) with detailed descriptions of towns, topography and communication 
routes in Portugal and Spain.  There is no doubt that any officer who wanted to 
learn was able to obtain useful information prior to his arrival in the theatre of 
operations.  
                                            
16
 Royal Military Chronicle, vol.1, Nov 1810, p. 40. 
17
 Royal Military Chronicle, vol. 1, Apr 1811, p. 459. 
18
 Royal Military Chronicle, vol. 6, Jul 1813, p. 213. 
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1.3. Historiography of military engineering during 
the Peninsular War 
Literature on the Board of Ordnance is relatively limited and the records in the 
National Archives are very patchy.  The first significant published account of the 
role of the Board of Ordnance was in ClodeÕs Military Forces of the Crown.19  
ForbesÕ three volume work20 also covered the general structure with the more 
specific military elements being covered in the histories of the Royal Artillery21 
and the Royal Engineers.22  More recently the OrdnanceÕs role within the 
military hierarchy is briefly described in S.G.P. WardÕs book, WellingtonÕs 
Headquarters,23 and a more detailed commentary is contained in Richard 
GloverÕs book on the period leading up to the start of the Peninsular War.24 
 
Commentaries on military education and training in the Ordnance tend to be 
restricted to the establishment and running of the schools themselves, the 
primary works being by W.D. Jones,25 B.R. Ward,26 and F.G. Guggisberg.27  
There has been no review of the operational effectiveness of the training that 
the officers received.  This thesis will undertake such a review. 
 
There is a recent trend to look beyond the operational aspects of war during this 
period.  Christopher Chilcott, in the introduction to his recent thesis, remarks 
that there is a gap between historians such as Stone, Emsley and Black who 
have written on state support for the military and Griffiths [sic] Fletcher and 
Haythornthwaite who have written on military operations.  This gap includes 
staff, logistics and intelligence.  Chilcott comments that Ôthe attitude of historians 
É has often been apatheticÕ in these areas.28  Charles Esdaile has written at 
                                            
19
 C.M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (2 vols, London, 1869). 
20
 A. Forbes, A History of the Army Ordnance Services (3 vols, London, 1929). 
21
 R.A. Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery (2 vols, London, 1874) 
22
 History of the Royal Corps of Engineers (12 vols, Woolwich, 1889). 
23
 S.G.P. Ward. WellingtonÕs Headquarters (Oxford, 1957). 
24
 R. Glover. Peninsular Preparation. The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 
1963). 
25
 W.D. Jones, Records of the Royal Military Academy (Woolwich, 1851).   
26
 B.R. Ward, The School of Military Engineering 1812-1909 (Chatham, 1909). 
27
 F.G. Guggisberg, The Shop, The Story of the Royal Military Academy (London, 1900) 
28
 C. Chilcott, ÔMaintaining the British Army; 1793-1820Õ, unpub PhD thesis, University of the 
West of England, 2005, p. 3.  Chilcott does not mention the earlier PhD by T. Redgrave on a 
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length on the role of guerrillas during the Peninsular War and has widened the 
understanding of the important role they played in tying up French resources.29  
ChilcottÕs thesis looks at logistical support and another recent addition is 
RomansÕ thesis, which describes the role of staff officers in gathering military 
intelligence, especially in the area of topographical surveying.30 
 
Works on Military engineering, artillery and sieges. 
 
There are no publications specifically about the Royal Engineers during the 
Napoleonic Wars.  This topic is covered, somewhat briefly, in around one 
hundred and fifty pages of volume one of the CorpsÕ twelve volume history.31  
This is still the best single source of information on the history and the 
operations of the Corps.  The focus, as with all published work on the activities 
of the Royal Engineers is on sieges and defence work.  There has been no 
evaluation of the wider role of the engineer officers in the Peninsula and this is 
an area that will be addressed for the first time in the thesis. 
 
There is a great deal of material written by the officers of the Royal Engineers 
which reflect their professional training in encouraging accurate record keeping 
as part of their daily activity.  This material falls into four categories.  Firstly, a 
number of the officers wrote on wider strategic and military matters showing 
their awareness of the contemporary issues.  These include Charles PasleyÕs 
Essay on Military Policy in Britain and the Empire32 and John BirchÕs Memoir on 
the National Defence,33 as mentioned above. 
 
                                            
similar subject.  ÔWellingtonÕs Logistical Arrangements : 1809-14Õ, unpub PhD Thesis, KingÕs 
College London, No Date. 
29
 C. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits, and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814 
(Cumberland, Rhode Island, 2004). 
30
 M. Romans, ÔProfessionalism and the Development of Military Intelligence in WellingtonÕs 
Army 1809-14Õ. Unpub PhD thesis, University of Southampton, 2005.  
31
 W. Porter,  History of the Royal Corps of Engineers (Woolwich, 1889) , volume 1. 
32
 C.W. Pasley, Essay on Military Policy in Britain and the Empire (London, 1810). 
33
 J.F. Birch, Memoir on the National Defence (London, 1808). 
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Secondly, there are general military histories.  Lieutenant-Colonel J.T. Jones 
R.E. published his two volume history of the Peninsular War in 1821,34 seven 
years before the first volume of NapierÕs classic work was published.35  Captain 
John Squire R.E. wrote a history of the Walcheren campaign, which included 
both topographical and operational commentaries.36 
 
Thirdly, there are technical works.  The most important of these is J.T. JonesÕ 
comprehensive work on the British sieges during the Peninsular War.37  Most 
writers on the subject of the sieges use this as the primary source.  There is 
also a similarly detailed French equivalent by Belmas, which also covers the 
British sieges.38  Pasley wrote many works for use as training material at the 
School of Military Engineering.39  
 
Fourthly, there is a wealth of primary material in the form of personal letters, 
diaries and correspondence some published and many not.  The most 
significant published work is WrottesleyÕs Life of Burgoyne,40 also useful are 
works by Rice Jones,41 George Landmann42 and Charles Boothby.43  John T. 
Jones privately published his diary for his immediate family only.44  Several 
officersÕ dairies or letters were also published in the Royal EngineersÕ in-house 
journal. 
 
                                            
34
 J.T. Jones, Account of the War in Spain and Portugal and the South of France From 1808 to 
1814 Inclusive  (2 vols, London, 1821). 
35
 W.F.P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula (6 vols, London, 1828-40). 
36
 J. Squire. A Short Narrative of the late campaign of the British Army under the orders of the 
Earl of Chatham (London, 1810). 
37
 J.T. Jones, Journal of the Sieges carried on by the army under the Duke of Wellington in 
Spain Between the Years 1811 to 1814; with Notes and Additions also Memoranda Relative to 
the Lines Thrown Up to Cover Lisbon in 1810.   3rd edition, (3 vols, London, 1846).  
38
 F. Belmas, Journaux des sieges faits ou soutenous par les francais dans la Peninsule, de 
1807 a 1814  (4 vols, Paris, 1836). 
39
 For example, C.W. Pasley. Course of instruction originally composed for the use of the Royal 
Engineer Department (3 Vols, Chatham, 1814-17.)  See bibliography for other works by Pasley. 
40
 G. Wrottesley, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshall Sir John Burgoyne (2 vols, London, 
1873). 
41
 H.V. Shore, ÔLetters from the Peninsula during 1812-14. Letters of Rice Jones R.EÕ,  Royal 
Engineer Journal, vol. 17, July 1912. 
42
 G. Landmann, Recollections of Military Life 1806-1808  (2 vols, London, 1854). 
43
 C. Boothby, A Prisoner of France, (London, 1898); Under EnglandÕs Flag from 1804-1809  
(London, 1900). 
44
 J.T. Jones, The Military Autobiography of Major-General John T. Jones. Twelve copies only, 
privately published for family use, (London, 1853). 
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The unpublished primary material is held in various archives including the Royal 
Engineers Museum, the British Library, the National Army Museum and the 
National Archives.  Much of this material has not been used before in 
publications.  This thesis will make significant use of this unpublished material. 
 
The involvement of the Royal Artillery in the sieges is covered in two main 
works: DuncanÕs History of the Corps45 and the Dickson Letters.46  Alexander 
DicksonÕs diaries contain large amounts of detail and complement J.T. JonesÕ 
book on the sieges, particularly as Dickson was heavily involved in most of the 
sieges.  Hughes also briefly discusses the Peninsular sieges in his book on 
artillery tactics.47 
 
In terms of general military histories, there has been no serious review of British 
sieges in the Peninsular War since the multi-volume histories of Oman48 and 
Fortescue49 appeared at the start of the 20th century.   There have been three 
single-volume works on the Peninsular War in the last twenty years, by Gates,50 
Esdaile,51 and more recently by Robertson.52  None had the space to go into 
military engineering events in significant detail, and generally they pass quickly 
over them following the lines taken by Oman or Fortescue.  Two compilation 
works on the Peninsular War, edited by Fletcher and Griffith have been 
published in the last ten years.53  Both contain articles on various topics by 
recognised experts and both have chapters on sieges.54  There are also works 
                                            
45
 R.A. Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery (2 vols, London, 1874) 
46
 ed. J.H. Leslie, The Dickson Manuscripts  (5 vols, Woolwich 1905-8). 
47
 B.P. Hughes, Open Fire : Artillery tactics from Marlborough to Wellington  (Chichester, 1983). 
48
 C.W.C. Oman, A History of the Peninsular War (7 vols, Oxford, 1902-1930). 
49
 J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army  (13 vols & 7 map vols, London, 1899-1930). 
50
 D. Gates, The Spanish Ulcer. A History of the Peninsular War (London, 1986) 
51
 C. Esdaile, The Peninsular War, (London, 2002). 
52
 I. Robertson, A Commanding Presence : Wellington in the Peninsula 1808-1814 : Logistics-
Strategy-Survival (Stroud, 2008). 
53
 Ed. I. Fletcher, The Peninsular War : Aspects of the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula 
(Staplehurst, 1998) and ed. P. Griffith, Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-
1814  (London, 1999). 
54
 In Fletcher, The Peninsular War, the article on sieges is by P. Haythornthwaite and in Griffith, 
Modern Studies, the article is by D. Chandler. 
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that cover the non-British Peninsular sieges, including those by Horward,55 
Lamare,56 and Rudorff.57 
 
There have been four recent works on specific elements of British Peninsular 
military engineering operations.  Myatt58 wrote on the British sieges, and worked 
mainly from well known published sources.  Grehan wrote about the Lines of 
Torres Vedras.59  The work focuses more on WellingtonÕs campaign prior to the 
retreat into the Lines and adds nothing new to what was already known.  
Fletcher has written twice on the third siege of Badajoz in 1812.60  Both works 
pull together, in a convenient format, the common information on the siege, but 
they do not add any new information. 
 
All of the above works contain factual errors, which would suggest that this 
subject area has been treated as an issue of secondary importance and 
consequently has not received the attention to detail that has been given to the 
primary thread of the publications.  Two examples are given below as an 
illustration, although other errors will be addressed at the appropriate place in 
this thesis. 
 
ChandlerÕs chapter on siege warfare refers to Õ36-pounder or larger pieces 
being the normÕ.61  Such a size was not used in any of the major sieges and the 
use of larger guns was very rare.  The ÔnormÕ was 18 or 24-pounder guns.  On 
the same page, Chandler writes about Ôcentury old Portuguese iron gunsÕ 
developing muzzle droop.  The old Portuguese guns were almost invariably 
brass, and it was these brass guns not iron guns that were prone to muzzle 
droop.  He then refers to rank and file from the Royal Military Artificers as 
belonging to the Royal Engineers. 
                                            
55
 D. Horward, Napoleon and Iberia, The Twin sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810 
(London, 1994). 
56
 J.B. Lamarre, Relation des Sieges et Defences DÕOlivenza, de Badajoz et de Campo Mayor 
en 1811 et 1812  (Paris, 1825).  Lamarre was the Chief engineer at the sieges of Badajoz. 
57
 R. Rudorff, War to the Death: The Sieges of Saragossa 1808-1809 (London, 1974). 
58
 F. Myatt, British Sieges of the Peninsular War . 
59
 J. Grehan, The Lines of Torres Vedras (Staplehurst, 2000). 
60
 I. Fletcher, In Hell before Daylight (Tunbridge Wells, 1984), and Badajoz, 1812 
(Wellingborough, 1999). 
61
 Fletcher, The Peninsular War, p. 58. 
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Oman states that men from the Royal Military Artificers were used to train 
soldiers from the Third and Seventh Divisions in sapping and mining before the 
second siege of Badajoz.  The engineers recorded that they had to train both 
the artificers and the soldiers, as neither had any prior knowledge.62 
 
There is much material that was not available one hundred years ago and it is 
time for a re-evaluation of military engineering in the Peninsular War.  Uffindel 
has contributed to this through his evaluation of primary material held in the 
National Army Museum.63  This thesis will review this new material and 
determine if it alters the common perceptions as documented in previous 
publications.  
 
Key officers mentioned in thesis. 
 
Below are the names of officers that will feature prominently in the thesis. 
 
The most frequently mentioned is Richard Fletcher who commanded the Royal 
Engineers from August 1808 until he was killed in August 1813 (apart from a 
three month period at the start of 1813).  He was replaced by Howard 
Elphinstone for the remainder of the war.  Elphinstone also commanded briefly 
at the start of the campaign, being wounded at the battle of Vimiero, although 
he was about to be superseded by Fletcher anyway.  The three other most 
common names from the Peninsula are John Thomas Jones, John Fox 
Burgoyne and John Squire, who were some of the most senior engineers below 
their commander.  Between them they had twelve years service in the 
Peninsula.  Burgoyne was there for the whole of the war, Squire until he died in 
May 1812 and Jones until he was wounded at the siege of Burgos in October 
1812.  Stephen Chapman is also mentioned before he returned to England at 
the end of 1811.  He was a friend of Henry Torrens and was liked by 
Wellington.  Charles William Pasley only served briefly in the Peninsula in 1808, 
                                            
62
 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, p. 420. 
63
 A. Uffindel, The National Army Museum book of WellingtonÕs Armies.  BritainÕs Campaigns in 
the Peninsula and at Waterloo 1808-1815 (London, 2003). 
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but is mentioned regularly throughout the period due to his correspondence with 
the officers in the Peninsula and his work at home to improve the training of the 
engineers and artificers. 
 
Apart from these seven officers, there are only fleeting mentions of other 
officers, usually specifically related to some specific event or activity.  The final 
name that will be mentioned frequently is Alexander Dickson, who commanded 
the artillery at many of the sieges and went on to command the artillery in the 
Peninsula from mid 1813. Appendix I gives further details on the key officers 
who are mentioned. 
 
1.4. Structure of Thesis 
One of the major challenges in undertaking this thesis has been the lack of 
published material on the Royal Engineers themselves.  Due to their role being 
primarily supportive and often away from the major centres of activity, they are 
often only mentioned in passing, or not at all.  To enable a comprehensive 
analysis of their organisation and operations a great deal of archival work has 
been required to access the necessary information and this has prompted the 
creation of important resources. The first is a comprehensive electronic 
database of all the officers who served during the Napoleonic Wars.  It contains 
information on their background, family history, ranks, the locations they served 
in and the activities they carried out.  This information has not been compiled 
before and will be a valuable new source available for future researchers. The 
second item is the analysis and cataloguing of many of the unpublished letters 
of these engineer officers covering specific engineering related material but also 
wider comments on the strategy, operations and battles during the war. The 
collection includes several thousand digital images of the original primary 
documents. 
 
Section two of the thesis will describe the political and military background in 
the long 18th century and comment on the relationship between the 
government, the army and the Board of Ordnance.  The Royal Engineers were 
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not part of the army at that time and were not directly responsible to the 
Commander-in-Chief. These relationships are still not well understood and 
confusion is evident even in the latest works.  For example, the diagram in 
Stephen WardÕs book64 is misleading and ChilcottÕs description of the structure 
of the Board of Ordnance is incorrect.65 
 
Section three will describe the introduction of education, undertake an analysis 
of the military engineering resources and the effectiveness of the education of 
the engineers.  It will also carry out an analysis of the officers who made up the 
Corps and finish with a detailed investigation of command and seniority in the 
Corps. 
 
Section four will undertake a wide ranging investigation of the roles and 
activities carried out by the Royal Engineers during the Peninsular War and will 
conclude with an assessment of their performance. 
 
Section five will briefly describe the progress of military education and military 
engineering after the Peninsular War through to the start of the Crimean War. 
 
Section six will provide a summary of the research and outline the findings. 
 
                                            
64
 S.G.P. Ward, WellingtonÕs Headquarters (Oxford, 1957), p. 7. 
65
 Chilcott, ÔMaintaining the British ArmyÕ, Introduction. 
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SECTION 2. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT. 
2.1. Britain in the Long 18
th
 Century 
 
The 17th and 18th centuries had seen a change in the importance of nation 
states in Europe.  There had been a growth in the status and power of England 
from insignificant player to a world power. EnglandÕs rise in importance was 
partially due to the growth in world trade on the back of the many territorial 
acquisitions.  Over the same period there was a decline in the status of Spain 
and a rise in the power of France.  
 
Through the long 18th century BritainÕs population grew significantly driving the 
growth in national wealth.  The population growth and the increasing 
international trade led to increasing military demands both to keep public order 
at home and to protect the trade routes and colonies.  The growth in wealth 
allowed the necessary increase in the size of the army and the navy.  The army 
was partly funded by keeping a significant number of troops in Ireland.   
 
Following the Glorious Revolution in 1688 the power base in England moved 
from the monarchy to Parliament.  The stability that ensued and the growth in 
trade provided the environment that allowed the development of the strongest 
Fiscal-Military state in Europe and allowed Britain to fund the war against 
Napoleon.  The end of the 18th century and start of the 19th century was a 
period of tremendous change in Europe.  Throughout Europe, revolutionary 
ideas were being voiced and traditional values being challenged.  The French 
Revolution had frightened the monarchs across the continent into realising that 
their power was not absolute.  Britain found herself at odds, first with France, 
and then, as Napoleon swept across Europe, with more and more counties as 
they fell into step with his demands. The war with France and the Continental 
blockade were intended to destroy England as a world power. 
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The British military successes of the 18th century had been achieved by small 
ÔprofessionalÕ armies supplemented by mercenaries from her larger European 
Allies.  Britain found herself involved in a struggle where armies were measured 
in tens, if not hundreds of thousands of men and she could not compete with 
these vast sizes.  At the start of the Napoleonic Wars in 1793, the effective 
strength of the regular army amounted to no more than 40,000 troops.   By 
1808, this had risen to around 200,000.1  This total had to police Britain, defend 
the many colonies across the world, and control the continually difficult situation 
in Ireland before any thought could be given to offensive operations.  Britain 
could pay for war across Europe, but had limited ability to fight it.   
 
Even Napoleon recognised the power of the Royal Navy to dominate the 
waves, but a ship of the line exerted limited power away from the coast, and 
that was where Napoleon operated.  The Royal Navy could strangle trade and 
movement but could not take or hold land, and land was the commodity that 
was being fought over.  The Royal Navy also had problems of itÕs own as the 
continental blockade and the growth in overseas colonies increased demands 
on resources, and this was made worse when the argument with America 
turned to war in 1812. 
 
Britain approached the Napoleonic wars as the wealthiest country in Europe, 
with the biggest navy in the world, a standing army much smaller than the other 
major European states and a political stability that allowed the highest taxation 
in Europe.  Britain also approached the Peninsular War with an unimpressive 
recent military history that included the Low Countries in 1793 and 1799, Egypt 
in 1800, Copenhagen and South America in 1807.  The professionalism of the 
British army was on trial. 
 
                                            
1
 R Glover, Peninsular Preparation (Cambridge 1963), p. 7.  Originally, taken from J.W. 
FortescueÕs History of the British Army (13 volumes, London, 1899-1930), vol. 4, part 2, p. 940.  
The number of British troops remained quite static from 1808 to 1815 only rising from 189,000 
to 207,000; Foreign troops in British service rising over the same period from 37,000 to 54,000.  
These figures are taken from : J.W. Fortescue, County Lieutenancies and the Army 1804-1814 
(London, 1909) pp. 291-294. 
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In Britain the organisation of the military was spread across a number of 
different groups.  The King, Parliament, the Cabinet, the Commander in Chief 
and the Master-General of the Ordnance all held part of the power and 
responsibility.  This mix of responsibility and decision making had a major effect 
on the operations and the effectiveness of the military.  To understand the 
operation of the British army through the Napoleonic Wars requires an 
understanding of these various roles and relationships.  The following section 
will outline how the various components fitted together and how well they 
worked together. 
 
2.2. The British Government during the 
Napoleonic Wars 
Whilst Napoleon fought across the plains of Europe, another battle was under 
way on the banks of the Thames.  A whole generation of orators and politicians 
lived and died, fighting for control of Britain, where Whigs, Tories and the 
Monarch manoeuvred in the corridors of Westminster.  At stake was control of 
probably the richest country in the world, a country that was fighting for its 
independence, if not survival.  Had Napoleon taken Britain, he could not leave 
such a powerful enemy intact. 
 
Even in Britain, the power of the people was growing to the detriment of the 
King.  It was a period of increasing infirmity of the monarch coupled with an 
ineffectual heir to the throne.  It was also a period of great instability for the 
British government.  The political scene was a mixture of strong individuals 
fighting for power and weak individuals who were unable to hold a government 
together.  The names of the politicians who battled in the Houses of Parliament 
reads like the whoÕs who of British History including Pitt, Fox, Grey, Liverpool, 
Castlereagh and Canning. 
 
Between 1783 when Pitt formed his first Government, and 1815, there were 
seven separate Governments in Britain.  There were six different Prime 
Ministers with Pitt serving two terms.  The longest serving government was 
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PittÕs first from 1783 to 1801 the shortest being the Ministry of the Talents, for a 
period of only 13 months from February 1806 to March 1807.  There were six 
different Governments between 1801 and 1815, which averages slightly over 
two years each.  Some measure of stability did commence as the Peninsular 
War started with only two Governments covering the period from 1809 to 1815, 
but the previous years of turmoil took some time to settle.  Throughout this 
period, forming an efficient government was extremely difficult due to the many 
rivalries that existed between the key players.  The King disliked Fox; Canning 
and Castlereagh would not serve together (after the duel); Sidmouth would not 
serve with Canning and Mulgrave would not work with Chatham.2 
THE CABINET IN 1808. 
In 1808, the Government was led by the Duke of Portland.  The Cabinet was 
made up of the following ministers :  
 
− Prime Minister 
− Chancellor of the Exchequer 
− Lord Privy Seal 
− Lord President of the Council 
− Lord Chancellor 
− Foreign Secretary 
− Home Secretary 
− Secretary of State for War and the Colonies 
− First Lord of the Admiralty 
− Master-General of the Ordnance 
− President of the Board of Trade 
 
Two further cabinet members were added, the Secretary at War (June 1809) 
and the President of the Board of Control (July 1809).  The Secretary at War 
was not normally of cabinet rank, and did not appear in subsequent cabinets 
when Portland resigned in October 1809. 
                                            
2
 These points extracted from C.D. Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War 1803-15 
(Manchester, 1992), pp. 52-70. 
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Several of these cabinet ministers had responsibilities for different components 
of the military machine at that time.  This division of responsibility seems 
illogical today, but had its origins in the countryÕs desire never to let the army 
gain sufficient power to threaten the legitimate government of the country.  The 
legislation of the country laid responsibility for internal management of the army 
with the Commander-in-Chief; financial control rested with the Treasury and the 
Mutiny Act ensured that Parliament always had overall control.  Overlaid over 
this understandable control, was an evolutionary division of responsibilities, 
which were never considered at the operational level.  This led to a situation 
where most senior members of the cabinet had a partial role in the funding, 
movement or supply of the army, both at home and abroad.  Once power had 
been given, no department would willingly give it up to another department for 
the sake of efficiency, so these inefficiencies were never properly addressed 
until after the Crimean War. 
 
The importance of the military to the government at this time, can be 
understood by looking at total government spending.  Military expenditure in 
1804 was around £30m, rising to £42m in 1808 and £71m in 1813.  In the same 
periods, total government expenditure was £40m, £66m and £77m.3  As a 
percentage in these three years military spending accounted for 75%, 65% and 
92% of the total expenditure.  Government borrowing also increased 
significantly over this period, both to run the country and to provide financial 
support for BritainÕs Allies.  Looking at these figures it is clear that the war 
against France WAS the primary business of the British government through 
the period.  
 
Clode confusingly described the responsibilities of departments like this :  
 
The Treasury continued to be primarily responsible (1) for all estimates 
submitted to the Crown, and, (2) for all monies voted [by Parliament] to 
the Crown; but in framing the one, and in disbursing the other, the 
Ministers in charge of the Ordnance and the War Office [Secretary at 
                                            
3
 Hall, British Strategy, pp. 15-16.  Hall is quoting from works by Siberling and Mitchell & Deane. 
Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
 22 
War], each in degree, were responsible to Parliament for these financial 
services.4 
 
This structure still confuses historians today, but can be explained as follows.  
Ultimate control for all military expenditure rested with the Treasury.  Day-to-day 
responsibility for the financial management of the army was under the Secretary 
at War; the Ordnance Department was under the Master-General and the Navy 
was under the First Lord of the Admiralty.  All had direct Parliamentary 
responsibility for their roles but ultimately could not undertake any new activity 
which increased their budget without the approval of the Treasury.  The above 
control also encompassed the Commander-in-Chief, who had no financial 
authority in his own right and had to submit all finance requests through the 
Secretary at War.  
 
The major military responsibilities of the various cabinet ministers will be 
outlined below and in the following section the roles of other senior, non-cabinet  
officers will be described. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Ð The Treasury 
Whist command of the army rested with the Commander-in-Chief, the true 
power was held by Parliament who tightly controlled both the purse strings and 
the movement of troops.  Wars were hugely expensive undertakings and this in 
part explains the desire to reduce the size of the army as quickly as possible 
following any conflict.  Within the Treasury, the most important functions, from a 
military perspective were  : 
Paymaster General 
The Paymaster-General was responsible for payment of the troops.  This was, 
until 1783, probably the most profitable of all the sinecures available in Britain.  
Up to that point the Paymaster-General withdrew the sums approved by 
Parliament to pay the army and held these huge sums in separate accounts 
where he obtained the benefit.  As part of BurkeÕs reforms, this practice was 
                                            
4
 C.M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (2 vols, London, 1869), vol. 2, p. 187. 
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stopped and the Paymaster-General could only withdraw sums from the Bank 
of England against warrants for specific payments.   
 
The Paymaster-General worked through each regimental agent who 
communicated directly with the regimental paymasters.  The regimental 
paymaster was appointed by the regimental colonel up to 1797 and again 
gained much income through his management of the money.  From 1797, the 
situation became more complex with the Regimental Paymaster having joint 
and conflicting responsibilities; military responsibility to his colonel, and civil 
responsibility to the Secretary at War. 
Commissary General  
The Commissary-General was responsible for the transport and supply for the 
army whilst on campaign and for the issue of government funds abroad.  These 
were civilian employees of the Treasury who handled all business abroad under 
instructions from the Treasury5 and were fully independent of military control.  
The commissaries had the unenviable task of standing between the demands of 
the army who wanted the materials to wage a war and the demands of the 
Treasury who wanted both thrift and full records of every transaction. 
 
Even when they were following the regulations, they attracted the anger of 
military officers and certainly in the early campaigns in the Peninsula there were 
several who did not know their job and attracted complaints from Wellington.  
Christopher Hall quotes Wellington complaining that Ôthe men in the 
commissariat were incapable of managing a counting houseÕ.6  Wellington wrote 
home many times on matters concerning the commissariat including reporting 
one individual who had previously being dismissed the service for theft,7 and on 
another occasion asking for an individual to be removed.8  Wellington was not 
always negative.  On a further occasion, Wellington wrote to the Commissary-
General recommending a Mr Ogilvie for promotion because of his Ôabilities and 
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servicesÕ.9  The commissariat were in a very difficult position.  Because 
Wellington was campaigning on ÔfriendlyÕ territory he had to abide by the rules in 
terms of paying for his supplies.  This meant that Wellington could only move 
when he had sufficient supplies for his army or money to pay for them.  When 
supplies failed, such as during the Talavera and Vitoria campaigns, then his 
whole strategy was thrown into chaos. 
 
The scale of the work of the commissariat should not be underestimated.  The 
average daily consumption in WellingtonÕs army in 1813 was 100,000 lb of 
biscuit; 200,000 lb of forage corn and 300 cattle.10  Obviously the cattle could 
move themselves but this set the pace of the army.  If you pushed the animals 
too hard, they had insufficient time to feed and consequently they lost weight.  
This then led to needing more animals to feed the army.  The typical capacity of 
a peninsular cart was 500 pounds, which meant that six hundred carts were 
needed to carry the one hundred and thirty tons, which made up one days 
supply.  Much of the actual delivery was by mule and the numbers present with 
the army ran to several thousand.  Whilst the inland waterways could be used 
to move supplies in bulk, eventually they had to be loaded on carts and mules 
for final delivery.  The commissariat was responsible for all this as well as 
making sure stores were in the right places and in the right quantities. 
Storekeeper-General.  
This position was established in 1807 to bring under government control, a 
private enterprise which was managing storage depots on behalf of the army.  
This had been run (quite successfully according to Forbes, but not everyone 
agreed) since 1794 by Messrs Trotter & Co. and peaked at one hundred and 
nine stores around the world.11  Its purpose was to Ôbe Storekeeper of all 
military stores in the departments of the Quartermaster-General, the 
Commissary-General  É and of all such stores as had been theretofore 
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provided under the direction of the Secretary at WarÕ.12  The Storekeeper-
GeneralÕs responsibilities were restricted to services in Britain.  Abroad, the 
Commissary-General was responsible for distribution of stores and money, 
although from 1812 staff from the Storekeeper-GeneralÕs department were sent 
abroad to operate the stores on campaign.  These stores were in addition to 
those managed by the Ordnance department which held and dispensed warlike 
materials (guns and ammunition) to the army and navy. 
Comptrollers of Army Accounts. 
These were employed by the Treasury to audit army expenditure through the 
Paymaster-General and Commissary-Generals offices.  All extraordinary 
expenditure (sums not approved by Parliament) had to be reviewed by the 
Comptrollers.  A special Auditor-General was appointed for the first time during 
the Peninsular War to go out to the Peninsula and undertake local audits on 
behalf of the Treasury. 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. 
Clode described three key components of the responsibilities of the Secretary 
of State for War and the Colonies : 
− the number of the military forces to be maintained; 
− the appointment of officers duly qualified; 
− the employment of the army.13 
 
It was the Secretary of State for War who gave orders to generals on campaign 
and corresponded with them.  He was responsible for proposing the size of 
standing army and the movement of troops abroad.  The Secretary of State for 
War was also responsible for all the British colonies.   
Foreign Secretary 
Whilst the Foreign Secretary had no specific responsibilities within the military, 
he had a great interest in when and where armies were employed. The 
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employment of armed forces abroad should have always been for some 
strategic purpose and it was the Foreign Secretary through his ambassadors 
who collected information on the intentions of the other European powers.  With 
this information he could suggest where BritainÕs military forces should be used 
and consider how this could be co-ordinated with its Allies. 
Home Secretary 
The Home Secretary was responsible for the defence of the United Kingdom 
and all military personnel present in the country.  This included approving all 
movement of troops on British soil.  Requests for troop movements in the 
United Kingdom were made by the Home Secretary to the Secretary at War 
who issued the appropriate ÔrouteÕ.  Without this route, troops were forbidden to 
move. 
 
Apart from the regular forces he was also responsible for raising and control of 
the extensive militia and volunteer forces.  During the height of the invasion 
scare in 1804-1805, the Home Secretary presided over the raising of a huge 
volunteer force which peaked at 360,000 in 1803-4 but as the invasion threat 
receded, it dropped substantially, to less than 70,000 by 1812.  Over the same 
period, the militia forces which had peaked at 85,000, dropped to 71,000.14  At 
times during the Napoleonic Wars, the Home Secretary commanded a paper 
force larger than the army and navy combined. 
 
The other major impact that the Home Secretary had on military strategy was 
his concern for internal order in the country.  This was maintained by having 
small bodies of troops dispersed at all centres of population.   Concentration of 
these troops for military purposes (for example, training), or for use abroad was 
never to the satisfaction of the Home Secretary who had to deal with the 
incoming complaints of disorder from local authorities. 
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Master-General of the Ordnance 
Theoretically, the Master-General was the military advisor to the cabinet.  The 
constitutional safeguards that excluded the Commander-in-Chief from the 
government left the cabinet bereft of professional military advice from within 
their numbers.  The different governments through the period rarely asked for 
military advice from the Commander-in-Chief, the Master-General or the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, often presenting their decisions as a Ôfait accompliÕ.  This 
situation changed as the Napoleonic Wars continued, with particularly Canning 
and Liverpool showing greater willingness to consult and seek advice. 
 
The Master-General was responsible for the supply and issue of all arms and 
ammunition on both land and sea.  This included small arms, artillery and 
gunpowder.   He was also responsible for construction, maintenance and 
supplies in fortifications both at home and abroad.  He commanded both the 
Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers which were not part of the army and 
therefore not under the control of the Commander in Chief.  Further details of 
the role and responsibilities of the Master-General will follow below. 
First Lord of the Admiralty 
Whilst the army was viewed with suspicion by the government, the navy was 
seen as the right and proper tool to project British power abroad.  However, the 
Royal Navy did not win wars, no more than air superiority can today.  There is 
no doubt that Wellington succeeded in the Peninsula partly through the British 
naval superiority which kept French forces restricted to the land and through the 
effective supply of material to his army. 
 
Apart from the well understood responsibilities for building, and operating the 
ships and men of the Royal Navy, the Admiralty had other responsibilities.  The 
movement of troops and materials involved the Royal Navy in two separate 
activities; the arrangement of naval protection for convoys and the hiring and 
equipping of civilian ships to transport troops.  The Admiralty was also 
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responsible for the movement and the care of all Prisoners of War, and the care 
of sick and wounded seamen.15  
 
Like the Commissariat, the scale of these duties should not be underestimated.  
Often with little warning, they were required to gather a large number of 
privately owned vessels to meet the demands of the government.  These 
vessels were generally quite small and consequently large numbers were 
required.  For example, the 1807 expedition against the Danish fleet required 
three hundred and seventy-seven transports, and the Walcheren campaign 
needed about five hundred.  Trials were made using the larger ships of the line 
to move troops, but the navy simply did not have such vessels to spare. 
2.3. Military responsibilities outside of the Cabinet 
Secretary at War.   
Kenneth BourneÕs recent work on Palmerston includes the following description 
of the role of Secretary at War : 
 
The office of Secretary at War is not merely difficult, it is almost 
impossible to describe.  It was not responsible for military policy; that 
was the business of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.  It 
was not in charge of personnel and discipline; they were the sphere of 
the Commander in Chief.  It did not control the supply of arms and 
equipment; these were the functions of the Ordnance and the 
Commissary-General.  It did not even pay the army; that was the job of 
the Paymaster-General.  But it was concerned primarily with finance and  
with acting as a sort of constitutional buffer between the army and the 
public, and the complex nature of these responsibilities, together with the 
curiously complicated structure of Army organisation, deeply involved the 
War Office one way or another in virtually all aspects of military policy 
and administration, and its interference and authority therefore 
overlapped in widely varying degrees with responsibilities that 
supposedly were centred elsewhere.16 
 
The Secretary at War was responsible for obtaining Parliamentary approval for 
the funding for army; for day-to-day management of military expenditure and for 
the setting of pay scales.  He, and not the Commander-in-Chief authorised 
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troop movements at home, ostensibly as part of the controls on the army.17  The 
request for the movements originated from the Home Secretary to whom the 
Commander-in-Chief had to make his request. 
 
The role of the Secretary at War was much more than a keeper of the purse 
strings.  In 1809 there started a protracted dispute between Sir David Dundas, 
the Commander-in-Chief and Palmerston, the Secretary at War.  The issue was 
whether the Secretary at War was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief.   
The output of this debate is covered at length in Clode.18  There are different 
views today on the importance of this debate, particularly as it happened at the 
height of the Napoleonic wars when the senior officers of the government 
should have been concentrating on more important issues.  But, there was an 
important constitutional question being considered.  This question revolved 
around who controlled the army.  The Secretary at War was directly responsible 
to Parliament and controlled the finances of the army.  If this position was 
subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, then the army would gain some control 
over its spending.  This was the big constitutional question of whether 
Parliament controlled the army or vice-versa.  On a number of occasions during 
the 18th century there had been no Commander-in-Chief, and on these 
occasions the Secretary at War took full control of both civil and military 
decision making.  The outcome of the debate was sensibly to conclude that the 
Secretary at War was independent of the Commander-in-Chief and owed his 
allegiance to Parliament.  It also agreed that the Secretary at War should 
consult with the Commander-in-Chief on planned changes which would have an 
effect on the army, and where there was disagreement these would be brought 
to the cabinet for their consideration.  Clode described the reality of the situation 
which existed between the Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief when 
he wrote Ôno minister doing his duty faithfully to the civil community, was so 
certain to be unpopular with the army as the Secretary at War.  How could it be 
otherwise?Õ19 
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The Secretary at War ran the War Office which was one of the largest 
government departments at that time.  The War office was perceived to be very 
inefficient with several well known people, including Lord Liverpool, Colonel 
Gordon (Military Secretary to the Duke of York) and Wellington criticising its 
efficiency.20  One has to question the efficiency of a department, which worked 
a five hour day at the start of the 19th century!   
Commander in Chief of the Army. 
The Commander-in-Chief reported directly to the King and was responsible for 
the internal discipline and training of the army.  This was managed through the 
Horse Guards who supported the Commander-in-Chief in the execution of his 
duties.  The Commander-in-Chief had no involvement in military strategy or the 
setting of objectives, his role was purely administrative.  His only influence 
came from his control of the armed forces and his ability to say what troops 
were, or were not available for any particular service.  However, some ministers  
during the period, Pitt particularly, wanted to get involved in the detail and 
micromanage all aspects of the military.  In PittÕs defence, during the period of 
the invasion scare, the defence of Britain was the most important item on his 
agenda.  
 
Under the Commander-in-Chief was the Board of General Officers. This group 
was formed by Royal Warrant in 1707 to provide some sort of independent 
control on the actions of regimental colonels when clothing and equipping their 
regiments.21  Any profit made from the difference between the actual cost and 
the funds provided by the government went to the Colonel and there had been 
a number of instances of the troops suffering for the financial gain of their 
colonel. 
 
The Commander-in Chief was assisted by three senior officers : 
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− Adjutant-General who was responsible for discipline, leave, dress and 
recruitment; 
− Quarter-Master-General who was responsible for planning 
accommodation, routes and orders of march (which had to be ordered by 
the Secretary at War); 
− Military Secretary who was responsible for general correspondence with 
the Government, appointments and promotions.22 
2.4. The Board of Ordnance  
The Ordnance Department was originally established in 1597, under its first 
Master-General, Robert, Second Earl of Essex.23  Its responsibility covered the 
provision of armament for both army and navy and also the construction, 
maintenance and operation of the countryÕs defensive works.  In 1683, the 
Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers were formed in the military branch of 
the Board of Ordnance.  The importance of the Board of Ordnance is seen in 
the fact that, until 1828, the Master-General of the Ordnance had a seat on the 
Cabinet.24 
 
The Board of Ordnance was made up of two distinct branches, Military and 
Civil.   The structure of the Board in 1784 was five principal officers under the 
Master-General, three of whom needed to be present for the Board to sit : 
− Lieutenant-General who was responsible for the military branch including 
the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers; 
− Surveyor-General who was responsible for the Civil functions, and was 
responsible for checking the quality and quantity of all stores received; 
− Clerk of the Ordnance who was effectively the Accountant of the 
Ordnance, responsible for drawing up the annual estimate for Parliament 
and the monthly returns to the treasury; 
− Principal Storekeeper who was responsible for the articles received into 
and issued from the stores.  The stores at outposts and garrisons were 
his responsible through local Storekeepers.  
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− Clerk of the Deliveries who managed the actual issue of stores providing 
warrants to the Storekeepers and arranging delivery of the items.25  
 
The responsibilities of the Military Branch included : 
− The issue of all arms and ammunition (land and sea); 
− Permanent stores at home and in the colonies; 
− Construction and maintenance of fortifications at home and abroad; 
− Royal Artillery under the Deputy Adjutant General of the Artillery; 
− Royal Engineers under the Inspector General of Fortifications; 
− Royal Military Artificers (Royal Sappers and Miners from 1812); 
− Royal Corps of Artillery Drivers; 
− Royal Military Academy. 
 
In the opening sentence of Richard GloverÕs book,26 he criticises Oman for 
being Òbetrayed into historical misjudgementÓ over a reference which suggests 
that Oman was unaware the Royal Engineers were part of the Board of 
Ordnance rather than the army.  Based on this perceived error, Glover then 
seems to dismiss OmanÕs work whilst praising the great value of Sir John 
FortescueÕs.27  However, it does illustrate the point that even at the highest 
levels historians still find the structure of the British military machine difficult to 
understand and communicate to the reader.  This is probably most true when 
discussing the responsibilities and operations of the Board of Ordnance, which 
in many books is simply ignored and combined with the roles and 
responsibilities of the Army. 
 
The Civil branch was managed by the Surveyor-General.  Its responsibilities 
included Ô(1) custodians of public treasure in land, buildings and stores (2) 
supply the army and navy with warlike munitions and equipmentÕ. 28  The Civil 
Branch was made up of six departments : 
− Stores 
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− Land 
− Survey 
− Defensive Works 
− Contracts 
− Manufacture (Factories including gunpowder) 
 
The Board of OrdnanceÕs role and contribution to the war effort should not be 
underestimated.  Through the period they supplied all the weapons to both the 
army and navy in a period of huge growth in demand.  Not only did the armyÕs 
size increase five fold, but the Militia and Volunteers forces made even greater 
demands for weapons.  In addition the Board of Ordnance was responsible for 
the maintenance and provision of all permanent fortresses both at home and 
abroad.   There were other conflicting demands, such as the East India 
Company who competed for the limited resources of the gun makers, thereby 
driving up prices, or through surpluses like the inferior East-India pattern 
musket that was handed out the British troops in Europe when it was not 
possible to obtain supplies of the preferred weapon.  Through the Napoleonic 
wars the Ordnance was called upon to supply weapons not only to the Spanish 
and Portuguese but also to other European Allies.  
 
The Board of Ordnance also proved itself to be many years ahead of the army 
in recognising the need to have trained officers.  All artillery and engineer 
officers were not commissioned until they had proved their knowledge through 
examination.  The Royal Military Academy was set up in 1741 for this purpose.  
In comparison, at this time an infantry officer was appointed without any training 
and was expected to learn his skills on the job.  Whether he actually learnt 
anything was left up to the diligence or otherwise of his regimental commander. 
 
Throughout the war, the officers employed at the Board of Ordnance worked to 
improve the quality of the tools which the armed forces had to use.  Often 
quoted are inventions such as Shrapnel shells or Congreve rockets, although 
one more important, but less well known improvement, was in the quality and 
consistency of gunpowder.  It would be wrong to suggest that everything at the 
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Board of Ordnance was good.  If fact, there are numerous complaints from 
many sources throughout the war about inefficiencies in the department.   
 
This is some part was probably due to the unusual role and responsibility of the 
Master-General of the Ordnance. The Master-General of the Ordnance was one 
of the great offices of state in the early 19th century.  He controlled an enormous 
budget, and until BurkeÕs Reform Act in 1780 had complete authority over how 
the sum was spent.  As mentioned above, the Master-General was a member 
of the government with a permanent seat on the cabinet.  The role entailed both 
civil and military responsibilities, and in a number of cases was also held with 
other responsibilities.  For example, Chatham was Master-General when he 
commanded the army at Walcheren and Lord Cornwallis was both Master-
General and Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.  As a member of the government, the 
Master-General was a political appointment.  This meant appointments were 
not always based on suitability for the job and the Ordnance departments 
efficiency was dependent upon the individual who held the position. Some 
Master-Generals such as Richmond were very effective and their leadership led 
to improvements but others, particularly Chatham, were seen as lazy and 
incompetent and left the organisation to fend for itself.  Unfortunately, Chatham 
was in control for most of the period from 1801 to 1810 and his contribution was 
not impressive.  As a serving senior officer in the army, Chatham still wanted to 
command in the field, and this ultimately led to his resignation after the 
disastrous Walcheren campaign.  His replacement, Mulgrave, was more 
effective and approved the major organisational changes that occurred in the 
Ordnance in the latter part of the Peninsular War.  These will be discussed in 
detail below. 
2.5.  SUMMARY. 
BritainÕs growth as a commercial and martial nation had occurred in a relatively 
short space of time.  The organisational structure of monarchy, government and 
the military was confused and responsibilities were often unclear or overlapped.  
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The British military had grown into a small professional army that hired in 
expertise as and when required.  Funding of the military was always an issue in 
peacetime and this made it difficult to retain experience and competence in 
readiness for the next war.  Much of its activity through the 18th century was in 
non-European campaigns and the army and the ordnance reflected this in their 
structures and thinking. 
 
The early campaigns of the Napoleonic wars had not been successful for the 
British army and, by 1807, almost every other country in Europe had been 
defeated or threatened into submission by Napoleon.  Britain was faced with a 
situation where they could not pay for someone else to fight the French and 
needed to find opportunities where they could make direct military incursions.  
Britain was incapable of fielding an army that was large enough to face the 
French.  The chaotic structure of the military organisation faced new challenges 
in funding and supplying the resources for a first European campaign on a scale 
never faced before by Britain. 
 
Recent thinking has recognised that understanding the problems faced by 
Wellington in the Peninsula need to look much deeper than the purely martial 
aspects.  Winning a battle was about getting the right number of troops, 
properly fed and equipped to a battlefield.  The key components of this 
statement were delivery, fed and equipped, not fighting.  Most of these 
components were out of the direct control of Wellington, relying on civilian and 
military staff from the Treasury, Royal Navy and Ordnance.  The success of 
Wellington was dependent on the education, training and competence of these 
people.   The role of the Ordnance department is not well understood and has 
faced much criticism.   The most visible sign was the weapons used by soldier, 
ship and fortress.  Operating with the army were the key specialist troops, the 
artillery and engineers.  The role of the Royal Artillery tends to be included in 
the descriptions of campaigns and battles due to the importance that artillery 
now had on the outcomes.  Less well understood is the role of the Royal 
Engineers.  This thesis will investigate their activities and evaluate their 
performance and contribution to the war effort. 
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SECTION 3. THE RISE OF THE SCIENTIFIC SOLDIER 
3.1 Overview. 
The need for trained specialists had been recognised in the English army since 
the invention of gunpowder.  Artillery specialists had always been present in 
very small numbers, but there was no recognition that training was required for 
army officers prior to them receiving their first commissions.  The chapter on 
tactics in the first monthly part of the Royal Military Chronicle began with : ÔIt is 
often mentioned É of foreigners who have travelled in England, as a subject of 
reasonable astonishment, that we are totally without any general school for 
military instructionÕ.1  In contradiction to many of the most senior officers of the 
day the article goes on to argue against the Ôvery shallowÕ objections to the 
study of military science to allow an infantry officer to perform his role 
effectively.   
 
The 18th century saw the formation of the first military school in England to 
specifically address military education.  The opening of the Royal Military 
Academy by the Board of Ordnance in 1741 recognised the need for consistent 
training for artillery and engineer specialists to meet the growing demand for 
officers.  This section will review the formation of the school and the progress in 
providing relevant training to Ordnance officers.  The primary focus will be on 
the Royal Engineers but it will also look at the development of the Royal Military 
Artificers, who were the rank and file dedicated to providing support to the 
engineer officers.  The need for scientific soldiers was also recognised in the 
army but not for another fifty years.  The introduction of trained military 
specialists in the army will also be touched on, as the performance of both is 
reviewed. 
 
Because the number of Royal Engineer officers was relatively small, it is 
possible to take a detailed look at them as individuals and build a picture of the 
type of person who joined, their background and their views on what was 
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happening around them.  Due to the education and training which emphasised 
accurate recording of information, their diaries and letters contain much unused 
material relevant to the wider conflict in the Peninsula.   
 
The question of effective provision of training and resources to the Royal 
Engineers is an important one.  Their activities during the Peninsular War have 
been heavily criticised by many authors and it is time for a re-evaluation of their 
performance based on the availability of new primary material and a greater 
understanding of the logistical and political challenges which they faced.  The 
focus of this section will be on the education and professionalism of the military 
engineering service and will address the question of whether the education they 
received was appropriate for the demands.  Understanding of these areas is 
necessary to allow a full review of the operational performance which will be 
undertaken later. 
3.2. Education, Training and the rise of the 
Scientific Soldier. 
This section will review the education and training of Ordnance officers and 
compare it with what was undertaken in the army. It will then look at the 
development of engineering artificers to support the officers and finish with a 
review of the engineer officers view of their training and leadership prior to the 
Peninsular War.  The questions to be addressed in the section are : 
− Was the training the Royal Engineer officers received appropriate for 
their needs? 
− Was the engineering support they received adequate? 
3.2.1. THE ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY AND ITS ROLE IN 
THE TRAINING OF OFFICERS 
The early years of the Royal Military Academy 
The Royal Military Academy was created in 1741 to satisfy the need for better 
trained officers for the Ordnance Department. This was primarily to furnish 
officers for the Royal Artillery.  At this time the Royal Engineers did not exist as 
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a distinct corps although the Ordnance Department retained some officers 
trained as engineers.  Ordnance cadets had been in existence prior to 1741 and 
had been attached directly to the seven artillery companies.  Their military 
education was dependent upon the skills, interest and presence of the officers 
in each company, as was the case in the army until well into the 19th century.  
 
The Royal Warrant of 30 April 1741, stated Ôthat it would conduce to the good of 
our service if an Academy É was instituted É for instructing the É people 
belonging to the Military branch of this office, Éto qualify them for the service of 
the artillery, and the business of engineersÕ.2  The rules and procedures which 
were drafted made it clear that the original intention was wider than the training 
of new cadets. The ÔRules and OrdersÕ, with the associated ÔDirections for the 
Teaching of Theory and PracticeÕ, made it clear that the lectures should be 
attended by ÔEngineers, Officers, Sergeants, Corporals and CadetsÕ of the 
Royal Artillery, and also all such É as have a capacity and inclinationÕ. 3  The 
word ÔinclinationÕ suggests that the various officers and soldiers mentioned had 
some choice in their attendance, and it should be noted that there was no 
greater onus on the cadets attendance, than there was on the others. The Chief 
Master did, however, provide monthly lists of attendees and their performance 
to the Master-General.  According to Duncan, the practical lessons were 
attended by the cadets and all the officers and soldiers who were off duty, while 
the theoretical lessons were only attended by those above the rank of 
Bombardier and soldiers who had shown special talent for capacity and study. 4 
 
The initial budget approved was £1,000.5  Part of this sum paid for the 
appointment of two teaching staff and a secretary.  The Chief Master, Mr John 
Muller, was appointed on a salary of £200 per annum, and a second master, Mr 
Derham, on a salary on £100.6  They were each to be employed three days a 
week, providing three hours teaching daily, based in the Warren at Woolwich.  
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The Governor of the Academy was the Master-General himself, who delegated 
day-to-day command of the Academy to the Commanding Royal Engineer at 
Woolwich. 
 
In 1744, it was decided that the cadets would be withdrawn from the artillery 
companies and formed into ÔThe Company of Gentlemen CadetsÕ.  This 
decision appears to have been made soon after the Royal Artillery were 
inspected by the Duke of Cumberland and the cadets were an embarrassment 
to all present.   The Company had an original establishment of one Captain, 
three Lieutenants, a Drum-Major and forty cadets.7  Apart from attending the 
Warren for lectures and parades the cadets were left to themselves, which did 
not appear to have done much for discipline or their studies.  In many cases 
these cadets were young children, possibly away from their home or some form 
of control for the first time in their lives.  The cadets links to the artillery 
companies was not fully severed until 1764, and it was still possible that cadets 
could be called up for foreign service, as happened when they were sent to 
Flanders in 1747 and the East Indies in 1754.8 
 
1764, saw the appointment of the Lieutenant-Governor, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pattison, with direct responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the Academy.  
The staff size was increased to six and attendance at the Academy was 
restricted to cadets only, with serving officers and non-commissioned officers 
being stopped from attending lectures.  This was seen as a benefit to the 
cadets as the interest and behaviour of the others often set a bad example.  
Lieutenant-Colonel Pattison endured strong resistance from both cadets and 
masters who were unused to organisation and discipline.9  His power was 
further enhanced in 1772, when the first Inspector of the Royal Military 
Academy, Captain G. Smith, was appointed.  Through their efforts, the teaching 
standards and the behaviour of both cadets and masters improved.10  Some 
level of consistency was also achieved through there being only two Lieutenant-
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Governors at the Royal Military Academy during the period of the Napoleonic 
wars.  Lieutenant-Colonel William Twiss R.E. was in charge from 1795 to 1809 
and Lieutenant-Colonel William Mudge R.A. commanded until 1820. 
Size of Academy 
Table 3a. Size of the Royal Military Academy. 
Year Number of Cadets Year Number of 
Cadets 
1744 40 1810 200 (0 for EIC) 
1746 48 1816 188 
1782 60 1819 150 
1793 90 1820 100 
1798 100 (40 for EIC) 1828 60 
1803 180 (60 for EIC) 1831 90 
1806 248 (60 for EIC) 1839 100 
1807 259 (45 for EIC)11   
 
In 1798, the number of cadets was increased to one hundred, although this was 
actually a decrease due to an agreement with the East India Company (EIC) 
that allowed forty of its engineer cadets to be trained.  To make up the numbers 
for the Ordnance Department, Ôextra cadetsÕ were placed in local schools 
around Woolwich. These extra cadets had to pass the entrance examination, 
follow, the same education plan and were included on the muster roll for the 
Academy.12 
 
In 1803, the size was increased again to one hundred and eighty, of which sixty 
were for the East India Company. One hundred of these were at Woolwich 
(sixty for the Ordnance and forty for the EIC) and eighty were placed at the new 
Royal Military College at Great Marlow (sixty for the Ordnance and twenty for 
the EIC).13  The numbers at Great Marlow included the transfer of all the extra 
cadets from the local schools.  
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Cadets occupied a new building on Woolwich Common for first time in 1806.14  
One hundred and twenty-eight cadets, from the top four academies, were 
housed there.  The two lower academies of sixty cadets were left in the old 
building at Woolwich Arsenal.  A further sixty cadets were in the Junior 
Department of the Royal Military College at Great Marlow. Of these two 
hundred and forty-eight, approximately sixty were allocated to the EIC.  A 
further fifteen to twenty supernumerary cadets were housed in local schools at 
their parents expense.  
 
In 1810, the East India Company opened its own college at Addiscombe, and 
started withdrawing their cadets.  Once more space was created by their 
removal, the Ordnance cadets located at Great Marlow were moved back to 
Woolwich, the last returning in January 1811.15  Appointment of  supernumerary 
cadets was stopped in 1814 as the effects of the peace started to have an 
impact on the opportunities for promotion.16  As the vacancies dried up from 
1814 onwards, cadets had to wait two to three years for a commission to 
become available.17 
Structure of the RMA 
In 1766 the cadets were divided into two academies18 as the less able cadets 
were so far behind the most able.  This was directly related to the lack of an 
entrance examination, which in the worst cases led to cadets arriving who could 
not read or write.  The focus of the lower school was on basic education with no 
military subjects being taught.  There were also four classes within each 
academy to reflect the different abilities of the cadets.  In 1782, a third academy 
was added to cater for the increase in the number of cadets,19 and by 1806, 
there were six academies.  The first and second were taught the Ômore 
advanced parts of mathematics, military subjects and drawingÕ.20  The third and 
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fourth learnt Ômathematics, French and drawingÕ.21  The lower academies were 
taught the same as would have been taught in ordinary schools of the time.  In 
1810 the syllabus of the third and fourth academies were extended to include 
the elements of fortification.  
General Admissions process  
From 1741 to 1774 all requests for entry to the Royal Military Academy were 
made directly to the Master-General.  It was only on nomination from the 
Master-General that cadets were admitted.  At this time there was no entrance 
examination.  When there were no vacancies, it was possible for students to 
study at Woolwich at their own expense.  These students were called 
ÔGentleman AttendantsÕ and were not included in the muster-roll.  The 
admission of Gentleman Attendants was abolished in 1797. 
 
The newly appointed Lieutenant-Governor, found on his arrival that many 
cadets on the muster-roll were not present at the Academy.  On ordering them 
to report, he found the youngest was not yet ten.  Special permission was 
granted for them to remain at home until they reached the age of twelve and 
further admission before the age of twelve was stopped.22  Because of this, in 
1764 the minimum age of entry was set at twelve but no maximum age was set.  
There were cases of cadets joining in their twenties, but generally most were 
younger than seventeen.  In 1774, following strong representation from the 
Lieutenant-Governor, the Master-General approved the use of an entrance 
examination based on the ÔThe first four rules of arithmetic with a competent 
knowledge of the rule of three and the elements of Latin grammarÕ.23   This was 
seen as essential to improve entry standards.  Too much time was being spent 
by the masters bringing the children up to a point where their military education 
could start. 
 
                                            
21
 Guggisberg, The Shop, p. 66. 
22
 Guggisberg, The Shop, p. 4. 
23
 Guggisberg, The Shop, p. 14. 
Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
 43 
In 1782 the minimum age of entry was raised to fourteen, although there was 
some flexibility in its application.24  Admission into the Academy was granted to 
applicants between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, after they passed the 
examination set by the masters of the lower academies.  The general 
requirements were Ôto be well grounded in arithmetic, including vulgar fractions, 
write a very good hand, and be perfectly the master of the English and Latin 
grammarsÕ.  In 1813, the Lieutenant-Governor, Colonel Mudge, persuaded the 
Master-General to further tighten the entry qualifications for the admission of 
Gentleman Cadets25 : 
 
No candidate can be admitted under 14 or over 16 years. Must be 
possessed of (at 14) decimal fractions, duodecimals, or cross 
multiplication, Involution, Extraction of the square root, notation and the 
first four rules of Algebra, Definitions in Plane Geometry, English 
Grammar and Parsing, French Grammar. At 16 add, remainder of 
Algebra except cubic equations, the first two books of EuclidÕs ÔElements 
of GeometryÕ or the first 65 theorems of Dr HuttonÕs course of 
Mathematics, construing and parsing the French language. 26 
 
It is likely that part of the reason for tightening up the entrance requirements 
was to reduce the time the cadets would take to complete their studies and 
therefore be able to turn out officers faster.  Although from 1799 three attempts 
were allowed to satisfy the entrance requirements, as vacancies became more 
scarce towards the end of the war, the number of attempts was reduced to one.  
These new regulations also introduced a probation period of one year, after 
which cadets were removed if satisfactory progress was not made27 Ôas not 
being likely to qualify for commissions in the time allowedÕ.28  This did lead to a 
marked improvement in the effort of the junior cadets.  
 
The length of study at the Academy varied from one month to the maximum of 
five years. The duration depended primarily on the prior education, intelligence 
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and application of the cadet, but also on the demand for officers by the 
Ordnance.29 
Fees  
In 1810, the entry charge into the Royal Military Academy was twenty guineas 
to pay for uniform, books and other items, plus an additional thirty shillings for 
the cadetÕs warrant.  This amount was very close to the annual pay of a captain 
in the line at that time,30 although this was considerably cheaper than the cost 
of buying a commission which was around £400 in a line regiment and £900 in 
the Guards.31  
Teaching. 
From the start in 1741 when the Academy was formed with two masters , there 
was a steady growth in the number of staff and the subjects covered. The list 
below, indicates the growth as each new subject was introduced : 
 
1741 Mr John Muller Ð Chief Master;  Mr Derham Ð Assistant Master; 
Mr Talbot Fulchet Ð Secretary 
1743  Mr Crosbie Ð Model Maker; Mr Abel Cassel Ð French Master 
1744 Mr Gabriel Ð Drawing Master 
1759 Mr John Palladin Ð Fencing Master 
1764  Rev William Green Ð Master for Classics, writing and arithmetic 
1772  Mr F Warre Ð Dancing Master 
1788  Dr Allen Crawford Ð Lecturer on Chemistry.32 
 
Many of the senior masters spent their whole life at the Royal Military Academy  
including Professor Barlow who taught mathematics for forty-one years, Doctor 
Bonnycastle who taught fortification for thirty-nine years (his son joined the 
Royal Engineers), Mr. Landmann who taught fortification for thirty-eight years 
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(his son joined the Royal Engineers) and Messrs. Green, Gregory and Hutton 
with about thirty-five years. 33 
 
Up to 1797 the masters were allowed to take private pupils and also provide 
extra tuition to the cadets and Gentleman Attendants. Since masters decided 
when a cadet was eligible to be promoted from one academy to another, private 
tuition was a conflict of interest.  It was also customary for masters to receive 
ÔpresentsÕ from the parents of pupils.34  Following the appointment of the 
Inspector in 1772, the movement between academies was through 
examinations in the presence of the Inspector, rather than through the 
recommendation of the masters.35  In February 1799, a limit was placed on the 
number of attempts by cadets for academy promotion.36  After three failed 
attempts, the cadet was given two months for further study. Three more 
attempts were allowed before the cadet would be recommended for removal 
from the Academy.   
 
Appendix A shows the examination syllabus of 1792. The masters were 
required to give monthly reports on the progress of cadets.  The Inspector also 
prepared reports on the attendance of the Masters. 
Academy Environment. 
In the period immediately after the foundation of the Academy :  
 
the cadets were under no discipline worthy of the name; they wore no 
uniform, and were so outrageous in study.  That one of the occupations 
of the officer on duty in the Warren was occasionally to visit the 
Academy, and prevent the Masters from being ill-used, and even 
pelted.37 
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Duncan went on to say :  
  
The cadets, ingenuity in evading detection [of offences] was equalled by 
their talent in inventing new methods of annoyance. This talent was too 
often aided by the connivance of the newly commissioned officers, 
whose sympathies were more with the law-breakers, they had left than 
the law-insisters they had joined.38 
 
Discipline was a major problem through the whole period and there were many 
documented cases of bullying for the purpose of stopping the studious cadet 
from embarrassing his less industrious peers.39  Bullying was endemic and 
maintaining discipline was a constant problem.  Many cadets were dismissed 
for their behaviour.  One of the likely causes of poor discipline and study was 
the complete lack of extra Ð curricular activities, which led the cadets to provide 
their own.   The wide range of ages of the cadets, from twelve through to 
twenty, also did not help.  Similarly, the presence of commissioned and non-
commissioned officers was reported as a major source of difficulty in 
maintaining discipline.40 
 
The behaviour of the masters was often no better than the cadets.  From the 
early days of the Academy little control was exercised over their activities.  The 
introduction of the Lieutenant-Governor and then the Inspector brought 
restrictions that they resented and fought against.  Duncan cited one example 
of the friction which was present :  
 
the reply É is principally to correct two essential mistakes contained in 
the four lines which compose the letter.  You say that at my request you 
have subjoined your opinion on the mode of education in the Academy, 
and desire me to present it to the Master-General in your names É I 
signified to you the Master-GeneralÕs being not well pleased at the slow 
progress made by the Gentlemen cadets É you expressed great 
discontent at the printed rules you are prescribed to teach by É I 
required, not requested you to represent them to me in writing, that I 
might É lay them before the Master-General; not meaning as you seem 
to conceive to be merely porter of them in your names.41 
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The attitude to study was seriously affected by the demand for cadets.  
Throughout the Napoleonic wars the demand far outstripped the supply.  This 
had two effects. Firstly there was pressure on the Academy to speed up the 
education process, which led to pressure to reduce the examination 
requirements.  Secondly, the cadets knew the situation and on occasions had 
seen cadets commissioned without having to take the examinations.  It was 
possible that a cadet who was ejected from the Academy for failing the 
examinations, or for bad behaviour, could still get his father to buy him a 
commission in the army, which would involve the cadet in much less effort.   
Examinations and Commissions 
Public exams were first introduced in 1764, were held annually and attended by 
senior officers of the Ordnance.  In 1768 these were replaced by private exams 
held in the presence of the Lieutenant-Governor, and from 1772 the Inspector 
was also present.  Public exams resumed in 1786.42 
 
In 1791 the Royal Artillery added two more companies and had thirty-five 
vacancies to fill. The Lieutenant-Governor said the Ôbackward stateÕ of the 
cadets meant he could not fill them.  Similarly, in 1792, the Lieutenant-Governor 
announced that thirty commissions would be available, but only six cadets 
passed the examinations.   Public examinations were again suspended in 1794 
following the outbreak of war :  
 
The Master-General is very desirous of filling up the vacant commissions 
É the Professors and Masters will take measures for enabling the 
cadets in the Upper Academy to make a quicker progress, by dispensing 
for the present with some of the less essential particulars, and by making 
some other changes suitable to the occasion É but when the demand 
for officers becomes less urgent, the more regular mode of teaching 
must be again adopted.43 
 
At that time, the Gentlemen cadets had to be :  
 
examined and found to be qualified in Arithmetic and logarithms; Algebra 
as far as Quadratic equations; the first four books of Euclid; Mensuration 
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including trigonometry and heights and distances; practical geometry; the 
general principles of fortification the construction of the three systems of 
Vauban the definition and explanation of artillery in general and the 
construction of a piece of ordnance, illustrated by 24 drawings; they must 
also be able to read and translate French.44 
 
The Napoleonic wars made great demands for the supply of officers that the 
Academy could not meet.  From 1794 to 1811, the public examination of cadets 
was suspended and the syllabus of the ÔprivateÕ examination under the 
stewardship of the Lieutenant-Governor varied as the demand rose and fell.  
This had a significant effect on the quality and quantity of training that the 
cadets received.  The cadets likewise recognised the high demand for officers 
and this affected their commitment to study.  The demand was so great that on 
occasions exams were held on an individual basis as soon as a cadet felt 
himself competent.  In 1795, the inspector was asked to recommend without 
examination, those cadets from the upper and second academies Ôwho may 
appear likely to prove useful at this moment as officersÕ.45 :  
 
I am directed to inform you, É that the É service requires an immediate 
supply of officers from the Royal Military Academy; his lordship therefore 
desires that Éyou will recommend to him for promotion such of the 
cadets É as may appear likely to prove useful at this moment as 
officers, selecting those only who have distinguished themselves by their 
general conduct. However as the persons you are now required to 
propose are wanted for immediate service, a certain degree of height 
and manliness will be indispensably necessary, and you are not to 
recommend any one É who has not attained the height of five foot four 
inches.46 
 
ÔFifteen cadets from the upper and twenty from the Second Academy were 
recommended for commissionsÕ.47  Later that year, on 14 July 1795, the Master-
General made it clear that this relaxation was a one-off and that in future, 
cadets must meet the current regulations. 
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In June 1798, a change was made to the way commissions were awarded. 
Previously, all commissions were awarded into the Royal Artillery, with officers 
stating their preference to be transferred to the Royal Engineers :  
 
The Master-General É thinks it more advisable that a limited number of 
such cadets as may be found to have a turn for the profession should 
(after being duly qualified at the Academy) be sent to some station where 
they may improve themselves É by acting as Assistant-Engineers until 
vacancies occur for them in the Corps. 48  
 
In 1802 the Master-General considered the re-introduction of public exams, but 
on the strong recommendation of the Inspector he decided against as : 
 
the war had so shortened the time spent there by most cadets, that they 
were completely ignorant of all but the most elementary parts of the 
subjects in the course; consequently they could not fail to bring great 
discredit on the teaching at the Royal Military Academy if they were 
allowed to present themselves at a public examination. 49    
 
The Inspector at this time had been in post for ten years and must have been 
very familiar with the masters, the cadets and the state of the education at the 
Academy. The concern expressed about ÔdiscreditÕ to the Corps, probably 
indicates a high failure rate was expected in the public examinations.  It 
provides an internal view on the state of the education of the cadets against the 
syllabus.  What it does not do, is allow us to make any judgement on the 
suitability of the syllabus at that time.  We will come back to this point later 
when the views of the officers themselves, on their education is examined. 
 
The demand for officers remained high, and in 1803, ÔIn consequence of a most 
serious want of officers for the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the Master-General 
Ôdirects that the usual summer vacation shall not take place, but that a fortnight 
be added at Christmas this yearÕ.50  By the end of the year, seventy-seven 
cadets had been commissioned (including seventeen into the EIC).  This was a 
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very large number in view of the fact that there were only one hundred and 
eighty cadets in the Academy at this time. 51 
 
The custom was that cadets wishing to join the Royal Engineers would remain 
at the Academy for a further six months to improve their knowledge.  On 1 
March 1803, the Lieutenant-Governor proposed that candidates for the Royal 
Engineers Ôinstead of remaining at the Academy an extra six months É were to 
be sent to the Royal Military Surveyors under the direction of Major Mudge, to 
be instructed in surveyingÕ.52  This had the dual benefit of getting the junior 
engineers some practical experience, while also providing a trained resource for 
the urgent task of mapping the southern shores of England against the risk of a 
French invasion. 
 
Public examinations resumed in 1811, but the problems with the education 
were still not resolved.  The whole of the Upper Academy (twenty-nine cadets) 
was examined in July 1812, with a maximum of twenty-four to be 
commissioned.  All the cadets failed in mathematics and were ordered to re-sit.  
This was done on 9 September 1812, and the twenty-four were then equally 
split between the artillery and the engineers.53 
 
Throughout the period of the Napoleonic wars there was a steady increase in 
the annual number of engineer commissions.  Prior to the French Revolution, 
the number had usually been below five.  There were a number of years 
between 1793 and 1807 where the number grew up to twenty, with the average 
being about ten.  The average across the period 1808 to 1815 was about 
twenty per year.  Appendix E, shows the commissions into the Royal Engineers 
over the period.  
 
The Royal Engineer officers who served in operational theatres throughout the 
Napoleonic Wars were the officers who passed through the Royal Military 
Academy during the period when public examinations were stopped and private 
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examination requirements were variable.  The most senior officer who served in 
the Peninsula, Richard Fletcher, was commissioned in 1790, at the start of this 
period.  The other senior officers who served in the Peninsula were 
commissioned between 1793 and 1800, and all the Captains by 1804.54 
 
There is no doubt that the Royal Military Academy was concerned about the 
level of education that was being given to the cadets. There is no doubt that 
demand outstripped supply throughout the period. But there is also no doubt  
that even the partial training of an Ordnance officer at the Academy was far in 
excess of anything that was given to a regular army officer at that time.  Until 
the Royal Military College started producing its first recruits after 1800, there 
was no other source of officers with some education and technical training.  The 
armyÕs response to education and the Ordnance officers view on their education 
will be discussed below. 
 
The next section will look at the other significant gap in the supply of specialist 
services to the army, trained artificers who could provide military engineering 
support to the Royal Engineer officers. 
3.2.2. THE ROYAL MILITARY ARTIFICERS, AND THE 
SCHOOL OF MILITARY ENGINEERING. 
The Royal Military Artificers 
One of the anomalies of the Corps of Royal Engineers on its formation was that 
it was an officer only organisation.  There were no lower ranks.  Manual labour 
and tradesmen were provided from the infantry regiments whilst on campaign 
and by local civilians for static establishments. 
 
The first steps to redress this omission were taken at the garrison in Gibraltar 
around 1770 when they could not find enough local tradesmen to work on the 
fortifications.  The Commanding Royal Engineer at that time was Lieutenant-
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Colonel William Green and he suggested to the Governor, General George 
Augustus Elliot (another ex-engineer), that skilled tradesmen should be 
transferred from the garrison regiments at Gibraltar and formed into a 
permanent body to carry out military engineering work.55  
 
A Royal Warrant was issued on 6 March 1772, to raise a ÔCompany of Soldier 
ArtificersÕ at Gibraltar.56   The initial strength of the unit was sixty-eight rank and 
file with the local Royal Engineer officers providing command.  The intention 
was for the unit to serve only in Gibraltar.  It performed well through the siege of 
Gibraltar from 1779 to 1783 and on 30 June 1786, a second company was 
raised with the total strength of two hundred and seventy-five men. 57 
 
As tensions grew in Europe, and the need to defend the shores of England 
became more apparent, a further six companies of one hundred and twenty-six 
men each, were raised on 10 October 1787, under the title of the ÔCorps of 
Royal Military ArtificersÕ (RMA).  They were to serve at Woolwich, Chatham, 
Portsmouth, Gosport, Plymouth and the Channel Islands.  Again each company 
was destined to serve only in the one location.  The Gibraltar companies were 
also amalgamated into the RMA.  A further four companies were added on 1 
August 1806 to serve at Dover, Cork, Nova Scotia and the West Indies. 
 
The intention behind the formation of the RMA was to provide skilled workmen 
at the main ordnance locations around Britain, Europe and eventually the globe.  
There was never an intention that these troops would be mobile and available 
to travel in significant numbers with an army.  The lack of their own officers 
meant that they were never properly managed and were allowed levels of 
freedom which should never have been tolerated in any military organisation. 
Captain Charles William Pasley commented on the soldiers Ôgoing greyÕ in the 
corps, while stagnating in the same location, for life.  He also commented on 
the effects of receiving volunteers from the line regiments, which allowed units 
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to get rid of their worst troops.58  When Pasley took command of the Plymouth 
Company in 1811, not one of the RMA companies had been employed as a unit 
on active service.  In a letter to a fellow officer he wrote :  
 
The command of the Company here gives me a greater insight into the 
nature of our establishment  É There is no guard except of a Sunday at 
the Barrack gates, which breaks up at eleven o'clock É The É backward 
spirit amongst the Non Commissioned Officers is very great, and their 
ideas of subordination are exceedingly lax É I think these companies will 
not be worth much till they are changed every two or three years, and go 
upon actual service bodily, not by detachments.59 
 
PasleyÕs role in the advancement of the RMA will be described further below.  
Another famous engineer from that period, John Thomas Jones wrote :  
 
After É observing how very much the want of Sappers and Miners 
prejudiced every siege operation in Spain, it will be learnt with surprise 
that, É England paid, fed, clothed, and lodged a very large body of 
engineer troops, É These Écomposed chiefly of mechanics, were 
considered as more intimately intended for permanent works; and the 
most limited number were reluctantly spared for field service, it being 
difficult to make it understood how mechanics could be required in any 
great number with an army 60 
 
Although it had been known for some years that the Ordnance could not easily 
put together troops for active operations, the start of the Peninsular War 
highlighted this serious inadequacy both in the numbers available and the 
quality of the soldiers training.  Through the early years of the war, the Corps 
struggled and the sieges of 1811 brought home the fact that the current 
situation could not continue. 
 
The problem had been recognised at home.  Steps were being taken, but they 
would not bring immediate changes.  One significant step was taken in May 
1811 when the size of the RMA was increased to four battalions of eight 
companies with a total strength of over 2,800 men.  At the same time it was 
decided that in future the RMA companies would be rotated around the 
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locations and would move as a whole body rather than in small detachments.61  
These changes were in place by the end of the year, but in parallel, actions 
were also being taken in the Peninsula. 
 
After the second attempt to take the fortress of Badajoz, in June 1811, in an 
effort to reduce the skills shortage, Wellington had asked Burgoyne to start 
training two hundred volunteers from the Third Division.62   On 29 July 1811, 
Jones noted that Lieutenant Wright was ordered to join Burgoyne at Castello 
Branco to assist him in training the men to sap63 and by 16 August 1811, Jones 
recorded that ÔCaptain Burgoyne was complete with all the prerequisites to 
enable him to teach his party to sap and they are now regularly instructedÕ.64  
This clearly was a serious attempt by the army in Spain to enhance its limited 
resources.  Burgoyne noted in his diary on 15 August 1811, that he commenced 
that day instructing the men.  Lieutenants Emmett and Reid were ordered to 
join Burgoyne on 25 August 1811, to assist in the training, and on 5 September 
1811, Lieutenants Skelton and Elliot also joined him. 65 
 
Captain George Ross R.E. was ordered to carry out a similar exercise in the 
First Division,66 and Captain William Nicholas R.E. was instructing soldiers in 
Cadiz.67  Burgoyne in a letter to Pasley, written after the siege of Ciudad 
Rodrigo in February 1812, mentioned this training and stated that although little 
progress was made, there was some benefit.68  Pasley congratulated him on 
being the first person to train ÔSappers in the British service that acted against 
the enemyÕ.69  
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Pasley, however, was not completely right with his congratulations.  The 
deficiency was known to many of the engineers and Jones made reference in 
his diary in April 1811 to Ôan arrangement made for instructing the RMA and the 
younger officers in the manner of forming a sapÕ.70  A group of RMA artificers 
had just arrived at Elvas, under the command of Captain Ross and since they 
had no previous training in operational activities, it was decided to start training 
them.71  Over the following days, JonesÕ diary noted the General Order, 
allocating one hundred troops from the ranks who had artificer skills, being 
brigaded with the RMA and being trained in siege works.  The instructions they 
received included physically digging a sap to learn the requirements.  It was 
Ross who took charge of the troops that were assigned, the training being 
carried out in the vicinity of Olivenza.  Clearly, all this preparation was for the 
first siege of Badajoz, and occurred before the training referred to above by 
Burgoyne.72  This method of training troops from the ranks was tried through the 
first and second sieges of Badajoz with very limited success.  Training troops 
from the line regiments at the point to need was not going to provide the skills 
and dedication that was required.  The training also required the continuous 
involvement of the engineers and the troops, both of which proved very difficult.  
Although Burgoyne was first asked to train troops in July 1811, the order was 
repeated in November 1811,73 showing how difficult it was to provide any 
consistent form of training due to interruptions caused by operational 
movements.  BurgoyneÕs diary through this period, makes almost no mention of 
the instruction of troops, but makes frequent mention of part or all of the Third 
Division being moved.  There is no mention of instruction between the first entry 
on 15 August 1811, and the repeat order in November 1811, this period of 
course being when Marmont was manoeuvring in front of Ciudad Rodrigo.  
There is then no further mention in BurgoyneÕs diary through to the end of the 
year.  However, Burgoyne in a letter dated 14 September 1811 noted that : 
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My principal business now is training 200 men of different regiments to 
the duties required in a siege, which, to our disgrace and misfortune, we 
have no regular establishment equal to, notwithstanding the repeated 
experience of the absolute necessity of such a corps to act under the 
engineers in a campaign. For want of such an establishment we are 
frequently led to the loss of valuable officers, and very undeserved 
discredit.  The undertaking I am set about will only be temporary, and will 
supply very imperfectly this deficiency.74 
 
Burgoyne was based at Albergaria from early August to mid September 1811.  
It is very unusual that Burgoyne did not mention the training in his diary if it was 
happening.  Some comment positive or negative would be expected.  Burgoyne 
does not mention the training in any of his letters before his long letter criticising 
the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, dated 12 February 1812.  This lack of comment 
suggests that little training was in fact carried out. 
 
John Squire writing to Pasley in March 1812 wrote :  
 
Every event in this country proves more and more the necessity of our 
having an establishment of Sappers and Miners É Lately at Ciudad 
Rodrigo we succeeded in taking the place more from its own weakness, 
than from any means we possessed of approaching nearer with success. 
I really should dread to attack a regular fortress :- we have no men fit for 
the operation, and if we attack Badajoz again, which is something like a 
regular place, depend upon it, that our loss in officers will be severe :- it 
must be so, until we have men drilled to this particular service. Your 
efforts at Plymouth do you the greatest credit É However persevere in 
the noble work you have begun, and it is probable that their eyes may be 
opened, and they may be convinced. 75 
 
The noble work referred to by Squire, was PasleyÕs proposal to form a school to 
train soldiers in military engineering, who could effectively support the Royal 
Engineer officers in the field. 
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The school of Military Engineering and the formation of the Royal Sappers 
and Miners 
The start of the 19th century saw the emergence of a new breed of engineer 
who faced new challenges of a type that had never been faced before by British 
engineers.  These engineers cut their teeth in sieges in Egypt, Turkey, South 
America, the Low Countries, and Holland. They had seen first hand the 
consequences of not having trained specialists to help with the attack and 
defence of places and had started commenting on the need for the situation to 
be rectified.  Initially these comments were addressed to each other, but the 
more forward thinking and in some respects, braver officers started writing to 
their superiors making suggestions on how the corps could be made more 
effective.  Their views did not always receive a good reception from some of the 
senior officers in the corps : Ôsome of the old officers such as General Mercer; 
who objected that they could not see why this innovation should be introduced, 
since they themselves experienced no difficulties in the American WarÔ.76  
General Morse, the Inspector General of Fortifications Ôthrew cold water on it 
[the proposals] from the first in all its stagesÕ.77   
 
The need to make changes became more public, primarily due to the actions of 
two people. The first was the Duke of Wellington who suffered through four 
sieges in 1811 and early 1812 and wrote home on a number of occasions 
expressing his view that changes in the engineering service, which were not 
part of the army, were required.   On the 11 February 1812, Wellington wrote to 
Lord Liverpool :  
 
I would beg to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding to the 
Engineer establishment a corps of Sappers and Miners. It is 
inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake anything like a siege 
for want of assistance of this description. É we are obliged to depend É  
upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and 
willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many 
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casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is 
lost at the most critical period of the siege.78 
 
WellingtonÕs letter after the third siege of Badajoz, in April 1812, made his views 
explicitly clear and could not be ignored any longer.  This letter, which was 
addressed privately to the Earl of Liverpool was lost for many years and was 
not printed in WellingtonÕs Despatches. It was found in 1889 amongst 
LiverpoolÕs papers : 
 
My dispatches of this date will convey the account of the capture of 
Badajoz, which affords as strong an instance of the gallantry of our 
troops as has ever been displayed. But I anxiously hope I shall never 
again be the instrument of putting them to such a test as that to which 
they were put last night. I assure your lordship that it is quite impossible 
to expect to carry fortified places by vive force without incurring great 
loss and being exposed to the chance of failure, unless the army should 
be provided with a regular trained corps of sappers and miners. I never 
yet knew a head of a military establishment or of an army undertaking a 
siege without the aid of such a corps, excepting the British Army. É I 
earnestly recommend to your lordship to have a corps of Sappers and 
Miners formed without loss of time. 79 
 
Writing the day after Wellington, John Squire, who was one of the senior 
engineers at the siege, said nearly the same, ÔThis siege has served to confirm 
an opinion, which I have long since entertained - that constituted as our Corps 
is - we are decidedly not equal to the attack of a place ... Sappers and Miners 
are as necessary to engineers during a siege, as soldiers to the GeneralÕ.80 
 
The second person working for changes was Charles William Pasley.  Pasley 
was a promising and intelligent young engineer officer who had seen service on 
a number of campaigns.  He also had very strong views on what was necessary 
to make the Royal Engineers more effective.  As a twenty-nine year old Captain 
serving during the Walcheren campaign, he felt so strongly that he wrote to 
Colonel Fyers, Deputy Inspector General of Fortifications, on 12 May 1809, 
enclosing his ideas Ôon making the Corps more efficientÕ.81  Tragically for his 
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operational career, but luckily for the service, he suffered a serious back injury 
on 14 August 1809, at the Siege of Flushing.  After a lengthy period of 
convalescence, Pasley took up duty again, commanding the Royal Military 
Artificer company at Plymouth in 1811.  Pasley then set his mind to the task of 
improving the training and effectiveness of this RMA company and over several 
months made huge improvements.  He believed that artificer soldiers were 
required to support engineer officers on operational duty and the RMA in its 
current state was not capable of providing this.  Pasley wrote bluntly and at 
length on his findings and proposed that a school should be set up to train 
soldiers who could be deployed with the army to assist in military engineering 
activities.  In August 1811, John Rowley, Secretary to the Inspector General of 
Fortifications wrote to Pasley :  
 
on the subject of training the R.M. Artificers to their duties in the field. É 
General Morse forwarded the letter you sent him, to the Master-General, 
with his recommendation É I É hope that his Lordship will think proper 
to call upon you to superintend and carry on the system of instruction 
you have so well pointed out.82 
 
Not waiting for any official sanction for his activities, Pasley continued with what 
he believed was right, but kept his superiors informed of his actions :  
 
Since I last wrote to your lordship upon this subject, I have employed my 
spare time entirely in digesting a system of instruction for the use of the 
young officers of engineers and for the non-commissioned officers and 
soldiers of the department.  When complete, it will be, to the engineer 
department, what General DundasÕ book is to the army. And, though I 
have no model to follow, É  I have practically proved the efficacy of it by 
the rapid improvement of the Royal Military Artificers under my 
command. É they now not only make no difficulty in marking out field 
works according to a plan, but are themselves capable of drawing plans 
and sections of any kind of work.  As it will be much more gratifying to 
my feelings to contribute É to the improvement of the department É 
than to lay its deficiencies open to public view, I have determined to 
proceed no further with the second part of my essay until I have 
completed the system of instruction in question 83 
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PasleyÕs reference above to the Ôsecond part of my essayÕ concerns the 
publication in 1810 of his Essay on Military Policy.84  This was very well 
received in both military and political circles and ran to four editions over the 
next three years.  It was certainly read by Wellington and Beresford.  His 
original plan was to publish a second part, describing what was wrong with the 
Ordnance Department and what needed to be done to correct it.  This would 
clearly have caused some anger within the Board of Ordnance.  His offer to 
concentrate on improving the Ordnance by working within their systems was as 
an olive branch to the senior officers he was criticising.  
 
Considering that Pasley was only a Captain in the Royal Engineers, his 
correspondence verged on the insubordinate. Writing to Colonel-Commandant 
Mann, the Inspector General of Fortifications, in January 1812, :  
 
I enclose a memoir upon the state of the engineers department, which 
will fully explain the grounds upon which I consider it the most inefficient 
department in His MajestyÕs Service É Not long after the retreat É of the 
British troops employed under Sir John Moore, in a campaign , in which 
the defects of the department had been fully proved É  Lord Chatham 
directed General Morse to give in a plan for forming an establishment of 
trained sappers and miners, with a view to render the Corps efficient in 
the Field É Major Lefebure had declined the command in Portugal when 
offered to him, on the avowed plea; that the engineer Establishment in 
the field was so imperfect, that the officers had nothing before them but a 
prospect of certain failure and disgrace in every operation of importance. 
É At Copenhagen and Flushing, the most mortifying blunders, confusion 
and delays took place owing to the inefficiency of the department É At 
Badajoz É some of our most promising officers of the Corps, either 
suffered, or actually fell a sacrifice to the defects of the system. Captain 
Dickenson lost his life [at Badajoz], because he was obliged continually 
to expose himself on the top of a parapet, showing the men of the 
working party how to place and picket down fascines É As a proof of this 
I have learned since I wrote you last [sic], that Lord Wellington has lately 
adopted an expedient for obviating É the defective state of the 
Establishment. For two or three months past, a certain number of 
soldiers É have been trained to sapping and other field duties of the 
engineer department.  If something of the same kind is not Established at 
home by authority of the Master-General from whom it will naturally be 
expected that all improvements of the engineer department should 
originate; I am sorry to say that I feel thoroughly persuaded that the 
Ordnance Department will soon sink into public contempt and that the 
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consequences of the necessary measures just stated, to which Lord 
Wellington has been forced to resort for the safety of his army, may 
prove in the end highly injurious to the honour and interests of the Corps 
of Royal Engineers, and may tend to set aside the Royal Military 
Artificers altogether as an [sic] useless and contemptible description of 
troops which I know that they are generally considered. 85 
 
Although the tone of the letter was very strong, his views were obviously 
supported by some of the Ordnance hierarchy as his proposals for setting up a 
school were well received and were being seriously considered.  Two letters 
from John Rowley to Pasley show that events in early 1812 were moving fast :   
 
As General Mann is very desirous that the instruction of the R.M. 
Artificers in the construction of field works, should be put in train, É he 
wishes to see you upon the subject as soon as convenient É General 
Mann wishes you would turn in your mind some outline É for him to lay 
before the Master-General, as to the best means of carrying the system 
into effect, with some idea if possible of the expense which would attend 
it upon any given scale. 86 
 
I have made known to General Mann that you are ready for your order to 
come up to town. Your memorial [Request for promotion to brevet Major] 
has been forwarded to the Master-General with his recommendations.87 
 
PasleyÕs ideas were also being aired by his peers who were serving in the 
Peninsula.  Richard Fletcher wrote to the Inspector General of Fortifications 
after the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812 ÔThe sappers we lately 
employed were taken from the Third Division, and had received such instruction 
as time and means afforded, under Captain Burgoyne.  They were certainly 
useful, but far from expertÕ.88  This quotation is taken from WrottesleyÕs work on 
Burgoyne.  In it, Wrottesley suggests that the common belief was that the first 
proposal for the formation of a trained body of sappers and miners came from 
Wellington in April 1812.  As this quote predates it, this cannot be true.  A 
review of the dates would show that WellingtonÕs letter of 7 April 1812, which 
was received in London on 23 April 1812, cannot have been the cause, since 
the Royal Warrant for the formation of the Royal Sappers and Miners was also 
dated 23 April 1812.  WellingtonÕs letter may have been the final trigger, but it 
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was not the first proposal.   More concrete evidence can be found in a letter 
from Rice Jones of 28 August 1811 where he records Ôthe Royal Military 
Artificers, called Royal Sappers and Miners very soon; and they are to be drilled 
in the construction of batteries, trenches, saps, &c.Õ89  WrottesleyÕs error in 
giving full credit to Wellington for the formation of the Royal Sappers and Miners 
is still common amongst some recent writers.90 
 
Omitted from WrottesleyÕs commentary, is the fact that Fletcher also submitted 
with this letter of 29 January 1812, mentioned above, a proposal for the creation 
of a corps of sappers and miners which was different from PasleyÕs proposals.  
They were similar in a number of ways, but clearly developed independently.  
This leads to the question of whether Fletcher knew of PasleyÕs proposal.  It 
also questions if there was any communication going on between Fletcher and 
Pasley, as it seems unusual that Fletcher would have submitted a separate 
proposal at this time if he knew of and agreed with PasleyÕs proposals.  
FletcherÕs main subordinates, Burgoyne, Squire and Jones certainly all knew of 
PasleyÕs plans and it is inconceivable that Fletcher did not know. 
 
It appears that Fletcher was proposing a quick fix solution for immediate 
implementation by cherry picking the best soldiers from the Royal Military 
Artificers and using junior Royal Engineer officers to command them.  His 
proposal made no reference to PasleyÕs plans which is surprising as a co-
ordinated effort was more likely to produce success.  FletcherÕs proposal would 
also appear to be a little optimistic in believing they could identify 800 suitable 
soldiers from the RMA.  At that time the total size was around 1,700 soldiers 
and only 900 were in England. 
 
PasleyÕs continued correspondence with the Master-General eventually led to 
him submitting a proposal to set up the School of Military Engineering.  A 
committee was formed, at the request of the Inspector General of Fortifications, 
to evaluate PasleyÕs proposal and make recommendations.  The committee of 
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three senior engineers, headed by John Rowley with Alexander Bryce and 
George Bridges, reported on 14 March 1812 and recommended that PasleyÕs 
proposals be put into action.91  The Inspector General approved the 
CommitteeÕs recommendation and Pasley was asked to take command of the 
new School of Military Engineering.  Unfortunately at this point the plans came 
to a halt due to a stand-off between Pasley and the Master-General over 
promotion.  Pasley believed he was entitled to a brevet rank of Major and would 
not accept the position until it was granted.  The Master-General would not 
agree to the promotion.92  On 23 April 1812 the Royal Warrant was issued by 
the Prince Regent authorising the establishment of the school under Pasley.93  
The Warrant was signed on the same day that WellingtonÕs despatch of 7 April 
1812 was received in London.94  In the National Archives there is a letter from 
the Master-General, dated 8 April 1812, which seeks legal opinion on whether 
changing the name of the Royal Military Artificers would require all the soldiers 
to be attested again and whether new soldiers would be bound by the Articles 
of War and the Mutiny Act.95  This shows that the Master-General was taking 
steps to progress the formation of the school regardless of the stand-off with 
Pasley. 
 
The RMA was reformed on 4 August 1812 under the title of the ÔRoyal Military 
Artificers or Sappers and MinersÕ. This was shortened to the ÔRoyal Sappers 
and MinersÕ the following year.96  The initial strength remained at around 2,800 
men.97  The first soldiers from PasleyÕs school were in the Peninsula before the 
end of 1812.  Though there were still complaints about their skills, they were a 
major improvement on the performance of the RMA.  Apart from training more 
suited to operational activities, they now came with their own subaltern officers, 
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which removed the problem which ruined the RMA of having no constant and 
consistent leadership. 
 
Another consequence of the formation of the school, which appears to have 
been overlooked by all writers on the subject, was that from 1812, all newly 
commissioned Royal Engineer officers were sent to the school to instruct and 
be instructed on practical field works.  The Corps monthly returns state clearly 
that officers were being sent to Chatham for this purpose.98  Writing to his sister 
in May 1812, PasleyÕs view is clearly explained Ôyou know I have long had a 
plan in view of training the young officers and all the N.C. Officers and soldiers 
to their field dutiesÕ.99  He uses almost identical words in a letter to John 
Burgoyne in March 1812.100  Also, in a minute from the meeting of the Board of 
Ordnance dated 11 May 1812, reference is made to Ôthe System of Instruction 
in the Field Duties intended for the junior officers of engineers and the Corps of 
Military Artificers Sappers and MinersÕ.101  PasleyÕs Memoir on the formation of 
the Royal Sappers and Miners states that the key role of the engineer officers 
was the instruction of the soldiers but goes on to say :  
 
When the officers of engineers are not occupied in military or field duties, 
they have a course of study laid down for them, calculated to improve 
them in the science of attack, upon which the art of fortification is 
founded. They are required to present memoirs relative to the various 
operations of a siege, stating the number of men, materials and tools, 
and the distribution of them.102  
 
The junior officers typically spent a further four to six months gaining experience 
of the practical aspects of their profession and also gained valuable insight into 
the command of the first sappers and miners who were to be sent to the 
Peninsula.  In many cases, these junior officers would travel to the Peninsula in 
command of the soldiers they had trained with.  Pasley also used any other 
officers who were available to come and teach the new recruits.  A greater 
testament to the newly formed establishment was given by Lieutenant-Colonel 
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Samuel Dickens, who wrote to Pasley requesting permission to spend a couple 
of months at the school, Ôto take a little instructionÕ before going out to the 
Peninsula.103 
 
Pasley was keen to remove the previous experiences of poor discipline through 
attaching engineer officers permanently to each company of the Royal Sappers 
and Miners.  Whilst he acknowledged that many engineer officers were averse 
to any form of regimental duties, which they saw as ÔdrudgeryÕ, he saw the 
introduction of the newly commissioned junior engineers immediately into the 
regimental role at Chatham as a way of reducing this view.  Pasley also put 
forward the notion that there should be one title, ÔRoyal EngineersÕ for both the 
officers and the soldiers.  He saw the two separate titles as causing a lack of 
concern in the engineer officers about the actions of the artificers as they took 
no pride or responsibility for their actions and reputation.104 
3.2.3. THE ARMYÕS RESPONSE - THE ROYAL STAFF 
CORPS & THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE. 
Royal Staff Corps 
The Royal Staff Corps was formed in 1798 by the Duke of York partly in 
reaction to the Board of OrdnanceÕs inability (or unwillingness) to provide 
sufficient engineers and artificers for the campaign in Holland in 1795.  The 
Duke of York had asked for engineers and heavy ordnance to be supplied to 
support the planned campaign and was told that the Ordnance could supply 
neither the officers or artillery in the quantities he required.  The Duke of York 
decided that he did not want to have to rely on the Board of Ordnance in the 
future and encouraged the Horse Guards to provide their own specialist troops 
who would be attached to the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs department. 
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Unlike the Royal Engineers, the Horse Guards recognised that the Royal Staff 
Corps required both officers and soldiers to provide a complete military 
engineering service.  The life of this corps is not well documented.  From the 
General Order of 1 February 1804, it would appear that the ranks were initially 
filled by volunteers from the army.  The General Order asked for men who had 
served regular apprenticeships as carpenters, wheelers, sawyers, shipwrights, 
boat builders, masons, bricklayers or miners.  It also indicated that the 
applicants would be tested in their trade before being accepted.105  There is no 
evidence of a separate arrangement for training of the officers.  The Royal Staff 
Corps received some officers from the Royal Military College and they also 
received some officers who transferred from the Royal Engineers.106  The 
original establishment was only one company, but this was rapidly increased to 
five in 1800 and then to a battalion (10 companies) in 1809, giving a total 
strength of not much more than five hundred officers and men.107 
 
On paper there was a distinction between the roles of the Royal Staff Corps and 
the Royal Engineers.  The Royal Staff Corps were responsible for acting as 
guides, surveying terrain and undertaking temporary works such as field works 
and flying bridges, while the Royal Engineers were responsible for more 
permanent fixtures like besieging and defending fortresses, and major building 
work.  In practice, there was less distinction.  Wellington appeared to use 
whatever group was available when he needed them.  The commander of the 
Royal Staff Corps in the Peninsula, Lieutenant-Colonel Sturgeon, is mentioned 
many times in WellingtonÕs Despatches and made a particular name for himself 
with some innovative bridges, including the repair of the bridge at Alcantara and 
the design of the bridge over the river Adour.  He died in 1814 at Vic Bigarre, it 
has been suggested, getting himself deliberately killed for incurring WellingtonÕs 
wrath for failures in his command of the postal service. 
 
One of the major contributions of the Royal Staff Corps to the war in the 
Peninsula was their work to map Spain and Portugal.  Along with colleagues 
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from the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs office, several staff corps officers worked 
constantly to map the Peninsula at a scale of four miles to the inch, giving 
Wellington access to mapping information that was not available from the 
printed maps of the period.108  Some of the output of this work was eventually 
printed in what is still the best and most accurate maps of the peninsular 
battlefields, WyldÕs Atlas. 
Royal Military College 
The Royal Military College (RMC) was the brainchild of John Gaspard Le 
Marchant.  He believed that there was a need for the British army to improve its 
professionalism by training officers to provide the administrative and 
organisational skills required in the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs department.  This 
need had been fulfilled for many years in continental armies, but staff 
experience in the British army was gained by trial and error.  
 
Le Marchant was well known to the King and the Duke of York, and his 
proposals were received favourably and strongly supported by both, as well as 
by Dundas, the Quartermaster-General, Calvert, the Adjutant-General109 and 
Brownrigg, the Military Secretary.  Le MarchantÕs proposals were submitted in 
January 1799, approved and the school officially opened in May 1800. 110 
 
The original proposal was for a school with three departments. The senior 
school was for those destined to serve on the staff; the junior department for the 
training of Gentleman Cadets; and the Legion was for sons of soldiers and Non 
Commissioned Officers.  The Legion was not approved due to concerns that the 
number of promotions from the ranks would be too great.111 
 
The junior department was very much the equivalent of the OrdnanceÕs Royal 
Military Academy and in fact for a number of years the surplus from the Royal 
Military Academy was placed at the Junior College at Great Marlow.  The 
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Warrant described two purposes : to train some of those who from an early life 
were destined for the military, and to provide for the sons of officers who died or 
were wounded in the service of their country.  As with the Royal Military 
Academy, there were entry requirements, with cadets having to be between 
thirteen and fifteen years old, to be mentally and physically fit, and to have 
some mathematical knowledge and a good hand for writing.  Cadets had to 
pass final examinations within four years of entry.  Initial capacity was for one 
hundred cadets.112  Of these one hundred, twenty were destined for the East 
India Company, thirty were the sons of officers who died or were wounded in 
the service of their country, twenty were for the sons of serving officers, and 
thirty were for the sons of noblemen and gentlemen (who paid more for the 
privilege of sending their sons to the College).113 
 
The senior department, or Staff College, started life as a private venture by the 
French migr, General Jarry, who set up a school at High Wycombe in 1799, 
to teach staff duties to junior officers.  The numbers present in the original 
school were quite small, never exceeding thirty-four in this period.  In 1802, 
when the Staff College received its warrant, it moved to High Wycombe.  Entry 
requirements required both practical experience and a basic level of education.  
They had to be at least nineteen years old, with two years regimental service 
and a knowledge of mathematics and French. 
 
The RMC was also dogged by problems with the behaviour of the cadets.  In 
1806, Le Marchant was charged with calumny for complaining in private to the 
governor of the college that the discipline and education was unacceptable at 
Great Marlow.114  As Great Marlow housed the additional cadets from the Royal 
Military Academy one is left to wonder if the attitude had been transferred from 
Woolwich or if it was more of a general problem.  It is difficult to understand why 
the two military colleges had discipline problems which would not have been 
tolerated in schools for gentleman and even more so, in the army. 
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Although this was a start, the impact it had during the Napoleonic wars should 
not be over estimated.  The Junior department at the college only provided 
about 4% of the first commissions into the army.115 
 
3.2.4.  ENGINEERS VIEW OF THEIR TRAINING, 
CAPABILITY AND LEADERSHIP. 
The common view of artillery and engineer officers amongst the army, was of 
studious, stuffy and pedantic officers.  The ÔScientific soldierÕ was a term that 
was used at this time and the training and education of Ordnance officers 
differed significantly from the training and education of junior officers in the 
army.  But was this perception based on fact?  Were the Ordnance officers 
better trained?  Were they competent to undertake the tasks they would be 
asked to perform?   Did the Ordnance even understand what the requirements 
were for modern warfare in Europe?   
 
Their experience in the 18th century was almost non-existent.  Early  18th 
century campaigns made extensive use of officers from other European nations 
to provide the specialist engineering services in English armies.  More recent 
operations by the British army alone were focussed on colonial campaigns in 
India or America, or limited attacks on coastal fortresses often carried out by, or 
with, the Royal Navy.   There was very limited experience of siege warfare in 
Europe.  Wellington was one of the few British generals who had experience of 
siege warfare, but ÔSepoyÕ experience counted for little at home.  
Training 
The engineer officers who were involved in operations through the early years 
of the 19th century were not happy with the training they had and felt that 
changes were required. There was resistance from several senior ordnance 
officers to the reforms which were being proposed by the younger breed of 
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engineer officer like Pasley, Squire, Lefebure and Burgoyne.  Bearing in mind 
the remarks made above on the Royal Military Academy and the quality of 
training the cadets received, it is important to note that many of the officers who 
played prominent roles in the Napoleonic wars passed through the Royal 
Military Academy during the period when examination requirements were being 
lowered to meet the demand for officers.  
 
In almost (if not) all cases, the officers themselves complained bitterly about 
their training and their experiences.  One only has to look at the campaigns in 
which they fought in the period from 1793 to 1810 to realise that they had 
almost all had nothing but bad experiences at Alexandria, Buenos Ayres, 
Copenhagen and Walcheren.  There was a constant theme of the lack of 
training engineer officers had received in the practical aspects of their work.  
 
Pasley writing around 1811, described his views :  
 
I should have suggested several improvements that appeared to me 
from my own experience and reflection to be essential, É I considered 
the British Army É to be incapable of succeeding in a siege, É without 
either having recourse to the barbarous measure in incendiary 
bombardment, or without an enormous sacrifice of the lives É  in 
sanguinary assaults É which might be rendered unnecessary by a more 
efficient organization of the Royal Engineer department, and especially 
by forming a well-instructed and well-disciplined body of engineer 
soldiers É  The better instruction of the junior officers of the Royal 
Engineers appeared no less essential, for at that time they were not even 
taught the theory of the attack of fortresses É and the examinations for 
commissions were merely a matter of form, and no genuine test for 
proficiency. As for practical instruction, they had none, for they were sent 
on service without ever having seen a fascine or gabion, without the 
smallest knowledge of the military passage of rivers, of military mining, or 
any other operation of a siege, excepting what they may pick up from 
French writers, of which a striking proof occurred in Sir John MooreÕs 
retreat, when all attempts to blow up stone bridges É  made by officers 
of the Corps, myself amongst others, failed É with the exception of only 
one, which Lieut. Davy, a very promising young officer, succeeded in 
completely destroying, but at the expense of his own life, which he lost 
from not understanding the very simple precautions necessary to insure 
the safety of the person who fires the train of the mine. For my part, I 
should not have even known how to make a battery in the attack on 
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Copenhagen, the first siege in which I was employed, but from the 
information I derived from a French book on the subject.116 
 
Jones made a similar point in the preface of his book on the sieges during the 
Peninsular War,  ÔIn the English language there exists not a single original 
treatise on sieges; all our knowledge of them is obtained from foreign writersÕ.117 
 
Analysis of the movements of officers on these campaigns shows that there 
was a small number who repeatedly appeared in the operational activities and 
these officers came to know each other very well and trusted the judgement 
and discretion of their peers.  Their letters over the period on occasions display 
an almost incandescent rage at the bad planning and organisation of 
engineering activities.  The early years of the 19th century saw these officers 
talking amongst themselves about what needed to be changed.  There was a 
recognition that change at home was going to be very slow and they started 
talking about how they could make progress themselves.  Pasley described 
how this small group of officers responded to the challenge :  
 
The very inefficient state of the engineer Department, strange to say, 
appeared to be unknown, not only to the rest of the Army, from the 
Commander-in-Chief to the youngest ensign, but even to the senior 
officers of the engineers themselves É Young or in the prime of 
manhood, full of enterprise and zeal, meeting and comparing notes 
together in the metropolis after the desultory expeditions in which they 
had served, and afterwards those employed in 1810 in the construction 
of the lines of Torres Vedras, meeting from time to time in some central 
spot, they excited each other, and inspired their juniors with an espirit-
de-corps and a devotion to the service of their Sovereign and Country 
that I do not suppose was ever exceeded. Captain Charles Lefebure É 
was at first the most influential of these officers, partly from his character 
and example É He it was who first pointed out to me and other officers 
his juniors as early as 1805 the inefficiency of the Corps for want of 
disciplined and instructed Sappers and Miners. 118 
 
As mentioned above, the initial instigator appeared to be Charles Lefebure, who 
started talking about forming a group to foster ideas and knowledge.  Burgoyne 
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seems to have taken up the planning of this society.  This was no easy task at 
this time as many of the officers were placed in different locations and planning 
was over an extended period by letter.  In 1810 the ÔSociety for Procuring 
Useful Military InformationÕ was formed with an initial membership of six, made 
up of J.F. Burgoyne, S. Dickenson, G.C. Ross, E.R. Mulcaster, J.T. Jones and 
J. Squire,119 Lefebure having been killed in April 1810, at Matagorda.  The aim 
was the Ôencouragement of military study and engineeringÕ.120  Membership was 
by invitation only and restricted to officers Ôas are inclined to be of the same way 
of thinking with ourselvesÕ.121  The admittance of the junior officers was 
discussed and initially discounted, as they were not thought to have sufficient 
experience to contribute, but, it was hoped that membership would Ôparticularly 
act as a forcible hint to the young men we admit how absolutely necessary it is 
to study and procure information theoretical, practical and local in our 
complicated professionÕ.122 
 
One unexpected omission from the initial group was Charles Pasley who had 
been tirelessly campaigning for years to improve the standard of training and 
education in the Ordnance. Although Pasley was working at home to convince 
the Ordnance on the need to re-organise the Royal Military Artificers and 
corresponding regularly with the likes of Squire and Burgoyne, he was not 
invited to join.  Pasley had previously not been on good terms with Lefebure, 
but this was unlikely to have been the reason.  He was a logical choice for 
membership, even if it was for the sole reason of having a UK based supporter 
who could collate, disseminate and promote on the SocietyÕs behalf.  The 
probable reason why Pasley was not amongst the founder members was 
because he was recovering from the injuries he received at Walcheren.  He was 
also working to complete and complete his ÔEssay on Military PolicyÕ, which was 
published in November 1810.  Pasley returned to service in December 1810, 
when he took up a position as commander of the sixth company of Royal 
Military Artificers at Plymouth.  Also omitted from the group were the Senior 
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engineers in the Peninsula during the period, Richard Fletcher and Howard 
Elphinstone.  Elphinstone, was by this time, back in England, but FletcherÕs 
omission is more surprising. 
 
The group grew from six to eighteen in January 1811 when Birch, Nicholas, 
Goldfinch, Fanshawe, Pasley, Boothby, Thackeray, Parker, Lewis, Marlow, 
Douglas and Arnold were admitted.  Very little correspondence has survived on 
the activities of this group.  What is clear, however, is the recognition of the 
need to share experiences and to improve effectiveness in the Corps. That no 
senior officers were invited to join indicates that the membership did not feel 
they shared its views. 
Leadership 
Another driver for the formation of the ÔsocietyÕ was a lack of confidence in their 
senior officers.  Letters from the most recent European campaigns contain 
strong language and emotion as the performance of their superiors was 
discussed.  The Walcheren campaign of 1809 was led by the Earl of Chatham, 
who at that time was Master-General of the Ordnance.  Along with 40,000 
troops there were twenty-eight engineer officers and two hundred and sixty 
Royal Military Artificers.  This was the largest contingent sent on operation in 
the history of the corps.  The engineers were under the command of Colonel 
William Fyers, who was Deputy Inspector General of Fortifications and about 
fifty-six years old.  The engineering aspects of this campaign were as 
unsatisfactory as the other military elements.  The letters of the engineers 
reflect their opinions on the campaign from an engineering perspective :  
 
The Corps of Engineers is disgraced and damned for ever.  The cry of 
the whole army and navy is against us.  I found Jones when I landed in a 
state of despair. Boteler wished that the first shot might take off his head 
É We were offered the whole army to act under us. É such 
circumstances would have put life into a statue É But what could we do 
with a parcel of old men or rather old women at our head, É with fellows 
old in years, poor in spirit, beardless in military experience, destitute of 
knowledgeÕ.123 
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Pasley had already written once on the subject in May 1809, but clearly he still 
felt so strongly that he felt further complaint was necessary. : 
 
The same melancholy disgusting system prevails in our Department, É 
our brilliant second was seized with a fit of zeal and enthusiasm : he 
represented our want of activity to DÕArcy, and proposed to undertake 
the improvement of the works of Flushing himself É but the vile system 
upon which D acts is this : - make a shew of work - never mind what you 
do Ð so that you do something : - can anything be more contemptible and 
absurd than this : - but our department is going headlong to win an 
eternal infamy : the island it seems will be retained É much now 
depends on the exertions of the engineers and their conduct now will 
most justly become a subject of severe censure hereafter : - We entered 
the place on the 16th or 17th August Ð we attempted no efficient repair or 
reform, until the 16th Sept; and then our operations are guided by the 
pitiful desire of pleasing the eye of an English General at the expense of 
the real interests of the country É the fine season has now slipped 
through his hands : - and the late incessant rains have almost put a stop 
to the proceedings.124 
 
Our affairs here, I grieve to tell you , proceed worse than ever; and our 
chiefs have neither sense nor spirit enough to resist the [?] and insults 
continually offered to the Department. É I have proposed, that all the 
Captains should express their sentiments on this lamentable occasion É 
Let us not permit - that age and rank should not cover the grand defects 
of understanding and experience - The country should and ought to 
know in what manner it is served.125 
 
A base exposure of facts É is quite sufficient to convince a military man 
É of the absurdity of our proceedings - But, I will go further, and say, 
that we have been criminally negligent É we have had ample means at 
our disposal É The state of indecision, in which we have been placed, 
since the occupation of the island has been our ruin É A weak and 
vacillitating Ministry - a commander in Chief without spirit, patriotism or 
judgement and an engineer department conducted by obstinacy and 
ignorance - Such are the grievous evils under which we have laboured 
É I certainly should be glad to return to England - because the system 
pursued here in every matter is thoroughly disgusting.126 
 
but what are we to expect from such men as these without patriotism, 
talent or energy É we must do our utmost to change our military system 
- I mean the conduct of our military operations É Is DÕArcy to be a 
Baronet!!!!!!! Impossible.127 
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One other event which says much about the leadership of the Royal Engineers 
at the time is described by Jones :  
 
An order was issued by Colonel Fyers [after he was wounded on 13 
August 1809] that the senior Engineer . . . should . . .deliver a written 
report . . . of anything extraordinary that might have occurred during the 
night. The first morning Colonel DÕArcy. . . refused compliance, saying he 
had other things to do, and no solicitation could prevail on him to write a 
single line. . . The third morning Colonel D again declined, saying it was 
all nonsense. . . He was requested to reconsider the matter, and on a 
decided refusal, the Brigade-Major put him under arrest.128 
 
DÕArcy continued his refusal right up to the point of the Court Martial beginning.  
His argument appeared to be based on his skewed understanding of relative 
seniority of himself and Fyers, but does demonstrate a less that cordial working 
relationship between the senior engineers.  Another comment from Jones sums 
up his view of the leadership of the whole campaign :  
 
The nomination of Lord Chatham was forced on the Ministry by George 
III ... Lord C was a man so notoriously indolent as to have acquired the 
soubriquet of the ÔlateÕ earl ... He was sadly embarrassed in his 
circumstances, and if he should not attain fame he was at all events 
certain to acquire the means of paying his debts.  The second in 
command was a man of acknowledged gallantry and of much 
experience, but sadly deficient in headpiece, if not actually labouring 
under the aberration of intellect which shortly afterwards caused his ruin. 
Of the General officers, some were better known on the turf than in the 
field, É and only one or two had any recent military experience. 
Furthermore, the honours and pensions bestowed on the captors of 
Copenhagen two years previously drew forth from their snug abodes the 
heads of the military departments under the expectation of similar 
recompenses. Thus a veteran who had held a snug and lucrative post at 
Woolwich for more than thirty years and who had never served in the 
field except as a subaltern, now reappeared on the stage as 
Commanding Officer of Artillery; and an equally old officer, precisely on 
an equality with the last described, with respect to experience and 
service, came forth from an office in London as Commanding Engineer 
É Such was the experience and energy brought together to command a 
force destined to invade the French territory and contend with the most 
active and intelligent troops the world ever saw. 129 
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This was the background with which the middle-ranking engineer officers faced 
the major task ahead in the Peninsula.  Their expectation was that they could 
not rely on help from above and would have to make do with their own best 
efforts. 
3.2.5.  SUMMARY. 
The section started with two questions : 
− Was the training the Royal Engineer Officers received appropriate for 
their needs? 
− Was the engineering support they received adequate? 
 
The Royal Military Academy provided a standard education to artillery and 
engineer cadets.  The majority of the cadets were destined to serve in the Royal 
Artillery and the education had to be tailored to meet the needs of both corps.  
Such a situation will always lead to compromises.  Engineering commissions 
were typically seen as the preferred objective and the best students usually 
chose the Royal Engineers.  Through continued attendance or secondment to 
the Ordnance Survey new engineer officers were able to gain some further 
training and experience after being commissioned.  The syllabus at that time is 
shown in Appendix A.  A major part of the syllabus covered the attack and 
defence of fortifications.  What was lacking at this time was practical experience 
of the various activities.  A complaint of the engineer officers was that they had 
no real experience before they arrived at their first siege.  Whilst a complaint 
such as never having made a fascine or gabion could be easily remedied, it is 
less likely that the full challenges of a real siege could be practiced.  The major 
problems in actual operations were dealing with the limitations of time, 
resources and men, these would be even harder to teach.  The officers who 
were most useful in the field were those who were most able to adapt to the 
circumstances.  It should also be noted that almost all complaints about lack of 
training were related to siege work.  As will be described later, undertaking 
sieges was only a small part of an engineers role.  They had adequate training 
for the other roles they undertook. 
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Much of the writing on the Royal Military Academy (and also the Royal Military 
College) focuses on the negative, the bullying, the poor discipline and the 
relaxing of examination requirements.  These were all real problems, but 
focussing on these elements masks the fact that cadets received education that 
did help them when they were commissioned.  Even when the examinations 
were suspended, cadets were only recommended for commissions when the 
masters thought they were capable of being useful.  One can understand that 
the purists and often the new officers themselves felt that standards were not 
good enough, but the fact is that the engineer and artillery officers who were 
commissioned were able to perform their duties.  Where they had no 
experience, they, like the army officers had to learn as best they could.  The 
demands of war often lead to compromises and the output of the Royal Military 
Academy was not exempt from the realities of war.   
 
The limitations in education were addressed as the war progressed, both 
through peer education and through improvements at home.  From 1812, all 
new engineer officers received several months practical training before being 
sent abroad.  The officers in the field shared information and also prepared 
instructions which were sent home for use in the schools.   The training of the 
Royal Engineers was not perfect, but it did give officers a grounding in the 
principles they needed.  As the war progressed the training of cadets and 
officers improved. 
 
The situation with regard to engineering support is less satisfactory.  Broadly, it 
would be true to say that there was no effective engineering support for 
operational activities at the start of the Peninsular War.  The Royal Military 
Artificers could best be described as static garrison soldiers.  Whilst this fact 
was appreciated it needed the painful experience of a major siege to bring the 
seriousness of the situation to the commanders.  Before 1812, the presence of 
engineering artificers at a siege was effectively non-existent.  The two sieges of 
Badajoz in 1811 started the impetus that eventually led to the formation of the 
School of Military Engineering in April 1812.  It should not be forgotten that the 
biggest change was the decision to make the Royal Military Artificer companies 
mobile in mid 1811.  This was the decision that allowed artificers companies to 
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be despatched into the field.  The engineer officers continued to struggle with 
the lack of support until the end of 1812, Burgos being the first siege where the 
newly trained sappers were available.  From 1813 the number of trained 
sappers increased and, more importantly, they also had consistent leadership 
through nominated engineer officers and their own sub-lieutenants.  The junior 
engineer officers had also taught and trained with the sappers at the School of 
Military Engineering and they knew each other when they went on campaign.  
The work of Palsey particularly had a huge impact on turning the Royal Military 
Artificers from a liability into an effective military engineering force. 
3.3.  Analysis of Royal Engineers Officers 
The men who joined the Corps of Royal Engineers during the late 18th and early 
19th centuries performed a very different role from most officers in the British 
army of the time. Unlike their peers in the line and to a lesser extent, the 
artillery, the engineer officer typically worked and lived with the senior officers in 
the army.  Their usefulness was often not restricted to the engineering skills and 
experience which they possessed but often encompassed wider responsibilities 
where the generals needed an intelligent officer to perform some activity.  
These roles often overlapped with those of the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs 
department, the Royal Staff Corps and Aides-de-Camp.  This section will look at 
the type of person who joined the Royal Engineers and analyse their 
background, their progress in the military and their personal lives.  
3.3.1.  WHO JOINED THE ROYAL ENGINEERS?  
Entrance into the Royal Engineers was, in theory, open to anyone, but in 
practice there were restrictions placed on those who could enter.  Up to 1774, 
entry was based solely on the recommendation of the Master-General of the 
Ordnance.  To gain such a recommendation, required access to the offices of 
the Master-General and also the recommendation and patronage of someone 
of note who could champion the potential cadetÕs case.  
 
In 1774, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Military Academy successfully 
argued that an entrance examination was required to ensure that some basic 
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level of education was received by all applicants prior to joining the Academy.  
The entrance examinations were of such a level that it was essential that the 
applicant had received significant schooling prior to joining.  This in turn 
required sufficient wealth to allow the child to either receive private tuition or to 
attend preparatory school.  So although there were no limits based on position 
in society, there were obvious boundaries based on the need for sufficient 
wealth to put the child through schooling. 
 
However, one difference between the Ordnance and the army was that 
commissions did not need to be purchased.  So a prospective parent could 
save the £400 price of an Ensigncy in the line, if he could get his child into the 
Ordnance.  Similarly, because promotion in the Ordnance was based on 
seniority, the prospect was there for steady progression through the ranks 
without further expenditure.  On the other hand, this was perceived to be much 
slower than progression in the army through the purchase system.  To reach 
the highest ranks in the Royal Engineers could take fifty years. 
 
Guggisberg suggests that there was a difference of opinion between the cadets 
themselves and their sponsors.  Many of the cadets realised that to graduate 
from the Academy typically required two to four years of hard work.  Exam 
failure, or in some cases, expulsion, was likely to require the parents who had 
set their mind on their son entering the military, to purchase a commission, 
which got the son the rank without the effort.  
 
It should also be remembered, though, that there was a tradition of military 
families in Britain similar to that in France, where positions were almost 
guaranteed to sons from families with generations of service.  The letters of the 
officers of the British army through this period, confirm that patronage and 
connections were still important parts of the process of obtaining commissions 
and later promotion.  Even the French Revolution did not destroy this link in the 
French army.  Blaufarb describes this at some length in his recent work on the 
French Army.130  Can this traditional link be demonstrated in the applicants to 
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the Ordnance?  The table below shows the occupation of the fathers of several 
of the Royal Engineer officers.131  
 
Table 3b. Occupation of fathers of Royal Engineer officers. 
Background 
(Father) 
 Total 
Ordnance TM Dickens132, EW Durnford, F Fyers133, WC 
Holloway, HD Jones, JT Jones, GCD Lewis,  
C Mann, GF Macleod,RZ Mudge134,  
FW Mulcaster, AW Robe, CW Rudyerd,  
JMF Smith, HP Wulff 
15 
RMA staff RH Bonnycastle, GT Landmann 2 
Army / Militia JR Arnold, JF Burgoyne, C Boothby,  
ST Dickens135, GH Henderson, J Jebb136,  
R Jones, JS Macaulay137, L Machell,  
GF Macleod138, G Nicholls, G C Ross,139  
C Shipley, PO Skene, GIP West,  
FW Whinyates140 
16 
Navy /  
Royal 
Marines 
W Bennett,141 MC Dixon142; E Fanshawe143,  
A Fraser144, H Elphinstone145; J Oldfield,  
L Peake146, JE Portlock, JN Wells 
9 
Clergy R Fletcher, G Gipps, W Gregory, GC Hoste,147 R 
Morse, W Reid, RJ Shipley 
7 
Civil Service 
& GovÕt 
J By, W Nicholas148, A Walpole149 3 
Royalty J Mackelcan150 1 
Doctor J Carmichael Smyth, J Squire, FR Thackeray 3 
Law J Longley, RJ Vicars 2 
Total  58 
                                            
131
 All 280 Royal Engineer officers were investigated.  The table show the officers where details 
of the father could be determined.. 
132
 Brother Charles in RA, Brother J.T. in RN 
133
 Father was Willam Fyers RE 
134
 Father was William Mudge RA, third Director of Ordnance Survey. 
135
 Father was Lieut-Col. Thomas Dickens, 1
st
 Foot. 
136
 Father was Lieut-Col. in Scarsdale Volunteers. 
137
 Father was a Surgeon in 33
rd
 Foot. 
138
 Two brothers in the RA and one in the Army. 
139
 Father was Uncle of Sir Hew Dalrymple. 
140
 Two brothers in the Navy, one in the RA and one in the EIC. 
141
 Grandfather was Admiral William Bennett. 
142
 Father Admiral Sir Manley Dixon; brother Manley Hall Dixon RN. 
143
 Father was Captain Robert Fanshawe RN. 
144
 Father was Vice-Admiral Fraser. 
145
 Father was Captain John Elphinstone, R.N 
146
 Father was Sir Henry Peake, Surveyor of the Navy. 
147
 Two brothers in Royal Navy. 
148
 Grandfather was Admiral Sir Thomas Frankland, Bart. 
149
 Sixth son of the Hon. Robert Walpole. 
150
 Illegitimate son of George III. 
Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
 81 
 
The table above shows officers in the corps for whom parentage could be 
determined and represents roughly 20% of the total number.  Of the sample, 
72% of the officers came from families where the father had a military 
connection.  The remainder came from ÔprofessionalÕ families, with no evidence 
of cadetships being given to the trades or working classes.  As mentioned 
above, this is almost certainly due to the high educational requirements to gain 
admittance.  The footnotes to Table 3b show, many officers also had other 
relations in the military.  
 
The figures above suggest that there was a strong relationship between the 
cadets joining the Ordnance and previous military service in their families. It is 
also interesting to note the near equivalence of sons of ordnance and army 
officers.  As there are a great many more army officers (ten thousand against 
two hundred), it suggests a strong tendency for sons to follow their fathers 
footsteps into the ordnance. 
3.3.2.  COMPARISON WITH THE ARMY. 
As discussed above, the early days of the Royal Military Academy were 
characterised by indiscipline amongst the students, but the subaltern officers 
who left the Academy had a level of education which was far above what was 
available in the army.  Obtaining a commission in the army had some 
similarities and some differences from the ordnance.  The major difference was 
pre-requisites in terms of education.  The basic requirement to obtain a 
commission was to be at least sixteen years old, with the recommendation of at 
least a Major in the army as to the applicantÕs character, education and bodily 
health.  
 
Against common perception, most first commissions were not purchased, but 
obtained free. Purchase of a commission was usually necessary to obtain a 
regiment of choice, and was much more prevalent in the cavalry (nearly 50% 
against an average of 20% in the army overall).  A further 70% of promotions 
were by seniority with the remaining 10% being recommendations by the 
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Commander-in-Chief.  Glover comments that in many popular regiments, 
promotion by purchase was not faster than promotion by seniority. 
 
The breakdown of first commissions was151 : 
 
Table 3c. Breakdown of obtaining first commission. 
From the ranks 5% 
From Volunteers 5% 
From the Royal Military College 4% 
From the Militia, for persuading forty men to sign up 20% 
Applying for commission 65% 
 
Regulations stated that within two years of joining his regiment, an officer had to 
be capable of commanding and exercising a troop or company in every 
situation.  After that, any other education was at the discretion and diligence of 
the Colonel of the regiment. 
 
Another common misunderstanding was that the officer class was populated 
from the landed gentry and nobility.  Glover records that there were only 140 
Peers or sons of Peers among the 10,000 officers in the army.  Similarly the 
representation from the great Public Schools was below 300.  The majority of 
Peers and ex-public school officers were concentrated in the Guards and the 
cavalry, the proportions being around 57% in both cases.  This left less than 
200 officers in total, spread across the rest of the army.152 
3.3.3.  PATRONAGE & FRIENDS 
The Ordnance officers were a very close knit community.  Apart from working 
with a small number of colleagues who they got to know very well, they also 
socialised with their peers. On campaign, they usually shared accommodation, 
when there were other Ordnance officers present.  Several also married 
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relations of other officers.  At least thirteen of these officers married into a 
military family, several of them being Ordnance families.153  
 
The Ordnance officers had a very different relationship with senior army 
commanders than regular army officers. There are four reasons for this : 
 
They were not part of the army hierarchy.  As previously mentioned, the 
artillery and engineer officers were responsible to the Board of Ordnance, not to 
Horse Guards.  This had both advantages and disadvantages.  One 
disadvantage was that they were not eligible for staff positions with the army, a 
task that many would have filled very capably.  Army commanders had limited 
opportunities to recognise their efforts.  Generally, an army officer could 
suggest that an engineer officer was promoted for his efforts, but could not 
recommend it.154  The award of brevet army ranks was used, but rank within the 
corps could not be altered.  However, the award of brevet ranks caused major 
issues in the Peninsula, as Second Captains in the Ordnance were not entitled 
to awards of brevet ranks.   As there were several Second Captains serving in 
the Peninsula, this caused great resentment.  It was eventually overturned in 
1813, when a group of artillery officers gained WellingtonÕs support and he took 
the matter up directly with the Prince Regent.155  On the advantage side, the 
engineer officers in the Peninsula had a great deal of autonomy because the 
senior officers of the Ordnance were not present.  Most of these officers would 
have been very happy to be outside of the control of Ordnance headquarters.  
The absence of these senior Ordnance officers from the campaigns meant that 
many engineer officers got to know the senior commanders in the army, and in 
several cases they had served with these generals before the start of the 
Peninsular War.  This helped both in securing places on operational campaigns, 
and in quickly fitting in to the army or divisional headquarters when they arrived. 
                                            
153 William Bennett, Richard Bonnycastle, Ralph Bruyeres, Henry Cardew, Edward Fanshaw, 
Richard Fletcher, George Gipps, Alexander Hall, John Handfield, Charles Holloway, William 
Holloway, James Carmichael Smyth and Frederick Mulcaster. 
154
 One example of this was WellingtonÕs active support for the promotion of Captain Chapman 
after he returned to England in 1811. Wellington wrote at length to show his support for 
ChapmanÕs claim for promotion.  WO5/599, pp.316-319. 
155
 M. Glover, Wellington as Military Commander (London, 1973). Sphere Books edition, p. 221. 
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They had regular contact with senior army commanders.  Because the 
number of engineer officers was so small, they were probably all known to the 
senior army commanders.  On campaign, many were attached to Headquarters 
or divisional command and worked directly for the senior commander.  From the 
lowest ranks in the Royal Engineers, they could receive orders directly from the 
army commanders and could make reports directly back to them.  It was this 
sort of responsibility and direct contact that got officers noticed and could have 
an impact on future assignments and promotion prospects.  One example is 
Burgoyne using his prior involvement with Sir John Moore to write to him and 
secure a place on the planned campaign in Sweden in 1808.156 
Greater responsibility for their rank. Most officers in the Royal Engineers 
undertook tasks that would normally have been entrusted to much more senior 
officers in the army.  The Commanding Royal Engineer for most of the 
Peninsular War was Richard Fletcher.  When he first joined the Peninsular army 
in 1808, he held the Corps rank of Captain.  He was promoted to Lieutenant-
Colonel in 1809, but like the artillery officers was still very junior compared to 
the officers in the army.  This level of responsibility at low rank applied equally 
across the Royal Engineers.  One other example was Lieutenant ReidÕs 
attachment to General DÕEspaaÕs Spanish army in a staff liaison role in 
1811.157 
Engineer officers were usually part of a GeneralÕs family. As a general rule, 
engineer officers were included in the ÔfamiliesÕ of the various headquarters, 
whether they were WellingtonÕs, divisional or in some cases Spanish. They lived 
within the command structure, often working with the staff and ADCÕs to carry 
out the generalÕs orders. This wider role will be examined in more detail later.  
Because of this close relationship, they developed friendships and working 
relationships with the senior officers in the army. 
 
Apart from the particular Ordnance related differences, the officers still operated 
within the normal 19th century conventions of friendship and patronage.  
Because of the points mentioned above, many engineer officers did form 
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friendships with army officers who they had served with.  It was normal to help 
friends and relations get positions by using contacts and friendships.  Some 
examples are given below. 
 
Pasley was related to the Malcolm family who were great friends of Wellington. 
In 1811,  Captain Pulteney Malcolm RN, wrote to Wellington, asking if he could 
employ Pasley in the Peninsula.   
 
John Burgoyne was made Commanding Royal Engineer of the 1807 expedition 
to Egypt by General Fox, brother of BurgoyneÕs godfather.   
 
George Ross was educated by Sir Hew Dalrymple after his own fathers death.  
Ross wrote regularly to Dalrymple up to his death at Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812. 
 
John Squire was a great friend of Henry Bunbury, Under-Secretary for War.  
They had served together previously.  The correspondence of Squire and 
Bunbury is another rich source of information.  Several of SquireÕs letters were 
used by Napier in his history of the war.  Squire was also not above blatant 
attempts to use his contacts to better his position.  In one of his first letters to 
Bunbury after he arrived in the Peninsula, he asked Bunbury to see if he could 
get him transferred into another role which would be Ôvery agreeableÕ.158 
 
Stephen Chapman was a great friend of Henry Torrens, Military Secretary to 
the Commander-in-Chief.  Torrens was appointed by Wellington as his Military 
Secretary during the 1808 campaign in the Peninsula.  Torrens, was a confidant 
of Wellington, and their letters show the trust they had in each other.  Torrens 
wrote to Wellington twice, seeking his support for obtaining promotion for 
Chapman.159  Torrens in this correspondence also notes that he had raised the 
matter with the Commander-in-Chief. 
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building work at the fort of St Julian in Lisbon. He wanted Bunbury to request that he made a 
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Attempts to use connections were also used outside of family and friendship.  
During PasleyÕs stand-off with the Master-General about his promotion in 1812, 
he even wrote to General Eyre Coote asking him for a testimonial based on his 
services at Walcheren.  This is surprising due to the very critical comments 
Pasley made at the time about the command of this expedition. 
 
Because of the small number of officers in the Peninsula and their high profile 
around the senior officers, a significant proportion of them were mentioned in 
official correspondence.   It is likely that this high profile caused some jealousy 
back in England.  The officers themselves felt that their efforts were not 
appreciated and that there was a distinct lack of support from Ordnance 
headquarters in the award of brevet ranks.  This is maybe not surprising, since 
the active officers during the Peninsular War obtained their brevet ranks of 
Major and Lieutenant-Colonel much quicker than their superiors, in some cases 
in half the time.160  In most cases these brevet awards were for service in the 
field, which is exactly the same reason why many were awarded in the army.  
The awarding of brevet army ranks did not follow the same sequence as corps 
rank and this did cause some confusion.  There were a number of occasions 
where questions were asked about whether corps or army rank took 
precedence when deciding on command.  This will be considered below. 
3.3.4.  LATER POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The inability to sell an engineer commission and the promotion by seniority 
meant that most officers remained with the corps.  Of the two hundred and 
eighty officers who served in the corps during the Peninsular War, only twenty-
four went on to Half-Pay.  Ten of that number went on to Half-Pay around 1824 
when the Ordnance was trying to reduce the huge backlog of cadets waiting for 
commissions.  A further officer went on Half-Pay in 1813 as a result of losing his 
leg at the battle of Talavera.161  Only five of these twenty-four officers 
subsequently retired, the remaining nineteen staying on half-pay until they died. 
                                            
160
 Pasley, Burgoyne, Goldfinch and Jones made brevet Lieut.-Colonel in 14-15 years. Gother 
Mann, the Inspector-General of Fortifications at that time took 34 years. See Appendix J for a 
sample of the times taken for various officers. 
161
 Charles Boothby. 
Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
 87 
 
Seventy-eight officers retired (including the five mentioned above).  Seven of 
these retirements were around the 1824-25 period of restructuring.  Of the 
remainder the majority had around forty years service with very few of them 
having less than thirty years.  This would mean that most of these officers 
would still have been serving past fifty and some would have been in their 
sixties.  William Twiss served until he was sixty-five, Nepean to sixty-seven, 
Morse to sixty-eight, Charles Holloway until seventy-five and Samuel Dickens 
until eighty-three.  The longest serving and oldest was Gother Mann who 
served as Inspector General of Fortifications until his death at the age of eighty-
four, by which time he had served for sixty-seven years. 
 
This leaves around one hundred and eighty officers who remained with the 
Corps until their death.  Deaths on active service account for about thirty of this 
number, so around one hundred and fifty, which is over half of the total served 
with the corps until they died. 
 
Of the two hundred and eighty officers, one hundred and one remained to make 
Colonel and forty continued through to the highest rank of Colonel-
Commandant.  This shows the resilience of the officers as there were only 
around five posts as Colonel Commandant and ten as Colonel, in the 
establishment of the corps. 
 
The summary above shows that most engineer officers remained in the Corps 
for the whole of their career and in many cases the whole of their life.  Some did 
make the transition to positions of responsibility outside of the Corps.  Several 
went to hold senior positions of responsibility in the empire.  In almost all cases 
it was their education as an engineer that led to their future appointments.  The 
following section highlights some of the future activities of these officers.  It is 
also worth noting that several of these positions were held whilst still retaining 
their Royal Engineer commissions.   
 
− George Barney made Lieutenant-Governor of North Australia in 1846.  
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− John By supervised the construction of the Rideau canal in Canada from 
1826-32 and founded Bytown, which later became Ottawa. 
− Stephen Chapman was Governor of Bermuda 1832-9. 
− Thomas Colby spent his whole career working on Ordnance Survey and 
was one of the founder members of the Royal Astronomical Society. 
− George Gipps was Private Secretary to first Lord of the Admiralty from 
1834 and Governor of New South Wales and New Zealand from 1838-
46. 
− George Graydon was Lieutenant-Governor St Lucia from 1841. 
− Francis Bond Head was Lieut.-Governor of Upper Canada from 1835-37. 
− George Harding was Lieutenant-Governor Guernsey from 1855. 
− George H Henderson was founder/Director of London & South Western 
Railway Company & Southampton Gas and Light Company.  
− Joshua Jebb was made Surveyor-General of prisons in 1837 and in 1844 
he was made Inspector General of military prisons.  
− William Reid was Governor of Bermuda from 1838-46 and Governor of 
Windward Islands in 1846. He was knighted in 1851 for his service as 
Chairman of the Great Exhibition.  He was then Governor of Malta from 
1851-1858. 
− Charles Shipley was Governor of Grenada from1813-15. 
− James Carmichael Smyth was Governor of the Bahamas from 1829 and 
Governor of Guyana from 1833. 
− James Vetch was appointed to the commission for settling the Irish 
boundaries.  From 1836-1840 he was the Chief Engineer for Birmingham 
and Gloucester Railway. He designed the drainage system for Leeds 
and Windsor, including Windsor castle. 
3.3.5.  SUMMARY 
The conclusions from this research is that there is a strong family tradition of 
service in the military shown in the officers who served in the Royal Engineers.  
There is no evidence of the introduction of officers from the new class of 
business men that were emerging in England at this time.  The majority of the 
officers completed their whole life in the Corps.  Therefore, being an engineer 
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was seen as a lifetimeÕs occupation and not as a career step to something 
ÔbetterÕ. 
 
In many cases the officers took an active interest in science and engineering 
outside of their profession and in most cases they belonged to local and major 
interest groups.  Membership of the Royal Society, the arts, Civil Engineers and 
the Astronomical Society were quite normal.  They clearly were well respected 
in society.  One example was Thomas Colby, who was nominated to the 
Institute of Civil Engineers by Thomas Telford. 
 
Several officers moved on to civil positions in their later careers.  It is not 
surprising that many of these posts were in distant locations of the British 
Empire.  These officers had served abroad and understood what was required.  
Often the officers are better known abroad than they are at home.  The 
Dictionary of Canadian National Biography has information on several officers, 
because of the important roles they played in the formation of that country. 
There are similar entries in a number of Australian publications.162  This small 
group of engineer officers had a material effect on many countries around the 
globe and they have a lasting legacy to the good work of the Royal Engineers. 
3.4. Careers of the Engineer officers  
Between 1808 and 1815, there were two hundred and eighty officers who 
served at some point in time in the Corps of Royal Engineers.  This number of 
officers had to provide engineering support to the whole of the British Empire, 
with the exception of India, which was separately resourced by the East India 
Company.  This section will review the distribution of the officers around the 
globe to meet the demands of the Empire, and the growing and conflicting 
needs of the wars in Europe and worldwide. 
 
Seniority was as great a source of comment and concern in the Corps of 
Engineers as it was in the army, which is perhaps surprising when promotion in 
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the engineers was fixed by seniority.  The different methods of promotion 
between the Corps and the army will be described followed by and examination 
of the time taken to reach the higher ranks and an analysis of whether 
promotion by seniority was strictly followed.  This will lead in to a review of the 
command of the engineers in the Peninsula and the issues that seniority and 
brevet promotions brought. 
 
The analysis will continue by looking at the officersÕ operational experience and 
consider what experience they brought to the campaigns in the Peninsula from 
1808 to 1814.  The number of officers with significant experience was very 
small, but many of them wrote a great deal through this period and much can 
be learnt from their correspondence.  The  casualty rates for the period will be 
reviewed and compared with those of the army. 
3.4.1.  SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE CORPS OF 
ROYAL ENGINEERS 
Officer Numbers 
Between 1808 and 1815, there were two hundred and eighty officers who 
served in the Corps of Royal Engineers.  The largest number in any one year, 
during this period, was two hundred and twenty-nine in 1815.163  The total 
number of engineer officers had risen steadily from one hundred and forty-three 
in 1808, constantly trying to train enough new officers to reach the approved 
establishment level, which peaked at two hundred and sixty-two in 1813.164  
The actual number of officers continued to rise after the war to a maximum of 
two hundred and sixty-one in 1817, as cadets already in the system were 
commissioned, before the effect of the peace caused the establishment to be 
slashed. 
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Table 3d. Actual and Establishment levels in the Royal Engineers.165 
Actual 1796 1800 1802 1806 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 
Colonel 
Comm. 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Colonel 5 5 6 5 6 6 6 7 9 8 9 9 
Lieut.-Col. 6 6 6 10 12 12 15 15 16 16 22 22 
Captain 16 17 20 24 30 30 35 35 40 40 45 45 
2nd Captain 14 19 20 25 31 31 36 36 41 41 47 46 
1st Lieut. 27 30 41 46 51 61 67 71 80 77 77 89 
2nd Lieut. 14 13 2 4 9 29 18 24 0
166
 14 12 13 
Brigade 
Major 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Total 85 93 98 118 143 173 182 193 191 201 217 229 
EstablishmÕt 94 114 113 157 172 201 201 229 229 262 262 262 
% of Lieuts 48% 46% 44% 42% 42% 52% 47% 49% 42% 45% 41% 45% 
% of CaptÕs 35% 39% 41% 42% 43% 35% 39% 37% 42% 40% 42% 40% 
 
The number of engineer officers nearly trebled between the French Revolution 
and Waterloo, reflecting the increasing demand for skilled officers.  Over the 
same period that size of the army grew from around 40,000 in 1793167 to 
around 230,000168 and the artillery grew from around 4,000169 to 27,000.170  
Although at first glance there was a significant increase in the number of 
engineers, the Royal Engineers grew less quickly than the other parts of 
BritainÕs military establishment. 
The Location of Engineers at Home and Abroad 
The Corps of Royal Engineers had to provide resources across the whole of the 
British Empire, with the exception of India.  The Napoleonic Wars put a massive 
strain on the Corps in trying to meet this demand from their very limited 
resources.  The expansion of the British Empire during this period  placed 
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additional strain on the establishment.  The conflict with the United States led to 
further demand which in the short term was difficult to meet. 
 
The geographical spread of these officers was as follows : 
 
Table 3e. Royal Engineer Officers by Location. 
Location Jan 1809171 Jan 1811172 Jan 1813173 
Great Britain 77 67 77 
Ireland 14 22 17 
North America 16 15 15 
Caribbean 10 10 10 
Africa & Asia 8 9 7 
Mediterranean 24 30 32 
Iberian Peninsula 25 42 39 
Others 2 2 3 
Total 176 197 200 
 
This table highlights a number of points.  Through the whole period, around half 
of all engineer officers were based in the United Kingdom.  Many of these were 
newly commissioned officers and assigned to local districts or the Ordnance 
Survey whilst they gained experience.  From 1812 onwards, all newly 
commissioned engineer officers spent time at the School of Military 
Engineering.  Table 3f shows the number of junior engineers in the corps, in 
selected years. 
 
Table 3f. Newly Commissioned Engineer Officers 
 1809 1811 1813 
Commissioned previous year 26 14 13 
Total 2nd Lieutenants 29 24 14 
Total 1st Lieutenants 61 71 77 
 
The proportion in the United Kingdom dropped over the period from 52% in 
1809 to 47% in 1813, showing that more officers were being posted outside of 
the United Kingdom, which was inevitable during a war.  The percentage of 
engineers who were not in the Peninsula or Mediterranean averaged around 
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65%.  It can be generalised that this group was involved in garrison duty.  So, at 
any one time during the Peninsular War, two thirds of the corps were not 
involved in the war.  The percentage is actually higher than this, as the majority 
of the engineers serving in the Mediterranean were not involved in active 
operations (the exceptions being Gibraltar and Cadiz).  
 
The increase in the engineer establishment during this period was used to 
supply officers for the operations in the Peninsula with the proportion of the total 
rising from 14% through to 20%.  Towards the end of 1813, the proportion 
peaked at 25%.  There was also an increase in the officers serving in the 
Mediterranean.  The actual numbers serving in the United Kingdom, the 
Americas and elsewhere remained static throughout the period with almost all 
spare staff being directed to operations in Europe. 
 
Table 3g. Officer numbers summary174 
 1809 1811 1813 
Great Britain and Ireland 91 89 94 
Americas and Caribbean 26 25 25 
Peninsula and Mediterranean 49 72 71 
Others 10 11 10 
Total 176 197 200 
 
Further analysis reveals that many of the officers who were located at the 
remote stations around the world did not move often, if at all.  This was partly 
due to the accumulation of local knowledge, but was also, in part, due to the 
very serious travel limitations during the age of sail.  Whilst passage of the 
Atlantic was usually a voyage of a few weeks, the journey to far flung outposts 
like Ceylon could take up to nine months.  
Engineers in the Peninsula 
Eighty-six (31%) engineer officers served at some point during the Peninsular 
War with the Duke of Wellington.  This number increased to ninety-seven 
officers who either served in the Peninsula with Wellington or during the 
Spanish east coast campaign of 1812 to 1813, which is roughly 35% of all 
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engineer officers.175  Sixty-six officers served in the Mediterranean, the Spanish 
fortresses or the campaign on the east coast of Spain (this covers Cadiz, 
Gibraltar, Tarifa, Sicily, Minorca, Malta, Madeira, Genoa, Ionian islands and 
Corsica).  In total, one hundred and thirty-four176 different engineer officers 
served at some time in the Peninsula or the Mediterranean between 1808 and 
the end of the war, which is 48% of the total of Corps of Royal Engineers over 
that period. 
 
The maximum number in the Peninsula at any one time peaked at forty-five in 
the summer of 1813.  The number had been growing steadily through the war, 
with roughly fifteen in 1809, twenty in 1810, thirty in 1811 and 1812 and forty in 
1813 and 1814. 
 
The longest serving officer was Captain Frank Stanway who served the full six 
years from summer 1808 to summer 1814, with John Burgoyne serving only a 
few months less.  The average length of service in the Peninsula was 
approximately twenty-one months.177  Many of the officers spent a significant 
time in the Peninsula and their knowledge and experience must have grown 
over the period.  Nineteen officers served more than three years and thirty-four 
served over two years. 
 
The number in the Peninsula was never enough to meet the operational 
demands.  There were occasions when Wellington said that he did not have 
engineer officers for a particular task.  Through the peak years of 1811 and 
1812, the casualties were particularly high and the influx of new officers did not 
lead to an overall increase in numbers. 
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Table 3h. Officers killed and wounded in the Peninsula 
Year Killed Wounded178 
1808  1 
1809 1 2 
1810 2  
1811 6 4 
1812 9 17 
1813 5 8 
1814 2 2 
Total 25 33 
 
Reacting to the demand, Wellington wrote to Liverpool on 31 March 1811,179 
forwarding a letter from Fletcher and asking for more engineers to be sent out.  
Several new officers did come out later in the year, but the total number of 
officers available did not change due to the casualties.  Whilst some of the 
wounds suffered by officers were minor and did not have any long term effect, 
some were much more serious. Boothby lost a leg at Talavera in 1809.  In 
1812, J.T. Jones, W.C. Holloway and Macleod were wounded; in 1813 G.C. 
Lewis lost a leg and Barry was wounded.  None of these officers returned to the 
Peninsula. 
 
Throughout most of the war there was a fairly consistent presence of a small 
number of senior engineer officers.  Between 1809 and 1813, Wellington dealt 
almost exclusively with Fletcher, J.T. Jones and Burgoyne.  Jones was injured 
at the end of 1812 and returned to England.  When Fletcher was killed in 1813, 
he was replaced by Elphinstone who was present until the end of the war.  
Burgoyne was present throughout.  This gave Wellington a stability in his 
dealing with the Royal Engineers that he never achieved with the Royal 
Artillery, until he appointed Dickson in mid 1813.  He may not have liked 
Fletcher or Elphinstone, but he could work with them.  Wellington certainly had 
confidence in Burgoyne and Jones.   
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3.4.2. SENIORITY AND COMMAND 
Comparison of Promotion in the Ordnance Department and Horse Guards 
Very different systems were used by the army and the Ordnance for the 
promotion of officers.  The army followed a process based on the historical 
precedent of the regiment being the personal possession of its colonel.  The 
regiment was a business, in which the colonel, if he ran it efficiently (or some 
would say negligently) could make a profit.  Britain got a body of trained and 
equipped men partly funded at someone elseÕs expense.  Officers bought their 
rank and saw it as an investment, which could be cashed in or exchanged at a 
later date.  The system of purchase was seen as discriminatory and favouring 
those with money.  It was claimed to introduce those who had no interest or 
talent into the army to the detriment of its effectiveness.  The period 
immediately preceding the wars with France from 1793 reinforced this view 
through an ineffective or non-existent British Commander-in-Chief, who allowed 
permanent rank to those with no military experience.  The arrival of the Duke of 
York in 1794 slowly brought about a change which eventually put some order 
into the system.  One of the major changes was the introduction of minimum 
periods of service at a rank before an officer was allowed to purchase a 
promotion to the next rank.  This was set at two years in the regular army 
before a Lieutenant could purchase a Captaincy, and six years for a Majority.180  
The purchase system could only be used up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. 
 
The Ordnance followed the more equitable policy of promotion by seniority.  
Each officer was promoted to the next rank based on his length of service in the 
Corps with no exceptions.  There was also no opportunity to sell the rank and 
no pension, except for injury181, so officers often remained until death.  Whilst 
this system appeared fairer, it led to almost complete stagnation in the upper 
ranks and the consequent lack of opportunities for younger officers.  More 
seriously, the development of the Corps was stifled by these same old men who 
saw no need to change the way they had operated through the second half of 
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the 18th century.  Most of these officers had no operational experience in 
mainland Europe and their knowledge, if they had any, was based on 
operations in North America, the Caribbean and India.  Generally though, the 
Ordnance officers accepted the process and knew that persistence would 
eventually gain them the senior ranks and the benefits that went with them. 
 
With the added complexity of brevet ranks in the army, there was still 
opportunity for tensions and disagreements. One example occurred in early 
1812 following the successful siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.  Burgoyne was the 
siege director, under the Commanding Royal Engineer in the Peninsula, 
Richard Fletcher.  Jones was the Brigade-Major and Macleod, one of the 
engineers at the siege.  In WellingtonÕs despatch after the siege, dated 20 
January 1812,182 Macleod got a mention in passing and Jones got a thanks 
from Wellington along with Fletcher as the Senior Engineer.  Through an 
oversight, Burgoyne was not mentioned.  Based on them being mentioned in 
despatches, Jones and Macleod received their brevet army rank of Major.  Less 
than two weeks after Wellington wrote his despatch, Charles Pasley was writing 
from England to Burgoyne :  
 
You have been unlucky in having two junior officers promoted over you, 
who were employed on the same service. MacleodÕs case in particular is 
a great shame, his father took advantage of the mere mention of his 
name, and settled the matter in a moment.183 
 
Macleod and Jones were below Burgoyne in the corps seniority list and by 
getting their brevet army rank first could have a claim to seniority.  JonesÕ 
promotion was justified but it appears Macleod got his because his father was a 
Major-General in the Royal Artillery.  Wellington realised the mistake and it was 
quickly resolved, with Burgoyne also receiving a brevet army Majority with the 
same effective date as Jones and Macleod.184  The imbalance was restored, a 
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few months later, when Burgoyne and Jones got their brevet army promotion to 
Lieutenant-Colonel, Macleod not getting his until 1817. 
 
Pasley was embroiled in a similar argument with the Ordnance at the same time 
as described above.  He had been asked to form the School of Military 
Engineering, which he had been arguing for years was desperately needed.  
However, he expected to receive his brevet Majority for this role and the 
Master-General would not agree.  Pasley refused to take up the role until the 
issue was resolved.  Along with the issue of rank in the Portuguese army, 
brevet army ranks caused a number of problems during the war in the 
engineers, the artillery and the army. This will be discussed further below. 
 
Though the system of purchase was seen as unfair, in practice it did produce 
some good results and wealth was not necessarily a barrier to talent.  In some 
ways the purchase system followed in principle the system in use in France up 
to the start of the Revolutionary wars, where families (often gentry) with 
generations of service held key posts and were admitted to the ecole militaire in 
preference to their poorer countrymen.  This is discussed at some length in 
BlaufarbÕs book on the French army.185  There is similar evidence in this country 
of families with generations of military service providing excellent officers. 
 
The Duke of York reformed the purchase system, but recognised that it could 
not be replaced easily due to the sums invested in it by the officers.  He advised 
against the introduction of purchase for the East India Company and did not 
allow it in the Royal Staff Corps.186  His preference, based on the advice he 
gave to the East India Company was for promotion by seniority up to the rank of 
Captain, and then by merit.  This was a compromise solution between that 
which operated in the army and that which operated in the Ordnance.  
 
In December 1814, the Master-General broke the hallowed seniority tradition for 
the highest rank of Colonel-Commandant, arguing :  
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he cannot conceive that the possibility of breaking the routine of seniority 
by succession in consequence of distinguished services, can hurt the 
emulation or break the spirit of the corps.187 
 
This change was strongly opposed by the officers themselves who saw their 
guaranteed (but slow) promotion prospects being eroded.  The Master-General 
went on to explain that he could not change his decision, particularly as he had 
received the Prince RegentÕs ÔpleasureÕ to make this change.  The officers saw 
it differently.  As brevet army promotions had shown, promotion based on 
performance could give an advantage to those in the right place at the right 
time, which some would argue was unfair.  Garrison and headquarters duty was 
not as exciting (or dangerous!) but it was still a necessary task. 
Time taken to gain promotion in the Corps188 
Earlier, the different methods of promotion between the Ordnance and the 
Horse Guards were described.  In this section, the time taken to rise through 
the ranks within the Royal Engineers will be reviewed.  For the analysis, the 
time to rise from an officersÕ first commission as 2nd Lieutenant, to the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel has been used.  Of the officers who were still active during 
the Peninsular War, there were forty-eight who reached the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel.  The earliest was Robert Morse in 1783 and the last, John Burgoyne in 
December 1814. 
 
Twenty-one were appointed before the Peninsular War started (that is twenty-
one, in the twenty-five years between 1783 and 1808), with twenty-seven being 
appointed in the following six years between 1809 and 1814.  It was not just the 
volume of appointments that changed during the period.  The time taken to 
reach the rank also decreased at the periods of maximum demand for officers.  
The longest time was Gother Mann, who obtained his rank in 1793, nearly 
thirty-one years after being commissioned.189  The shortest was between 
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sixteen and seventeen years for six officers promoted in the years 1806 and 
1814.  The time taken dropped from an average of around twenty-seven years 
before 1800, to twenty-one years, up to the start of the Peninsular War and then 
down to around eighteen years during the war.  The surplus of officers after the 
war, immediately pushed the average time back up to twenty-five years.  The 
officers who gained much faster promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel, were 
fortunate to be able to take advantage of the rapid increase in the size of the 
corps.  The number of Lieutenant-Colonels on the establishment grew from 
eight in 1805, to ten in 1806 (this is the 1806 blip in time to reach Lieutenant-
Colonel mentioned above), and on to the peak of twenty-two in 1814 (the 
second blip in time to reach Lieutenant-Colonel mentioned above). 
 
In the later years of the war, the time taken to rise from 2nd Lieutenant to 1st 
Lieutenant was about a year; to rise from 1st Lieutenant to 2nd Captain about 
four years.  Both of these times were significantly reduced from averages of five 
years and eight years respectively around 1780.  Further promotion came to a 
complete stop after the war with no promotions to Captain or Lieutenant-
Colonel between 1817 and 1824. 
 
There is no evidence of alteration in the principal of seniority which was used in 
the Royal Engineers.  Officers, whether on active service, employed at 
headquarters or on garrison duty were promoted in turn.  Two officers spent the 
whole period as prisoners of war, and still kept their place in the seniority 
lists.190  Recognition for exceptional effort came through brevet promotions and 
these invariably, but not always, went to officers on active duty.  Charles Pasley 
received his brevet promotions for his work in the training and education of the 
Sappers and Miners.  The difficulties caused by brevet ranks will be discussed 
below. 
 
                                            
190
 M.C. Dixon and A. Fraser were captured in 1808 and spent the rest of the war to 1814 at 
Verdun. They both received promotions to 2
nd
 Captain, when they were due in 1810/11 even 
though they were prisoners. 
Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
 101 
Michael GloverÕs analysis across the army showed an average time to reach 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the infantry, of 24.8 years by seniority and 17.6 years by 
purchase.  The figures for the cavalry, were not significantly different.  
 
Table 3i. Time taken to reach Lieutenant-Colonel In the Army.191 
(Years) Infantry by 
seniority 
Infantry by 
purchase 
Cavalry by 
seniority 
Cavalry by 
purchase 
Time to Lieut.-
Colonel 
24.8 17.6 24.2 16.7 
  
Comparing the time to reach Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Engineers with the 
same event in the army, shows a unexpected finding.  Although the common 
view was that promotion by seniority was slower, there does not actually appear 
to be any significant difference in the time to move through the ranks in the 
army and the Ordnance.  The fastest promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel in the 
Royal Engineers during the Peninsular War was Charles Pasley in 16.4 years.  
This is actually better than the average by purchase in the army.  An army 
officer who purchased all his promotions up to Lieutenant-Colonel would have 
spent £8,200192 to obtain an annual salary of just over £300.193 
 
The problem with slow promotion was more apparent above Lieutenant-
Colonel.  There were just not enough positions at the top of the Corps.  In 1815, 
there were only fifteen posts as Colonel or Colonel-Commandant.  This dropped 
to twelve posts in 1819, when the size of the Corps was reduced by 25%.  The 
young, recently appointed Lieutenant-Colonels had no promotion prospects for 
the foreseeable future. 
Command of the Engineers in the Peninsula 
The highest ranking engineer officers in the field in the Peninsula were Richard 
Fletcher and Howard Elphinstone.  Fletcher, who did not make Lieutenant-
Colonel until June 1809, was a lowly twenty-fourth in seniority in the Corps, and 
Elphinstone, a Captain until 1813, was nine places lower.  It would seem 
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unusual that such a junior officer was sent to command the biggest military 
operation that the British army was mounting in the world.  The questions which 
needs to be considered are : was Fletcher the first on the seniority list who was 
available and able to go to Peninsula?; was the selection based on previous 
operational experience? or was there some other reason for the choice?  A 
review of  FletcherÕs superiors provides the following information :  
 
Table 3j. Royal Engineer Officers by seniority, Part A. 
Name Role/Location in 1809 Age in 
1809194 
Last Active 
service195 
Morse Headquarters. Inspector General of 
fortifications. 
66 1763 
Mercer Headquarters 70est 1779 
Mann Headquarters 62 1793 
Twiss Lieut-Gov. Royal Military Academy. 64 1799 
Evelegh CRE Portsmouth for at least 4 years 58est nk 
Fisher Ireland for at least 4 years 56 nk 
Nepean Headquarters 61 1794 
Shipley West Indies for 30 years 54 nk 
Fyers Headquarters Ð Deputy IGF 56est 1783 
Johnson West Indies for at least 16 years 53est 1794 
Kersteman CRE Severn district for at least 6 
years 
53est 1794 
Holloway CRE Gibraltar  60 1800 
Humfrey CRE Jersey for at least 4 years 53est nk 
DÕArcy CRE Chatham for at least 4 years. 
Went to Copenhagen in 1807. 
53est 1807 
Bridges CRE Ceylon for 7 years 53est 1795 
Dickens CRE Malta for 9 years 45 nk 
Mackelcan No record of his responsibilities196 50 nk 
Bruyeres CRE Canada for 9 years 44 1799 
Rowley Headquarters 41 1793 
De Butts CRE Guernsey 39 1794 
Fenwick Ireland for 2 years 41est nk 
Bryce CRE Sicily for 4 years 40 1800 
Pilkington CRE Weedon Stores for at least 4 
years (Main engineer stores) 
44 nk 
Fletcher Portsmouth for 5 years 1802-7 40 1807 
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There are not many obvious candidates above Fletcher in the seniority list.  If 
the most senior officers who were based at headquarters are removed; then 
remove officers with long residences at locations; then remove officers at 
remote locations; then remove officers who had no recent military experience, 
and then look at the age of the senior officers, there are a small number of 
potential candidates.  These would include DÕArcy and Fletcher, with Bryce, De 
Butts and Rowley as less obvious candidates.  DÕArcy did not go out to the 
Peninsula, but did go out to Walcheren, where he was court martialled for 
refusing to accept orders.  He did not serve abroad again.  Bryce had just 
returned from nearly four years in the Mediterranean.  De Butts never left the 
United Kingdom during the Napoleonic Wars.  Rowley was attached to 
headquarters for most of his career, being Deputy Inspector General of 
Fortifications from 1812.  Fletcher was the first in the seniority list who did not 
have a substantive command, had the most recent operational experience and 
had the most operational experience.  This makes Fletcher, the logical choice, 
but it is still surprising that no senior officer wanted to take the command. 
Fletcher was a mere Captain when he first took command in August 1808, 
although he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in June 1809. 
 
One of the complaints about the Walcheren campaign was that many senior 
officers were present, because those who went to Copenhagen made 
substantial financial benefits and officers were expecting the same for the 
Walcheren campaign.  The conclusion is that the view of many senior Ordnance 
officers was the same as their juniorsÕ, that the campaign would be swiftly over 
when Napoleon pushed the British out of the Peninsula. 
 
Working further down the seniority list from Richard Fletcher, again there are 
few candidates. 
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Table 3k. Royal Engineer Officers by seniority, Part B. 
Name Role/Location in 1809 Age in 
1809 
Last 
Active 
service 
Evatt At Gibraltar for 4 years 37 1799 
Hayter At Woolwich for at least 4 years. 
Inspector of buildings and stores. 
37(est) 1793 
Ford Southern District for at least 4 
years 
36(est) 1800 
Mulcaster Command of Gunpowder works at 
Faversham for 6 years. 
37 1798 
Gravatt Gravesend for at least 4 years. In 
poor health. Transferred to Invalid 
Engineers in March 1812. 
38 1797 
Rudyerd Portsmouth for 2 years, with 
previous 2 years being in Canada. 
36(est) 1799 
Lefebure Recently returned from five years 
in Mediterranean.  
36(est) 1806 
Hughes Canada for at least 8 years 36(est) 1794 
Elphinstone Some operational experience over 
past 10 years 
36 1807 
 
The two most obvious, with recent experience, Lefebure and Elphinstone, both 
went out to the Peninsula in 1808.  Elphinstone arrived in the Peninsula first, in 
July 1808, and took overall command as the senior engineer.  He was wounded 
the following month and returned home.  By that time, he had been superseded 
by Fletcher, who arrived in August 1808.  Lefebure did not arrive until August 
1808, and missed his opportunity to command before Fletcher arrived.  Had he 
not been killed in 1810, it was Lefebure who would have taken command in the 
Peninsula when Sir Richard Fletcher was killed in 1813.  Lefebure was a great 
loss to the Corps.  He was well respected by his peers, and was the instigator 
of the formation of the ÔSociety for the Procurement of Useful Military 
KnowledgeÕ mentioned above.  Lefebure had been the cause of some major 
disagreements with other officers a few years earlier during his time in the 
Mediterranean, particularly with Pasley, but these had been resolved and there 
was a sense of comradeship in the letters amongst the officers who were 
involved in operational activities. 
 
The conclusion from reviewing the senior Ordnance officers is that it was the 
middle ranking officers who were available to command the operational 
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activities and also were more likely to have had recent operational experience.  
The most senior officers were in static posts, commanding the major districts, 
garrisons or managing the Corps.  Fletcher and Elphinstone (along with 
Lefebure, who did not survive the war) were the most senior of this group.  The 
officers who made the biggest names for themselves during and after the war, 
came further down in the seniority lists again.  These include John Burgoyne, 
John T. Jones and Charles William Pasley. 
Investigation on the issue of command of the Corps in the Peninsula 
From the very first days of the Peninsular War, there was ÔdiscussionÕ about 
seniority in the Corps.  In August 1808, Elphinstone was certainly unhappy 
about Fletcher replacing him and this may have had some part in his decision to 
return home after he was wounded at the battle of Vimiero : 
 
I have this day written for leave to return to England so you may expect 
me daily after you receive this letter. I think General Morse having sent 
out Fletcher over my head as shabby a thing as ever was done. Luckily 
he did not arrive until after both actions had taken place so that in all 
events I have secured the credit . . . I am just going to write a Jesuitical 
letter to General Morse in hopes of securing a good station upon my 
return.197 
 
Clearly his wound was not serious, as he took the post of Commanding Royal 
Engineer at Gravesend on his return to England in September 1808, a post he 
held until his return to the Peninsula in February 1813.  Elphinstone was 
ordered back out to the Peninsula at a time when Fletcher had been granted 
temporary leave of absence to return home.  Judging by ElphinstoneÕs letters, 
he was clearly expecting to take command of the engineers, but was very 
concerned that Fletcher would return and take the command from him again.198  
Fletcher wanted to return home as his wife had died in May 1808, and with five 
young children, he wanted to make long term arrangements for their future.  
This included, according to ElphinstoneÕs ÔgossipyÕ letters, returning to England 
to find a wife to look after them.  Fletcher did return in April 1813 and was killed 
in August at the siege of San Sebastian.  Wellington subsequently wrote to Lord 
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Liverpool in October 1813 asking for a provision to be made for FletcherÕs 
family.199 
 
When Richard Fletcher went home in December 1812, Burgoyne wrote to 
Wellington seeking clarification on who was the senior engineer.  Goldfinch held 
the seniority in the Royal Engineers, but Burgoyne held the senior army rank of 
brevet Lieutenant-Colonel.  Wellington found in favour of Goldfinch.200  This 
exchange is important at a number of levels.  
 
Firstly, Wellington had no authority over such matters, it being an Ordnance 
Department concern.  It would have been expected that the engineers would 
write to the Board of Ordnance for clarification of seniority.  There is no doubt 
that the Board would also have found in favour of rank in the Corps.  
 
Secondly, was Burgoyne trying to gain advantage by playing on his good 
relationship with Wellington?  It is difficult to see why Burgoyne would believe 
that army rank would take precedence.  In a similar debate a few years earlier, 
which Burgoyne was aware of, the Board had clearly stated that even seniority 
within the Ordnance (that is, Royal Artillery against Royal Engineer) did not hold 
and the senior engineer present would always command.201 According to 
Jones, a similar situation occurred on the east coast of Spain in 1812, where he 
believed he should have command over Thackeray based on his brevet army 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, but an ÔamicableÕ settlement was made where he 
was transferred to the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs Department and Thackeray 
commanded the engineers.202  
 
Thirdly, WellingtonÕs response stated that the senior engineer would take 
command when there were officers from different armies present.  BurgoyneÕs 
claim for command was based on the need to command engineers from the 
British, Portuguese and Kings German Legion. WellingtonÕs response that the 
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senior would take command could have led to a situation in which the senior 
Portuguese Engineer officer would lead.  This was not a situation he was willing 
to allow in the army.  Yet, Wellington used exactly this route to appoint Dickson 
to command the artillery in 1813, he being the senior on the basis of his rank in 
the Portuguese artillery. 
 
The situations highlighted above recurred throughout the Peninsular War.  They 
were usually featured in private letters rather than official correspondence.  
BurgoyneÕs letter to Wellington was unusual in that it was done formally.  
BurgoyneÕs own explanation was that this was so that he could show the 
correspondence to Goldfinch to demonstrate that his intentions were 
honourable.203 
 
When Fletcher was killed, Burgoyne took over as temporary Commanding 
Engineer at Headquarters.  Elphinstone was the senior engineer in the 
Peninsula at this time.  He was based in Lisbon, having been ordered there 
from Headquarters when he arrived in the Peninsula.  It would appear that 
Wellington was in no hurry to call up either Elphinstone from Lisbon or 
Goldfinch who was at Pamplona.  He was surprised when Elphinstone, on his 
own initiative, got a sea passage and arrived at headquarters on 13 Oct 
1813.204  Elphinstone had some very real concerns about his taking over 
command after FletcherÕs death. Wellington had recently caused great 
consternation in the Royal Artillery by keeping Alexander Dickson, as his senior 
representative of the Royal Artillery in the Peninsula, over the head of more 
senior artillery officers.  ElphinstoneÕs letters to his wife suggest that he thought 
the same might happen again, in favour of John Burgoyne.  In letters to his wife, 
he wrote :  
 
My coming up will I fancy make some little bustle at Woolwich, as Ld W. 
has sent away two Lt. Col's and put Dickens [Sic, should say Dickson] in 
command upon his brevet rank over the heads of four senior officers in 
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the country, all of whom are mean enough to remain and serve under 
him.205  
 
And, 
 
I heard rather a moderate man say he thought if any officer senior to 
Dixon [Sic, Dickson] remained to serve under him after my coming up 
they ought to be sent to Coventry by the regiment.206 
 
Wellington had suffered with problems with his relationship with the 
Commanding Officer of the artillery and had developed a close working 
relationship and trust in Dickson going back two or three years.  Following the 
injury to Colonel Robe at Burgos, Colonel Fisher was sent out to replace him.  
Wellington and Fisher fell out and in May 1813 and Fisher asked to resign the 
command and return to England.  Wellington then appointed Dickson to 
command the artillery, over several other officers who were his senior in the 
regiment, based on his local rank in the Portuguese artillery.  Although 
ElphinstoneÕs letter would suggest that the officers in the artillery were against 
Dickson, there were other officers who recognised his merit and were willing to 
serve under him,207 although they all recognised the sensitivity of the situation.  
In fact there had already been a precedent set two years earlier, when Dickson 
commanded at the first siege of Badajoz over more senior officers in the Royal 
Artillery.208 Dickson did his bit to play down the situation by always wearing his 
Portuguese army uniform.209 
 
Elphinstone also commented in one of his letters that Burgoyne had indicated to 
him that he would refuse the command if it was offered to him by Wellington.210  
This would fit in with the picture of Burgoyne as someone who would not ask 
for, or take anything that he was not entitled to.  The justification for keeping 
Burgoyne in command would have been very tenuous, as the only obvious 
reason would be using BurgoyneÕs brevet army rank over ElphinstoneÕs corps 
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rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.  Elphinstone could clearly see parallels between 
Dickson and Burgoyne who had both been with Wellington for some time and 
commanded his respect. 
 
Wellington had tried on a number of occasions before to keep officers he 
trusted, near to him, with varying levels of success.  One example was Robert 
Craufurd, who commanded the Light Division, when there were more senior 
officers available.  By 1813, WellingtonÕs successes, gave him more power to 
influence decisions on officer appointments, but it must have caused him some 
concern that he officially had no say over Ordnance appointments (artillery and 
engineers).  Wellington was working in a very sensitive area.  The early years of 
the Peninsular War were difficult because many general officers refused to 
serve under Wellington for the very same reason of seniority.  It was not until he 
was appointed Field Marshal that the issue was resolved. 
 
The issue in the engineers was made slightly more difficult by the awarding of 
brevet army ranks.  Whilst there is no evidence to back up suggestions that 
officers were promoted out of turn within the corps,211 there was a clear 
difference around brevet ranks.  Outside of the routine awards of brevet ranks, 
almost all the more senior engineer officers who served in the Peninsula 
received their brevet ranks earlier, generally through being mentioned in the 
official despatches of army commanders.  They included Lefebure, Birch, 
Chapman, Squire, Jones and Pasley.212  This created an issue around brevet 
ranks which had not occurred before, as there had been limited use of them in 
the past.  Situations now were occurring regularly where there was debate 
about whether Corps or army rank took precedence.  The evidence of the 
letters of these officers show that the lack of clarity did have an effect on morale 
and relationships. 
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All the situations described above do appear to follow a common thread, and it 
appears that Wellington was applying the rules consistently.  Although a 
number of officers including Burgoyne and Jones tried to use brevet army rank 
to claim command, the fact is that Wellington did not recognise this within the 
Ordnance corps.  Wellington in responding to Burgoyne and in appointing 
Dickson, made the senior artillery or engineer officer the commander, whether 
he was in the British, Portuguese or Kings German Legion.  The issue of brevet 
was not taken into account. WellingtonÕs view could not have been put any 
clearer : 
 
In the event however of the British officers meeting either with those 
belonging to the King's German Legion, or with Portuguese officers, the 
Marquess of Wellington would then look upon the senior officer of the 
Corps of Engineers, whether Portuguese, British or German, as the one 
to have command of the whole.213 
 
It would appear that Wellington was acting in a consistent manner in his 
dealings with officers.  Although Wellington tried very hard to avoid situations 
where an officer from the Portuguese or Spanish armies could claim seniority, 
he did recognise the principle.  One example was at the battle of Albuera when 
General Long was replaced as commander of the Allied cavalry by General 
Lumley as there was a Spanish cavalry commander who was senior to Long.  In 
this case Wellington was not willing to allow the British cavalry to be 
commanded by an officer from any other nation. 
3.4.3.  OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND SELECTION 
Experience of Officers Prior to the Peninsular War 
An analysis of operational activity between 1790 and 1809 paints an interesting 
picture of the breadth of experience that the officers in the Royal Engineers 
could provide.  Only sixty-nine officers had any operational experience during 
this period (see Appendix B).  This was approximately a quarter of the Corps 
total.  The majority of these had only served in one campaign (forty-four of the 
sixty-nine officers) leaving only twenty-five officers who had served in more than 
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one operational campaign (10%).  The Walcheren campaign of 1809 saw a 
number of officers going on their first campaign.  Omitting this campaign would 
reduce the number of officers with operational experience down to fifty-two, 
which is only 19% of the Corps.  Including Walcheren only twenty-five or 10% 
had served in more than one campaign and only ten officers had served in 
more than two operations.  Whilst these numbers show that there was only a 
small proportion of engineers with operational experience it is also true that the 
same situation would be present in the army and the proportion of army officers 
with operational experience would have been similarly small.  The final point to 
note is that the majority of the officers with experience continued to serve in the 
field through the Napoleonic wars, so the most experienced officers were 
present. 
Allocation of Officers for Active Duty 
It is not clear how officers were selected for operational appointments.  The 
diaries of engineer officers suggest that selection was, in many cases, by them 
actively canvassing for operational employment.  This was not only achieved by 
writing to the senior officers in the Royal Engineers, but also by writing directly 
to general officers who they knew, had served with previously, or who they 
knew were about to embark on some expedition.  
 
For example, in 1802, Burgoyne served as the Aide-de-Camp to General Fox, 
the brother of the politician Charles James Fox, who was also his Godparent.  
This connection led to him being appointed  to be Commanding Royal Engineer 
in the expedition to Egypt in 1807 organised by General Fox.  Burgoyne, 
unfortunately suffered eye trouble and was replaced by Thackeray.  During this 
campaign, Burgoyne became acquainted with Sir John Moore, and this in turn 
led to his appointment to the planned expedition to Portugal in late 1807, which 
was abandoned when the French Marshal, Junot, entered Lisbon and the 
Portuguese royal family fled to South America.  Burgoyne was again requested 
by Moore for his expedition to Sweden in early 1808, and remained with the 
expedition when it was subsequently diverted to Portugal, although Richard 
Fletcher joined as Commanding Royal Engineer in July, before they reached 
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Portugal.  Boothby was another engineer officer who went on the Swedish 
expedition and the connections he made with Sir John Moore led to his 
appointment on the expedition to Portugal.214  Clearly, patronage could have a 
significant impact in the selection of officers for specific duties. 
 
Burgoyne served throughout the Corunna campaign, before embarking with the 
Light Division at Vigo, thereby missing the battle of Corunna.  On returning to 
England, Burgoyne noted in his diary on 19 February 1809 that he ÔWrote to 
General Morse to request to be employed on active serviceÕ.215  Clearly there 
were events in the planning stage, as Morse replied only three days later 
advising Burgoyne to be ready to embark at the shortest notice.  Burgoyne 
noted that Squire, Boothby, Pasley and Mulcaster were also going.216 
 
Although these officers were keen to go on active service, there appears to 
have been great reluctance by some officers to go to the Peninsula.  Burgoyne, 
writing in his diary on 8 March 1809, noted that ÔSquire and Pasley had, by their 
solicitations, been countermanded from the serviceÕ.217  He made the reason for 
their action clearer when he went on to write Ôthere is little doubt we are going to 
Lisbon, and our prospect is only that of remaining quiet in a dull quarter, and 
returning to England if the French approachÕ.218  Other officers with experience 
were ordered for this foreign service and accepted their position.219 
 
In PasleyÕs case this was a decision that prematurely truncated a potentially 
glorious active career, but turned one of the best minds in the Royal Engineers 
to improvement in the CorpsÕ efficiency. 
 
This extract above raises several questions about the allocation of officers.  It is 
likely that the officers mentioned were actively canvassing to be appointed to 
expeditions. Their appointment is understandable in the context of enthusiastic 
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volunteers being appointed to positions, when there was a significant number of 
officers who could not go, or did not want to go.  It is surprising that they also 
appear to have had some say in which expeditions they were appointed to, as 
the implication is that they were appointed to the Peninsular expedition and 
then managed to get their names removed. 
 
There is little evidence to prove that serving in previous campaigns made an 
officer more likely to be selected for a successive campaign.  As discussed 
above, when looking at the selection of command in the Peninsula, there were 
a limited number of the senior officers who were not attached to some ongoing 
responsibility, such as command of an engineer station.  The officers who 
became available, on completion of one piece of operational activity were the 
easiest to allocate to the next operation.  The only exception during the period 
appears to be the Walcheren campaign, which was different for two reasons.  
Firstly, it was close to England, so many UK based officers were allocated to 
attend.  It was certainly convenient, and the campaign was expected to be 
short.  Secondly, the Earl of Chatham, who was Master-General at the time, 
commanded the expedition.  The potential for advancement, through serving 
directly under the eyes of your commander, was not lost on the officers.  There 
was possibly a third, reason, suggested cynically by one officer, that there were 
so many senior officers there at the prospect of prize money, as had been given 
at Copenhagen.  
 
It is clear that once officers were selected for an operation, they tended to stay 
there until the end.  There are very few situations where an officer left part way 
through a campaign. Chapman and Rice Jones went home when they were 
appointed to staff positions in the Ordnance and Edward Fyers was sent home 
with mental problems.  Other than these three officers, the only other officers 
who went home were injured.  Fletcher briefly went home at the end of 1812, 
but this was an exceptional circumstance, and it was temporary leave not a re-
assignment. 
 
It was unusual for newly commissioned officers to be sent straight out on 
campaign.  In almost all cases they were appointed to stations in the UK or 
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Ireland to gain some experience before they were sent abroad.  From 1812, all 
new officers spent time at the School of Military Engineering to gain some 
practical experience of operational skills. 
Casualty Rates of Engineers on Active Operations 
As shown in Table 3g above, twenty-five officers died on active service during 
the Peninsular War, which is roughly 27% of the officers who served in that 
theatre.  Two more were killed in 1814, one at Bergen-op-Zoom in the 
Netherlands and the other at New Orleans.  The sieges account for nineteen of 
these deaths with BadajozÕs three sieges alone accounting for nine.220  
 
Engineer officers were also reported as having been wounded thirty-three times 
during the period.  Combining the two groups, there were forty-eight officers 
who were wounded or killed during the Peninsular War.  This amounts to a 
casualty rate of 36% of officers in the Peninsula or 17% of the whole corps.  In 
addition to the twenty-seven officers who were killed in operations, a further 
twenty-three died, worldwide, of other causes making a total of fifty.221 
 
Without any attempt to increase the size of the Corps, seventy new officers 
were required to keep the strength constant through this period. 
 
The engineer officers were unhappy about the casualty rate, particularly as they 
felt they were having to take unnecessary risks to compensate for the lack of 
support from the artificers, the lack of trained soldiers from the army and the 
lack of attention to duty by the army officers whilst on garrison duty.   The 
casualty rates though high, were not substantially higher than those suffered by 
many units in the army.  For example, officer casualties (killed and wounded) at 
the battles of Fuentes dÕOnoro, Albuera and Salamanca were roughly 7%, 36% 
and 13%.  At the third siege of Badajoz, the officer casualties were over 50%.  
Compared with these numbers, the engineer casualties look quite normal.  
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Apart from the sieges where the engineers were thrust into the front line of 
events, they were generally well protected and looked after.  Their role was to 
be at the front leading during sieges and that is why their casualties were high 
at those times.  Overall an engineer officer probably had a better life 
expectancy that the average infantry officer. 
3.4.4. SUMMARY OF CAREERS OF OFFICERS. 
The key points from this section confirm some common understandings but also 
highlight a number of unexpected conclusions. There were two key differences 
between the army and Ordnance.  In the Ordnance, promotion was by seniority 
and officers were unable to sell their commissions.  This led to stagnation at top 
of the Corps with the most senior officers serving over sixty years until their 
death in their eighties!  Partly for this reason, no senior Corps officer went out to 
the Peninsula.  Most were based at Headquarters or in charge of major 
garrisons.  
 
The numbers of engineer officers trebled during the Napoleonic Wars.  The 
majority of these remained on static duty in garrisons and fortresses around the 
world.  As the number of officers increased there was a larger proportion 
allocated to the war in Europe.  Analysis of promotion within the Corps identified 
two main points, that promotion during the war was much quicker with officers 
reaching Lieutenant-Colonel in about sixteen years rather than the thirty years it 
took before the Napoleonic War.  The unexpected finding was that promotion by 
seniority in the Corps did not appear to be slower than by purchase in the army. 
 
Another unexpected finding was that Wellington appears to have applied his 
rulings on command consistently.  He said that the most senior officer of any 
corps would command.  In the case of the engineers (and artillery) that would 
be the most senior, be they British, Portuguese or KGL.  Dickson was appointed 
on the basis of his rank in the Portuguese army although this did cause great 
concern at the time.  Based on WellingtonÕs decisions in the army, for example  
the replacement of Long by Lumley at Albuera, he also applied this ruling to 
include Spanish officers.  Wellington made sure the situation of a Spanish  
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officer commanding never happened in the army by moving officers around.  
This situation never came up in the Ordnance corps.  There was some 
challenging around command based on Brevet rank, but again Wellington was 
consistent with Corps rank taking precedence. 
 
In terms of prior experience, about 25% of officers had some operational 
experience at the start of the Peninsular War with only ten having been on  
more than two operations.  This shows that there was limited experience but 
this small number of officers had served in Egypt, South America, Copenhagen 
and Walcheren so they had what little operational experience it was possible to 
get. 
 
The final point to note was that casualty rates were high but the analysis has 
shown that they were no higher than was being suffered in the army.   
 
3.5. Conclusion from Section 3 
The Napoleonic Wars saw the widespread use of British soldiers in mainland 
Europe for the first time in many years.  Significantly different from previous 
campaigns was the fact that Britain was fighting alone and could not call on 
specialist skills such as engineers and artillery from their Allies.  At the start of 
the Napoleonic Wars the army and the Ordnance had to move from a reduced 
peace time establishment to a full wartime strength and this was not without 
problems. 
 
The Royal Engineers struggled to supply the demand for trained officers 
throughout the war and this did affect the training given to officers.  Both the 
need for formal examinations and the syllabus were adjusted as the demand 
rose but officers were still given a reasonable grounding in the skills required 
and although the test was subjective, they were not commissioned until the 
academy thought they were ready.  As the war progressed the situation 
improved through new officers being sent to the School of Military Engineering 
to finish their training and by the commissioned officers actively sharing 
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experience and mentoring each other.  The provision of artificers to support the 
engineer officers was similar.  Effectively, there were no artificers available for 
operational service at the start of the war.  This deficiency was complained 
about by both the army and engineer officers.  By 1812, with the opening of the 
School of Military Engineering there was now a formal mechanism for 
consistently training artificers and this complemented by the changes in the 
organisational  structure meant that there were trained units of artificers being 
deployed from the end of 1812.  There is no doubt that the professionalism of 
the engineer officers and artificers improved greatly during the war. 
 
The officers who served in the field during the Napoleonic Wars were a sub-set 
of the Corps.  Generally they were from the middle or lower levels of seniority 
and in many cases showed personal initiative to get assigned .  The dedication 
and persistence they showed led to them being well known to army 
commanders and this sometimes assisted in more rapid promotion.  Although 
there are many comments by officers throughout the war about relative 
seniority, there is no evidence that the normal rules as applied across Corps, 
brevet and army rank were broken is determining command status. 
 
In terms of the officers themselves, there is strong evidence of them coming 
primarily from military and professional families.  There is no evidence of an 
influx from the families of businessmen or tradesmen.  Promotion by seniority 
and the inability to sell commissions meant that for many officers the Corps was 
a lifelong career, literally until death.  Many exhibited a desire to learn the skills 
of their profession and these skills assisted a number who in later life went on to 
use their skills in the civil engineering arena.  A number built on their colonial 
experience to take up roles as governors or administrators in the British Empire. 
 
Having looked at the education of the officers and the officers themselves, the 
next section will undertake a review of the operational activities and determine 
how effectively the officers carried out their role in the field. 
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SECTION 4 Ð OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
4.1. Overview of Section 4 
This section will investigate the operational roles and performance of the Royal 
Engineers in the Peninsula and describe their wider operations.  Previous 
writing on the Royal EngineersÕ role has tended to focus on their involvement in 
sieges.  The time spent on sieges during the Peninsular War was fifty-six days1  
for the four major sieges in 1811-12 and less than one hundred and forty days 
for all the sieges.2  There were Royal Engineer officers in the Peninsula from 
July 1808 through to September 1814, which is six years and two months or 
approximately 2,250 days.  Based on these numbers, engineers were employed 
in sieges for a maximum of 6.2% of the time.  Even if the blockades, such as 
that at Pamplona are included, this time spent on sieges still comes to less than 
15% of the total time.  Not all engineers in the Peninsula were employed at the 
sieges, so the actual involvement of Royal Engineer in sieges is much lower 
than these figures.  This naturally leads to the question, what were the Royal 
Engineer officers doing the rest of the time? 
 
An analysis will be undertaken on the various tasks that the engineer officers 
performed and give a more comprehensive picture of their activities during the 
war.  It will start by undertaking a fresh review of the major sieges to evaluate 
the performance of the Royal Engineers and also to consider the engineersÕ 
own view of their performance.  A neglected area of research is the other 
activities that engineers were involved in.  This will be addressed by 
investigating and analysing the activities that took up the bulk of the engineersÕ 
time during the Peninsular War.  The activities of the Royal Staff Corps and the 
Royal Engineers will be compared to determine the commonality and 
differences in their roles and also to look at how the two separate corps were 
used by the army commanders.  This section will conclude with a review of the 
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Almeida, Tarragona or Pamplona. 
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performance of the Royal Engineers based on the tasks identified and their 
success in achieving them. 
4.2. Sieges in the Peninsula   
4.2.1. INTRODUCTION TO SIEGES IN THE PENINSULA 
The Peninsular War did not follow the previous Napoleonic trend, as it had a 
significant number of sieges.  As David Chandler described, the operational 
doctrine had changed, certainly in NapoleonÕs eyes, to crushing the enemy in 
battle and not getting involved in major sieges.3  
 
The Iberian Peninsula had four groups of fortresses, which commanded the 
main communication routes. These fortresses could not be ignored, as 
bypassing them would leave supply routes open to disruption.  Routes into 
Portugal were guarded by Badajoz and Elvas in the south with Almeida and 
Ciudad Rodrigo in the north.  The western route into France was commanded 
by Pamplona and San Sebastian with the eastern route guarded by Gerona, 
Figueras and Perpignan.  These towns were the locations of almost all the 
sieges during the war.4 Chandler noted fifteen5 sieges during the war, and Philip 
Haythornthwaite, twenty-nine.6  A comprehensive analysis shows thirty-nine 
sieges or blockades, the other writers having ignored some of the smaller 
events.  The complete list of sieges and blockades is detailed in Appendix K. 
 
Apart from the strategic importance of these places, the sieges had one other 
important effect, particularly on the Allied army.  This was the cost in terms of 
casualties.  Compared with some of WellingtonÕs major battles, these were 
significant not only in terms of the actual numbers but also more importantly in 
the loss of experienced troops and officers who tended to fare worse in 
assaults. 
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Table 4a. Casualties at sieges and major battles.7 
Siege Killed Wounded Total 
Sieges of Badajoz 1,263 4,889 6,152 
Siege of Burgos 509 1,555 2,064 
Sieges of San Sebastian ? ? 3,500 
Battle Killed Wounded Total 
Talavera 801 4,562 5,363 
Fuentes dÕOnoro 241 1,563 1,804 
Albuera 984 3,564 4,548 
Salamanca 896 3,866 4,762 
Vitoria 751 3,843 4,594 
 
Between 1811 and 1813, Wellington lost about 13,000 troops during sieges 
compared with about 15,500 in the major battles.  The French were more 
successful because many fortresses surrendered to them thus avoiding the 
need for a costly assault.  The French were also in a better position to absorb 
their casualties, whereas Wellington was badly affected by the loss of Allied 
troops. 
 
It is not intended to go through the sieges in detail.  This has been thoroughly 
done by Jones, Oman, Myatt and Fortescue amongst others.  The investigation 
will initially compare the sieges carried out by the French and the Allies with a 
review of the specialist resources that each had available to them.  It will then 
focus on the Allied sieges, evaluating the reasons for decisions, the 
effectiveness of those decisions and in some cases, who made the decisions.  
A key question is : who was making the decisions? Wellington was not 
renowned for listening to other officersÕ views, even those of his senior 
generals.  The engineer officers were blamed for poor choices at some of the 
sieges.  This section will examine evidence about who was making the 
decisions and the relationships between the various officers involved.  The 
investigation will also focus on whether the materials, resources and training 
were appropriate and consider if there were any other external factors to take 
into account (for example, time). 
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 The battle figures are taken from OmanÕs Peninsular War and the siege figures from JonesÕ 
Journal of Sieges.  The exact breakdown of killed and wounded across the two sieges of San 
Sebastian cannot be determined. 
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The Allied army was involved in thirteen sieges and blockades during the 
Peninsular War : 
− Olivenza in April 1811 
− 1st Siege of Badajoz in April/May 1811 
− 2nd siege of Badajoz in May/June 1811 
− Blockade of Almeida in May 1811 
− Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812 
− 3rd Siege of Badajoz in April 1812 
− Salamanca Forts in June 1812 
− Burgos in September 1812 
− 1st siege of San Sebastian in July 1812 
− 2nd siege of San Sebastian in August 1812 
− Blockade of Pamplona in 1813 
− 1st siege of Tarragona in June 1813  
− Blockade of Tarragona in July 1813 
 
The table below summarises all the sieges and blockades and their outcome. 
 
Table 4b. Comparison of sieges and blockades.8 
Nation Number Surrendered Stormed Other Failed 
British 13 3 3 1 6 
French 24 14 3 2 59 
Spanish 2 0 1 1 0 
 
Looking at the raw statistics, the British failure rate was 46%, against a French 
failure rate of 21%. The six British failures include the abortive siege and 
blockade of Tarragona.  The other four, the first and second sieges of Badajoz, 
Burgos and the first siege of San Sebastian were all abandoned on the threat 
from approaching French armies, although some were progressing very badly 
at the time they were abandoned.  These will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
                                            
8
 Sieges and blockades as listed in Appendix K. 
9
 Cadiz, two sieges of Gerona, Tarifa and the first siege of Saragossa. 
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A much greater proportion of the French sieges ended in surrender, with only 
three fortresses being stormed; Saragossa, Gerona and Tarragona. Looking at 
the other sixteen French successes (apart from storming the three fortresses), 
they have been broken down as follows : 
 
Table 4c. Sieges : Reasons for surrender to the French. 
Reason Total 
Breach practicable for an assault 7 
Ran out of food or ammunition 3 
Garrison escaped  2 
No good reason (i.e. too early) 3 
French bombarded civilians 1 
 
Time does appear to have made a big difference.  The average duration of 
successful Allied sieges, excluding the blockade of Pamplona, was sixteen 
days.  The average time for the French, excluding the siege of Cadiz was forty-
five days.  If the very short French sieges of Campo Mayor, Castro-Urdiales, 
and Lerida are removed,10 the average duration of the sieges rises to fifty-two 
days.  The French typically took three times as long as the Allies to take a 
fortress.  The French usually had less time pressure, as there was no effective 
relief force.  In some cases, they defeated the relieving force, leaving no hope 
for the besieged.  The only French siege that was stopped by the approach of a 
relieving force was the second attempt on Gerona in August 1809.  In most 
cases there could be no rescue and all the governor could do was resist as long 
as possible.  Several sieges appeared to have ended sooner than was 
expected, but it is not difficult to have some sympathy for the defenders who 
knew that there was no chance of relief and every chance of death.  
 
Another important factor was that the Spanish and Allies were defending towns 
containing a friendly population, who would suffer in an assault.  In many cases 
the loss of the fortress was inevitable, and inflicting additional hardship on the 
civilians would seem unnecessary.  The French when defending, had less 
concern about the fate of the civilians, and their soldiers could also expect fair 
                                            
10
 Where the governor surrendered because the French were bombarding the town rather and 
killing large numbers of the civilians.  There was no French attempt to make an assault. 
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treatment from the enemy during a storm.  The French had much less to lose by 
resisting to the end.  The final difference was that Napoleon had made it clear 
that he did not approve of surrender, except as a last resort and the French 
governors knew that they would receive no sympathy from Napoleon if they 
surrendered too early.  The gentlemanly conduct of sieges in the 18th century 
was not present in the Peninsula. 
 
A constant theme throughout this thesis is the number of trained engineers and 
artificers available.  In comparison with the limited resources available to the 
Allied army, the French armies had an established organisation which was 
assigned to the larger French formations as a matter of course.  A French corps 
would typically have one or more companies of sappers and a body of miners 
as well as dedicated engineers.  An early example during the Peninsular War 
was at the second siege of Saragossa where the French engineer park 
consisted of forty engineers, two hundred and thirty-eight miners and 1,082 
sappers.11  The engineer stores establishment for a French corps amounted to 
one hundred and twenty men with fifty waggons carrying 5,000 entrenching 
tools, 1,700 cutting tools and various other items of engineering and bridging 
equipment.12  British armies had no established engineer resources and 
consequently had to make do with much less throughout the Peninsular War.  
The situation was improving towards the end, but the first British army to take 
the field with a proper engineering establishment was WellingtonÕs army for the 
Waterloo campaign.  The table below shows that during the early part of the 
Peninsular War, a significant portion of available Royal Engineers had to be 
drafted in for siege work. 
 
Table 4d. Engineers present at sieges. 
Siege Engineers present 
at siege 
Total number of 
engineers in Peninsula 
1st siege of Badajoz 21 31 
2nd siege of Badajoz 21 32 
Ciudad Rodrigo 19 33 
                                            
11
 Fletcher, Modern Studies, p. 222, quoting from Belmas, Journaux des sieges,  vol. 2, pp. 337-
339. 
12
 Jones, Journal of Sieges, vol. 2, p. 386. 
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3rd siege of Badajoz 24 33 
Burgos 5 33 
San Sebastian 18 45 
 
4.2.2. SIEGES OF BADAJOZ IN 1811. 
There were three sieges of Badajoz carried out by the Allied army.  The first two 
sieges were between April and June 1811 and were both aborted due to the 
approach of French armies.  The third siege in April 1812 ended successfully 
with the fortress being stormed, but at a high cost in casualties.  
 
Figure 4.1. Map of Badajoz 
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4.2.2.1. First Siege of Badajoz, April 1811 
This was the first major siege that the British conducted during the Peninsular 
War.  They had just successfully completed the siege of Olivenza where the 
French had surrendered on 15 April 1811.  However, Olivenza was a poor 
fortress with only four hundred troops to defend its one mile perimeter.  The 
governor surrendered soon after the attackersÕ guns opened fire, as he had no 
realistic chance of being able to resist.  
 
Table 4e. Timeline for first siege of Badajoz. 
20 April 1811 Wellington visits and agrees plan for siege. 
23 April 1811 Bridge at Jerumenha swept away. 
29 April 1811 Bridge at Jerumenha restored. 
4 May 1811 South side of Badajoz invested. 
8 May 1811 North side of Badajoz invested. 
8 May 1811 Trenches started that night. 
10 May 1811 French sortie against Fort St Christoval. 
11 May 1811 Allied guns opened fire against Fort St Christoval 
and Fort Picurina. 
11 May 1811 All stores moved to north bank in preparation for 
raising siege. 
11 May 1811 Work started on attack against castle at night and 
stopped in early hours of 12 May 1811. 
13 May 1811 Siege raised. 
 
The unexpected loss of Badajoz to the French changed the face of his whole 
strategy for 1811.  WellingtonÕs  intention when Massna retreated from the lines 
of Torres Vedras was to advance and re-take the fortresses of Almeida and 
Ciudad Rodrigo and then, having secured the northern passage, turn his 
attention to the south.  The loss of Badajoz left both the southern and northern 
routes into Portugal in French control, and put Wellington on the defensive.  
Replying to a question on his priorities from Lord Liverpool on 7 May 1811, he 
wrote that retaking Badajoz was his first priority as it dictated his whole strategy 
for the rest of the year.13  Speaking to Earl Stanhope in October 1836, Wellington 
said ÔHad it not been for the last, [The surrender of Badajoz] I could have 
                                            
13
 WD, To Liverpool, 7 May 1811. It is interesting to note that Wellington did not have any great 
desire to take Almeida at this time.  It was circumstance, not planning that led to the blockade. 
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blockaded Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo at once; and when I had taken them 
carried the war to the southÕ.14  Strategically, it was vital that Wellington 
recovered the fortress as quickly as possible. 
 
Operationally, Badajoz was a major fortress with a strong garrison and an able 
governor.  The problem Wellington faced was, because the loss of Badajoz was 
unexpected, no provision had been made for siege equipment in that area.  
Oman criticised the British Government for not providing a siege train for 
WellingtonÕs use writing, ÔThe British army in Portugal was absolutely destitute 
of artillery destined for and trained to the working to siege gunsÕ.15  On this point 
he is wrong.  At that time, there was a brand new British siege train stored in 
transports at Lisbon.  Wellington knew it was there and planned to (and did) use 
it for the future siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.  There was simply no practical way to 
move it quickly from Lisbon to Badajoz, even if its safety could be guaranteed.  
Similarly, Wellington was short of bridging equipment, as the only large pontoon 
train in the south had just been lost at Badajoz.  
 
Wellington made a quick visit to the area, leaving the north on 15 April 1811. 
With him came Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Fletcher R.E. who was to take 
command of the siege, taking over from Captain John Squire R.E. who was 
attached to BeresfordÕs force and had just successfully completed the siege of 
Olivenza.  WellingtonÕs visit required a three hundred mile round trip by horse 
which demonstrated the importance he placed on recapturing Badajoz.  The 
purpose of his visit was not just to make arrangements for the siege.  He also 
needed to resolve issues around command and seniority between Beresford 
and the Spanish commanders.  It was likely that the French would come to the 
relief of Badajoz and a battle might have to be fought to stop them.  The senior 
Allied commander in the area was the Spanish general, Castaos.   
 
On WellingtonÕs arrival at Elvas on 20 April 1811, he spoke to Major Alexander 
Dickson,  the senior artillery officer and to Squire.  He was informed that the 
                                            
14
 Earl Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington (London, 1938), p. 90. 
15
 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, p. 274.  More recently, I. Robertson, A Commanding 
Presence, also suggests that Wellington did not have access to a siege train. 
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siege guns and stores used at the siege of Olivenza were ready to move when 
Badajoz was invested. As there was a shortage of gun carriages, the gun 
carriages from Olivenza would then be used to collect further guns from Elvas.  
Squire also reported that he had sufficient tools to start the siege.  Wellington 
made a personal reconnaissance around Badajoz on 22 April 1811, and the 
following day wrote three memorandum.   
 
The first was a letter to Beresford outlining the strategy he should follow for the 
siege and how he should respond if a French relief force was sent.  The most 
important point in this letter was that Wellington authorised Beresford to fight a 
battle if he felt it was appropriate.  
 
The second memorandum detailed WellingtonÕs recommendations on the siege 
operations for Beresford, Dickson and Fletcher.16  The two key points in 
WellingtonÕs instructions for the siege were : 
− All three outlying works, San Christoval, Picurina and Pardaleras were to 
be attacked simultaneously; 
− Only when all three works had been taken would the attack on the 
fortress itself begin.  Wellington suggested that the most likely point of 
attack would be the south face, but left the decision to Beresford. 
 
The third memorandum was a letter to three senior Spanish generals in the 
area, Castaos, Blake and Ballasteros, asking for explicit acceptance of 
WellingtonÕs operational plan.  Any move against Badajoz was dependent upon 
their agreement.17  Wellington made his views absolutely clear to Beresford on 
6 May 1811, writing : ÔIf Gen. Blake does not positively agree to everything 
proposed in my memorandum, and does not promise to carry it strictly into 
execution, I think that you ought not to be in a hurry with the siege of BadajozÕ.18   
The following day he informed Liverpool that he had told Beresford to delay the 
siege until agreement had been received from the Spanish generals19  It is 
                                            
16
 WD, All three memorandum were dated 23 Apr 1811, pp. 490-496. 
17
 WD, Memorandum 23 Apr 1811, vol 8, pp. 494-496. 
18
 WD, To Beresford, 6 May 1811. 
19
 WD, Wellington acknowledged CastanosÕ acceptance in a letter to him dated 13 May 1811. 
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significant that Beresford did not take any positive steps to start the siege until 8 
May 1811 when the Spanish generals agreed to the proposals in WellingtonÕs 
memorandum.  Beresford could have started a few days earlier and the artillery 
and engineer officers were puzzled by the delay.   
 
Overall the siege was not off to a good start.  The lack of siege stores at Elvas, 
the loss of the temporary bridge at Jerumenha, which provided their primary 
means of communication across the river Guadiana and the delays in resolving 
the command issues meant that eight weeks had passed since the French took 
Badajoz.  Beresford heard that Soult was marching to relieve the fortress on 10 
May 1811, before the first gun had even opened fire.  The day the first gun 
fired, on 11 May 1811, Beresford was already making preparations to raise the 
siege. 
 
The Plan of attack on Badajoz.  
 
There are a number of points that need examining in relation to the plan : 
− Why was this particular plan chosen and who decided? 
− Were the resources available?  
− Was the plan followed? 
 
Why was this particular plan chosen and who decided? 
 
According to John Jones R.E., when Wellington arrived at Elvas on 20 April 
1811, he was : 
 
determined to lay immediate siege to Badajoz, if any plan of attack could 
be offered which should not require more than sixteen days open 
trenches, as in that period, and the time required to make the necessary 
preparations for the siege, it was calculated that Marshal Soult would be 
able to collect a force equal to its relief.20 
 
                                            
20
 J.T. Jones, Journal of Sieges carried on by the Duke of Wellington in Spain during the years 
1811 to 1814, 3
rd
 Edition, (3 vols, London, 1844),  vol. 1, p. 12.  Unless otherwise started 
references to Jones will be from this edition. 
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The preference of most of the officers, including Wellington, was for an attack 
on the southern face.  No plan could be developed that would meet the sixteen 
day target, normal calculations for such an attack indicating that twenty-two 
days would be required.  Jones continued that Ôit was of the greatest 
consequence to the future operations of the army that Badajoz should be 
retakenÕ.21  Probably under pressure from Wellington, Fletcher proposed a plan 
that he felt could be achieved within the sixteen days.  The plan was to take the 
fort of St Christoval which overlooked the castle and once it was taken, to form 
batteries to batter the old castle walls which would then be stormed when there 
was a practicable breach.  It was also proposed to make simultaneous false 
attacks on the other two outworks to mask the real intentions.  According to 
JonesÕ diary, these discussions occurred before WellingtonÕs reconnaissance 
on 22 April 1811, and Wellington approved this plan after he had examined the 
fortress.  
 
There is a confusing difference in the accounts at this point.  JonesÕ published 
Journal described FletcherÕs plan above.  This Journal also printed WellingtonÕs 
memorandum of 23 April 1811, but crucially left out WellingtonÕs last point, 
which stated that all three outworks must be taken before the attack on the 
fortress started.  WellingtonÕs instructions made no mention of false attacks and 
suggested an attack on the southern side.  WellingtonÕs instructions do not 
appear to be the same as FletcherÕs plan.  JonesÕ original diaries, which he kept 
at the time, do not specifically detail FletcherÕs proposal.  He did however, detail 
WellingtonÕs memorandum including the crucial last point, which was not printed 
in his published Journal.  On 8 May 1811, he noted in his diary ÔFletcher marked 
out a work against the Picurina redoubt and to conceal from the enemy the real 
point of attack, it was decided to carry out a false attack against the 
Pardaleras.Õ22  Later in the diary entry for that day, he noted troops breaking 
ground for the false attack against the Pardaleras fort, but no mention was 
made of the attack on the Picurina being false.  In his published Journal, and in 
                                            
21
 Jones, Journal of Sieges, vol. 1, p. 13. 
22
 REM, 5501-59-1, Jones diary, 8 May 1811. The original diaries are very difficult to read.  
Copious notes from them were taken by John Hancock, the ex-Curator of the Royal Engineers 
Museum.  My comments are from his notes, not the original diaries. 
Section 4. Operational Performance. 
 130 
his original diary, Jones made continued reference to false attacks on the 
Pardaleras.23 
 
Alexander Gordon, who was one of WellingtonÕs Aides-de-Camp, travelled with 
him to Badajoz.  His comment on 23 April 1811, the day Wellington inspected 
Badajoz, was that he expected the attack would come from the south side, after 
opening against the three outworks.24  A later letter still talked about taking all 
three outworks.25  
 
Oman was highly critical of the decision to attack St Christoval and puts the 
blame firmly on the shoulders of Fletcher, the commanding engineer.  He 
criticised the decision to make it a requirement to capture all three forts before 
attacking the castle, noting that Ônone of these were to be mere false attacksÕ.26  
In OmanÕs work there is no mention of Jones as a source for the first siege 
although he does use Jones for the subsequent sieges of Badajoz.  Although 
OmanÕs text is explicit, the map of Badajoz in his book marks both the 
Pardaleras and Picurina forts as ÔFalse attacksÕ.27  It is possible that Oman did 
not have, or chose not to use the comprehensive third edition of JonesÕ work 
when writing about the first siege.  The original first edition of JonesÕ Journal, 
published in 1814, had a shortened account of the first siege.  This edition 
described the attack on St Christoval, but did not mention the false attacks on 
the Picurina or Pardaleras. 
 
Fortescue used JonesÕ Journal and recognised that the engineers had a 
preference for taking St Christoval over the other two outworks.  He also 
criticised the decision to attack St Christoval rather than follow the French lead 
and attack the southern face. 
 
The above analysis leaves two unanswered questions : 
                                            
23
 Jones, Journal of Sieges, vol. 1, p. 22, 26; REM, 5501-59-1 Jones diary, various entries from 
8 to 14 May 1811. 
24
 R. Muir, At WellingtonÕs Right Hand (Stroud, 2003), p. 193. 
25
 Muir, At WellingtonÕs Right Hand, p. 205. 
26
 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, pp. 282-283. 
27
 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, facing p. 286. 
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− Was the decision to attack St Christoval due to time constraints 
reasonable?  
− Why did JonesÕ published account completely ignore WellingtonÕs final 
instruction to take all three outworks before attacking the fortress? 
 
In answer to the first question, it is necessary to acknowledge the experience of 
the engineers.  Their judgement was that twenty-two days would be necessary 
to attack from the south.  This did not meet WellingtonÕs requirement of sixteen 
days.  The plan proposed by Fletcher was certainly risky, but quickly taking the 
outwork would have given the army a great chance of meeting the short 
timescale.  Certainly, the strength of St Christoval had been underestimated by 
everyone,  Dickson noting that St Christoval Ômight easily be takenÕ.28  On 26 
April 1811, Wellington sent Beresford copies of the French plan of Badajoz and 
their plan of attack which had been intercepted by Castaos.  With this 
information, there was time to change the Allied plan of attack, but no change 
was made.  In the end it was the limited resources that led to failure against St 
Christoval, not the decision to attack it. 
 
The answer to the second question is more difficult.  The plan followed by the 
engineers, which is clearly reported in JonesÕ Journal, was to attack all three 
outworks, but only the attack on Pardaleras was meant to be false.  The map in 
DicksonÕs Diaries shows the attack on the Cerro del Vinto (Pardaleras) as being 
a ÔfalseÕ attack.29  Rice Jones similarly talks about only this attack as being 
false.30  These do not match FletcherÕs original proposal described in JonesÕ 
Journal.  Neither does it appear to follow WellingtonÕs instructions of 23 April 
1811.  WellingtonÕs instruction to take all three outworks, does not appear to be 
logical when time was critical.  It would have taken significantly longer to 
capture all three outworks, where the possession of two or even one would 
allow the start of an attack on the fortress.  The plan that was actually followed 
will be discussed below. 
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 Dickson, Manuscripts, vol. 3, Letter to Maj-Gen Macleod, 21 Mar 1811, p. 364. 
29
 Dickson, Manuscripts, vol. 3, map of Badajoz and surrounding areas. This map is loose in the 
1987 facsimile edition. 
30
 H.V. Shore, An Engineer Officer under Wellington in the Peninsula (Cambridge, 1986), p. 
100. 
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Were the resources available? 
 
The biggest problem Wellington faced with the loss of Badajoz was getting 
together the resources to try and re-take it.  Both Oman and Fortescue criticise 
WellingtonÕs preparations but neither are accurate.  Fortescue stated that 
Wellington did not ask about resources at Elvas until 6 April 1811, with 
deficiencies being made up from the ÔEnglishÕ battering train at Lisbon.31  
Wellington did not actually write ÔEnglishÕ battering train, but  ÔourÕ battering 
train, probably just referring to resources at Lisbon.  Wellington was reluctant to 
use the new English battering train, writing that it would ÔcrippleÕ future siege 
operations.32  He did subsequently send a number of siege guns from Lisbon, 
but these were not from the new English battering train. 
 
Oman wrote that Wellington did not start preparations for collecting the guns 
until 18 April 1811, when he sent Dickson to Elvas.33  Dickson, the commander 
of the artillery, was writing as early as 21 March 1811 that the artillery would 
come from Elvas.34  WellingtonÕs first letter to Beresford on the subject of the 
siege was written on 27 March 1811, where he stated : ÔElvas must supply the 
means [for the siege of Badajoz], if possible : if it has them not, I must send 
them there; this will take time, but that cannot be avoidedÕ.35 Writing to 
Beresford on 6 April 1811, Wellington explained ÔIn respect to Badajoz, the first 
thing to do is to blockade it strictly É and I am most anxious to receive the 
accounts of what Elvas can supply for this purposeÕ.36 Beresford sent for 
Dickson on 2 April 1811, and asked him to prepare a return of the Ôordnance, 
ammunition etcÕ in Elvas for Wellington.37  Clearly the answer Wellington 
received, was that Elvas could not provide the necessary resources,38 because 
on 9 April 1811 Wellington was ordering siege material to be sent up to Elvas 
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 Fortescue, British Army, vol. 8, p. 143. 
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 WD, To Beresford. Elvas, 20
 
 Apr 1811. 
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 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, pp. 273-274. 
34
 Dickson, Manuscripts, vol. 3, Letter to Maj-Gen. Macleod, p. 364. 
35
 WD, To Beresford, Gouvea, 27 Mar 1811. 
36
 WD, To Beresford, Villar Maior, 6 Apr 1811. 
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 Dickson, Manuscripts, vol. 3, pp. 374-375. 
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 REM, 4601-71 Misc Letters, f. 13.  Squire writing on 11 Apr 1811 dates that Ôthere are no 
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from Lisbon.39  At the same time, Wellington also ordered heavy guns to be 
sent from Lisbon to replace the guns that were being moved from Elvas.40  
Writing to Beresford the next day, Wellington provided a list from Fletcher of the 
ordnance and ammunition that Elvas should supply for the siege of Badajoz and 
informed him about the stores he had ordered from Lisbon.41  Beresford wrote 
to Squire, who was the senior engineer present at that time, asking him to 
consider what materials could be obtained or made locally and what tools would 
be required.42  Squire responded the next day saying that timber would be a 
problem but he could see no difficulty in obtaining tools or making gabions and 
fascines.  
 
The criticisms of Oman and Fortescue mentioned above appear to be 
unfounded.  Similarly, FortescueÕs comment that Beresford must have told 
Wellington that Elvas could supply the stores appears similarly unfounded.43 
Heavy material for a siege took time to get together and Wellington had no 
warning that this would be required for Badajoz.  In comparison, it took from 
May to October 1811 to transport the siege train by sea and land to be ready for 
use at Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812.  
 
There were also problems with the delivery of the requested stores.  Wellington 
was informed that there was insufficient transport to move all the stores he had 
requested from Lisbon and on 23 April 1811, he reduced the amount of stores 
to be brought forward.  The stores ordered from Lisbon did not arrive at Elvas 
until 12 May 1811, and the first items did not get to Badajoz until that evening, 
by which time the siege was effectively over. 
 
There were similar difficulties with the availability of guns.  There were no 
modern siege guns immediately available for this siege.  The guns that were 
used were supplied from Elvas and as has been widely recorded elsewhere 
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they were generally old and in poor condition.  Through the efforts of Dickson, a 
siege train of thirty guns was put together.44  Some of these were the guns used 
at the siege of Olivenza and were still located there.  Once again, the more 
immediate problem was transport.  Dickson reported on 22 April 1811, that 
there were only three carriages at Elvas for transporting guns.  To get the guns 
to Badajoz would require moving the six guns at Olivenza as soon as possible 
so that their carriages could then be sent to Elvas to move the remainder. 
 
Apart from the physical resources, the engineers were concerned about the 
availability of experienced soldiers.  Although this became more prominent in 
the later sieges, the concern was there from the very first siege.  Squire raised 
concerns before the siege started about the lack of sappers and miners and the 
need for men who Ôknow how to carry on an approach under fireÕ.45  He knew 
that the French in their siege of Badajoz, sapped right up to the glacis and this 
required trained and experienced sappers.  SquireÕs view was that if the British 
had to do the same, there would be significant casualties.  
 
Was the plan followed? 
 
Wellington was impatient to get started on the siege of Badajoz.  As early as 30 
March 1811, he wrote to Beresford asking him to make arrangements for the 
attack,  commenting that Ôthe breach can be barely more than stockadedÕ.46  He 
wrote again on 6 April 1811, stating that Badajoz must be blockaded as soon as 
possible.  Writing to Liverpool on 9 April 1811, he mentioned that he ÔhopedÕ 
Beresford would have been blockading Badajoz from 3 April 1811.  These 
timescales all appear unrealistic as there had been problems establishing a 
crossing point over the river Guadiana in early April due to the river level rising 
unexpectedly.  Beresford also had to take Olivenza before he could move on 
Badajoz.  At that time he also did not know the exact whereabouts of Soult. 
Wellington also wrote to Beresford on 21 April 1811, when he heard that Soult 
was fortifying Seville.  He saw this as indicating that Soult could be planning an 
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operation to relieve Badajoz.  He explained that it was even more urgent that 
not a moment was lost in starting operations against Badajoz.47  
 
Immediately after the siege of Olivenza was concluded, Dickson and Squire 
were ordered to start preparing for the siege of Badajoz,48 and from 19 April 
1811 they were preparing the siege train of thirty guns and howitzers.  On 27 
April 1811, Beresford issued an order for one hundred troops to be permanently 
assigned to the engineers as artificers.  In addition, eighty-four carpenters and 
miners from the British divisions and twelve officers were to serve as assistant 
engineers (who were officer volunteers from the army).  Squire had requested 
these on 10 April 1811, and Beresford confirmed he could have them on 20 
April 1811.49  The men arrived at Olivenza on 2 May 1811, and some were 
immediately put to work cutting timber and making the siege materials.  The 
remainder were given some basic training in siege craft along with the small 
number of Royal Military Artificers who were present, none of whom had any 
previous training in siege works.50 
 
Beresford told Wellington in a letter of 3 May 1811 that he was waiting for  
Fletcher to confirm that all the stores were ready and would then order the 
investment of the north side of the river Guadiana.51  Dickson and Squire 
certainly thought everything was ready to start the investment of Badajoz before 
this date.52  The final delays were likely to have been caused by waiting for 
confirmation that the bridges had been restored at Jerumenha; that the troops 
allocated to assist were present; and that the additional shovels had arrived 
from Abrantes.  All these events happened on or around 2 May 1811. 
 
Following the investment of the fortress on the south side of the river Guadiana 
on 4 May 1811, the guns at Olivenza were moved up and placed in the park 
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behind the Cerro del Vinto on 6 May 1811.  The carriages were then sent off to 
Elvas to be available to bring up the next batch of guns.  The guns for the attack 
on St Christoval had been available since 5 May 1811, and were only waiting 
for the north side of the river to be invested.  Dickson recorded that it would 
take two trips (that is, two days) to transfer the eight guns required for the north 
side.  In the same letter he mentioned he was still waiting for two companies of 
Portuguese artillery, who were essential to progress the siege on the south side 
of the river.53 
 
Dickson expressed his confusion on 1 May 1811, and again on 7 May 1811 as 
to why the siege had not commenced.54  Similarly, there were a number of 
comments from engineer officers, the earliest being 25 April 1811.55  The 
engineers believed that arrangements had been made for the right bank of the 
river Guadiana to be invested on 4 May 1811.  They moved stores and 
pontoons up and had to make rapid arrangements for their protection when no 
troops arrived on the right bank.  Jones commented on 8 May 1811 that the 
stores for the attack on St Christoval had been waiting on carts for two days.56 
 
There appears to have been a change of plan around this time.  JonesÕ diary 
recorded that the plan of attack was put Ôon paperÕ on 5 May 1811, and agreed 
by Beresford on 7 May 1811.  WellingtonÕs earlier memorandum had not 
specified exactly how the attack was to be carried out, noting that after taking 
the three outworks, Beresford was to decide where to attack the castle.  
Although Wellington had suggested the south side of the fortress, he had not 
ordered it.  The engineers had a clear preference under the time constraints for 
an attack on the castle, rather than the south side.  It may have been the lack of 
trained sappers and miners that influenced the decision to attack St Christoval 
and breaching the walls from a distance.  Such an attack would require fewer 
sappers and miners.  Based on the comments at the time from the engineers, it 
is probable that the plan Fletcher presented to Beresford on 7 May 1811, 
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included a proposal to start the attack on the castle before St Christoval was 
taken. It was necessary to attack the Picurina outwork to do this; it was not 
necessary to take the Pardaleras outwork.  This was earlier than had been 
proposed in FletcherÕs original plan as documented in JonesÕ Journal.  Fletcher 
would have been looking for quicker ways to take the fortress to mitigate the 
impact of the additional delays since the original plan had been agreed.  It was 
now two weeks since Wellington had sent his memorandum to the Spanish 
generals (and eight weeks since the French took Badajoz) and as yet, there has 
been no answer from them.  That there was a change in the plan is indicated by 
the numerous comments from engineer officers which refer to attacks on St 
Christoval and Picurina and false attacks on Pardaleras.  These include :  
 
It had however been previously decided to attack the castle at the east 
extremity of the town É the intention was to breach the castle, while 
batteries were established on the right bank of the Guadiana to take in 
flank and reverse. With this view it was necessary to take Fort Christoval 
É The whole was intended to be a simultaneous operation, so as to 
have divided the attention of the enemy. If we had had sufficient tools it 
was also proposed to make a fake attack to the westward by re-opening 
the trenches of the enemy.57 
 
On the 8th É we broke ground on this side against Fort Christoval in 
earnest and they in joke opened the old French parallels on the other 
side.58 
 
The project was to commence a parallel embracing the castle having its 
right on the river, and to attack that part, the castle being like most others 
on a hill accessible and the wall not covered; at the same time attacks 
were to be carried on against the fort of St Christoval on the opposite 
side of the Guadiana.59 
 
The attacks to be directed against the castle and Fort Christoval.60 
 
On the same day that Beresford approved the plan (7 May 1811),  Jones 
recorded that a working party was preparing materials near the spot where it 
was intended to start the battery against fort Picurina.61  This would suggest an 
acceptance of the plan to attack the castle.  Significantly, Jones also noted that 
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Lieutenant Forster R.E. was employed that night to cross the Rivellas stream 
and ascend the height to the castle wall to determine the feasibility of British 
troops approaching the walls.  It is difficult to think of any reason to carry out 
such a dangerous reconnaissance unless the plan was to attack the castle at 
this point.  It is probable that the actual plan followed by the engineers was what 
had been agreed with Beresford, but it has not subsequently been recorded in 
that way.  It is inconceivable that the engineers would have been allowed to 
alter WellingtonÕs plans without his or BeresfordÕs agreement. 
 
Fletcher was marking out the positions for the trenches against the Picurina 
during the day on 8 May 1811 and Squire was doing the same on the other side 
of the river against St Christoval. The trenches were started against all three 
outworks on the night of 8 May 1811.  Jones started marking out the ground for 
the attack on the castle the following morning with the expectation that the 
trenches would be started that night.  However, Beresford ÔforbadeÕ any work to 
start.  Jones then wrote that the noon reliefs on 10 May 1811, for the attacks 
against the Picurina and Pardaleras were ÔnominalÕ to make a Ôshow of workÕ.  
Beresford agreed to start the attack on the castle on 10 May 1811, but on 
hearing news of the French plan to move against him, he deferred the work 
again.62  At the evening relief on 10 May 1811, because ÔBeresford was still 
forbiddingÕ work against the castle, Ôit became necessary to devise some means 
to amuse the enemyÕ,63 and further trenches were dug against the Picurina and 
Pardaleras. Jones again mentioned small parties working against the two 
outworks on 11 May 1811.64  
 
The delay in starting the attack against the castle also had a major impact on 
the attack against St Christoval in that the fire from Badajoz was almost wholly 
directed against the St Christoval attack.  On the morning of 10 May 1811, the 
French made a sortie against the works around St Christoval.  They briefly had 
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control over the trenches and did minor damage before they were repulsed, but 
the British covering party rashly chased them up to the very walls of the fort and 
suffered four hundred needless casualties.  The delays caused by Beresford 
not allowing work to start against the castle was causing some frustration 
amongst the engineers :  
 
Still we were urged on É with the reason É that we were to take the fire 
off the main attack É by attracting it to ourselves!!!!!!  É The daylight of 
each succeeding day however affording us the mortification of seeing 
that our promised support from the main attack had been withheld ... 
Marshall Beresford not allowing the original plan to go on.65 
 
The project was to commence a parallel embracing the castle É at the 
same time attacks were to be carried on against the fort of St Christoval 
É This latter one however only was commenced, Marshal Beresford, 
who commanded saying he would take that first, the consequence was 
that that small attack [on St Christoval] É had to support for three days 
the whole fire and efforts of the place and fort.66 
 
On the evening of 10 May 1811, Beresford finally gave permission to start work 
against the castle on the following evening but insisted that work must not start 
until Fletcher could guarantee that the workmen would be fully protected from 
French fire by the morning.  To achieve this the tools ordered from Lisbon were 
needed, and these were expected to arrive during 11 May 1811.  The batteries 
finally opened against St Christoval on the morning of 11 May 1811.  DÕUrban 
and Oman, both suggested that the battery on St Christoval started too early67 
and took all the return fire from Badajoz.  Ross, one of the engineers working at 
St Christoval wrote clearly that Ôon the 11th by order, our battery of three 24-
pounders and two 8-inch howitzers opened upon Christoval having [the whole 
of] Badajoz opposed to itÕ.68 
 
The battery against the Picurina had been ready since 9:00am on 10 May 1811.  
There is no specific comment on when this battery opened, but Jones 
commented that the Picurina battery fired one hundred and sixty rounds on 11 
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May 1811, hitting the target only four times.69  This would strongly suggest that 
the battery had been firing for most of the day. 
 
Dickson said that his and FletcherÕs wish Ôwas not to begin the fire from any one 
battery until the whole attack should be more advancedÕ.70  Their view was that 
the Picurina battery was not sufficiently far forward to support St Christoval.  
The effect of the two batteries fire was negligible due to the inexperience of the 
artillerymen and the faults in the guns.  The battery against St Christoval was 
overwhelmed by fire, with four of the five guns being disabled by mid-afternoon.  
It was decided to build another battery next to the one that had been badly 
damaged, and this was started on the night of 11-12 May 1811.  This battery 
did not open fire before the siege was raised.  
 
At 5:00pm on 11 May 1811, Fletcher received news that the tools required to 
begin the attack against the castle would not arrive that night.  He told 
Beresford that the works against the castle could not start until the following 
night.  When the new tools finally arrived, the trenches were started against the 
castle on the night of 12 May 1811.  Good progress was being made, when at 
1:00am an order was received from Beresford for the work to stop immediately 
and for the troops to be withdrawn. 
 
Activities over the next 48 hours became very confused, with most of 13 May 
1811 being spent removing stores.  However, work was still continuing against 
the forts of St Christoval and Pardaleras.  According to Jones, at 6:00am on 14 
May 1811 Beresford wrote to Fletcher and suggested that the attack could 
continue against St Christoval, as he believed the French were only 
manoeuvring.  Fletcher had started recalling the stores when he was informed 
that orders had been issued to the army to raise the siege and he then had to 
countermand his orders.  On the night of 14 May 1811, the batteries were 
dismantled and any remaining stores that could not be removed were burnt.  
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The final covering forces did not leave Badajoz until the night of 15-16 May 
1811. 
 
Comments on the First Siege of Badajoz. 
 
OmanÕs account of the siege is flawed in a number of areas.  He claimed that 
WellingtonÕs orders were for the siege of Badajoz to begin the moment that the 
guns and material were ready.71  This is not true.  Wellington had told Beresford 
not to start the siege until the Spanish generals had agreed to his memorandum 
of operations.  This did not happen until 8 May 1811.  The evidence shows that 
the siege was ready to start before that date.  Oman states that the south side 
was invested on the 6 May and the north side on 7 May 1811.72  He also wrote 
that Beresford only invested the south side after Fletcher and Dickson said all 
the stores were ready on 5 May 1811. 73  These dates should be 4 and 8 May 
1811, respectively.  WellingtonÕs only comment on the investment dates are in a 
letter to Liverpool on 15 May 1811, where he said both sides were invested on 
the 8 May 1811. Beresford writing to Wellington on 3 May 1811, stated that he 
intended to invest Badajoz on 4 May 1811 but this did not happen.74  
 
OmanÕs summary of the strategy accurately reports WellingtonÕs memorandum 
of 23 April 1811.  Oman goes on to say that none of the attacks were to be false 
attacks and that the engineers had given Wellington Ôbad counsel as they 
certainly did to Beresford during the subsequent weeksÕ.75  He then concluded 
by saying that planning three attacks when the engineers knew they had limited 
resources was inexcusable.  OmanÕs criticisms are based on the premise that 
the engineers were following the plan described by Wellington on 23 April 1811.  
The diaries of the engineers show that they were not.  A more plausible solution 
is that the engineers were operating to a plan based on that originally proposed 
by Fletcher, but with a change to bring forward the attack on the Picurina and 
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castle to make up some of the additional lost time and this is what was agreed 
with Beresford on 7 May 1811. 
 
Without even looking at the actual work undertaken during this first siege, the 
timescales for its completion were unrealistic. The whole operation started too 
late and was too hurried.  Wellington was desperate to recover Badajoz, as his 
whole strategy was dependent on it being in Allied possession.  Wellington 
pressurised the engineers to come up with a plan to meet his tight timescale.  
The plan was risky, but could have worked.  The strength of St Christoval was 
certainly underestimated but at the time both the engineer and artillery 
commanders believed it was possible to take the fort in a few days.  
 
There is real confusion both at the time and amongst writers about which plan 
was being followed.  The plan Wellington wrote up was not that proposed by 
Fletcher.  The plan implemented was not that proposed by Fletcher either, but 
was much closer to it.  The engineers believed they were working to a plan that 
Beresford would not let them implement fully, after he had approved it.  Their 
frustration comes through clearly in several of their letters.  
 
The resources required were not available, either in terms of guns or siege 
materials.  The siege train was too small and ineffective.  Although thirty-two 
guns were available for the siege, only thirteen of these made it into the 
batteries.  Five guns76 opened against St Christoval on 11 May 1811, four of 
which were damaged the same day and were not replaced before the siege 
was raised, although a new battery for four guns was started.  The eight guns 
for the attacks on the two outworks on the south side were too far away to 
cause any significant damage.  During the whole siege there were only five 
siege guns firing to make a breach from 7:00am to around noon on 11 May 
1811.  The stores in terms of tools, shot and powder were insufficient and had 
to be shipped in from Lisbon.  Even the reduced stores ordered from Lisbon did 
not arrive until 12 May 1811. 
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There were too many delays in starting the siege.  It appears that the decision 
to besiege Badajoz had developed a level of momentum and rather than stop it, 
each problem just delayed the start, with no-one re-evaluating the risk and 
benefits of continuing with the siege.  Most of the delays were not the fault of 
the engineers.  These included the problems with the bridging across the 
Guadiana, getting the stores to Badajoz and getting the agreement of the 
Spanish commanders to WellingtonÕs operational plan.  The loss of a week 
between 24 April and 1 May 1811, due to the river rising was the last in a series 
of delays that severely affected the plan to attack Badajoz.  WellingtonÕs 
correspondence shows that the deciding factor for starting the siege was the 
agreement of the Spanish commanders to WellingtonÕs memorandum.  
Beresford did not want to commit to starting the siege until he knew he would 
have their full support.  Neither Oman, Fortescue or later historians pick up on 
this. 
 
Beresford knew on 10 May 1811 that Soult was advancing to relieve Badajoz.  
He was in a difficult situation.  There was no way that there would be sufficient 
time to complete the siege before Soult arrived.  But if Soult was just making a 
demonstration, or decided that his force was not strong enough and retired, 
Beresford would be criticised for raising the siege too early.   
 
The engineers all wanted to start the attack on the castle on 9 May 1811, but 
Beresford would not allow them.  From 11 May 1811, Beresford was trying to 
protect the siege materials and conduct the siege at the same time.  The impact 
was that neither was done successfully.  The siege was half-hearted in its 
application and many stores had to be destroyed when the siege was raised.  A 
better strategy would probably have been to suspend the siege and keep a tight 
blockade around Badajoz until SoultÕs intentions were clear and then restart 
with all the materials and resources immediately at hand.   
 
In the end there was no way that the siege could have succeeded.  There were 
only five days between the investment of the fortress and the raising the siege.  
It was impossible to take the fortress in that time.  It should be remembered that 
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the French took forty-two days to take Badajoz and that was through surrender.  
It would have taken them longer to take the fortress by storm. 
 
One impact of the first siege of Badajoz was the effect it had on BeresfordÕs 
reputation.  There was a growing lack of confidence in BeresfordÕs leadership 
which had started with the action at Campo Mayor.  Gordon, WellingtonÕs ADC 
had very little good to say about Beresford before they rode down to sort out the 
problems.  Squire described the leadership as all Ôdoubt and indecisionÕ.77  
Boutflower, the surgeon of the 40th Foot complained that they were Ôvictims of 
some shameful mismanagementÕ.78  Following the battle of Albuera, there were 
many other officers who were complaining about BeresfordÕs leadership. 
 
The first siege resulted in nearly seven hundred and fifty casualties with no 
visible benefit, although the bulk of the casualties were caused by the reckless 
pursuit of the French sortie on 10 May 1811.  Of the twenty-one engineers 
present, two were killed and three wounded, all on the St Christoval attack.79  
The troops were despondent, and after the bloodbath at Albuera were to come 
straight back to Badajoz to try again.   
4.2.2.2. Second Siege of Badajoz, May 1811 
Following the battle of Albuera, there was a stand-off between the armies for 
two days when Beresford was not sure if Soult was going to renew his attack.  
On 18 May 1811, when it was clear that Soult was retiring, Beresford ordered 
HamiltonÕs Portuguese Division and MaddenÕs cavalry Brigade to re-invest 
Badajoz, while he followed Soult south. Hamilton completed the investment on 
the south side of the river on the morning of 19 May 1811.  Dickson and 
Fletcher were immediately ordered to prepare to restart the siege.  In the period 
since the siege had been raised, Phillipon the governor, had worked hard to 
make repairs.  He also ordered the soil to be removed from the area where the 
batteries would be sited for any subsequent attack on St Christoval.   
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Table 4f. Timeline for second siege of Badajoz. 
19 May 1811 South side of Badajoz invested by Hamilton. 
25 May 1811 North side of Badajoz invested by 7th Division. 
25 May 1811 Flying bridge installed at the mouth of the Caya 
27 May 1811 3rd Division joined investment on south side 
29 May 1811 Work started on false attack against Pardaleras 
30 May 1811 Work started against St Christoval & Picurina 
3 June 1811 Guns opened fire on both sides 
4 June 1811 7 guns moved forward to new battery on night 4-5th June 
5 June 1811 7 Guns opened from Battery No 6, south side 
6 June 1811 1st assault on St Christoval, night 6-7th June 
7 June 1811 3 guns opened from Battery No 7, south side. 
8 June 1811 10 guns opened from Battery No 7, south side, including 
6 Iron 24-pounder guns which had arrived from Lisbon 
9 June 1811 2nd assault on St Christoval, night 9-10th June 
10 June 1811 Siege raised and guns removed by that evening 
 
Wellington also arrived on 19 May 1811, and established himself in Elvas to 
command the siege personally.  Jones noted that it would take around eleven 
days to have the guns ready, primarily because the gun carriages needed 
significant repairs after the first siege.80  
 
Wellington now considered the plan to be followed for the second attempt.  
Jones noted that Wellington ÔAfter much consideration, determined É to follow 
the plan É for the last attackÕ.81  This infers that the plan that the engineers 
actually followed for the first siege was known to Wellington, even though it was 
not documented, as discussed above.  The plan was for attacks against the St 
Christoval and Picurina outworks (which would ultimately become the attack 
against the castle), with a false attack against the Pardaleras outwork.  Some 
changes were made to the overall plan, to increase the number of guns 
available, to set up counter-battery fire and to start both attacks simultaneously.  
There was one major boost to the planning, in that the stores that Wellington 
had ordered from Lisbon in April 1811, for the first siege, had eventually arrived 
at Elvas and were now available for use.  But there were still not enough tools 
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for the planned activities as 1000 more picks and shovels were ordered from 
Lisbon on 22 May 1811.82  
 
The siege train that Dickson put together comprised thirty 24-pound cannons, 
four 16-pound cannons, eight 8-inch howitzers and four 10-inch howitzers.  
These were still all supplied from Elvas and were still of the same age and poor 
quality as those used previously.  To bolster these limited resources, orders 
were sent to expedite the arrival of the six iron guns that had been ordered from 
Lisbon around 10 April 1811 and also to assign a company of British 
artillerymen to support the Portuguese artillerymen.  Wellington, clearly still had 
no intention of using the new English battering train that was at Lisbon.  As 
early as 14 May 1811, he was arranging for it to be moved north for the planned 
siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.  Fletcher also requested that Beresford assign two 
hundred and sixty-five soldiers to the engineers and that the assistant 
engineers who volunteered for the first siege would be made available again. 
 
All the officers knew that this was going to be another race against time.  
Dickson writing on 29 May 1811, wrote ÔReinforcements are on their march from 
MassenaÕs army to the south, so that we must soon take Badajoz, or we 
probably will be interrupted againÕ.83  Similarly, JonesÕ view was Ôanything to be 
undertaken against Badajoz, must therefore be of a rapid natureÕ.84  As with the 
first siege, collecting men and material together with the limited resources that 
were immediately available proved time consuming and it was not until 30 May 
1811 that everything was in place to start the attacks.  
 
Between 30 May 1811, and the morning of 3 June 1811, the batteries and 
trenches were formed for the attacks against St Christoval and the castle.  The 
attack against St Christoval suffered the same problems as before, through the 
lack of soil and the incessant bombardment from the French.  Due to the limited 
number of workmen available on the south side, the parallel was not a long as 
proposed and on the night of 31 May 1811 it was decided to prepare the main 
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battery at the end of the current parallel rather than wait a further twenty-four 
hours for the parallel to be extended nearer to the walls. The decision was 
made to accept the extra distance for the sake of speed.85  The batteries were 
completed and opened fire on the morning of 3 June 1811. 
 
Table 4g. Comparison of the ordnance at the start of the sieges of Badajoz. 
 1st Siege 2nd Siege 
Attack on St Christoval 586 2387 
Attack on Castle 888 20 
  
There was an impressive increase in the number of guns brought forward.  
Compared with the first siege, three times the number of guns were available 
on the morning the firing commenced. 
 
On the north side, there were four batteries in action.  On the south side all the 
guns were initially placed in one large battery.  Fletcher had written to 
Wellington on the evening of 3 June 1811, stating that as Ôthe guns employed 
are so uncertain in their effects it may become necessary to push yet further 
forwardÕ.89  He told Wellington that he had ordered work to be started that night 
on the second parallel and a new battery that would bring the range to the 
castle walls down to six hundred and fifty yards.  This work was completed and 
seven guns opened fire on the morning of 5 June 1811.  Again that night, the 
parallel was extended further to the right and another battery was started at five 
hundred and twenty yards from the castle.  This battery opened with three guns 
on 7 June 1811, and that night the six iron 24-pounders, which had eventually 
arrived from Lisbon were installed with one other gun, bringing the battery up to 
ten guns on the morning of 8 June 1811. 
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Table 4h. Guns available each morning of the 2nd siege of Badajoz.       
 3 Jun 4 Jun 5 Jun 6 Jun 7 Jun 8 Jun 9 Jun 
Attack on St 
Christoval 
23 21 15 14 13 20 17 
Attack on Castle 20 18 19 17 18 13 13 
 
The table above shows the number of guns that were available each morning.  
The old brass guns continued to exhibit all the problems that had been apparent 
during the first siege.  Most were made inoperative through use rather than 
through enemy action.  Both Jones and Dickson remarked on the improvements 
when the first iron guns became available on the morning of 8 June 1811. 
 
As predicted by the engineers, the wall of the castle was quickly destroyed on 
the first day of firing.  However, what was not expected was that the wall was 
actually just a facing for the ground behind which refused to collapse and 
peeled off in sheets leaving a near perpendicular face behind.  This was 
battered incessantly until 10 June 1811, and it was only at this point that there 
was some hope that the breach might be practicable.  Captain Mulcaster R.E. 
reconnoitred the Rivellas stream on the night of 5 June 1811, and identified two 
fords where troops could cross near the proposed breach.90  Captain Patton 
R.E. was mortally wounded making a further reconnaissance of the Rivellas 
stream and the castle walls on the night of 8 June 1811.91 
 
The fire against St Christoval was also more successful than it had been during 
the first siege.  The breach was declared practicable following a 
reconnaissance of the breach on the night of 5 June 1811, by Lieutenant 
Forster R.E.  An assault was ordered for midnight on 6 June 1811 led by 
Lieutenant Forster.  The assault failed, primarily due to the prompt action of the 
French who had cleared away the rubbish from the breach between dusk and 
midnight when the attack was made.  The attacking party made valiant attempts 
for nearly an hour to find a way in, but eventually retired with losses of twelve 
killed and eighty wounded.  Jones noted that Ôthe storming party, I am afraid, 
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did not march until midnightÕ, which suggests that the engineers thought the 
delay before the assault was too long.92 
 
The siege batteries commenced firing again the following morning and battered 
the walls for a further two days, when the breach was once again declared 
practicable.  To reduce the time for the French to clear away the rubbish, the 
assault was scheduled for 9:00pm.  The size of the assault force was increased 
but a similar result occurred, with the garrison showing great energy in clearing 
the rubbish from the breach and blocking the breach itself.  The leader of the 
assault Major McGeechy and Lieutenant Hunt R.E. who was guiding the party, 
were both killed in the first minutes of the attack.  Casualties this time were fifty-
four killed and eighty-five wounded.93 
 
At noon the following day, 10 June 1811, Wellington called together his officers 
and told them he was raising the siege.  The guns and stores were removed 
over the following two days.  The comprehensive reasons Wellington gave for 
his decision were :  
− The poor quality of the siege guns; 
− The even poorer quality of the gun carriages; 
− The resistance of the castle wall (he was ÔastonishedÕ at the resistance); 
− Failure to take the fort of St Christoval; 
− The expected arrival of French relief forces; 
− The depletion of the ordnance stores at Elvas to a point where it would 
not be able to defend itself; the lack of replacement stores from Lisbon 
and the lack of transport to deliver replacement stores; 
− The depletion of provisions to the point where there were less than a 
fortnight of supplies for Elvas; 
− The need for the transport used at the siege of Badajoz to replenish the 
ordnance stores and provisions at Elvas.94 
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Comments on the Second Siege of Badajoz. 
 
This section will again concentrate on the performance of the engineers rather 
than on the events themselves.  That the first two sieges of Badajoz were 
failures is not in doubt.  However, it is time, to look again at the circumstances 
and re-evaluate them. 
 
There are some common threads running through both sieges :  
− They were carried out against time pressures; 
− There were limited resources available: manpower, materials and guns; 
− There were transport problems; 
− The choice of point of attack was strongly criticised both at the time and 
later. 
 
The two most significant English writers on the war, Oman and Fortescue, are 
highly critical of the sieges, blaming the engineer officers and to a lesser extent 
Wellington.  The same line is generally taken by Myatt, but he is more 
sympathetic of the problems that the Allies faced.95  In the analysis below  both 
sieges will be treated as one, because they were effectively the same siege 
undertaken twice. 
 
Both Oman and Fortescue criticised the decision to attack St Christoval in the 
strongest terms.  Whist criticism with hindsight is always easy, the views of the 
experts who were making decisions at the time must be considered.  On two 
separate occasions the engineers advised that primarily due to time constraints, 
there was not sufficient time to carry out a regular approach.  The admittedly 
high risk attack on St Christoval and the castle was the only possible solution 
they could see to meet the time limits.96  Their plan was agreed by Wellington 
and Beresford on both occasions.  Dickson, the senior artillery officer, 
expressed no concern about the strategy before, during or after the sieges.  On 
both occasions, the siege was raised because of an approaching army.  Oman, 
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when commenting on the second siege stated that Wellington had four weeks 
to take Badajoz.  The fact is that Wellington only had ten days from opening the 
trenches to raising the siege.  He had even less time in the first siege, just four 
days.  The remainder of the time that the Allies had available was taken up 
arranging guns and stores or sorting out communications across the river 
Guadiana.  If the plan chosen was believed to be the fastest, then there was 
absolutely no chance of an attack on the south side succeeding.  The French 
took seven weeks to take Badajoz and that was by surrender, not assault.  It is 
difficult to understand why most writers believe that Wellington could achieve 
the same in seven days. 
 
DÕUrban stated in his diary that the breach in St Christoval was never 
practicable and noted on 10 June 1811 that a French sapper who had deserted, 
said that the castle wall could never be breached at the point chosen as it had 
solid rock behind (which was shown to be untrue).  DÕUrban wrote the 
engineers had chosen the wrong point of attack and should have attacked the 
south side.97  DÕUrban reserved more serious criticism for the overall strategy in 
that he believed that Wellington should have focussed on destroying SoultÕs 
army first and then turned on Badajoz at his leisure.  There is also an 
interesting comment by George Ross R.E. who wrote that Beresford believed 
that the siege of Badajoz should not have been undertaken.98 
 
The two assaults on the fort of St Christoval need further consideration. St 
Christoval was a small, but very strong fort, each side being around one 
hundred yards long.  The first assault used less than two hundred soldiers and 
the second a few more. During the first assault, the French had less than two 
hundred soldiers in the fort and probably not more than four hundred during the 
second assault.  Oman and Fortescue both commented that the storming 
parties were too small.99  There is no reason why the size of the storming 
parties could not have been larger.  With the forces Wellington had available, 
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he could have made an attempt to overwhelm the fort.  Brute force may not 
have led to any greater casualties, as the casualties were caused by these 
small groups spending up to an hour trying to get into the fort.  Ladders could 
have been used at different points as well as at the breach.  At no time did the 
French have enough troops in the fort to defend all the faces at the same time.  
When Wellington finally took Badajoz in 1812, it was the secondary attacks that 
succeeded, not the main attack.  A similar approach attacking at multiple 
locations should have been used in the assault St Christoval in 1811, 
particularly due to WellingtonÕs strong desire to re-take Badajoz.   
 
There is no doubt that the guns available from Elvas were not up to the task of 
performing siege work.  There is no doubt that the lack of trained sappers and 
miners had an effect in that there were no experienced troops who could take 
the sap forward.  There is also no doubt that the transport problems meant that 
not all the materials were there when they were required.  But the single 
inescapable reason why these sieges failed was time.  None of the other factors 
would have prevented the sieges success had Wellington not been working 
against deadlines.  Wellington had known for days that he could not continue 
the siege past 10 June 1811.100  In a letter to Charles Stuart, he wrote, ÔBadajoz 
may fall; but the business will be very near run on both sidesÉ I have never 
seen walls bear so much battering, nor ordnance, nor artillery so bad as those 
belonging to ElvasÕ.101  He also knew that Badajoz only had supplies for two 
weeks.102 
 
Added to the above, there were some other factors.  St Christoval proved to be 
stronger than Wellington, the artillery and the engineer officers expected.  It 
must also not be forgotten that the governor proved his skill many times during 
the three sieges of Badajoz.  With a less energetic governor, Badajoz would 
probably have fallen in June 1811.  Overall there were too many factors working 
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against the sieges succeeding, but they had to be tried because of the strategic 
importance of Badajoz. 
 
What is surprising in looking closely at the writing of Oman, Fortescue and 
many modern writers is that the sieges have been skipped over and not really 
understood by them.  Examples of this include OmanÕs criticism that Wellington 
could have ordered up better guns in early May 1811 for the second siege of 
Badajoz.103  Wellington had ordered additional guns for the first siege of 
Badajoz around 10 April 1811, a full month earlier than this.  The lack of 
transport made moving them very difficult.  These guns finally arrived near the 
end of the second siege of Badajoz on 8 June 1811, two months after they were 
ordered.  Fortescue gets similarly confused over the guns.  First he suggests 
that time constraints meant that Wellington would not wait for the English siege 
train.104  Later he writes that they sent for some British iron guns from Elvas.105 
The iron guns from Lisbon were actually Portuguese marine 24-pounders.  
They were also old and worn, but much better than the old brass 24-pounders 
that were being used prior to their arrival.  
 
In summary, the first two sieges of Badajoz were attempted with insufficient 
time and material available.  The choice of point of attack was not the preferred 
option for any officer but circumstances led them to believe that this was the 
only option that might succeed.  The engineer officers felt that they were not 
allowed to follow the plan that had been agreed.  There is no strong evidence to 
support the view that another point of attack under the same circumstances 
would have been successful. 
4.2.3. SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO, 1812. 
The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was probably the only British siege during the 
Peninsular War that was successfully planned and executed.  Unlike the two 
earlier sieges of Badajoz, Wellington knew this siege was inevitable and could 
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plan when to commence it as part of his overall strategy.  The operation started 
a full eight months before the siege when Wellington gave orders in May 1811 
for the British siege train which was lying in transports at Lisbon to be moved 
north by sea to Oporto.106   
 
Table 4i. Timeline for siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. 
14 May 1811  Wellington ordered siege train to be moved from 
Lisbon to Oporto. 
1 Dec 1811 Siege Train moved up to Almeida, ready for use. 
8 Jan 1812 Fortress invested. 
8 Jan 1812 Reynaud redoubt stormed on night of 8/9 Jan 1812. 
8 Jan 1811 Trenches opened on night of 8/9 Jan 1812. 
13 Jan 1812 Convent of Santa Cruz stormed on night of 13/14 Jan 
1812. 
14 Jan 1812 French sortie from fortress. 
14 Jan 1812 Siege guns opened fire on fortress. 
14 Jan 1812 Convent of San Francisco stormed on night of 14/15 
Jan 1812. 
18 Jan 1812 New battery opens to form second breach 
19 Jan 1812 Fortress stormed on night of 19/20 Jan 1812. 
 
The scale of the planning and the time required to move this siege train 
reinforces the reasons why it was not possible to arrange a similar event at 
short notice for the previous sieges of Badajoz.  The siege train was made up of 
thirty-eight guns, eighteen mortars and twenty-two howitzers, totalling seventy-
eight pieces of ordnance.  WellingtonÕs memorandum of 19 July 1811 details 
1,092 carts and an additional 768 bullocks to move the train and supplies from 
Oporto.107  Even with this large number of carts, they were required to make 
two trips.  One hundred and fifty boats were also needed for the river passage 
of the siege guns.108  Collecting this amount of transport together was a major 
task and keeping the carts and bullocks together for an extended period leading 
up to the siege was even more difficult.  The siege train was ordered forward to 
Almeida in mid-November 1811109 and work started on preparing materials for a 
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bridge to be used to cross the river Agueda at the same time.110  The troops to 
undertake the siege had been in the vicinity for many weeks and they were 
ordered to start preparing the siege materials on 18 December 1811.  On 1 
January 1812, Wellington saw an opportunity to attack the fortress and ordered 
it to be invested on 6 January 1812.  Due to the shortage of transport he 
decided not to wait for the howitzer ammunition to be delivered and attacked 
the fortress with cannon only.111   
 
Engineer resources for the attack comprised of Fletcher in overall command 
with eighteen other officers112 and eighteen soldiers from the Royal Military 
Artificers.  A company of artificers had been ordered up from Lisbon on 18 
December 1811, but they had not yet arrived.113  Burgoyne and Ross were 
assigned as siege directors, taking twenty-four hour shifts in turn.  Additional 
support as in the previous sieges was made up of twelve assistant engineers 
and one hundred and eighty soldiers from the Third Division who had been 
given some basic training under Burgoyne in the preceding months.  
 
Heavy snow delayed the investment due to the difficulty in bringing the stores 
forward.  The fortress was finally invested on 8 January 1812 and the same 
night the Reynaud redoubt was stormed by troops under the command of 
Colonel John Colbourne.114  Work started on the trenches that night and 
breaching batteries the following night.  The plan was to form the breaching 
batteries on the Great Teson hill and then move nearer to form a second 
breaching battery on the Little Teson hill.115  Ross, one of the siege directors, 
was killed early on the night of 9 January 1812.   
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On 10 January 1812, one of the batteries being constructed was found to be 
partially masked by the Reynaud redoubt and some of the guns had to be 
moved to another battery.  Jones remarked, possibly with some irony, Ôthat it 
was thought less labour to remove five of the guns  [to another battery]É than 
to cut away the redoubtÕ.116  Overall progress was good but the troops were 
suffering due to the freezing weather and because they had to march from their 
camp that was ten to twelve miles away.  On the route they had to ford a river 
so they spent most of their twenty-four hour shift cold and wet. 
 
There was a change of plan on 13 January 1812, when Wellington asked 
Fletcher if the second, nearer, set of breaching batteries could be dispensed 
with as he had received news that Marmont was moving to relieve the fortress. 
This was agreed, although work continued on the trenches to keep WellingtonÕs 
options open if Marmont did not advance.  That night the convent of Santa Cruz 
was stormed as it directly threatened the second parallel.  On the morning of 14 
January 1812, the French made a sortie from the fortress and briefly took 
control of the trenches, but limited damage was done and the breaching 
batteries opened later that day.  There was another error in the siting of the 
guns, as it was now found that two 18-pounders could not see the foot of the 
wall in the convent of San Fansisco which they were supposed to attack.   
 
 Two new batteries were started to open a second breach in the wall and these 
opened on 18 January 1812.  The new guns had an immediate impact and on 
19 January 1812, the wall collapsed creating the second practicable breach.  
Wellington inspected the breaches and wrote orders for an assault that night.  
The Third Division was to storm the main breach and the Light Division the 
second breach.  The assault was planned for 7:00pm that evening and both 
attacks succeeded, the troops then dissolving into a disorderly mob to ransack 
the town.  Order was restored by the morning and work commenced to make 
the fortress defensible. 
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This siege was generally seen as being very successful both at the time and by 
later writers with the fortress taken in twelve days.  However, there are 
circumstances that need further evaluation.   
 
Analysis of the siege. 
 
WellingtonÕs decision to attack on 1 January 1812 was a consequence of 
intercepting orders from Napoleon reorganising the French command structure 
and simultaneously detaching troops to the east coast of Spain.117  The impact 
being that the French forces covering Ciudad Rodrigo were reduced in numbers 
and moved further away thereby increasing the response time to any actions by 
Wellington.  The assault on Ciudad Rodrigo was clearly a snap decision, as on 
30 December 1811 Dickson wrote ÔWellington thinks in about a fortnight we 
shall have sufficient [ammunition] here to commence operationsÕ.118  Two days 
later, he wrote that the Ôoperation will be undertaken immediately É and É the 
trenches will be open in six or seven daysÕ.119  Dickson who was many miles 
away was slightly behind with the decision making.  Jones noted in his diary on 
28 December 1811 that ÔWellington determined to start the siege instantly he 
could get up the smallest possible proportion of stores and ammunitionÕ.120  
Once again Wellington was starting a siege with a very small window of 
opportunity, which meant that the normal rules of sieges would be ignored.  The 
weather was atrocious and the stores were not ready.  One engineer remarked 
ÔLord W is anxious to break ground tomorrow night, for which he has not 
afforded the meansÕ.121 
 
This quick decision meant that there was no transport to deliver the howitzer 
ammunition and Wellington took the risk of starting the siege with limited ability 
to carry out counter-battery fire.  This would explain why there was no attempt 
to silence the French guns until the day of the assault.  After the siege, 
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Wellington appeared to justify this decision as a new tactic : ÔWe proceeded at 
Ciudad Rodrigo on quite a new principle of sieges. The whole object of our fire 
was to lay open the wallsÕ.122  The disadvantage of this principle was that many 
more Allied troops were injured through the consistent effective fire from the 
numerous French guns.  The French were certainly surprised by the lack of 
counter-battery fire.123  Colville, commanding the Fourth Division commented 
that Fletcher had requested counter-battery fire on 18 January 1811, and that 
when the guns were directed at the French batteries just prior to the assault 
they had an immediate effect.  Colville also noted that whilst he thought 
counter-battery fire was necessary, Wellington did not.124 
 
One of the main reasons why Ciudad Rodrigo was taken so quickly was 
because it was a second rate fortress with nothing like the strength of Badajoz.  
Burgoyne, after a visit to the fortress in 1808, described it as Ôincapable of 
defence É its works É possessing nearly every fault a fortification can haveÕ.125 
Squire in 1810 described Ciudad Rodrigo as Ômerely a walled townÕ,126 and 
commenting to Pasley after it was taken wrote : Ôwe succeeded in taking the 
place more from its own weakness, than from any means we possessedÕ.127  
Wellington took full advantage of this weakness and was able to breach the 
walls from the position of the first batteries. The governor and the garrison were 
similarly weak,  Barrie, the governor, was Ôthe only general of brigade available 
at Salamanca when his predecessor, Renaud was takenÕ.128  Renaud described 
Barrie as a Ômiserable fellow, perfectly unfit for the jobÕ.129  His performance 
matched the expectations set : Ôall British accounts agree in condemning Barrie 
for his lack of energyÕ.130 There was no serious resistance to the taking of the 
redoubt, the convents or the fortress.  Barrie has to take the responsibility for 
this.   
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The greatest success of the siege and the single event that made the siege so 
rapid was Colbourne taking the Renaud redoubt on the first night.  Typically four 
to five days would have been needed to prepare and take such an outwork.  It 
is worthy of note that to take this small redoubt Colbourne used more troops 
than Wellington did during the two failed attempts on St Christoval at Badajoz.  
The outcome at Badajoz may have been different had a similar strategy been 
used.   
 
The size and quality of the guns used during the siege also had a significant 
effect on the outcome.  Wellington had none of the problems with inaccuracy 
and overheating that plagued the old brass guns at Badajoz.  Had he been able 
to bring up the howitzer ammunition, there would probably have been 
substantially fewer casualties before and during the assault.  
 
The performance of the engineers tells a different story from the previous two 
sieges.  At Badajoz, the engineers had neither time nor resources to complete 
their task.  At Ciudad Rodrigo they had better guns and more time, although 
time was still a constraint.  Whilst the result was positive, there were some 
worrying mistakes.  Three significant errors were recorded : a battery being 
placed behind the Renaud redoubt; the guns to attack the convent of San 
Fansisco being too low to see the base of the wall; and the embrasures for the 
main batteries being misaligned when originally opened.  The first error, the 
misplacing of the battery, was made on the night of 8/9 January 1811, when 
Ross who was siege director for the night was killed.  Burgoyne was strongly 
critical of the time and effort wasted, writing  : 
 
it was placed behind the French redoubt, it was nearly finished, some 
platforms laid, and we had worked two nights to level the parapet of the 
redoubt, when it was at length ascertained that not a single gun of the 
nine could see the object to be fired at.131   
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He continued: ÔOur Headquarters party have sent home a journal of the siege, 
in which I presume this battery does not make its appearance Ð it makes a very 
ugly one in my journalÕ.132  Burgoyne and his comrades do not specifically 
identify who they thought was at fault.  Fletcher certainly marked out the 
batteries previously at Badajoz and it is difficult to believe that he was not 
present when this, the most vital stage, was being carried out, even if Ross 
actually did the work.  Similarly, the failure to open the embrasures properly 
occurred after the engineer in command, Lieutenant Skelton was killed whilst 
standing on the top of the parapet encouraging the troops to perform the task.  
His death was unlikely to have helped with the troopsÕ willingness to expose 
themselves to the French fire.  Burgoyne noted that when the batteries 
originally opened on 14 January 1812, many of the shots were passing over the 
top of the town.  JonesÕ published Journal notes SkeltonÕs death but not the 
problem with the embrasures.  However, his unpublished diary noted Ôthe want 
of [a] qualified É Engineer É to superintend the opening of the embrasures É 
caused such a delay that the day was lostÕ.133  This problem was corrected that 
night and the guns were firing effectively from the following morning.134  The 
loss of Ross so early in the siege probably had an ongoing effect.  Ellicombe 
who replaced him, whilst being a senior officer, had no operational experience 
and after some years in Ceylon had been in the UK for the preceding three 
years.  All three errors were avoidable and should have been identified earlier.  
Whilst Burgoyne is highly critical of the errors he took no personal responsibility 
for them, which as one of the siege directors he should.  Ultimately Fletcher 
must take responsibility as the senior engineer.  None of these errors had a 
material effect on the timescale or the outcome of the siege, but they must have 
had some effect on the reputation and confidence of the engineers.   
 
Burgoyne was critical of most elements of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, even 
though this was seen as the most successful Allied siege during the Peninsular 
War.  The Commanding Royal Engineer at the siege, Richard Fletcher, gave 
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high praise to Burgoyne who Ôgave me every assistance, and executed the 
works under his charge with great zeal and abilityÕ.135  BurgoyneÕs initial 
comments in his diary were quite mild : ÔOur works were certainly not carried on 
with great expeditionÕ.136  In private letters he was much more critical.  He wrote 
lengthy letters to John Squire and Charles Pasley criticising most aspects of the 
siege including the preparation (the gabions and fascines were made too far 
away, without proper supervision, leading to poor quality and delivery problems) 
and the daily operations (the siting of the batteries and guns, the want of 
arrangement in bringing up stores and the organisation of the working parties). 
Burgoyne in a letter to Squire complained : ÔWe go on most miserably, no 
superintendents, no arrangements, it is said that Wellington objects to give any 
assistance the Colonel proposes, but I canÕt think this would be the case to a 
man of firmnessÕ.137  In a later letter he wrote : ÔHis Lordship can have but little 
confidence in Colonel Fletcher, as it appears from what we hear that he objects 
to nearly every proposal made by him ... for some reason or other Colonel 
Fletcher had not influence enough to get the smallest assistance from the 
armyÕ.138  This appears to be the first suggestion that there was a lack of 
confidence in FletcherÕs command both amongst his subordinates and 
Wellington.  
 
BurgoyneÕs criticism was not restricted to his engineering superiors.  He 
believed that Wellington summoned the French governor too early and that the 
French would have been much more likely to ask for terms had they had been 
summoned on 19 January 1811, just before the assault, when there were two 
significant breaches.139  The commitment (or lack of it) from the army that 
became very evident at Burgos was also an object of criticism.  Burgoyne noted 
that the line officers Ôdo not seem to think it a point of duty or honour to interest 
themselves in the exertions of a working partyÕ140 and suggested that having a 
general officer with the troops in the trenches would help to maintain progress. 
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In terms of resources for the siege, all the senior engineers, Burgoyne, Jones 
and Ross commented on Wellington refusing to provide line officers to assist.141  
This should, in fairness to Wellington, be offset against the fact that the 
engineers had been allocated around 200 soldiers and officers from the third 
division who had been given some rudimentary training in the previous few 
months.  In addition to this the division on duty each day had to furnish a further 
group of carpenters and miners. 
 
In summary, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was a great operational success that 
materially strengthened WellingtonÕs position and put the French firmly on the 
defensive. The success was due to three main factors : the weakness of the 
fortress, the strength of the Allied battering train and the lack of energy in the 
French governor.  Overall, the engineers had performed their duties well, but as 
Fortescue wrote Ôthe engineers themselves É were by no means faultless in 
their plans.Õ142  As mentioned above, the first signs of criticism within the 
engineers were also appearing.  This situation was not helped when, due to an 
oversight, BurgoyneÕs name was omitted from WellingtonÕs despatch and only 
Jones and George MacLeod were mentioned.  Both received brevet promotions 
through being mentioned and only a subsequent appeal got the same 
recognition for Burgoyne.  The promotion of Macleod in particular would have 
caused annoyance as he was mentioned in connection with the troops from the 
Third Division who had been trained as sappers.  Burgoyne was responsible for 
their training and received no thanks for his work training these troops or for his 
performance as siege director.   
 
Casualties among the nineteen engineer officers were two killed and five 
wounded.  Two of the wounded sailed to England and did not return to the 
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Peninsula.143  Three of the four fortresses covering the main routes in Portugal 
were now in Allied hands.  It was not difficult to see what was coming next. 
4.2.4. THIRD SIEGE OF BADAJOZ IN 1812. 
As soon as Wellington had the repairs for Ciudad Rodrigo underway, he turned 
his attention to the next challenge, the retaking of Badajoz.  On 25 January 
1812, Dickson arranged for all the 24-pounder round shot and shells along with 
nine hundred barrels of powder to be moved to Oporto for onward transmission 
to Elvas.144  The following day Wellington ordered sixteen 24-pounder 
carronades (howitzers) and a number of gun carriages to be moved by land 
from Almeida to Elvas.145  On 28 January 1812, Wellington met Borthwick (the 
senior artillery officer in the Peninsula), Dickson and Fletcher to discuss moving 
the 24-pounder guns from Almeida to Elvas, but Dickson argued that the state 
of the bullocks and the availability of forage made it impossible.146  Wellington 
then revised his plan to use sixteen 24-pounder guns that were on transports in 
Lisbon, supplemented by twenty more which Wellington hoped could be 
supplied by Admiral Berkeley from the British fleet.  On the same day 
Wellington sent orders to Lisbon for the engineering stores to be collected and 
despatched to Elvas to allow the garrison to start work on gabions and fascines.  
George MacLeod R.E. was despatched to Elvas to superintend the preparatory 
work. Wellington had previously made arrangements for a pontoon train to be 
collected, ready for use to cross the river Guadiana which would be in full flow 
at that time of year.147   
 
Table 4j. Timeline for third siege of Badajoz. 
 28 Jan 1812 Wellington agreed there was insufficient transport to 
move main siege guns from Ciudad Rodrigo to Badajoz.  
Arrangements made for alternative supply from Lisbon. 
5 Mar 1812 Wellington hands Ciudad Rodrigo over to Spanish 
Governor and sets out for Badajoz. 
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8 Mar 1812 Last guns of siege train arrive at Elvas. 
11 Mar 1812  Wellington arrives at Elvas to direct the siege. 
16 Mar 1812 Fortress invested. 
17 Mar 1812 Trenches opened night of 17/18 March 1812. 
19 Mar 1812 French launched sortie from Picurina fort. Col. Fletcher 
wounded. 
25 Mar 1812 Batteries opened fire on fortress. 
25 Mar 1812 Picurina fort stormed night of 25/26 March 1812. 
5 Apr 1812 Fortress stormed night of 5/6 April 1812. 
 
Dickson found out on 10 February 1812, that Admiral Berkeley was planning to 
provide twenty Russian 18-pounders instead of the hoped for English 24-
pounders.148  This caused Wellington and Dickson great concern as 18-
pounders were significantly less effective in siege work.  The guns were also in 
poor condition, which meant that both accuracy and power were further 
reduced.  Wellington complained to Berkeley, but at the time Berkeley would 
not offer an alternative.  Berkeley did eventually source ten new English 18-
pounders but Dickson argued that he did not want to mix 18-pounders (Russian 
and English) or to delay the siege to bring them up.  Myatt notes that he was  
unsure if they were used in the siege, but JonesÕ journal clearly stated that they 
were not used.149 
 
Wellington remained in Ciudad Rodrigo while all the preparations were being 
made.  The main reason for this was to keep the French guessing as to what 
his next step would be.  Although the siege of Badajoz was an obvious step, 
there were other possibilities and until Wellington signified his intention by going 
to Badajoz, the French had to keep their options open. 
 
JonesÕ diary described a meeting to discuss the plan of attack on Badajoz.  
There had been much criticism of the point of attack on Badajoz the year before 
and a decision had to be made on whether to follow the same plan as last year, 
the previous French plan, or some other alternative.  At the meeting were 
Wellington, General Castanos, the Spanish Chief Engineer and Fletcher.  Jones 
recorded that Wellington and the Spanish engineer wanted to attack the 
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southern face as the French had done in early 1811, while Fletcher wanted to 
attack the south-western corner from the Picurina redoubt.  Initially Fletcher was 
reluctant to admit openly that his recommendation was due to the lack of skilled 
sappers and miners to deal with the mines that the French were known to have 
placed on the southern face.  Wellington, on being reminded of the situation, 
reluctantly agreed saying Ôhe regretted extremely our deficiencies and it obliged 
him to undertake an attack he did not approve, but that knowing the means he 
believed it to be the only attack in our power to get throughÕ.  Jones added : 
Ôthough adopted through necessity,  É it was never for one moment approved 
by any one employed in drawing it up, or in the execution of itÕ.150  Jones 
summed up his thoughts with the comment : Ôwhat a reflection on those who 
have governed the engineering service for the last nineteen years of warÕ.151  
Jones added further comments in his published Journal to the effect that the 
attack on the southern side would have required a further thirty guns and 
significantly more engineering stores and that this was beyond the available 
resources and transport.152   
 
The siege 
 
The south side of the fortress was invested on 16 March 1812.  Fletcher had 
twenty-three engineers including Squire and Burgoyne, who acted as siege 
directors, and Jones as Brigade-Major.  At least one and possibly four of this 
number did not arrive until the very end of the siege.153  For the first time in the 
war there was a significant number of troops from the Royal Military Artificers 
present, a total one hundred and fifteen men.  A further thirty had been ordered 
up from Cadiz, but they did not arrive before the end of the siege.  Fletcher also 
had at his disposal the remainder of the soldiers from the Third Division who 
had been previously trained in sapping.  This group was now reduced to around 
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one hundred and twenty from its starting size of around two hundred.  Finally, 
there were also ten assistant engineers from the line regiments.154  
 
Fletcher marked out the first trenches on 17 March 1812, and these were 
commenced that night.  The weather over the first few days was poor with 
constant rain. And this made work in the trenches very difficult.  The river 
Guadiana rose until it swept away the pontoon bridge on 22 March 1812.  This 
was a major concern to Wellington as the bridge was both his source of his 
siege supplies and also his line of retreat.  A complete loss of communication 
across the river would require Wellington to raise the siege, the nearest 
alternative bridge being at Merida, twenty miles away.  Lieutenant Piper R.E. 
was sent to investigate the damage to the pontoon bridge and reported that 
twelve of the twenty-four pontoons had sunk.  Two were subsequently 
recovered from the river, but the rest were lost.  For the remainder of the siege 
the pontoons were used as rowing boats exclusively for the carriage of powder 
and shot across the river.155   
 
Despite the poor weather, some progress was made.  The French launched a 
sortie at noon on 19 March 1812, and once again caught the Allied army 
unprepared.  A small body of French cavalry made it to the engineersÕ depot 
where they attacked the unarmed soldiers and captured two officers before they 
were driven off.  Little damage was done to the works, but many tools were 
carried off as the French troops had been promised a reward for every one they 
collected.  Allied casualties were around one hundred and fifty men including 
the Chief Engineer, Fletcher whose wound confined him to bed until 5 April 
1812 but did not stop him retaining the command.  The routine for the 
remainder of the siege was for Wellington to meet with Fletcher and Jones each 
morning to discuss progress and agree the tasks for the next twenty-four hours. 
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The poor weather had probably delayed completion of the batteries by two or 
three days but they finally opened on the fortress on the morning of 25 March 
1812 and started to batter the fortress and also the Picurina and San Roque 
outworks.  No significant damage had been inflicted on the Picurina fort when 
Wellington ordered it to be stormed that night, Oman suggesting that this was to 
make up some lost time.156  Due to the delay between the siege guns ceasing  
fire and the attack the French had time to make repairs and although the attack 
was successful, fifty-four were killed and two hundred and sixty-five wounded 
out of five hundred attackers.  Once the fort had been taken the second parallel 
and associated batteries could be started. 
 
From 27 March 1812, the trenches were extended towards the San Roque 
lunette with the intention of taking it and destroying the dam that kept the 
ground in front of the fortress flooded.  WellingtonÕs intention was to launch the 
assault across this ground but until the water was drained this was not possible.  
Progress by the partially trained sappers was not fast enough and casualties 
were high.  An attempt was made without success on 2 April 1812,  to mine the 
dam near the San Roque lunette.  Lieutenant Stanway R.E. led a party forward 
and placed four hundred and fifty pounds of gunpowder on the dam, but the 
explosion did not have the desired effect.  The attack on San Roque was now 
abandoned and Wellington accepted that the attack would have to work round 
the flooded area.  The danger involved in trenching is well described in a letter 
from Lieutenant Vetch R.E. :  
 
I was employed É in advancing the approaches ; we were three or four 
officers, at least half an hour laying out the work not 80yds from the 
French parapet.  The sap was marked out with a white cord, and the 
men put down as near as they could work along the line.  They squat 
down and worked away as hard as they were able, in order to cover 
themselves É the moment we were perceived they opened a very sharp 
fire of musketry, and killed seven men in the first half hour, after which 
our men got too much cover to be hit. 157 
 
As the days moved on into early April, Wellington once again found himself 
balancing the time needed to batter the fortress against the advance of the 
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French to relieve the fortress.  Wellington was aware that Soult was collecting 
troops and was moving north towards Badajoz.  He needed to decide between 
rapidly concluding the siege, or putting it on hold and advancing to meet Soult, 
leaving a force to guard the trenches or raising the siege.  Marmont was also 
demonstrating in the north against Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, but Wellington 
cannot have been seriously concerned about their safety at this time. 
 
By 5 April 1812, the breaches looked ready and Wellington issued orders for an 
assault that night.  Later in the day the assault was postponed for twenty-four 
hours to allow a third breach to be battered in the curtain wall.  It would appear 
that Wellington asked Fletcher to look at the breaches and give his opinion.158  
Following his inspection, Fletcher advised that the defences the French had 
constructed behind the breaches were strong and that a third breach should be 
made where the French would have little time to prepare new defences.  The 
original plan was to make a third breach at the last moment.  The concentrated 
effort of the siege guns on 6 April 1812 quickly battered the wall and the third 
breach was ready in the afternoon.  The three breaches would be attacked by 
the Fourth and Light Divisions.  Separate attacks would also be made on the 
castle by the Third Division and on the San Vincente bastion by the Fifth 
Division.  Sunset was just after 7:00pm.159  The siege guns stopped firing at 
about 7:30pm but the assault did not get underway until around 10:00pm. 
leaving the defenders with plenty of time to prepare for the assault that they 
knew was coming.  The main attacks through the breaches all failed, with huge 
casualties, due to the obstacles put across the breaches and the heavy fire 
from the garrison.  When it became clear to Wellington that they had failed he 
ordered the troops to be withdrawn and planned to make another assault just 
before daybreak.  About this time, Wellington was informed that PictonÕs Third 
Division had managed to scale the walls of the castle and that the Fifth Division 
had also entered the town.  He ordered the Fourth and Light Divisions forward 
again using these footholds to break out and finally take the fortress.  As at 
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Ciudad Rodrigo, there followed an uncontrollable sack of the fortress by the 
troops and it took two days before order could be restored.   
 
Casualties from the assault were shocking with 800 killed and 2,900 wounded 
out of an overall total for the siege of around 1,000 killed and 3,800 wounded.  
As always with the sieges it was the officers and better soldiers who took more 
than their fair share of the injuries.  Engineer casualties were similarly heavy.  
Of the twenty-four officers present, four were killed and eight were wounded, 
three of whom went home.160   
 
Wellington had taken Badajoz in twenty-one days.  His estimate before the start 
was twenty-four days not taking into account the bad weather that surely 
delayed progress.  Mulcaster, one of the engineers had estimated twenty-seven 
days for the siege.161  The French in 1811 took forty-five days to get the fortress 
to surrender and in reality it should have held out for many more days.  The 
cost of this rapid success was once again measured in casualties.  In this case 
they were all from the very experienced British divisions, troops Wellington 
could not afford to lose.  Although there were criticisms at the time of the 
decision to postpone the assault for another day to make the third breach, it is 
probable that this decision tipped the balance by spreading the defenders 
thinner which meant they were not able to resist the secondary assaults. 
 
Once order had been re-established in the town, work started immediately to 
repair the defences.  As a sign of the importance that Wellington placed on the 
speedy and effective repair, Fletcher the Chief Engineer was left to oversee the 
repairs and did not rejoin Wellington at headquarters until September 1812  
 
Analysis of the siege 
 
The huge casualties at the siege of Badajoz finally pushed Wellington into 
writing a strongly worded private letter to Liverpool demanding that something 
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be done about the lack of trained soldiers available to undertake siege work.  
His criticism overflowed into a more general complaint about the skills of the 
engineers.  An analysis of his complaints will be detailed below, but first the 
other components of the siege that were not within the control of the engineers 
will be evaluated. 
 
WellingtonÕs strategy of keeping the French guessing about his plans by staying 
north worked well.  Soult made arrangements for Marmont to come to his aid if 
Wellington attacked Badajoz.  Soult then appears to have become distracted 
and, even though warnings had started filtering through, he was at Cadiz until 
20 March 1812.  Soult then rushed back to Seville and spent the next ten days 
pulling together a relief force which did not exceed 25,000 men, believing that 
Marmont would be doing the same.  Marmont, in the meantime, had received 
direct orders from Napoleon not to support Badajoz, this being SoultÕs 
responsibility.  He was ordered to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo instead, which 
Napoleon believed would force Wellington to break off the siege of Badajoz and 
race north to protect it.162  Soult did not discover until around 6 April 1812, that 
Marmont was sending no supporting force.  By that time it was too late for the 
French to relieve the fortress. 
 
The habitual problem of transport once again caused the siege train to be much 
less powerful than Wellington would have liked.  At Ciudad Rodrigo the siege 
train was made up of thirty-eight new iron English guns, thirty-four of which 
were 24-pounders.  Since these could not be transported to Badajoz, reliance 
had to be placed on a combination of sixteen new English 24-pounders and 
twenty old Russian 18-pounders in poor condition.  There were an additional 
sixteen 24-pounder carronades but these were of no use for breaching work 
and appear to have been used for enfilade fire.  Jones commented that the 24-
pounder iron howitzer (carronade) Ôshould never be admitted into a battering 
trainÉ[as] it only served to waste ammunitionÕ.163  General Colville commented  
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ÔWe have for the third time undertaken the siege É deficient of means É half 
the guns are 18-pounders. We have not a single mortarÕ.164 
 
This siege train was a little better than the one used at the second siege of 
Badajoz, primarily due to the guns being made of iron, but it was much less 
powerful than that used at Ciudad Rodrigo, which was a much weaker fortress.  
The time taken to make a significant impact on the breaches was extended due 
to this less powerful siege train.  The lack of heavy howitzers limited the 
besiegersÕ ability to undertake counter-battery fire and this led to greater 
casualties in the trenches and during the assault.   
 
The weather also had a material effect on the early stages of the siege.  It 
rained consistently until about 25 March 1812, and this slowed down work in the 
trenches and certainly stopped any attempt to put guns into the batteries until 
the ground had dried out.  Of more concern to Wellington was the loss of the 
pontoon bridge and the difficulties with the flying bridge as the river rose.  At 
this time, around 22 March 1812, Wellington did not have a clear picture of the 
movements of Soult and Marmont.  The loss of his only bridge was a serious 
matter.  If the French had forced him to lift the siege and retire, his army would 
have been able to do this, but the siege train would probably have been lost.  
The wet weather also ensured that the inundation around the walls of Badajoz 
caused by the damming of the Rivellas stream was higher than normal and was 
impossible to cross.  This was what made the attack on the San Roque outwork 
important.  If heavy howitzers had been available to suppress the French guns, 
it might have been possible to take the San Roque lunette, which would have 
enabled the destruction of the dam and the draining of the area in front of the 
breaches.  Wellington could not reasonably blame the bad weather for 
unexpectedly hampering his plans. He understood what the weather would be 
like at this time of year and used the poor weather as an argument to explain 
his timing of the siege, as it would hamper the movements of the French.  Of 
course there was also a chance that it would hamper his own plans and in the 
event it did. 
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The French governor, Phillipon, showed the same energy and determination 
that he had exhibited in 1811.  The garrison was made up of seasoned troops 
and the experienced chief engineer, Lamarre, had been at the fortress for some 
time and knew it well.  The defendersÕ energy, particularly in clearing the debris 
from in front of the breaches and in blocking up the breaches, made the 
assaults much more difficult.  As described above, the assaults on the breaches 
all failed with massive loss of life and it was only due to the secondary attacks 
that the fortress was taken.  With another thousand men, Phillipon would have 
probably repulsed the assault.  It is doubtful that the British troops would have 
had the energy to make a further serious assault as Wellington planned on the 
morning of 6 April 1812.  
 
One question that needs further consideration is why did Wellington decide to 
make the assault on 6 April 1812?  Wellington was clearly concerned that the 
French would try to relieve the fortress, but there does not appear to be the 
urgency that Wellington felt.  He was aware of the movements of Soult and he 
had a reasonable idea of the size of SoultÕs force.  Wellington was also 
reasonably certain that Marmont was not marching to the aid of Soult.  He had 
a report on 4 April 1812 that Marmont had been in front of Almeida on 3 April 
1812, which suggested Marmont was not making any immediate plans to move 
south.165  Wellington was also clearly concerned that the breaches were only 
just practicable.  His decisions to order and then postpone the attack on the 
night of 5 April 1812 show a level of indecision that is very unusual in 
Wellington.  Wellington had made preliminary plans to suspend the siege and 
move to face Soult who he believed had up to 35,000 men.  When he realised 
that Soult had around 25,000 men he would have known that Soult could not 
possibly interfere with the siege without the support of Marmont.  Marmont did 
not receive permission from Napoleon to directly support Soult until 27 March 
1812, and would have needed ten to fourteen days to concentrate sufficient 
troops.  A week later he had not moved south and Wellington knew that, so the 
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earliest he could have arrived would have been the end of the second week in 
April. 
 
There are two areas where the lack of trained artificers appeared to have made 
a difference to the planning.  The first was in selection of the point of attack.  As 
mentioned above WellingtonÕs preference was to attack the south face, as it 
appeared to be the weakest.  This was the point that the French attacked.  The 
French, realising the same, had significantly strengthened it by reinforcing the 
Pardaleras outwork and also by placing mines in the approaches to the walls.  
The approaches to the southern wall that Wellington last saw in June 1811, 
were significantly stronger in March 1812.  The second was in the attempt to 
take the San Roque lunette and allow the destruction of the dam behind it.  This 
was abandoned due to the high casualties and poor progress made by the 
partially trained sappers from the army.  If trained sappers had been available, 
better progress would have been made and casualties should have been lower.  
But, the major difficulties were caused by the heavy fire from the defenders and 
without some attempt to reduce this, the effect might not have been any 
different.  The siege train at Badajoz did not contain weapons that were ideal for 
counter battery and breach clearing activities.  The 24-pounder carronades 
were the only Ôhigh-angleÕ weapon available and as they were equivalent to the 
smallest 5.5-inch howitzer they did not carry the punch that was required. 
 
It could be argued that Wellington moved too quickly to the assault, when he 
could have waited a few more days and continued battering the defences.  This 
would have reduced his casualties although it is unlikely that Phillipon would 
have considered surrender.  WellingtonÕs complaint about the lack of trained 
sappers and miners causing the additional casualties was justified, but even 
with the trained artificers he would still have needed to give them time to work 
and it is unlikely that the siege would have progressed any faster.  As in all the 
previous sieges in 1811 and 1812, Wellington was pushed into attacking early 
through the need to take the fortress before the relieving force could interfere.  
Badajoz was no different and trained artificers would  not have made a 
significant difference. 
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On 7 April 1812 Wellington wrote his despatch informing the government of the 
success at Badajoz.  With it was sent a private letter to Liverpool in which 
Wellington complained about the lack of trained engineers and artificers and 
blamed the heavy losses at Badajoz on the lack of such troops : 
 
it is quite impossible to expect to carry fortified places É unless the army 
should be provided with a regular trained corps of sappers and miners É 
The consequences É are Ð first, that our engineers although well 
educated and brave, have never turned their minds to the mode of 
conducting a regular siege, as it is useless to think of that which it is 
impossible in our service to perform.  They think that they have done 
their duty when they construct a battery, with a secure communication to 
it, which can make a breach in the wall of a place.; and, secondly, these 
breaches are to be carried by vive force by an infinite sacrifice of officers 
and soldiers ... I earnestly recommend to your lordship to have a corps of 
sappers and miners formed without loss of time.166 
 
His frustration at his losses extended his complaints from the reasonable 
towards what many engineers saw as an unreasonable attack on the whole 
engineering profession.  His complaints about the lack of sappers and miners 
were fully supported by the engineer officers themselves.  One example was 
Squire who used almost the same words as Wellington in his letter after the 
assault : ÔThis siege has served to confirm É that constituted as our Corps is, 
we are decidedly not equal to the attack of a place; whose scarp is covered by 
a good counterscarp and glacis  É Sappers and Miners are as necessary to 
engineers during a siege, as soldiers to the GeneralÕ.167   
 
WellingtonÕs critical comments in his letter of 7 April 1812 were lost until 1889, 
but a subsequent letter on the same subject to Major-General Murray was 
published in the despatches.   
 
I trust..... that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with the people 
necessary to carry them on as they ought to be; and that our engineers 
will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis and to blow 
in the counterscarp, instead of placing wherever the wall can be seen, 
leaving the poor officers and men to get into and across the ditch as best 
they can.168 
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This was responded to in JonesÕ Journal : Ôthe officers É were fully equal to the 
difficult duty of crowning the crest of the glacis had they been assisted by a 
proper trained body of menÕ.169  WellingtonÕs complaint about the casualties 
during the assault on the Picurina fort is particularly unreasonable.  The fort was 
stormed on his orders the same day the batteries opened when it was clear that 
no material damage had yet been inflicted.  Wellington rushed the assault to 
make up time lost due to the bad weather.  There is no doubt, based on the 
available evidence, that WellingtonÕs criticism of the engineer officers was 
unfair.  The four sieges of 1811 and 1812 had all been arranged with limited 
resources and limited time.  This led to compromises that affected the chance 
of success and the level of casualties.  There was not sufficient time at any of 
these sieges for formal approaches to be prepared.  Complaining about the lack 
of troops to deliver formal approaches is not reasonable when such troops 
would not have had the time to make the approaches anyway. 
 
However, as described above, WellingtonÕs complaints pushed the Board of 
Ordnance into finalising its work in establishing the School of Military 
Engineering and this was in place before the end of April 1812.  Liverpool wrote 
to Wellington on 28 April 1812, informing him that the Board of Ordnance had 
been working on this issue for some time and that the first troops would be with 
him before the end of the month.170  Although the Board of OrdnanceÕs 
response was a little dishonest, it is true that Pasley had previously started work 
on training artificers.  The incorrect understanding of the causes of the 
formation of the Royal Sappers and Miners still appears in most works.  
Oman171 assumes that WellingtonÕs letter of 7 April 1812, caused an immediate 
change and the formation of the corps.  Fortescue seems even wider from the 
mark, suggesting that Wellington was Ôbeginning himself to train one on the 
spotÕ.  Myatt does not recognise that the Board of Ordnance had been working 
through 1811 to rectify the situation.172  Similarly, in the most recent books on 
sieges in the Peninsula, there appears to be a misunderstanding of the role of 
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sappers and miners.  They would undertake the specialist tasks, like sapping up 
to the glacis or mining, but the bulk of the Ôspade workÕ would still be done by 
the line infantry with the trained artificers providing the supervision.173 
 
Fletcher was left at Badajoz to carry out the repairs and Burgoyne accompanied 
Wellington with  the army as it set out on the Salamanca campaign.  This was 
an unusual arrangement as typically the senior engineer would travel with 
Wellington.  Whilst there has been some question about whether this was 
evidence of a lack of trust in Fletcher, there is no evidence to support this 
position.  WellingtonÕs decision was probably based on two points that would 
have been high in his mind.  Firstly, that losing Badajoz again was unthinkable, 
so every effort had to be made to protect it.  Secondly, Wellington had handed 
over responsibility for Ciudad Rodrigo to the Spanish only four weeks before 
and he had already received communications to show that little progress had 
been made to complete the repairs; the Spanish were asking for further help to 
complete them and they had already used most of the supplies left for the use 
of the garrison.  Because of this Wellington was forced to remain in a position 
where he could support Ciudad Rodrigo when one of his options would have 
been to pursue Soult south.174  Although it was not approved, Wellington had 
also asked for promotion for Fletcher after Ciudad Rodrigo.175   
 
In summary, Badajoz was attacked with a second rate siege train; the lack of 
sappers and miners meant that the preferred choice of attack could not be 
selected; the fortress was assaulted too early; and together these factors 
caused the high casualties.  Badajoz was taken due to the secondary attacks 
succeeding when all the main attacks had failed.  Wellington was lucky. 
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4.2.5.  BURGOS, 1812. 
WellingtonÕs successful start to 1812 continued with victory at the battle of 
Salamanca and his entry into Madrid.  To take full advantage of these 
successes he had to hold his forward position, and to do this he needed to take 
Burgos.  Wellington ordered the guns collected but not used for the attack on 
the Retiro in July 1812 to be moved north.  These were three 18-pounders and 
five 24-pounder carronades,176 a composition that was wholly inadequate to 
attack anything but the most flimsy defence. Burgos did not meet this criteria 
and the defenders had significantly more ordnance with which to resist the 
attack.  Of even more concern to the Allies was the very limited amount of shot, 
shell and powder, which meant that the attackers were worried about supply 
levels before they had fired the first shot. 
 
Table 4k. Timeline for siege of Burgos. 
19 Sep 1812 Burgos invested. 
19 Sep 1812 Hornwork stormed on night of 19/20 Sep 1812. 
Work on trenches started. 
22 Sep 1812 First battery armed on night of 22/23 Sep 1812. 
22 Sep 1812 Attempt to storm outer wall of Burgos failed. 
23 Sep 1812 Trenches started from suburb of San Pedro on night 
of 23/24 Sep 1812. 
25 Sep 1812 Work started on first mine. 
27 Sep 1812 Work started on second mine. 
29 Sep 1812 First mine blown and second attempt to storm outer 
wall failed on night of 29/30 Sep 1812. 
4 Oct 1812 Second mine blown and third assault takes outer 
wall on night of 4/5 Oct 1812. 
5 Oct 1812 French launch sortie on Allied position. 
8 Oct 1812 French launch second sortie on Allied positions. 
10 Oct 1812 Work started on third mine under church of San 
Roman. 
18 Oct 1812 Third mine blown and fourth assault fails to take  
French second line. 
20 Oct 1812 Siege lifted. 
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Wellington took with him four divisions and two independent Portuguese 
brigades.  The Third, Fourth and Light Divisions which had taken on most of the 
work at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz earlier in the year were not allocated for 
this siege.  The broad plan was to take the hornwork of St Michael on the first 
night and establish batteries there.  At the same time, trenches would be dug 
from the suburb of San Pedro to enable a mine to be placed under the outer 
wall that would be assaulted when the mine was blown.  The two sets of inner 
defences would then be breached using the batteries.  Engineering resources 
were only five officers commanded by John Burgoyne (Fletcher still being at 
Badajoz) with support from ten assistant engineers (five of whom had previous 
experience)177, eighty-one volunteers from the line and eight Royal Military 
Artificers. 
 
The fortress was invested on 19 September 1812, and the same tactic 
employed at Ciudad Rodrigo was used with an immediate assault on the 
hornwork that protected the preferred point of attack.  The hornwork was taken 
with heavy casualties amounting to seventy-one killed and three hundred and 
forty-nine wounded.  Oman described this as a Ôvast and unnecessary loss of 
lifeÕ.178  Jones privately criticised the orders which were given to support the 
assault : ÔLuckily the assaulting columns carried the work and success glossed 
over this most unmilitary and inefficient mode of supporting themÕ.179 
 
Work immediately started on two batteries, the first of which was fitted with two 
guns and three howitzers on the night of 22/23 September 1812.180  Wellington 
decided to change the plan Ôwith a view to abridge the attack and save the 
troops from unnecessary fatigueÕ.181  He ordered an assault on the outer line of 
defences the same night, but the small group of four hundred volunteers failed 
completely with a further one hundred and fifty-eight casualties.  Wellington 
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then reverted back to the original plan to mine the outer wall.  The defenders 
kept up a continual fire of shot and shell on the attackers and the trenches were 
so close to the walls that the French could roll the shells down the hill and into 
the attackersÕ trenches. 
 
The Allied battery opened for the first time on 25 September 1812.  Dickson 
commented at the end of the first day that Ôit being found from the want of 
precision in the howitzers with round shot, a greater expenditure of ammunition 
would be requiredÉ than the limited means É could affordÕ.182  Ten per cent of 
the available round shot were used in one day to discover that the guns were 
highly inaccurate!  Dickson recorded that the soldiers were offered a bounty for 
every round shot they could recover and so as not to discourage them, even 
round shot of sizes which were of no use were paid for.  Wellington wrote to 
both the Royal Navy and the nearest fortresses for additional supplies. 
 
On 29 September 1812, the first mine was declared ready and the assault 
planned for that night.  Like the previous attempt, the assault party was small, 
only three hundred men.  The mine exploded, but the assault failed due to the 
forlorn hope losing their way in the dark and missing the breach.  There is no 
mention of any engineer officer accompanying the assault party and this 
probably was a contributory factor to the soldiers losing their way.  Jones noted 
that the effect of one thousand pounds of powder in the mine did not have the 
impact he would have expected and this may have been caused by the mine 
being placed against old foundations rather than against the current wall.183 
 
Work progressed on the second mine and a new battery close to the wall on the 
west side of the fortress.  The French detected it before the battery had opened 
fire and they pounded it mercilessly, damaging two of the three heavy cannons 
that Wellington possessed.  On the orders of Wellington, the two damaged guns 
were mounted on temporary carriages and fired with reduced charges (and 
reduced effect) for the remainder of the siege.  The second mine was 
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successfully blown on 4 October 1812, and finally the outer wall was taken, 
successfully led by a battalion of the twenty-fourth regiment.  Casualties during 
the assault amounted to thirty-seven killed and two hundred and thirteen 
wounded.  Among the wounded was John T. Jones R.E. which reduced the 
number of engineer officers present to three.  His injuries forced him to return 
home, although this did give him the spare time to publish in 1814 the first 
edition of his comprehensive work on the British sieges.184  For the next sixteen 
days the siege staggered on.  The Allies had neither the guns nor ammunition 
to make progress and the defenders had plenty of both.  The situation reached 
its worst point on 2 October 1812, when the whole of the working party for the 
night with the exception of the Guards regiments did not turn up.  This led to a 
stinging rebuke from Wellington and some officers being arrested for neglect of 
duty.  The French launched two sorties on 5 and 8 October 1812, causing some 
damage but WellingtonÕs troops had just lost heart.  A third mine was started on 
10 October 1812, under the church of St Roman and blown with the final 
assault on 18 October 1812, when four hundred troops assaulted the second 
line.  The defenders stood firm and the attack was repulsed with the loss of one 
hundred and sixty men.  The siege just petered out from this point until the 
siege was raised by Wellington on 20 October 1812 as the French armies finally 
started to threaten his position. 
 
Analysis of siege. 
 
There was clearly a serious underestimation of the resources required.  Burgos 
was not a strong fortress and even the smallest siege train would have caused 
severe damage in very little time. Jones described Burgos Ôas a very 
insignificant fortressÕ.185  Wellington must have believed that it would put up no 
defence and once started he would not accept that there were insufficient 
resources to take the fortress.  According to Fortescue, Wellington had 
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Ôsnatched away more than one Indian fortress by escalade, he hoped to do the 
like with BurgosÕ.186  Fortescue summed up the result : ÔAt Burgos É he fulfilled 
his threat and tried East Indian methods with disastrous resultsÕ.187   
 
The three attempts to assault the castle were all made by small groups of 
soldiers who were heavily outnumbered by the defenders.188  Whether this was 
due to WellingtonÕs guilt about the casualties at earlier sieges is not clear, but 
launching troops against defences that had not been seriously weakened could 
have no effect other than high casualties.  The effort of the troops and officers 
was not to the usual standard and Burgoyne particularly singled out the 
Portuguese units for their lack of effort.  But it must have been obvious to all the 
troops that the resources available were insufficient.  Perhaps the troops were 
getting sick of being used as cannon fodder?  Two thousand troops were 
injured at Burgos with nothing to show for it.  The retreat that followed finished 
1812 with a real blow after the successes of earlier in the year. 
 
In his despatch after the siege had been raised, Wellington made it clear that he 
did not hold the artillery or engineer officers at fault.189  This was a fairer 
statement than those he made after the successful siege of Badajoz.  
Considering the resources that they had to work with, it is difficult to see what 
else could have been achieved.  The engineer resources were miniscule.  The 
siege lasted thirty-five days.  From day eight they were down to four engineers 
when Captain Williams was killed and down to three engineers from day 
eighteen when Jones was incapacitated.  Burgoyne was lucky to be alive 
having been hit in the head by a musket ball and the two engineer lieutenants, 
Reid and Pitts, were also sick for part of the time.  Of the ten assistant 
engineers, six were killed or wounded.   
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Three mines were dug and exploded without any trained miners being present. 
They had no minersÕ tools and were obliged to use normal pick axes.190  Jones 
stated that the reason for the unplanned assault on the outer wall on 22 
September 1812 was because Wellington was doubtful that the mining could be 
achieved without trained miners.191  Jones continued that because the second 
assault failed a further five days were lost whilst the second mine was dug.  The 
mines had varying success.  The first did not do the damage expected, possibly 
due to encountering old foundations.  The second made a large breach in the 
wall as expected.  The third caused extensive damage to the terrace in front of 
the breach but did not bring down the church, which was expected.  However 
the purpose of the third mine was to provide access to the upper level and this 
was achieved by destroying the terrace. 
 
Overall, Jones was much more critical of the engineering effort than Wellington, 
although the prime thrust of his criticism was still the lack of trained sappers and 
miners.  Jones believed if there had been sufficient sappers and miners present 
then much more progress would have been made.  The decision to mine the 
defences was probably made to remedy the deficiency of ordnance.  The walls, 
as even the limited ordnance available showed, were not very strong.  A proper 
siege train would have removed any need for mining.  Burgoyne, writing 
privately to Fletcher, was strongly critical of the efforts of the troops and of 
WellingtonÕs decision to assault with small numbers of men.  Like Jones, he 
believed that Burgos could have been taken with the resources available.  One 
of BurgoyneÕs final comments, which Wrottesley192 did not publish, was Ôthe last 
assault failed entirely due to the small number of the storming parties against a 
fort having 1,500 men in it Ð they carried the works easy but could not hold 
themÕ.193  As on a number of other occasions, Wrottesley adjusted BurgoyneÕs 
quotes when they were especially critical of Wellington.  BurgoyneÕs final 
paragraph in his private letter to Fletcher, in the version printed by Wrottesley 
stated :  
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I have heard a hint that Lord Wellington said that the engineers told him 
Òthe fort might be taken without gunsÓ. This I do not believe; first, 
because it is not like him to say that he went by other peopleÕs advice É 
although he occasionally listened to some project or other194 
 
Burgoyne actually wrote : 
 
I have heard a hint that Lord Wellington said that the engineers told him 
Òthe fort might be taken without gunsÓ. This I do not believe because it is 
not like him, as I believe he never pays anyone the compliment to 
insinuate that he took their advice, though he may perhaps in a case of 
failure É and although he occasionally listened to some foolish project or 
other195 
 
Overall, Burgoyne was not impressed with WellingtonÕs performance.  The 
engineers did what they could with very limited resources and for once the 
British army did not pull a victory out of defeat despite their generals failings.  
Burgos was probably the biggest failure under WellingtonÕs command in the 
Peninsula. 
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4.2.6. SIEGES OF SAN SEBASTIAN IN 1813. 
First Siege of San Sebastian. 
 
As at Burgos the year before, Wellington needed to take the fortresses of San 
Sebastian and Pamplona to capitalise on his success at the battle of Vitoria.  
The French had retreated into the Pyrenees and if Wellington could take the 
fortresses he had a much better chance of holding the line of the Pyrenees 
against any future French advance.  The castle at Burgos had been destroyed 
by the retreating French and was no longer a threat. WellingtonÕs original plan 
had been to attack Pamplona, but he decided to attack the weaker fortress of 
San Sebastian and blockade Pamplona into submission. 
 
Table 4l. Timeline for first siege of San Sebastian. 
11 Jul 1813 Work started on batteries against St Bartolomeo on 
night of 11/12 July 1813. 
13 Jul 1813 Work started on batteries against eastern wall. 
14 Jul 1813  Fire opened on convent of St Bartolomeo. 
17 Jul 1813  Convent of St Bartolomeo taken. 
20 Jul 1813 Fire opened on fortress. 
21 Jul 1813 Governor rejects summons. 
23 Jul 1813 Main breach practicable, second breach started. 
24 Jul 1813 Assault postponed due to fires in town. 
25 Jul 1813 Assault fails. 
26 Jul 1813 Graham ordered to remove siege guns but keep 
blockade on fortress. 
 
After the fortress was invested on 11 July 1813, Wellington, Major Charles 
Smith R.E.196 and Dickson rode around the fortress, and at the suggestion of 
Smith, the same basic plan of attack was proposed as had previously been 
used by the Duke of Berwick in 1719.  The plan was to breach the wall on the 
eastern side where it was fully visible due to the sea going right up to the base 
of the wall at high tide and not allowing any other form of defence.  At low tide it 
was possible for troops to cross the tidal estuary of the river Urumea and storm 
any breach.  It would also be necessary to take some of the outworks on the 
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land side to reduce the fire that could be brought to bear on any attack across 
the estuary and also to give access to the foot of the eastern wall.  With this aim 
in mind the convent of St Bartolomeo was to be captured and trenches thrown 
forward to allow the defences to be silenced and for enfilade fire on the 
proposed breaches. 
 
As at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington had effective siege guns 
available.  A new siege train had been sent out to the Peninsula for use in 
northern Spain and with the six 18-pounders that travelled with the army and six 
24-pounders supplied by the Royal Navy, Wellington had a siege train of forty 
guns made up of : 
− Twenty 24-pounders 
− Six 18-pounders 
− Four 68-pounder carronades 
− Six 8-inch howitzers 
− Four 10-inch mortars. 
 
Engineering resources commanded by Fletcher included seventeen engineer 
officers and over three hundred rank and file from the Royal Sappers and 
Miners.197  This was the first siege at which there were a significant number of 
them present.  Although JonesÕ published Journal does not record the use of 
assistant engineers, both Burgoyne and Fletcher mention that a number were 
used on the left attack.198  Overall command of the siege was given to Sir 
Thomas Graham, Wellington being with the army to monitor the activities of the 
French forces. 
 
The initial attack was made against the convent of St Bartolomeo.  Two 
batteries were constructed and they opened fire on 14 July 1813.  The following 
day a force of Portuguese infantry was sent forward, but they encountered 
strong resistance and retired.  The guns continued firing on the convent for two 
                                            
197
 As previously JonesÕ Journal is misleading.  He list the full eighteen officers as present 
throughout the siege, but at least two did not arrive until well into the second siege.  Captain 
Collyer and Lieutenant Wortham did not arrive until 19 Aug 1813 with a company of RSM.  
These are all counted in JonesÕ totals. 
198
 REM, 5501-108-4; WSD Fletcher  to Graham, 25 Jul 1813. 
Section 4. Operational Performance. 
 186 
more days.  It was taken on 17 July 1813, though not without considerable loss 
through another undisciplined, pointless charge by the infantry against the main 
French positions.  Two new batteries were started near the convent and the 
plan was to dig a parallel right across the isthmus. 
 
The batteries against the eastern wall opened on the morning of 20 July 1813 
and once the French realised where the main point of attack was going to be, 
they started work on establishing defences behind the wall being breached.  
The same night the attackers started work on the main parallel across the 
isthmus, but due to the poor weather the majority of the Portuguese troops 
allocated for the work did not appear and only a third of the planned work was 
completed.  The following night, whilst completing this parallel, a large drain 
was found which had supplied water into the town until the supply was cut off.  
This was explored by Lieutenant Reid R.E. who found it went up to the western 
side of the hornwork and it was decided to place a mine at the end of the drain 
with the intention of breaching the hornwork.   
 
The breach in the eastern wall appeared practicable on 22 July 1813, but the 
French were making great efforts to clear away the debris despite the Allies 
continually sweeping the breach with grape shot and shells.  On the following 
day, the breach was declared practicable and the guns were directed to make a 
second breach in the wall at a location that locals had suggested was 
particularly weak.  This second breach was ready that night although there were 
also numerous fires in the houses behind the two breaches from the continuous 
shelling.  Graham ordered the assault for the morning of 24 July 1813, but in 
the morning the assault was cancelled as it was thought the fires that were still 
raging would impede the assault.199  This delay gave the French an extra 
twenty-four hours to improve the defences, although they were working under a 
continuous bombardment from the attackers. 
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The plan of attack was for troops from the Fifth Division to assault the two 
breaches, starting from the right (eastern) end of the parallel across the isthmus 
and skirting the foot of the wall until they reached the breaches.  The siege 
batteries would provide heavy covering fire from across the bay.  The plan was 
dependent upon the time of low time and daybreak, which were both expected 
to be around 5:00am.  The signal for the start of the assault would be the 
blowing of the mine in the drain by the hornwork. 
 
On the morning of 25 July 1813, the mine was blown before daylight and the 
assault commenced.  Filing out of the parallel was very slow and the first troops 
arrived at the breach in small numbers.  Although initially successful, there were 
not sufficient men present and they were quickly driven back, having been 
stopped by a twenty foot drop from the breach into the town itself.  In doing so 
they became mixed with the group who were tasked with assaulting the 
secondary breach and all retired in some disorder.  The assault had failed 
completely before there was enough daylight for the artillery across the bay to 
provide any support.  Casualties from the assault were five hundred and 
seventy killed and wounded.  There were five engineer casualties during the 
assault.  Fletcher, Lieutenant H.D. Jones and Lieutenant Reid were wounded, 
Captain Lewis lost a leg and Lieutenant Machell was killed.  Another officer, 
Lieutenant Hammond Tapp, had been severely wounded earlier in the siege on 
13 July 1813. 
 
When Wellington heard about the failure of the assault, he rode over from his 
headquarters determined to continue the siege.  However, he accepted that it 
would have to be postponed temporarily until further shot and powder were 
delivered.  In the meantime as Soult was still threatening to attack, so 
Wellington ordered most of the siege guns to be removed and returned to the 
boats where they would be safe until further ammunition was available.  He 
ordered a tight blockade to be kept in place. 
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Analysis of the first siege. 
 
Both contemporary and more recent writers have criticised the performance of 
the engineers in a number of areas.  Fortescue leads the attack with an 
unjustifiable apportioning of blame for the failures at San Sebastian, while 
Oman only holds the engineers partially to blame but identifies them as the 
primary culprit.  Their assessments in both cases appear to be led by the 
thoughts of one particular army officer who clearly had a dislike for the Ôscientific 
soldiersÕ.  The analysis below will look at the criticisms and compare them with 
to the available facts. 
 
Oman and, more recently Myatt criticised Major SmithÕs proposal to follow the 
Duke of BerwickÕs plan of attack of 1719.  Oman wrote that Graham, 
Wellington, Fletcher, Dickson and Frazer all agreed with the plan and they 
ÔforgotÕ that the Duke of Berwick did not have to assault the fortress.200  It is 
inconceivable, even excluding the other officers, that Wellington ÔforgotÕ about 
the possibility of another costly assault.  The strength of the fortress was 
directed against the land approaches for obvious reasons and once again the 
view was that there would be insufficient time to formally approach from the 
land side.  FletcherÕs view on the proposed attack on the eastern side was that 
Ôit would certainly save much time É compared with a regular siege of the very 
powerful defences crossing the isthmusÕ.  An attack on the land front would be a 
Ôwork of great difficultyÕ requiring a larger battering train and thirty to thirty-five 
daysÕ effort.201  Burgoyne also supported the proposed plan although with the 
benefit of hindsight he thought that finding the drain tipped the balance in favour 
of an attack across the isthmus.  He did, however, acknowledge that this attack 
would have taken more time.  Oman and Fortescue both wrote that when 
Wellington arrived after the assault he was insistent that the siege would 
continue and required the engineers to come up with a plan for a formal attack 
from the land side.  Burgoyne and Frazer indicate that an alternative plan of 
attack was discussed at the meeting with Wellington on 25 July 1813.  Jones, in 
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his diary entry for 25 July 1813 noted that Ôafter some consideration, it was 
decided to persevere in the same plan of attackÕ.202  Fletcher also wrote to 
Wellington on 27 July 1813 noting that WellingtonÕs opinion was for an 
extended attack using the original plan.203  Lack of ammunition stopped any 
progress in the short term.  By the time the new supplies had arrived, the plan 
as Jones noted, remained the same as before, with an attack on the east-facing 
sea walls.  Any thoughts of using a different plan were clearly put aside very 
quickly. 
 
OmanÕs narrative stated that when the mine was blown, the hornwork was to be 
assaulted by Portuguese troops from the parallel on the isthmus.  He continued 
that the engineers were unsure what level of damage would be caused by the 
mine and because of this no concrete proposals were made to make use of the 
explosion.  He noted that for the attack on 25 July 1813, Ôa little more attention, 
but not nearly enough, was givenÕ, but overall described the engineersÕ plans as 
Ôhalf-heartedÕ.204  Burgoyne clearly understood that the mine was to be used Ôas 
a signal only and with the chance of alarming themÕ [the French defenders].205  
Jones makes no mention of an assault on the hornwork.  DicksonÕs view before 
the assault was that blowing the mine would Õcreate such an alarm as may 
make them evacuate É and so produce a favourable diversionÕ, a view shared 
by H.D. Jones.206  After the assault Dickson noted, ÔA party of Cacadores 
availing themselves of the consternation produced amongst the enemy É made 
É their way into the ditch É but the defenders É commenced a fire É which 
obliged them to make É their way backÕ.207  It would appear that Oman based 
his suppositions on the comment above from Dickson, which does not give any 
real indication that it was a pre-meditated action.  There does not appear to be 
any evidence to back up OmanÕs claim that an attack on the hornwork was 
planned and that it was badly organised by the engineers.  It should also be 
noted that it was not the engineersÕ responsibility to organise the troops for any 
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attack.  That was the responsibility of the commander of the troops, so any 
blame should have been directed at Graham, not the engineers. 
 
There are a number of criticisms of the delay between the first breach being 
practicable and the assault, thereby giving time for the defenders to reinforce 
the damaged areas.  These criticisms are not helped by some confusion 
amongst the ordnance officers themselves.  Frazer complained in his letter of 
23 July 1813 that Ôafter [making] this excellent breach, they hesitate about using 
it É I am now ordered to make another breach É by which time the original 
breach will be entrenchedÕ.  His view was clearly that the failure of the assault 
was caused by Ôdelay and indecisionÕ.208  According to Jones, the general plan 
as had been used in previous sieges was to open a second breach at the last 
minute to stretch the defenders.  Frazer did not appear to be aware of this, 
perhaps because this was the first siege at which he was present.  Oman and 
Fortescue both criticise the two day delay between the first breach being ready 
and the assault.  Fortescue in particular seized on BurgoyneÕs remarks after the 
first siege where Burgoyne commented that the Ôwhole of the batteries É were 
constructed on the right bank É giving them immediate insight into the nature 
of the attackÉ and the breach was practicable two days before the trenches.209  
Careful review of the dates shows that the trenches were ready on the morning 
of 23 July 1813,210 the breach was declared practicable the same morning and 
the assault was planned for the following morning.  The two day delay is 
calculated because the assault was then delayed for twenty-four hours due to   
the fires behind the breach.  This delay may have been unfortunate and 
significant, but it was not due to the trenches not being ready.  It is difficult to 
see how the work on the breaching batteries could have been delayed to hide 
the point of attack.  They were started on 13 July 1813, which was four days 
before the convent of St Bartolemeo was taken.  It is unlikely that they would 
have all been ready on 20 July 1813, if they were not started until 17 July 1813, 
and this would then have lengthened the siege.  In every siege in the 
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Peninsular War, time was a critical factor.  San Sebastian was no different and 
the decisions taken were designed to reduce the time.  Graham wrote to 
Wellington on 24 July 1813, pointing out that the artillery had nearly run out of 
24-pounder shot.  If the assault had not gone in on the morning of 25 July 1813, 
the siege would have had to revert to a blockade, as there was insufficient 
ammunition to continue.211  One other factor that must be taken into account is 
the problems with working parties.  The problems on the night of 20 July 1813, 
when the working parties absented themselves, lost the attackers twenty-four 
hours.  They should have been ready on the morning of 22 July, which would 
have been the day before the breaches were declared practicable.212 
 
There were a number of criticisms around the assault itself on the morning of 25 
July 1813.  The plan required daylight so that artillery support could be given to 
the assault. Dickson had told Graham that the artillery would be able to 
suppress the defendersÕ fire during the assault.  GrahamÕs official report stated 
that the attack took place Ôsoon after daylightÕ, and Fletcher stated that the 
assault was given at daylight É the mine having been previously sprungÕ.213  
However, the artillery officers recorded that the assault had failed before there 
was sufficient light for them to determine what was happening.  Dickson stated 
Ôthe column of attack certainly moved forward too early, either from a mistake É 
or from over anxiety on the part of the directorsÕ.214  Frazer was more forthright 
writing ÔThe assault was É made É stupidly an hour before, instead of after 
daybreakÕ.215  It is almost certain that the mine was blown before 5:00am as 
GrahamÕs letter to Wellington informing him of the failure of the assault was 
written at 5:30am.216  Aspinal-Oglander in his biography of Graham, strongly 
refutes the claim that the attack commenced before daylight, but seems to base 
his argument on the fact that GrahamÕs despatch reported it was in daylight.217  
While no account clearly stated who gave the order to start the assault, it is 
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likely that Graham did.  Even if he did not, he must, as commanding officer, still 
take the responsibility for the failure. 
 
General Oswald, the commander of the Fifth Division, did not plan the actual 
attack well.  Campbell of the Ninth Foot was of the opinion that the troops were 
too extended during the assault and thought that if a compact mass had arrived 
at the breach they Ôwould have bodily forced through all oppositionÕ.218  He may 
have had a point about the organisation of the troops, but his approach would 
not have worked against the twenty foot drop that the attackers were faced with 
in the main breach.  OswaldÕs plan, bearing in mind the concerns about the 
narrow area in which the assault had to take place, organised his troops so that 
those heading for the nearest breach went first followed by those who needed 
to pass the first breach to go to the second breach.  With the failure of the 
assault on the first breach, the troops destined for the second breach could not 
get past the retiring troops and were swept back into the trenches with them.   
 
A more contentious issue is the view expressed at the time that the Fifth 
Division had not tried very hard.  Oman called this a Ômonstrous injusticeÕ writing 
Ôeverything that mismanagement could accomplish had been done to 
discourage themÕ.219  He quoted statements from Frazer and Larpent who are 
generally respected commentators, but pointed out that neither was present at 
the storm.  Burgoyne, recognised by Oman as one of the authorities on the 
siege, also recorded that the officers  Ôcould not get the men to follow themÕ.220  
Jones wrote that the attack was not pressed energetically but finished 
cryptically by noting although many officers thought so, it could not be true as 
the Ôhighest authorityÕ, Graham, had stated in his despatch that the troops had 
done their best.221  One authority not used by Oman was Lieutenant Harry 
Jones R.E. who led the column to the main breach and was captured there after 
being wounded.  Jones commented : 
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finding the descent [from the breach into the town] too great on the 
inside, I returned for the ladders É but upon reaching the foot of the 
breach everybody was running back with their heads between their legs 
as hard as they could.  At the foot I waited, expecting them to rally and 
come on immediately, which not being the case, the enemy's Grenadiers 
jumped into the breach sword in hand and made all prisoners who were 
able to crawl.222 
 
OmanÕs comment about the mismanagement has some validity, but this, sadly, 
was true of every other siege and the troops usually did their best despite the 
mismanagement of their superiors.  Whether the criticism of the Fifth Division 
was fair or not, this was a view held at the time and Wellington was clearly 
concerned enough to ask for volunteers from the other divisions, which the Fifth 
Division took as a clear insult.   
 
A figure who appears to have generated much of the criticism of the engineers 
was Lieutenant-Colonel William Gomm, who was with the Quarter-Master-
GeneralÕs department attached to the Fifth Division (and also an officer of the 
Ninth Foot, one of the regiments involved in the failed storm).  GommÕs 
criticisms are extensively used by Oman, Fortescue and Myatt with variants of :  
 
The successes [at Ciudad Rodrigo and the third siege of Badajoz were]  
É owing to the almost miraculous efforts of our troops has checked the 
progress of science among our engineersÉ the artillery have become as 
summary in their proceedings as our engineers É providing they can 
make a hole in the wall É they care not about destroying its defences223 
 
Of the above writers, only Fortescue uses the portion of GommÕs letter that 
reads : Ôhad we É attended to the niceties of the art in the attack of Ciudad 
Rodrigo or of [the third siege of] Badajoz it is possible we should have taken 
neitherÕ.  Gomm appeared to recognise that the sieges were being undertaken 
using methods which were not typical.  Gomm commented in the same letter 
that in his opinion there were sufficient resources to attack according to the 
normal rules of siege warfare.  This was clearly not a view shared by 
Wellington, the artillery officers or the engineers.  GommÕs scathing comments 
continue in his subsequent letters with phrases such as : Ôescaping from the 
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hands of those Philistines, the engineersÕ and Ôwhen we commence [the siege] 
again, I dare say we shall do it a little less en charlatan and more en regleÕ.224  
In this same letter he also notes that Ôthe enemy made a sortie this morning 
upon our lines, and, as we did not expect them, gave us more trouble than was 
necessaryÕ.  Perhaps the army officers should have been paying more attention 
to their own duties before criticising other branches of the military.  Gomm was 
not untypical of the ambitious, confident officer who had a view on everything, 
which sometimes did not match the views of their superiors or of the actual 
circumstances.  A number of the engineer officers would also fall into this 
category from their private letters.225  They may be entertaining to read but that 
does not make them accurate.  It is a little more surprising that Gomm is so 
outspoken about scientific soldiers, because he was one of them, having been 
to the Royal Military College in 1805.  It is possible that there was an element of 
professional jealousy in his opinions.  
 
One final puzzling item from the first siege of San Sebastian is the complete 
lack of comment on the presence of a large body of the Royal Sappers and 
Miners for the first time.  ConnollyÕs history of the corps details their efforts in 
the siege and the storm,226 but there is no mention of them by either engineer or 
army officers.  
 
Second Siege of San Sebastian. 
 
Although Wellington was busy with Soult at the end of July, he left Graham at 
San Sebastian with sufficient troops to maintain the blockade and keep the 
French from recovering any of the ground that had been taken.  It was not 
possible to stop the French making repairs in the town but there was a limited 
amount they could achieve. 
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Table 4m. Timeline for second siege of San Sebastian. 
6 Aug 1813 Order received to land the siege guns. 
19 Aug 1813 Supply ships arrive from England. 
21 Aug 1813 Remaining supply ships arrive from England. 
24 Aug 1813  Work on batteries resumes. 
26 Aug 1813 Guns open on fortress. 
26 Aug 1813 Island of Santa Clara seized on night of 26/27 Aug. 
31 Aug 1813 Town stormed successfully, French retire to castle. 
1 Sep 1813 Bombardment starts on castle. 
3 Sep 1813 Governor refused second summons to surrender. 
8 Sep 1813 French surrender. 
 
Following WellingtonÕs orders, the siege guns were returned to the transports 
until it was judged safe to land them again.  Everything was on hold waiting for 
the additional guns and round shot from England.  Four transports arrived on 19 
August 1813 containing two full siege trains and a further full siege train arrived 
on 21 August 1813.  There was now sufficient round shot to consider restarting 
the siege.  For the first time in the Peninsular War, the Allied army had more 
heavy guns than it could use.   
 
All the guns were in place and fifty-seven guns opened fire on the morning of 26 
August 1813.  The plan, as mentioned above, was similar to that used in the 
first siege.  The larger number of guns on the eastern attack would attempt to 
destroy the whole south-eastern corner of the fortress.  There were fewer guns 
used on the attack on the left (isthmus) and they made poor progress due to the 
distance from the walls.  Graham complained about this on 26 and 28 August 
1813,227  and Wellington ordered a new battery to be constructed.  Frazer noted 
that ÔWellington wisely ordered another and more advanced batteryÕ.228  This 
battery had an immediate impact on the wall of the fortress when it opened fire. 
 
A false attack was made on the night of 29 August 1813, to try to get the French 
to blow any mines they had placed in the defences of the town, but the French 
were not taken in.  On 30 August 1813, the damage caused by the batteries  
formed one continuous breach in the walls, and many of the guns were turned 
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to attacking any remaining defensive armament, the intention being to assault 
the town the following morning at low tide. 
 
The assault was scheduled for 11:00am on 30 August 1813. The situation with 
regard to the perceived lack of effort from the Fifth Division in the first assault 
was resolved to no-oneÕs satisfaction.  General Leith, who had returned as 
commander of the Fifth Division on 27 August 1813, refused to have the 
volunteers lead the storm and they were to be held in reserve with the Fifth 
Division making the attack.  The attack started on time and once again the 
troops could not get through the breaches due to the fire and defences of the 
French.  The volunteer reserves were also thrown in without effect.  An attack 
was also made across the estuary by the Portuguese but they did not make any 
better progress.  After about an hour, Graham gave the risky order for the siege 
guns to open fire and sweep the walls and defences of the town over the heads 
of the attacking troops.  Twenty minutes later when the guns stopped firing the 
situation had changed and finally the assault made some progress with the 
French retreating into the castle.  By 2:00pm, the town was in Allied hands.  It 
was also in ruins and large parts of it were on fire from the shelling.  Following 
what was now becoming the norm, many of the troops dispersed in an orgy of 
looting and destruction that took two full days to settle down.  Graham and 
Wellington were genuinely concerned that if the French made a sortie from the 
castle, the Allies would be hard pressed to hold the town.  Fortunately the 
French were in no fit state to do so. 
 
The Allied guns were now turned on the castle.  From 1 September 1813, they 
bombarded it for the next six days during which time the fires continued to rage 
through the town.  The French governor, Rey, refused another summons on 3 
September 1813, and new batteries were prepared to attack the castle.  At 
10:00am on 8 September 1813, fifty-six guns opened on the castle, which had 
no covered defences for the French or their prisoners.  Rey finally accepted the 
inevitable and raised the white flag around noon. 
 
Casualties during the siege and assault were again high with nearly 2,400 killed 
and wounded.  Engineer casualties were three killed including Fletcher and 
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three wounded including Burgoyne.229 BurgoyneÕs wound was not serious and 
he took over temporary command of the engineers.230  Across both sieges, out 
of the eighteen engineer officers present, four were killed and seven were 
wounded. 
 
Analysis of second  siege of San Sebastian 
 
Over both sieges, Wellington was again pushed for time due to the very real 
threat from Soult who made two determined attempts to disrupt the siege and 
the blockade of Pamplona.  There is no doubt that there would have been fewer 
casualties had San Sebastian been besieged according to the established 
rules, but, as Fletcher pointed out, this would have taken much longer.  In both 
sieges, the time from opening fire to the assault on the town was five days.  
This is a very short period of time which only allowed the walls to be breached 
and did not allow sufficient time to destroy the defendersÕ artillery and reduce 
the garrison physically and emotionally.  Ironically, Wellington had given orders 
to limit the amount of shell fire so as to reduce the damage to the town with the 
consequent reduction in damage to the defenders.  Unfortunately the town was 
pretty much destroyed by fire and Wellington was accused by the Spanish of 
deliberately burning the town to the ground as a punishment for the Francophile 
tendencies of the population.  Like the previous three sieges at Ciudad Rodrigo, 
Badajoz and Burgos, Wellington cut corners to reduce the time required due to 
external pressures.  The impact of the time reduction was measured in the 
increase in casualties that occurred. 
 
The biggest single criticism of the siege concerned the strategy selected for the 
attack.  It is inconceivable that Wellington was not aware of the risk and costs 
associated with the plan selected.  He wanted the fortress taken quickly to 
avoid the very real chance that Soult would relieve it.  Blaming the engineers for 
the plan is not reasonable since they were producing plans that met the 
requirements given to them by Wellington.  With hindsight, it may have been 
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better to go for the formal attack as the twin sieges took nearly two months in 
total, but that was not known or expected when the first siege started.  
However, the plan agreed by Wellington was to continue the same basic plan of 
attack for the second siege.231  The criticism of the engineers and to a lesser 
extent the artillery, suggesting that they were indifferent to the casualties in the 
army, is unfair and ignores the fact that it was usually an engineer officer who 
was leading these desperate attacks and their casualties reflect this.  The high 
casualties in the besieging army were caused by rushing the sieges and the 
responsibility for that rests with the commander.  This was compounded on the 
first assault by the assault happening before daylight, an action that Wellington 
had strongly discouraged. 
 
In terms of the operations of the engineers, both sieges were managed 
reasonably well.  There were some problems with the use of short navy 24-
pounders, the supply of working parties and the distant positioning of some 
batteries, but the breaches were still made very quickly despite these issues.  
Neither assault would have been quicker if these events had not occurred, as 
there were other tasks that had to be completed before the assault could 
happen.  The siege was under the control of Graham who corresponded with 
Wellington daily.  In some of these letters Wellington was personally critical of 
Fletcher and Dickson, particularly of their demands for working parties.232  Such 
criticism must have undermined the credibility of these officers with Graham.  
Wellington knew them well, trusted them and had worked with them for a 
number of years, but Graham did not know them and such criticism must have 
affected GrahamÕs view of their competence.   
 
The availability for the first time of significant numbers of troops from the Royal 
Sappers and Miners does not appear to have had any material effect.  There is 
a surprising lack of comment on their presence by both engineer and army 
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officers.  H.D. Jones makes one comment about the lack of training : Ôsappers 
and miners who have never seen a gabion made!Õ,233 but this is in a letter 
complaining about the number of engineer and sappers present at the siege, 
which is full of errors.  Neither Jones nor Burgoyne make any comment, but it is 
telling that when Burgoyne was asked to carry out some mining activities 
between the sieges he requested volunteers from the line regiments.234  
Though most of the sappers present were troops who had been in the 
Peninsula for some time, the company that arrived on 15 August 1813 was the 
first to have been through PasleyÕs School of Military Engineering.  
Unfortunately, the company arrived too late to have any real impact. 
 
The first assault on San Sebastian was a very poor attempt that was never 
going to succeed, mainly through the bad planning on the day of the assault.  
The second assault on the town barely succeeded and could very easily have 
failed again.  The pin point artillery fire during the second assault just tipped the 
edge in the attackersÕ favour.  It could easily have gone either way.  Wellington 
was lucky, again. 
 
4.2.7. EFFECTIVENESS AND REPORTING OF SIEGES. 
Of all the aspects of the British involvement in the Peninsular War, the sieges 
are the least impressive in terms of the outcomes and also the most 
controversial in terms of the reasons for these outcomes.  It has been both 
common and convenient to blame the Royal Engineers for the failures and the 
high casualties and this view still persists today.  Richard Glover is particularly 
vocal in his criticisms :  
 
No just estimate of the greatness of Wellington can be made except by 
those who have studied É the deficiencies of the Ordnance corps É On 
sheer ignorance of these matters rests the supposition that Wellington 
was bad at sieges É the most sensible line for the modern student É is 
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to consider seriously only those criticisms É by the few É who 
possessed the knowledge for making a valid judgement.235 
 
GloverÕs opinion is as flawed as his criticism of the alleged failings of the 
Ordnance.  There is evidence to support the view that the fault did not lie fully 
with the Ordnance.  The analysis above has reviewed the particular 
circumstances associated with each siege and reviewed the actions of the 
engineers involved.  There is justification to question the handling of sieges by 
Wellington, Beresford and Graham which is supported by criticism by officers 
who possessed the knowledge for making a valid judgement.  Many other 
commentators have also cited the lack of engineers and trained sappers and 
miners for causing some of the difficulties.236  There is no doubt that the sieges 
would have been better run had there been more of these soldiers.  But, and it 
is a big but, the lack of engineers and artificers was known before each siege 
started and actions should have been tailored to utilise the resources that were 
available.  Wellington was known as a defensive general and would not take 
unnecessary risks in manoeuvre or battle.  He appears to have had an entirely 
different approach to sieges, where because of the strategic importance of 
these places he was willing to take huge risks and accept huge losses to take 
the fortresses.  The failures and losses at the sieges in order of impact were : 
− Not enough time to use regular methods of besieging; 
− Insufficient or poor quality guns and ammunition; 
− Insufficient Transport; 
− Insufficient engineering resources. 
 
Applied to the sieges reviewed above, we can summarise the outcomes as 
follows : 
 
                                            
235
 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 105-110. 
236
 For example, Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 5, p. 256; Griffith, Modern Studies, p.223; Myatt, 
British Sieges, p. 198. 
Section 4. Operational Performance. 
 201 
Table 4n. Summary of outcomes of sieges. 
Siege Enough 
Time? 
Enough 
guns and 
ammunition? 
Enough 
engineering 
resources? 
Result 
1st siege of Badajoz No No No Failure 
2nd siege of Badajoz No No No Failure 
Ciudad Rodrigo Yes? Yes No Success 
3rd siege of Badajoz No No No Success 
Burgos Yes No No Failure 
1st siege of San Sebastian Yes No No Failure 
2nd  siege of San Sebastian Yes? Yes No Success 
 
The engineers were criticised for poor advice, particularly at the first two sieges 
of Badajoz and at San Sebastian.  In each case the plan for the siege was 
based on time constraints not on best engineering practice.  There is a clear 
case to argue that the deciding factor in the success or failure at each siege  
was having to work against time due to the constant threat of larger relieving 
forces.  The French could almost always concentrate a larger force to meet a 
major threat.  Neither the British nor the Spanish had the resources to do this.  
The French generally had the time to undertake sieges in the formal manner.  
Even with sappers it is unlikely that Wellington would have been able to wait for 
them to follow normal siege craft.  It is difficult to look at the sieges described 
above and conclude that there would have been a different outcome at any of 
them had there had been a greater number of engineers and artificers present.  
The military engineering resources were not the root cause of the difficulties 
encountered. 
 
Of the three successes, Ciudad Rodrigo was the best managed from the Allied 
side and the worst defended from the French side.  The third siege of Badajoz 
came within a whisker of failing because the assault was rushed.  The second 
siege of San Sebastian also came close to failing through being rushed.  In 
each of these sieges casualties were high because Wellington did not wait for a 
more effective reduction of the defences.   
 
Wellington took Badajoz in twenty-one days in 1812.  The French in 1811 took 
forty-five days to get the fortress to surrender.  In reality it should have held out 
for many more days and probably should never have been taken.  The cost of 
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this rapid success was measured in men.  There were some faults in the 
engineering, but there were also faults in the army (rash attacks, poor 
leadership in trenches), in logistics (transport) and in the command.  The 
casualties were caused by attacking prematurely to meet time constraints.  It is 
possible that Wellington was strong enough to hold off or attack Soult and then 
return to siege.  Marmont was not strong enough to pose a significant threat 
either in the north or south.  Wellington did not learn from the resolute defence 
of 1811.  The same governor was there in 1812 with more experienced troops. 
WellingtonÕs strong complaint of 7 April 1812 about the engineersÕ inability to 
sap to the glacis was not justified at Badajoz.  Where the attack was made, no 
sap could be done due to the Rivellas stream.  If Wellington had his way and 
attacked from the south, he would not have had enough guns and other 
resources for the attack at that point and the defences had been significantly 
strengthened since he last saw them.   
 
Wellington complained regularly throughout the Peninsular War about the lack 
of support from the government at home, the lack of support from the Spanish 
and Portuguese governments, the lack of money for his operations, the lack of 
support from the navy, the lack of British troops to carry out his operations, the 
poor quality of the Spanish generals and troops, the lack of good British 
generals to support him, the poor supply situation and the lack of engineering 
resources.  WellingtonÕs complaints about the engineers were part of this 
pattern and in many cases were unjustified.   
 
The armyÕs commitment to sieges deteriorated through the war.  Numerous 
diarists record the general antipathy of the troops and their officers to siege 
work.  This was not seen as real soldierly activity and there was no glory in 
being killed in a siege.  The later sieges, particularly Burgos and the first siege 
of San Sebastian show clear evidence of this dislike translating into poor 
behaviour. This is also demonstrated by the number of times that French sorties 
were more successful than they should have been through inattention and poor 
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leadership on the Allied side.237  The Allied forces seemed to get caught time 
and time again and never learnt.  It is easy to understand the feelings of the 
soldiers on storming fortresses as they took part in a succession of butcheries.  
Whatever the moral feelings today about the troopsÕ behaviour after the storm, 
the troops were of the belief that they deserved their excesses as payment for 
the huge risks they took.  Fortescue comments on the troops being weary.238  
The troopsÕ appetite for siege work diminished every time they were involved so 
that by the time of Burgos and San Sebastian they were not interested.   
 
What should have been of more concern to Wellington was that there also a 
general degradation in the troopsÕ behaviour.  Starting with the sack of Ciudad 
Rodrigo and Badajoz followed by the undisciplined retreat from Burgos.  After 
Vitoria, Wellington was unable to follow up his victory because many of his 
troops disbanded to plunder.  At San Sebastian the troops were out of control 
while the French were well within striking distance.  Wellington made a mistake 
in not clamping down on this bad behaviour much earlier.  Even at San 
Sebastian he wrote a nave letter to Graham, hoping that the troops would 
behave and focus on the French rather than plunder.239  It is difficult to 
understand why he would have any belief that the troops would act in this way. 
 
The more recent works on these subjects leave a general feeling that sieges 
were of secondary importance and the reporting often contains errors that 
would not have crept into discussions of the main campaigns.  Some examples 
have been included in the Introduction above but there are many more.  Myatt, 
in his biography of Picton at the third siege of Badajoz wrote that the ÔPicurina 
had been battered into ruinsÕ,240  whereas all other reports indicate that there 
was no visible sign of damage.  Esdaile, describing the same siege, stated Ôthe 
British guns needed so little support; so heavy was the weight of fire that the 
new siege train could bring to bear that the defenders were quickly 
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overwhelmed, and no fewer than three separate breaches blown in the 
defencesÕ.241  This is an overstatement as the siege train was not that ÔheavyÕ, 
nor were the defenders overwhelmed as was seen when the assault was made. 
 
In summary the story of the British sieges in the Peninsular War does not make 
good reading.  There is some criticism directed at Wellington, but the Royal 
Engineers and the Board of Ordnance have come in for particular criticism over 
the quality and quantity of resources available.  Whilst this was a contributory 
factor, the main causes of the poor performance were the time constraints that 
Wellington faced and the logistical difficulties in getting quality guns safely to 
the points of need.  The accusation from Wellington that the Royal Engineers 
had no knowledge of the skills necessary to undertake sieges is unfair.  The 
senior officers there knew what they had to do but they were unable to do it 
because of the resource and time constraints.  The frequent claim that the 
French were more effective at sieges is also debatable.  They certainly had 
more troops, and their success rate was more impressive, but the reasons were 
generally not tied up with the skills of the French engineers.  Their successes 
were often due to poor defence and the desire of the Allied governors to avoid 
inflicting the horrors of a storm on the population, or both.  The story of sieges 
in the Peninsular War would be very different had the magazine not blown up 
unexpectedly at Almeida in 1810, or Badajoz had not surrendered prematurely 
to the French in 1811.  To fully understand why the sieges were planned in 
particular ways and the high casualties that were inflicted, it is important to keep 
the wider strategic context in mind.  Wellington believed that he was working 
under severe time constraints at every siege and therefore the attacks had to 
succeed quickly regardless of the cost.  Having more engineers or artificers 
there would have made little or no difference under this constraint. 
 
The management of the sieges was only one aspect of the activities of the 
Royal Engineers during the Peninsular War.  Richard GloverÕs, Peninsular 
Preparation takes a typically critical and restricted view of the role of the 
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engineers.  His analysis of their work only covers offensive siege operations.242  
Whilst  this is without doubt the area that has received the most public attention, 
it does not adequately reflect the work they undertook.  The following sections 
will take a more complete view on the roles and responsibilities undertaken by 
the corps.  These other roles ultimately had a more material impact on the war.   
4.3. Torres Vedras and other defences 
The fortified Lines of Torres Vedras were probably the most significant piece of 
military engineering undertaken during the Napoleonic Wars.  John Grehan 
rightly describes it as the cornerstone of WellingtonÕs strategy in the 
Peninsula.243  It gave Wellington a solid, defensible position from which he 
could launch his campaigns against the French.  Torres Vedras was more than 
just the construction of one hundred and thirty forts, although that in itself was a 
significant piece of engineering.  The defensive position also included the 
destruction of bridges and roads that would be of use to the enemy, the 
construction of signal posts, the flooding of ground, the construction or 
improvement of roads behind the Allied lines and in the last extreme fortified 
positions from which to evacuate the army. 
 
Wellington had planned these defences well in advance.  Having ridden the 
ground with Fletcher during October 1809, comprehensive instructions were 
written asking Fletcher to estimate the work required to make the Lisbon 
peninsula defensible.244  Work started in November 1809 and continued without 
interruption until the Lines were manned for the first time as the army retreated 
into them following the battle of Bussaco.  However, even at this time the work 
was not complete and for the next two years additions and repairs were made 
to the Lines.  The detailed construction of the Lines is described elsewhere and 
will not be covered here.245 
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Many Royal Engineer officers did not think the Lines would work.  Grehan noted 
that Ross and Goldfinch thought they would be useless.246 Squire also had 
major concerns and was highly critical of WellingtonÕs decision not to defend the 
Portuguese frontier.247  Some of this pessimism may have arisen because none 
of these officers really wanted to be working on the Lines, they all wanted to be 
with the army on active operations.  Working on the Lines was seen as being 
left in a back water with no opportunity for gaining honour and glory and this 
could have clouded the officersÕ judgement. 
 
Despite their reservations, there were a significant number of Royal Engineer 
officers involved in the construction.  Their role in many cases was to design the 
works and then to manage the construction using militia and locally procured 
peasant labour.  Between November 1809 and March 1810, at least ten 
engineer officers were working on the Lines and by July 1810 this number had 
risen to seventeen.248  This was over half the total of Royal Engineers in the 
Peninsula at that time.  When the Lines were occupied in September 1810, 
twelve engineer officers were allocated to the six districts making up the Lines 
with Jones keeping overall command (under Fletcher).  Royal Engineer 
resources were allocated to the maintenance of the Lines for the remainder of 
the war, but as more officers became available the proportion allocated to the 
Lines was reduced, although the actual number did not decrease. 
 
Keeping the Lines secret from the French was a great success and Massena  
had no warning at all before he first saw them from Sobral.  Considering the 
security around these defences and WellingtonÕs strong views on information 
being leaked in the English newspapers, it is very surprising that the January 
1811 edition of the Royal Military Chronicle,249 lists the artillery present in the 
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Lines.  It was far too early to be making such information publicly available as 
Massena was still in front of the Lines at this time. 
 
The Lines of Torres Vedras were the most visible evidence of the defensive 
work carried out by the Royal Engineers during the Peninsular War, but there 
were many other places where essential work was carried out to support 
WellingtonÕs strategies.  Through the early months of 1810, WellingtonÕs 
despatches mention several places that were being strengthened.  These 
include Abrantes,250 where Captain Patton R.E. was present for many months 
supervising the work, Peniche, Palmella and Setuval.251  Burgoyne was at 
Almeida from May to July 1810, first strengthening Fort Conception and then 
mining it for destruction on the advance of the French. 
 
WellingtonÕs strategy from 1810 to 1812 was partially dependent upon the 
security of his southern flank, which the continued defence of Cadiz and 
Gibraltar contributed significantly towards.  1810 saw an influx of Royal 
Engineer officers into Cadiz.  Thirteen officers arrived during that year with 
twenty-one different officers serving there at some point during the war. Captain 
Lefebure R.E. the commanding engineer at Cadiz, was killed as the fort at 
Matagorda (near Cadiz) was being evacuated.  Similarly there was a significant 
presence at Gibraltar.  In January 1810, Landmann destroyed the forts in front 
of Gibraltar to save them from falling into French hands.252  At some point 
during the Peninsular War, thirty-three different Royal Engineer officers served 
at Gibraltar.  There was a similar sized presence in Sicily and officers were also 
present at Malta and the Ionian islands.  This continued presence of the Royal 
Engineers was not particularly visible but it helped to deny access to key 
locations to the French, provided sortie points to the Allies and tied up many 
thousands of French troops who would otherwise have been freed to threaten 
the various Allied armies.   
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The other significant defensive work carried out by the Royal Engineers was in 
the repair of fortresses.  When fortresses were taken it was vital to quickly make 
them defensible so as to protect them from future French advances and also to 
allow them to be used as storage depots and staging points.  This was 
particularly relevant at Ciudad Rodrigo, where the fortress was in a sufficiently 
good state of repair in March 1812 to resist MarmontÕs threatening behaviour 
while Wellington was undertaking the siege of Badajoz. 
 
A significant proportion of the resources of the Royal Engineers was allocated 
to defensive work throughout the Peninsular War.  This work was typically 
unrecognised by the military at the time and by modern writers.  The work was 
never high profile and often forgotten, but it made a significant contribution to 
the success of Wellington by keeping his lines of communication secure and by 
tying down large number of French troops. 
4.4. River and Road Communications. 
River Crossings 
 
The nature of the terrain in the Iberian Peninsula, with numerous mountain   
ranges made access to bridges vitally important for the movement of armies.  
The loss of a bridge could entail a detour taking several days.  In many areas 
the rivers were wide and deep all year and made effective barriers to those who 
did not have access to crossing points.  Secondly, the rivers could be used as 
communication routes to move men and materials quickly to the point of need.  
This was particularly important to Wellington who used the rivers throughout the 
war to move his resources.  
 
The rugged nature of the terrain and the unpredictability of the rivers, which 
could rise or fall by many feet in hours, meant that control of the permanent 
bridges and access to bridging equipment was a vital part of every movement 
carried out by both sides in the conflict. The importance of the fortresses 
commanding the major routes is well understood, but the control of a bridge on 
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a major river was as effective a defence as the walls of Badajoz or Ciudad 
Rodrigo.   
 
Wellington took great care to protect his river crossings but also used rivers to 
his advantage during his campaigning.  One example was in 1812, when 
Wellington ordered the repair of the Roman Bridge at Alcantara over the river 
Tagus, which had been destroyed in May 1809.  At the same time, he also 
ordered General Hill to destroy the French pontoon bridge at Almaraz.  The 
repair of one bridge for his use and the destruction of the French bridge meant 
that the distance WellingtonÕs troops had to cover between Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Badajoz was about 250 kilometres whilst the distance the French had to travel 
increased by 650 kilometres.253 
 
Research into the strategic and practical aspects of river crossings has been 
limited.  A recent study by Burnham has opened up this subject for the first time 
but has also demonstrated the limited availability of information.254  Bridging, 
more than any other area, has shown the confusion that existed and still exists 
in historians understanding of the roles of the Royal Staff Corps and the Royal 
Engineers.  Published material on bridge building is restricted to DouglasÕ work 
on military bridges, first published in 1816.255  There are unpublished 
manuscript notebooks on the subject from West, Scott and Burgoyne.256  All of 
these documents tend to focus on the two bridges built by the Royal Staff 
Corps, the suspension bridges at Alcantara and Almarez and also describe the 
boat bridge over the Adour.257  This has led to a perception that most bridging 
work in the Peninsula was carried out by the Royal Staff Corps.  The only 
chronicler of this corps stated ÔIt is an undisputable fact that the Royal Staff 
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Corps were responsible for the building of military bridgesÕ.258  Appendix M 
below, is a comprehensive (but still incomplete) list of bridging operations in the 
Peninsular War.  Of the sixty-five bridging events listed, only eleven were 
carried out by the Royal Staff Corps with fifty-one carried out by the Royal 
Engineers.259  Twenty-one of the events were destruction of bridges and these 
were all carried out by the Royal Engineers.  The Royal Engineers carried out 
75% of the build and repair operations, with the Royal Staff Corps completing 
the remaining 25%. 
 
Looking at the bridging events, it can clearly be seen that they played a major 
contribution in all of the Peninsular campaigns.  The strategically important 
bridges at Abrantes, Punhete and Villa Velha were first constructed in late 1808 
and were in position for most of the rest of the war.  At least two bridges were 
blown up during the retreat to Corunna to delay the French.  The inexperience 
of some of the engineers at that time was demonstrated by Lieutenant Davy 
R.E. who managed to blow himself up along with the bridge at Betanzos.  Many 
bridges were mined in preparation for the retreat to the Lines of Torres Vedras, 
although not all of them were destroyed when the route of the French was 
finally known.  When Massena retreated from the Lines of Torres Vedras in 
March 1811, a number of bridges were built or repaired to maintain the pursuit.  
In 1812 the two strategic bridges were repaired at Almarez and Alcantara by the 
Royal Staff Corps and several were destroyed during the retreat from Burgos.  
In 1813 and 1814 a pontoon bridge travelled with the army and was used on 
several occasions along with the repair of other key bridges.  The final stages of 
the war saw Wellington needing to cross several major rivers around the 
Pyrenees and into France. Between October 1813 and March 1814, 
WellingtonÕs troops crossed the Bidassoa, the Nive, the Adour and the 
Garonne.  The first three were successfully bridged, but there were major 
problems bridging the Garonne and Wellington was very unhappy with the 
delays that were caused.  This demonstrated that without effective bridging 
facilities Wellington had real difficulty in his operations. 
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Apart from using bridges to support the armyÕs operations, there were also a 
number of bridges built to support Allied siege operations.  The most notable of 
these were for the three sieges of Badajoz and for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.  
These sieges could not continue without the bridges and the temporary loss of 
the bridges at Badajoz in 1811 and 1812 severely affected the operations.   
 
There does not appear to be any pattern as to why the Royal Engineers or the 
Royal Staff Corps were used to build specific bridges.  It is probable that 
Wellington used the most appropriate resource based on expertise or 
availability.  The Royal Staff Corps constructed temporary bridges during the 
Talavera campaign and at the battle of Fuentes dÕOnoro because they were 
present with the army at that time.  On most occasions though, troops were 
borrowed from the line regiments to work under the supervision of an engineer 
officer.  This was also true of the Royal Staff Corps, one example being the 
building of the trestle bridge at Marialva in November 1811. 
 
The important point to note is the extensive role the Royal Engineers played in 
the construction and destruction of river crossings throughout the Peninsular 
War.  Like the Royal Staff Corps, the Royal Engineers had to come up with 
innovative designs based on available materials, as often there was a complete 
lack of local raw materials.  A number of bridges were created during the war by 
dismantling buildings and using roof beams, floor boards and doors for the 
construction. Along with their colleagues in the Royal Staff Corps the Royal 
Engineers gave Wellington an operational flexibility that the French do not 
appear to have achieved.  On the retreats to Corunna and from Burgos, the 
losses of the Allied army would have been much worse if key bridges had not 
been denied to the French.  Conversely the French losses following the retreats 
from Oporto in 1809 and Torres Vedras in 1811 were both much worse due to 
the successful crossing of river barriers.  The final months of the war saw 
Wellington successfully cross a number of major river barriers in the face of the 
French.   
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Bridging activity played a vital role in WellingtonÕs offensive and defensive 
operations, and the activities and outcomes could have been very different had 
skilled engineers not been on hand to carry out this work. 
 
Pontoon Train. 
 
In the early part of the Peninsular War, Wellington had limited access to 
pontoon equipment.  This was not an immediate problem in the defensive years 
of 1809 and 1810 but with the retreat of Massena, Wellington moved on to the 
offensive and the deficiency became more problematic.  In southern Spain, the 
only pontoon equipment readily available was lost when the French took 
Badajoz in early 1811.  On 31 March 1811, which was the day the make-shift 
bridge across the Guadiana for the siege of Badajoz was swept away, 
Wellington wrote asking for an extensive pontoon train to be sent out from 
England.260  Jones noted in his diary on 1 July 1811 that twenty-four pontoons 
had arrived in Lisbon from England.  Jones also subsequently noted the arrival 
of artificers to be specifically attached to the pontoon train.261  Though 
Burnham262 suggested that Dickson of the Royal Artillery was responsible for 
the pontoon train, it is clear that the Royal Engineers were primarily 
responsible.  Lieutenant Piper R.E. was in charge from the pontoon trainÕs 
formation in 1812 and Captain English also joined when there were sufficient 
pontoons to form two trains.263  The Royal Artillery were tasked with maintaining 
the unreliable carriages and providing the resources to pull the train, a situation 
which caused considerable resentment when artillery horses were 
commandeered to pull the pontoon train at key points in the war.  Wellington 
made a mistake when he asked for the pontoon train, stating it was not 
necessary to send out horses, as bullocks would be provided locally.  The size 
and weight on the pontoons made them very difficult to move and the lack of 
motive power was a constant problem.  By June 1812 the pontoon train had 
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grown to thirty-six pontoons.264  As more soldiers from the Royal Sappers and 
Miners became available, companies were permanently attached to the 
pontoon train.  In 1813 three companies were attached to the pontoon train for 
the Vitoria campaign.  In a rare case of joint operation, troops from the Royal 
Staff Corps were also attached and they worked together through the 
campaign.265 
 
River and road communication 
 
Another unseen aspect of the role of the Royal Engineers was their work on 
improving communications for the army.  This was for the purposes of better 
troop movement and more efficient supply lines.  As mentioned above, an 
integral part of the lines of Torres Vedras was the improvement to the roads 
behind the lines that allowed Wellington to rapidly concentrate troops against 
any French threat.  Conversely, Wellington had ordered several roads 
approaching Torres Vedras to be destroyed to impede the movement of the 
French.  While Massena was stationary in front of Torres Vedras the engineers 
were busy on the south side of the Tagus repairing roads and bridges, including 
those from Chamusca to Aldea Gallega.266 
 
Preparation for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo and the subsequent campaign 
included work to improve the navigability of the river Douro.  Two Royal 
Engineers were employed in late 1811 improving the upper reaches of the river 
up to the border at Barca dÕAlva.267  After the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 
Lieutenant Marshall R.E. was sent to continue the improvement work.  
Following complaints from the commissary who brought supplies up in early 
1812, Burgoyne was asked to go and review the river and spent three weeks in 
May and June 1812 carrying out a further survey of the river.268 
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4.5. Surveying and Reconnaissance 
Henry Lloyd commented in his theories on military science that : 
 
The next, and indeed most important object of any, to those who aspire 
to the command of armies, is geography; not only that which consists in 
a general knowledge of a country, but a local one: a man must be 
thoroughly acquainted with the face of the country.269 
 
Up-to-date topographical information on the Peninsula was not available in the 
early stages of the war to either the French or the British commanders.  Both 
sides relied on old and often inaccurate maps and this led to some serious 
operational errors.270  From the arrival of British troops in the Peninsula in 1808, 
Royal Engineer officers were tasked with surveying and reconnaissance 
activities in support of both defensive and offensive operations.  
 
Comprehensive standing orders were issued to Royal Engineer officers on their 
duties when attached to the army : 
 
The Engineer É will observe the general features of the country through 
which they pass É Rivers should be particularly attended to Ébridges, 
whether of wood or stone, É whether capable of bearing artillery É the 
population of towns and villages, their distances from each other, and 
their means of supply .. In general whatever can facilitate or retard the 
march of the army É must be digested into a written report.271 
 
This instruction went on to specify that sketches were to be made of any 
position the army took and any fortification that they passed.  These activities 
were part of a wider operation involving officers often (but not always) under the 
control of the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs (QMG) department.272 The surveying 
and reconnaissance activities were carried out by four groups : specific officers 
appointed for the purpose within the QMGÕs department, officers from the Royal 
Staff Corps, Royal Engineer officers and volunteer officers from the line 
regiments.  It is not clear how well co-ordinated these activities were.  Romans, 
has noted the development of military intelligence within the Quarter-Master-
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GeneralÕs department, but also recognises that divisional commanders often 
carried out their own reconnaissance primarily to meet their local needs.273  This 
was not always appreciated by Wellington, who was insistent that intelligence 
should be routed through his staff to ensure he always had the best information.  
On occasions Royal Engineer officers worked with QMG staff officers on 
reconnaissance,274 but more often than not, their orders came direct from 
Wellington or the Commanding Royal Engineer in the Peninsula.  The impact of 
this work was that, through much of the war, Wellington had better information 
on the topography than the French, which while due partly to the better 
relationships with the Spanish was also due to continuous work by British 
officers to map and describe the terrain and the towns. 
 
George Landmann R.E. recorded as early as June 1808 that he was employed 
surveying enemy positions around Ayamonte.275  Over the following months, he 
was used to survey the area of operations and potential retreat routes for Sir 
John Moore.276  But he was not alone in being used extensively in these early 
operations. Pasley was ordered to reconnoitre the mountains in Asturias for 
General Leith in September 1808,277 and was present throughout the retreat. 
Boothby was ordered in October 1808 to inspect the Spanish frontier around 
the river Tagus at Alcantara.278  He continued surveying roads and towns 
through November and December 1808 before being employed on 
reconnaissance duties during the retreat to Corunna.279  Burgoyne was sent to 
assess the capability of Ciudad Rodrigo to defend itself,280 and Captain 
Carmichael-Smyth R.E. reconnoitred the country between Astorga and Villa 
Franca in December 1808.281  While the British army under Sir John Moore was 
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retreating, Burgoyne was sent to Vigo,282 and Fletcher sent to Corunna283 to 
report on their suitability for evacuation.  MooreÕs decision to retreat to Corunna 
was based on these reports.  
 
Engineer officers were working through the start of 1809 as planning began for 
defending Portugal from the French.  In March 1809, Lieutenants Rice Jones 
and Stanway R.E. were ordered to reconnoitre ground around Thomar and 
Leyira.284  Two engineer officers were captured when Soult took Oporto, 
although both were released when Wellington ejected Soult in May 1809.285  
Wellington immediately ordered surveys of the surrounding areas.  Burgoyne 
and other Royal Engineer officers spent much of May to July 1809 on such 
work.  Initially they provided detailed reports on the River Douro from Oporto to 
the Spanish frontier. Details included distances, road condition, river details, 
terrain, size and defensibility of towns, number of boats, bridges, ferries and 
fords.286  Later their work focussed on surveying towns on the northern 
Portuguese border.  Detailed reports were provided on Caminha, Villa Nova, 
Valenca, Tuy, Moncao, Melgaco, Chaves, with further notes on possible routes 
to Oporto. 
 
John Squire, who for much of 1810 and 1811 was attached to General HillÕs 
corps in the south, noted in August 1810 that he was Ôconstantly employed by 
General Hill in reconnoitringÕ.287  Later, in 1810, Squire was ordered to 
reconnoitre Salvatierra and Punhete following reports of the French having 
many boats there and concern that they might try to cross the river Tagus.288 
Similarly, Rice Jones noted making almost daily excursions either alone or with 
General Craufurd in late 1811. 
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During the retreat in front of the French in summer 1810, Burgoyne and 
Fletcher were surveying defensive positions that Wellington could potentially 
use depending upon the route the French took.  The position at Bussaco was 
one of those surveyed.289  Once the French were static in front of Torres 
Vedras, Burgoyne was despatched to survey the river Mondego from Coimbra 
to the mouth of the river.290  In the same period, Lieutenant Reid was ordered to 
survey the area from Ota to the river Tagus.291  
 
There are also examples of other types of survey work.  In November 1811, 
Burgoyne was asked to identify positions to bivouac troops out of sight of 
Ciudad Rodrigo prior to the siege commencing.292  Through May and June 
1812, Burgoyne was surveying the river Mondego with a view to improving 
communications.  In August 1813, Wellington asked for an officer to be sent to 
Guertaria to evaluate the possibility of building wells and estimate the size of 
garrison required there.293 
 
The activities listed above are just examples and are not an exhaustive list of 
such events. Evidence from the engineer diaries shows that survey and 
reconnaissance work was a significant part of the duties of the engineer 
officers.  Whether based at headquarters, with divisional commanders or at 
static locations, engineer officers were frequently employed collecting 
topographical information to assist in the operations of the army and the 
defence of the Peninsula.  Romans comments : 
 
Staff reconnaissance was related to, rather than distinct from the 
functions of the two technical services [Artillery and Engineers].  Staff 
Officers were expected to report in detail on features such as river 
crossing points, but once potential locations had been identified, it 
usually fell to the Royal Engineers to provide a specialist report.  
Similarly, while Assistant QMGÕs or their deputies reported on the 
suitability of roads for wheeled transport, such initial observations were 
frequently referred to artillery officers for a second opinion.294 
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Based on evidence from the engineer officersÕ letters and diaries it appears that 
their involvement in reconnaissance was more widespread.  Apart from official 
requests to carry out survey or reconnaissance work, many engineer officers 
routinely kept detailed journals of their travels, noting terrain, town and weather 
details.  There is no doubt that this information was shared with their peers in 
the ordnance, but it was also used to provide topographical information to army 
commanders on request.  The inference, based on the lack of requests for work 
coming from the Quarter-Master-General, is that there was not direct co-
ordination, but there is no reason to assume that survey reports delivered to 
Wellington from the Royal Engineers did not find their way into the global pool 
of intelligence. 
4.6. Activity with the Army on Operations  
The officers from the Royal Engineers were no different to the officers from the 
army in their aspirations.  Most wanted to serve with the army on operations 
and were unhappy when they were given tasks that kept them away from this 
centre of activity.  Although the majority of engineer officers were involved in 
static activities, building and strengthening defences, there was a core that 
worked and travelled with the army when it was on operations.  The evidence 
below shows that they were generally welcomed into the general officersÕ 
Ômilitary familyÕ and were used extensively by them.  Wellington may have had 
an extensive staff around him, but the other generals had fewer staff.  The 
Royal Engineer officers represented a skilled resource that all the generals 
including Wellington gratefully accepted and used.  Below are some examples 
of the roles and activities that engineer officers carried out when assigned to the 
army.  The examples build on the previous sections and show that the engineer 
officers had a much wider role than historians have previously realised and 
were used by military commanders often in roles that would have been 
expected to be given to line officers. 
 
In the early stages of the Peninsular War a number of engineer officers were 
employed as Aides-De-Camp (ADC) and staff officers.  Captain Edward 
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Fanshawe R.E. accompanied Sir Hew Dalrymple to Portugal in 1808 acting as 
his Military Secretary during that time and during the negotiation of the 
Convention of Cintra.295  Pasley was used as an extra ADC first by Sir David 
Baird and then by Sir John Moore during the Corunna campaign.  He was 
ordered to attach himself to BlakeÕs army in November 1808, to Ôreport its state, 
position and operationsÕ.296  Pasley wrote a lengthy report on his findings to 
Baird in early Jan 1809.297  In December 1808 he was writing to Moore with 
reports from a spy in Burgos.298  Pasley was clearly considered to be part of 
MooreÕs family as he was present when he died and also at the burial, which 
was only attended by MooreÕs senior officers and ADCÕs.299  During the 
Corunna campaign, Burgoyne was used to transmit key orders to General Hope 
and to act as a guide in the required operations.300  Captain Lefebure R.E. was 
Ôemployed as a missionary on affairs of very particular importanceÕ, being sent 
to Bilbao with a message to the leaders in the Biscay regions.301  In September 
1808, Captain Birch R.E. was ordered by General Leith to join the Spanish 
headquarters to Ôenquire into the force, disposition and intended movements of 
that armyÕ.  He met Castaos and Blake and accompanied them to visit Palafox 
at Saragossa.302  Landmann was sent from Lisbon to Seville carrying 
despatches for the British Minister there.303 
 
From WellingtonÕs first campaign in 1809, engineer officers were allocated to 
each of his divisions whilst they were on operations.304  These allocations 
tended to be semi-permanent for much of the war.  Up to his death, Squire was 
always attached to General HillÕs Corps, Burgoyne was attached to PictonÕs 
Third Division and Rice Jones to the Light Division.  As illustrated above, a 
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primary role for these officers was in carrying out survey and reconnaissance 
activities. 
 
Engineer officers also were regularly involved during military operations being  
present at almost every battle in the Peninsular War.  Boothby described the 
role of an engineer officer in battle : Ôhe is always acceptable in the field if 
mounted, because he is generally a good sensible smart fellow .. and is 
trustworthy in the communication and explanation of orders É we generally 
offer our É services as aides-de-campÕ.305 
 
Elphinstone was wounded at the first battle at Rolica in August 1808.306  
Landmann was also present at the battle and describes it in detail in his 
recollections.307  He was with Wellington for part of the action and was sent to 
assist General Fergusson.  Lieutenant Wells R.E. was used as an ADC at the 
battle of Vimiero and was captured due to his poor eyesight, spending much of 
the remainder of the battle with the French general, Junot.308  Lieutenant 
Edmund Mulcaster R.E. was also with WellingtonÕs party and after expressing 
concern about the nearness of some French skirmishers was ordered to collect 
some soldiers and drive them off.309 
 
Lieutenant Hamilton R.E. was wounded at the taking of Oporto on 12 May 
1809.  He had been sent to place some riflemen in position when he was 
caught between charging British dragoons and the enemy.  He chose to charge 
with the dragoons and was shot through both legs.  He never recovered from 
these wounds and died later that month in Lisbon.310  In the same action, 
Burgoyne and Rice Jones were employed collecting boats to cross the river 
Douro.311 
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Active involvement in battles continued throughout the war.  The commanders 
of detached corps also used the engineer officers in a similar way.  One 
example was General Graham after the battle of Barossa in 1811, when he 
praised Captains Birch and Nicholas personally for their contribution during the 
battle.312 
 
WellingtonÕs trust in some of the engineer officers was demonstrated at El 
Boden on 25 September 1811, when he asked Burgoyne to stay with a 
Portuguese regiment which was under heavy fire and assist in keeping it under 
control.313  Burgoyne, like Dickson in the artillery, was particularly trusted by 
Wellington.  He was often involved in tasks that would normally have been 
carried out by staff officers.  For example, he took in the summons for surrender 
to the French governor at the first siege of San Sebastian in 1813 and carried 
out the negotiations with the French to conclude the ceasefire at Bayonne in 
April 1814.314  In a similar vein, Fletcher was ordered to command a force that 
was sent to  take the cattle belonging to the French that were grazing outside of 
Almeida on 11 April 1811.315  
 
There were also occasions when engineer officers supported the Spanish 
forces.  Lieutenant Reid spent some time with Don Carlos DÕEspana in late 
1811.  Burgoyne noted that Don Carlos wrote to Wellington asking for Reid to 
be allowed to stay with him and Reid was also keen that this would be 
allowed.316  On another occasion, Lieutenant Wells R.E. was seconded to assist 
the Spanish attack on Santona.317 
 
Another area of activity which did not conform to the engineersÕ official role was 
the construction of field works.  This was clearly the responsibility of the Royal 
Staff Corps.  In another example of the blurring of responsibilities, there are 
numerous examples where the Royal Engineers were ordered to construct field 
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works.  This became more evident later in the Peninsular War when there was 
a greater number of Royal Sappers and Miners present.  After the second siege 
of Badajoz, Fletcher went to Campo Mayor on 22 June 1811 to lay out two 
redoubts for the defensive positions that Wellington took up to face Soult and 
Marmont.318  Burgoyne,  Rice Jones and Stanway joined to assist.  JonesÕ diary 
noted in September 1811 that he was ordered by Wellington to lay out positions 
for the army at El Boden and Fuente de Guinaldo.  He also noted that the work 
was started on these positions by four hundred and fifty troops from the Fourth 
Division.319   
 
There are numerous references to the building of field works during the 
Pyrenees campaign of 1813.  These include orders to construct defences at the 
bridge over Bidassoa on 13 October 1813;320  Lieutenant Pitts R.E. and a 
company of Royal Sappers and Miners built several field works around Vera 
after the action there on 7 October  1813;321 and Smith prepared defences 
around Irun.322  
 
These examples show that, though small in number, the Royal Engineers 
played an important part in the operation of divisional and headquarters staff 
with the Allied armies.  Early in the Peninsular War it is clear that the lack of 
educated and intelligent staff officers meant that Royal Engineer officers were 
given many responsible tasks to assist their commanders.  There is also clear 
evidence that they played an important role with the army whilst on active 
operations.  Apart from their training in surveying and sketching, which made 
them useful for intelligence work, their knowledge of languages must have been 
very useful for communication with Spanish, Portuguese and French officers.  It 
is important when looking at the command staff activities in the Peninsula that 
the presence of engineer officers is not overlooked.  Their presence gave a 
significant boost to the resources available.  There is also clear evidence that 
they played a full part in the operations of the staff groups at the divisional level. 
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4.7. Relationship with the Royal Staff  Corps  
The presence of the Royal Staff Corps and the Royal Engineers in the 
Peninsula had the potential to create difficulties.  The Royal Staff Corps were 
part of the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs department under the control of the Horse 
Guards and the Royal Engineers were part of the Board of Ordnance.  On 
paper their roles were separate, the Royal Engineers focussing on permanent 
works and sieges while the Royal Staff Corps worked on communications and 
temporary works.  In practice, as has been shown above, this distinction was 
not evident, with both groups carrying out tasks that in principle were the 
responsibility of the other group.  For most of the Peninsular War there were 
simply not enough of either group to meet the demands of the army and a 
pragmatic approach appears to have developed that whoever was available 
was used.   
 
Although on most occasions the two corps worked on separate tasks, there 
were a number of occasions when they worked together.  These include Royal 
Staff Corps artificers erecting a telegraph station at Celorico under the 
directions of Captain Chapman R.E. in 1809,323 Royal Staff Corps artificers 
being attached to the reserve artillery in 1812,324 and Royal Sappers and 
Miners and Royal Staff Corps artificers being attached to the pontoon train in 
1813.325  The most notable occasion was the massive bridging operation across 
the river Adour in February 1814.  The scale of the operation meant that all 
available resources had to be pulled together and there was also a significant 
input from the Royal Navy.  There has been some criticism that the Royal 
Engineers unfairly claimed the credit for this construction, when in fact the 
Royal Staff Corps built the bridge.326  Officially the command of the bridge 
construction was entrusted to Elphinstone of the Royal Engineers.  He was 
certainly of the opinion that it was built under his command. In a letter home, he 
noted receiving a letter ordering him to make the bridge and Ôthat the staff corps 
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were to be under my ordersÕ.327  Sir John Hope who was in local command 
while Wellington was with the army, noted that Elphinstone was in charge of the 
task and that Burgoyne and Sturgeon (Royal Staff Corps) were following his 
orders.328  Similarly, Larpent describes it as ÔElphinstoneÕs bridgeÕ, and recorded 
that he had seen ElphinstoneÕs plans and drawings.329  There is no doubt that 
Sturgeon and Major Tod of the Royal Staff Corps were involved in the design of 
the bridge.330  Wellington sent Tod to discuss the design with Admiral Penrose 
on 7 February 1814, but Wellington was corresponding with Elphinstone on the 
planning and construction of the bridge.331  It is unusual that in WellingtonÕs 
official despatch on the crossing of the Adour, he did not mention the Royal 
Staff Corps or the Royal Engineers, although several Royal Naval officers are 
mentioned.332 
 
Generally though, relationships between the two groups of officers themselves 
appeared cordial.  Sturgeon, the senior officer of the Royal Staff Corps had 
transferred from the Royal Artillery.  He would have known and trained with 
some of the senior Royal Engineer and Royal Artillery officers.  Burgoyne, in his 
diary makes criticisms of SturgeonÕs attempts to destroy a bridge and his design 
for ladders at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, but these complaints are no more 
frequent than his negative comments on the performance of his fellow 
engineers.   
4.8. Improvements in Training and Experience 
Though some of the Royal Engineer officers admitted that they had limited 
practical experience at the start of the Peninsular War, there were instructions 
in place to assist inexperienced officers on their first campaigns.  Rice JonesÕ 
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diary333 contains instructions to officers on active operations outlining the sort of 
information they should be collecting as part of their normal daily movements. 
Examining the diaries that still exist, there are detailed descriptions of towns, 
roads and terrain with comments on people and the weather.  There are 
sketches to provide further detail and hand drawn maps which give information 
on roads and distances.  Assuming that much of this information found its way 
back to the operational leadership, then over the course of the Peninsular War, 
the level of knowledge must have increased significantly. 
 
One thing that does become apparent when looking through the letters, 
notebooks and diaries of the operational officers, is that they did share 
information.  For example, the notebooks of George West R.E.334 and Charles 
Rochfort Scott, R.S.C.335 contain almost identical hand-drawn images and notes 
explaining how a bridge was repaired or a pontoon was installed.   
 
Figure 4.2. The notebooks of G.I.P. West. R.E. and C.R. Scott. R.S.C. 
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It is evident that the professional courtesy of the scientific soldiers meant that 
they were willing to share their knowledge and experience with their peers.  
BurgoyneÕs notebook on bridging also has similar diagrams and he recorded 
that his notes on bridging using casks were taken from experiments carried out 
by Pasley at Chatham in 1813.  The same notebook also provides information 
on how the French repaired bridges (for example the bridge at Ponte 
Murcella),336 and describes notes made by Lieutenant Piper on the operation of 
the pontoon train.  Burgoyne wrote lengthy notes on bridging in August 1814 at 
the request of Ordnance headquarters for use at the Royal Military Academy 
and School of Military Engineering.337 
 
There is evidence that such information was being circulated at an individual 
level.  Writing to Squire in October 1811, Burgoyne enclosed a letter from a 
fellow officer with information on the destruction and repair of bridges.  
                                            
336
 REM, 4201-68, Notebook on Bridges and passage of rivers. 
337
 REM, 4601-72, f. 1814/11 
Section 4. Operational Performance. 
 227 
Burgoyne asked for the letter to be returned after Squire had read it.338  The 
formation of the unofficial ÔSociety for Procuring Useful Military InformationÕ in 
1810 which is described above showed that the engineer officers on active 
campaign were taking their professional responsibilities seriously.  Moving more 
slowly, the Board of Ordnance was also working to improve officer competence.  
The establishment of the School of Military Engineering in 1812 gave a further 
opportunity to ensure that junior officers had some practical experience prior to 
their first active appointment : 
 
Since that period [the formation of the School of Military Engineering], 
the junior officers of the Royal Engineers, and all the non-commissioned 
Officers and soldiers of the Department, in addition to the studies 
requisite for their respective stations, have been diligently exercised, not 
only in the execution of parallels, approaches, batteries, saps, mines, 
and other works of siege; but also in the manoeuvres of pontoons, and in 
the formation of military bridges in general.339 
 
Apart from the training and education of the engineer officers, the engineers 
were also very aware of the limitations caused by the lack of trained artificers to 
support them.  This deficiency led to the small number of engineers being 
constantly stretched due to them having to teach and monitor the activities of 
the soldiers from the line regiments who were drafted in to help.  Usually there 
was little assistance from the officers of the line regiments, who universally 
loathed siege work.  The second consequence of this deficiency was the 
number of engineer officer casualties that occurred as a direct result of the first.  
Many officers lost their lives while demonstrating to untrained soldiers the 
nature of their duties.  This was a constant theme of correspondence during 
1810-1813 when siege operations were undertaken.  A trickle of artificers were 
sent out to the Peninsula but even when they were present, their training often 
proved inadequate and complaints about them came home with great regularity.  
A typical example was :  
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One company of artificers were up who knew nothing and were made no 
use of except 3 or 4 individuals.  The officers of Engineers consequently 
had everything to arrange and do themselves.340 
 
A number of officers regularly wrote home asking for more artificers to be sent 
out and one, John T. Jones was reprimanded in 1812 for writing about the 
unwillingness of the Inspector General of Fortifications to risk artificers on 
campaign, writing : ÔNero fiddled whilst Rome BurnedÕ.341  
 
But despite these problems and complaints, the Royal Engineer officers were 
working to improve the situation.  Through most of 1811 and 1812, groups of 
Royal Military Artificers and volunteers from the line were being trained by 
engineer officers when time permitted.  These efforts continued for the 
remainder of the war.  Lieutenant Matson, R.E. was assigned to train the Royal 
Sappers and Miners artificers in the winter season prior to 1813 campaign.342  
 
The efforts of Pasley in England and several officers in the Peninsula and the 
complaints by Wellington, eventually led to the formation of the Royal Sappers 
and Miners.  By the end of the war, there was both an increase in quantity and 
quality of the specialist troops to support the engineer officers. 
 
On a wider level, there was also evidence of the increased awareness of the 
need for improved professionalism in the army.  Whilst the output of officers 
from the Royal Military College was still small, the first military journal appeared 
during the Napoleonic Wars.  The Royal Military Chronicle was first published in 
November 1810 and was designed to provide both up-to-date organisational 
information (promotions, despatches) and also material designed to improve the 
knowledge of the officer.  This included military histories, current information 
from campaigns around the world and material on the duties of officers. There 
was a surprising amount of material on offensive and defensive fortifications 
that possibly reflected the ready availability of material and officers willing to 
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contribute.  After the war, the United Service Journal became a major 
contributor to military thinking in England and a major campaigner for changes. 
4.9. Review of performance during the Peninsular 
War. 
What this section shows is that the role of the Royal Engineer officer was much 
more wide ranging than is currently thought.  The activities carried out by the 
Royal Engineers made a vital, but often unseen, contribution to the war.  They 
were not just brought out of storage and Ôdusted offÕ when sieges were needed 
but played an active and useful role with the army through its operational and 
static phases.  Unlike most officers in the army, they were busy during the non-
operational seasons carrying out tasks such as improving static defences and 
communications, training soldiers or undertaking survey and reconnaissance 
work. 
 
The safety of Lisbon, Cadiz and Gibraltar were ensured by the continuous work 
carried out in those locations.  Although they were never tested by the French, 
the formidable Lines of Torres Vedras had enormous strategic significance for 
the Allied cause, giving a safe defensive position for WellingtonÕs army, a 
secure delivery point for the supply chain and a base from which to launch his 
offensive campaigns. There was a large engineer presence in these areas 
throughout the war and this gave the Allied armies safe havens from the French 
and tied up large numbers of their troops.  The quick repair of fortresses made 
them safe against the French and provided staging points for the Allies and the 
guerrillas.  By their strategic location on the communication routes, they also 
made the movement of French troops, messengers and supplies more difficult.  
The analysis above has also demonstrated, for the first time, the major 
contribution that the Royal Engineers made to bridging in the Peninsula.  This 
role is not fully appreciated by historians and needs further work to build on the 
useful first study by Burnham. 
 
Another point that has not been noted in previous studies is the wider role that 
Royal Engineer officers played in supporting the command structure of the 
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army.  Although some of the information used above has been available in print 
for many years, it is only when these various comments are brought together 
with unpublished material that a clearer picture emerges of the frequent and 
comprehensive effort by engineer officers to support the needs of divisional, 
corps and army command.  Particularly in the early stages of the Peninsular 
War, the Royal Engineer officers were used extensively in staff roles to support 
their commanders, sometimes travelling large distances and working with the 
Spanish armies.  Recent studies, such as that by Romans, are beginning to 
explain how military intelligence was collected and used, but this only touches 
on the complementary roles of the Royal Engineers and the Royal Staff Corps. 
 
The review of the Allied sieges has shown that they were generally believed to 
be badly planned and executed.  The Royal Engineers came in for particular 
criticism on both the strategies employed and actual operations.  Much of this 
criticism is unjustified and the problems were often caused by poor equipment , 
limited resources or time constraints.  Mistakes were made, but there is no 
evidence to suggest that they had a material effect on the outcome of any of the 
sieges.  With hindsight it is always easy to conclude that a particular plan of 
action would have been better than the one selected, but whether this would 
really have made a difference to the outcome is debatable.  
 
There were some major deficiencies, particularly the lack of trained sappers 
and miners.  This was recognised both in England and in the Peninsula.  The 
Board of Ordnance was moving slowly to address the issue, the biggest change 
being in mid-1811 with the expansion on the Royal Military Artificers and the 
decision to rotate the locations of the companies .  There is no doubt that the 
pressure applied by Wellington did contribute to the earlier introduction of some 
changes, particularly the establishment of the School of Military Engineering.  
While these changes were being introduced the engineers in the Peninsula 
were taking steps themselves.  These included the training of volunteers from 
the line and any available sappers.  This was carried out from mid 1811 until the 
end of the war.   There is also evidence that the senior Royal Engineer officers 
were mentoring the recently qualified officers and also sharing information with 
their peers both informally in letters and through the ÔSocietyÕ mentioned above. 
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Did their training make a difference and was there was any improvement in 
performance during the war?  There is no doubt that the engineer officers had 
limited practical experience of siege craft.  Only a small number had been 
involved in previous sieges.  But these officers knew the principles and applied 
them as well as circumstances permitted.  There is no evidence that the results 
of the sieges were caused by repeated bad decisions by the engineers.  The 
improvement in the supply of sappers and miners is evident in the number 
available in the later sieges and in the Waterloo campaign. 
 
There is also no doubt that the training the engineer officers received was 
valuable in their wider staff roles supporting the army command structure.  Their 
knowledge of survey and drawing was very useful for reconnaissance and 
intelligence work.  Their mathematical  and engineering training allowed them to 
work effectively on the construction of defensive works and on the making and 
breaking of river crossings.  Their general intelligence and language skills made 
them useful as messengers, emissaries and liaison officers.  The dairies and 
letters of the engineer officers make it clear that the officers were very 
enthusiastic to be involved in staff work and most of the senior generals in the 
peninsula speak kindly of the engineers who were allocated to them.  Sources 
detail only one occasion when a request was made for an engineer officer to be 
removed from a particular post, but this officer was subsequently mentioned in 
despatches for other tasks he successfully completed. 
 
In summary, the Royal Engineer officers played an important but often unseen  
role in the Peninsula.  Their major contribution was not the sieges but in the 
various other roles which they performed to support the army on offensive and 
defensive operations.  There is also clear evidence that there were 
improvements in the quantity of resources and the quality of resources through 
the Peninsular War. 
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SECTION 5. AFTER THE PENINSULAR WAR 
5.1. Introduction 
The end of the Peninsular War saw many of the officers from the Peninsula 
being transferred to the remaining operations in the Low Countries and 
America.  The majority of engineer officers remained where they were 
continuing their work in the major garrisons around the world.  After Waterloo, 
many engineer officers were involved in survey and reconstruction work in 
Europe until 1818.  This section will outline the changes that occurred over the 
next forty years and describe how military reform and education fared during 
the peace.  The next major conflict in the Crimea was not a success and the 
end of this war saw major changes in the structure of the military in this country 
with the end of the Board of Ordnance and the formation of a single military 
engineering corps. 
5.2. 1814-15, Holland, America and Waterloo 
The final stages on the Napoleonic Wars saw three more campaigns outside of 
the Iberian Peninsula each of which included the involvement of Royal 
Engineers and the Royal Sappers and Miners. 
 
Following a request from the Dutch, a makeshift expeditionary force was sent to 
Holland under the command of Sir Thomas Graham.  This force landed at Tolen 
on 17 December 18131 and included a complement of nine Royal Engineers 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel James Carmichael-Smyth and eighty-three 
artificers from the Royal Sappers and Miners.2  All six junior engineer officers 
had spent time at the School of Military Engineering before their deployment.  
 
These officers and men played an active part in the following campaign starting 
with the construction of a disembarkation point for the cavalry.   A battery was 
built for the Prussians to protect the flying bridge at Tholen and another battery 
                                            
1
 Aspinal-Oglander, Freshly Remembered, p. 264. 
2
 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, pp. 206-207. 
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was repaired at Ford Frederick. A boat bridge was constructed using locally 
obtained boats at Zandwarbrieten on 31 December 1813.3  In February 1814, 
batteries were constructed to bombard the French fleet in Antwerp using a 
range of antiquated guns that were found in the area.  Five batteries were 
constructed, but the inferiority of the guns meant that no significant damage had 
been done when the bombardment had to be stopped on 6 December 1813 
when the supporting Prussian troops were withdrawn.  Without the Prussians, 
the Allied force was not strong enough to threaten Antwerp.  Graham decided 
that a surprise attack on Bergen-Op-Zoom might succeed and launched an 
attack on the night of 8 March 1814.  Whilst initially successful, the attackers 
were driven out in the morning by a counter-attack.  Three Royal Engineers 
officers with forty sappers led the various columns forward, Captain Hoste, 
Lieutenants, Sperling and Abbey being involved with Abbey being killed during 
the night.  Of the forty sappers, their officer, Sub-Lieutenant Adamson was 
killed, two artificers were killed, thirteen wounded and ten made prisoners.  The 
skills and bravery of the sappers was recorded by both Graham and the 
commanding engineer, Carmichael-Smyth.4  The first peace in Europe was 
declared soon after with the abdication of Napoleon, although many of the 
ordnance officers and artificers remained in Holland.  
 
The cessation of hostilities in Europe enabled another expeditionary force to be  
put together to make an attack on the American mainland at New Orleans.  The 
force collected was a mixture of locally based troops and some veteran 
regiments from the Peninsula commanded by Sir Edward Packenham.  
Included was twelve Royal Engineer officers and over one hundred artificers 
from the Royal Sappers and Miners all under the command of Burgoyne.5  The 
attack on New Orleans was a failure with Packenham losing his life and the 
council formed to decide on the next action choosing to abandon any further 
attempt. Connolly wrote that Ôboth companies [of the Royal Sappers and 
                                            
3
 Porter, History of the Royal Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 367-368. 
4
 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, pp. 206-208. 
5
 Porter, History of the Royal Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 359-360; Connolly, History of the Royal 
Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, pp. 210-212. 
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Miners] were of great service during the operations and assaultÕ,6 but provided 
no details of their actions.  One engineer officer, Lieutenant Wright was killed 
during the assault, which was ironic as he had been in the Peninsula since 
1811 and had served at all the major sieges.  The final event in the American 
war was the attack on Fort Bowyer near Mobile in February 1815.  At this attack 
the two companies of artificers were present and their effective work in digging 
the approaches led to an early surrender of the fort.  
 
The final event in the Napoleonic Wars was the one hundred days campaign 
which culminated in the battle of Waterloo.  There were numerous Royal 
Engineer officers present, the total was about sixty in June 1815 along with 
seven companies of Royal Sappers and Miners.  Many officers and artificers 
from the Royal Sappers and Miners were already in the Low Countries working 
on surveying and repairing fortresses and other engineering activities.7  As the 
news of NapoleonÕs return spread efforts increased on preparing defences.  For 
the first time, Wellington had proper engineer resources available and these 
were used extensively during the campaign. 
 
every division of the army had one engineerÕs brigade attached to it; 
each brigade consisting of a complete company of well-trained Sappers 
and Miners, with drivers horses, and wagons, carrying intrenching tools, 
sufficient to employ a working party of 500 men É A Captain and a 
number of subalterns were attached to each brigade, and were 
responsible for the discipline of the men and the efficiency of the horses 
etc É Five companies of Sappers and Miners were employed with the 
Pontoon train, which consisted of 30 pontoons É The number of  
Engineers officers serving with the army in France was only 41 ... They 
had under their command upwards of 800 Sappers and Miners, and 550 
drivers, and had charge of 160 waggons (pontoon carriages included) 
and more than 1000 horses.8 
 
At the battle itself, there were eleven Royal Engineer officers present.  A 
number had been employed a few days before, sketching the ground to prepare 
maps for Wellington.   As described above their role was to work as staff 
                                            
6
 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, p. 212. 
7
 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, p. 216, says at least three 
companies were on the continent. 
8
 Pasley, A Course of instruction, vol. 1, p. xii. 
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officers supporting the commanders but as they day wore on many were 
scattered across the battlefield.  The commanding engineer, Carmichael-Smyth 
remained with Wellington through most of the battle. 
 
The three campaigns outlined above demonstrate a material change in the 
quantity and quality of engineering resources available.  Compared with the 
early years of the Peninsular War, there were greater numbers of engineers 
and artificers present.  More importantly, the training received by both groups 
was beginning to show dividends in their capabilities.  The scale of the 
engineering resources during the Waterloo campaign would have made a 
difference if they had been available in the Peninsula.  This change was the 
culmination of effort over several years to highlight and then introduce much 
needed changes within the military engineering capability of the British army. 
 
5.3. From the Napoleonic to Crimean wars 
In the immediate aftermath on the Napoleonic Wars, large numbers of officers 
and artificers were engaged in surveying and repairing fortresses.  Proposals 
were prepared by August 1815 and a budget of £6.5m was allocated for 
building and repair work.  The budget was under the direct control of Wellington 
and he appointed John T. Jones R.E. as his assistant.  Many engineers 
remained through to 1818 working on these projects. 
 
In line with the army, the peace also brought the need to reduce the size of the 
corps.  The first cut came in 1817 when the corps was reduced by twenty-nine 
to two hundred and thirty-three.  1819 saw a further cut down to one hundred 
and ninety-three.  The reduction was made by the most junior officers at each 
rank being put on half-pay until a vacancy occurred.  The establishment 
remained at this level until 1825 when it was increased to two hundred and fifty-
one as part of the decision to undertake the ordnance survey in Ireland.  The 
establishment remained at this level until 1846 when it was increase to two 
hundred and ninety-eight and on the threat of war in 1854 up to three hundred 
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and thirty-six.9  The effect of the reductions in the establishment in 1817 and 
1819 was to stifle any promotion prospects in the corps and officers had to face 
many years on the same rank with no prospect of promotion.  There were no 
promotions to Captain or Lieutenant-Colonel between 1817 and 1824.   
 
In that year it was decided that a one-off restructure was required.  Nineteen 
officers were appointed to Lieutenant-Colonel.  The number of cadets waiting 
for commissions had reached over one hundred.  The problem was becoming 
impossible to manage.  A decision was made to reduce the backlog by 
implementing a one-off commissioning, promoting twenty-eight to the Royal 
Artillery, twenty-six to the Royal Engineers and over fifty were transferred to the 
line regiments.  Those who refused the offer of the transfer to the line had all 
allowances stopped.10  
 
The reductions in the establishment also had an effect on the Royal Military 
Academy. As the number of cadets dropped, the fifth and sixth academies were 
abolished in 1820, and the fourth in 1823.11  
 
There were similar reductions in the Royal Sappers and Miners.  In 1816 the 
establishment was reduced from 2,861 to 2,061.  Further reductions in 1817 
took the establishment down to 1,258 and in 1819 down to 752.12  Like the 
Royal Engineers, in 1824 the establishment was increased to 814 with the 
formation of an extra company for ordnance survey work in Ireland. 
 
Although the reductions above made a significant impact in the size of the 
engineer and artificer corps, the key learning points were not lost.  The Royal 
Military Academy continued to train cadets in the necessary skills before 
commissioning and the School of Military Engineering continued to train the 
artificers and provide post commissioning education for the newly qualified 
officers.  The growth of the ordnance survey from 1824 had two advantages.  
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 Porter, History of the Royal Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 406-408. 
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Firstly, it allowed officers to gain practical experience in surveying and secondly 
if increased the pool of engineer officers who could be called on in times of 
need.  There were still concerns about the education given.  The 1840Õs saw 
attacks on the syllabus as being Ôtoo narrowly theoreticalÕ.13  StrachanÕs 
comment that it was only in 1846 that practical elements were added to the 
syllabus is misleading as cadets had been receiving practical instruction 
through the School of Military Engineering since 1812.14 
 
The approach of the Crimean War, triggered an increase in the establishment of 
the Royal Engineers.  StrachanÕs criticism of the Ôinbuilt slowness to adjust to 
the demands of warÕ seems particularly harsh as the size of the Academy was 
constrained by the funding available.15  The inbuilt slowness was the typical 
function of the government in having to balance the cost of the military in peace 
against the needs in war. The military engineering aspects of the Crimean War 
were not impressive and brought reminders about some of the problems faced 
during the Peninsular War.  This must have been particularly galling for the 
senior engineer officers, some of whom were present forty years before.16 
 
Rightly or wrongly, the Crimean War saw the end of the Board of Ordnance.  
They were judged responsible for some of the failures and in 1856 the Board of 
Ordnance was amalgamated with the War Department to form the War Office.  
At the same time the Royal Sappers and Miners were absorbed into the Royal 
Engineers to form a single military engineering corps, an action that Pasley had 
argued for forty years earlier. 
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 H. Strachan, WellingtonÕs Legacy : The Reform of the British Army 1830-54 (Manchester, 
1984), pp. 124-125. 
14
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5.4. The ArmyÕs response to education 
Britain came out of the Napoleonic wars with a small but highly effective army.  
The realities of peace soon led to the downsizing of the army with regiments 
disbanded and officers placed on half-pay. 
 
The impacts were also felt in the Royal Military Academy and the size was cut 
back.  By 1829 the size of the staff in the Junior Department was reduced to a 
point where they could not provide the education and it was only by becoming 
self funding that the college survived at all.17  The Horse Guards view of military 
education was still undecided. The Royal Military College had only been in 
existence for fifteen years and Wellington was still not convinced of its value.  
Wellington firmly believed that officers should be educated, but his opinion was 
that the education should be that provided by public schools and appropriate for 
a ÔgentlemanÕ and that military education should be delayed until the officer had 
received his first commission.  This was seen to give the best relationship 
between officer and soldier,  the (country) gentleman knowing how to lead men 
whilst the noveau riche did not. 
 
The British Army provided those aristocrats with the temporary 
environment of camp life which was simply the continuation of life on a 
country estate. War was like any other outdoor sport, only rougher and 
more dangerous.18 
 
The Victorian era saw this position gradually eroded and there was a greater 
demand for education led by publications like the United Service Journal.  This 
pressure for military reform led to the growth of the relationship between the 
military and the public schools as described in WorthingtonÕs paper.19 
 
It was just before the Crimean War when it was finally accepted that military 
education had a part to play and this saw the growth of the military colleges, the 
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setting of minimum education standards for officers and ultimately the end of 
the purchase of commissions. 
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SECTION 6. CONCLUSIONS 
In the introduction to this thesis the purpose was outlined and the three primary 
questions were listed : 
− Were the Royal Engineer officers suitably trained and provided with the 
necessary resources to undertake their roles? 
− If a small percentage of engineer time was spent on the sieges during 
the Peninsular War, what roles did the Royal Engineer officers perform 
for the remainder of the time? 
− How well did they perform in their operational roles? 
 
This thesis has provided answers to each of the questions set, although some 
difficulties were encountered during the study.  One of the main difficulties was 
the limited information available on the Royal Engineers and its activities.  In the 
early stages of the research a significant amount of time was spent building a 
comprehensive database on the Royal Engineers during the Napoleonic Wars.  
The number of officers was small enough to treat them as individuals and 
gather information at that level.  There were two hundred and eighty officers in 
total and by combining published and unpublished material a comprehensive 
understanding has been developed of their careers and operational activities.  
The material collected includes several thousand digital images of original 
unpublished documents, which have been used extensively during the 
research.  This information, which has been collected together for the first time, 
has enabled a thorough analysis to be carried out on the role of the Royal 
Engineers.1  The availability of this information was a pre-requisite to 
completing the study. 
 
Some unexpected findings have come out of the research.   
− The common perception of the Allied sieges, that they were hampered 
by bad decisions and mismanagement, has been challenged and an 
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alternative suggested of poor results primarily through time and resource 
constraints; 
− The role of the Royal Engineer officers was much wider than has been 
previously thought.  They played a more active role in supporting the 
command structure than has been previously recognised; 
− There were more engineers actively involved in the Napoleonic Wars 
than historians have appreciated.  Many were involved in relatively 
unseen defensive activities across the Iberian Peninsula and the 
Mediterranean islands; 
− There was a significant effort to maintaining communications for 
WellingtonÕs operations.  This involved improving road and river access 
and also the construction and destruction of river crossings.  Previously, 
the perception was that much of this work was carried out by the Royal 
Staff Corps, but the facts do not support this position. 
 
These points will be picked up below. 
 
TRAINING 
 
The education of the Ordnance officers had been developed over a period of 
fifty years since the formation of the Royal Military Academy in 1741.  As shown 
by Appendix A, the syllabus was comprehensive providing a scientific rather 
than classical education.  Up to 1812 the syllabus was primarily theoretical 
although there were limited opportunities to put some of the learning to practice.  
The main difference between army and ordnance officers was that it was 
possible for junior army officers to learn their trade under the supervision of 
more experienced officers in their regiment.  An ordnance officer would be 
expected to know his trade when they were appointed and may not have had 
immediate access to other officers to provide advice and guidance.  Generally 
the syllabus achieved this aim and the variances of knowledge in leaving the 
Academy were caused by the demands of the wars.  Whilst the system was 
based on cadets passing examinations before commissioning, the stateÕs 
demand for officers meant that examinations were suspended from 1794 to 
1811.  In difficult circumstances, the Governor of the Academy and his staff 
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tried to ensure that the cadets who were commissioned during this period still 
had sufficient knowledge to be able to carry out the basic functions of their role.  
In many cases the recently commissioned officers were placed in garrisons for 
a period to allow some practical experience to be gained.  The suspension of 
examinations is one of the commonest criticisms of the Royal Military Academy, 
but it should be remembered that these officers were still much better trained 
than a typical army officer.  It should also be noted that with the exception of 
Richard Fletcher all the well known Royal Engineer officers from this period 
passed through the Royal Military Academy when examinations had been 
suspended.2   
The syllabus at the Royal Military Academy had remained relatively static for 
many years when with hindsight it could be argued that there was some need 
for change.  The first half of the 18th century saw a reliance on European 
partners for providing specialist military engineering skills.  The second half of 
the 18th century saw Britain primarily involved in colonial type campaigns in 
America and India where the need for formal siege skills was limited.   The war 
in Europe presented new challenges, which the campaigns of 1793 and 1799 
highlighted.  The senior Royal Engineer officers had not been called upon to 
undertake major sieges and had limited practical experience of siege work. 
They were slow to appreciate the possible need for change.  This applied even 
more so to the need to provide trained artificers to support engineer officers in 
the field.  The criticism of the Board of Ordnance in this area has some 
justification, but it faced the same problem as the army in finding the funds to 
train and maintain such a body.  Up to 1811 the artificers had the sole purpose 
of maintaining static garrisons where there was a clear need and budget 
available.  Efforts had been underway since at least 1809 to change the nature 
of the artificers and the change in the structure of the Royal Military Artificers in 
mid 1811 predates WellingtonÕs complaints by nearly a year.  The performance 
of the Board of Ordnance should be contrasted with the performance of the 
Horse Guards in their attempts to introduce training and education in the army.  
The Royal Military College was nearly sixty years behind the Royal Military 
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Academy and it was another forty years before it was fully accepted as 
necessary.  
 
Criticism of the training and education did not come only from outside of the 
Ordnance department.  Several officers complained that the training they 
received did not prepare them for their duties.  These complaints were typically 
from those officers who came through in the period when demand was at its 
greatest, and reflect their concern about their capabilities.  The focus of these 
concerns was invariably on siege work.  It is difficult to see what the Board of 
Ordnance could have done at that time because it was under intense pressure 
to produce officers quickly.  In reality there were limited opportunities for officers 
to gain experience other than through the active operations.   One question to 
consider is whether the situation was different in the army.  There were similarly 
limited opportunities for officers to gain experience in operations on the 
European mainland.  Apart from the minor campaigns in 1806 and 1807 there 
were no opportunities prior to the outbreak of the Peninsular War.  Both groups 
were forced to learn the hard way. 
 
The officers involved in active operations in the early 19th century worked hard 
to improve the situation.  This included PasleyÕs tireless work in England to train 
artificers and subsequently to gain approval for the establishment of the School 
of Military Engineering.   In the field there was clear evidence of the officers 
helping each other. The new breed of engineer officer, recognised the need to 
improve their skills and in the absence of outside help, looked for ways 
themselves.  There is clear evidence of sharing of information both within the 
Royal Engineers and also with the Royal Staff Corps. 
 
In a wider context, there were educational articles published in the Royal 
Military Chronicle and after the war in the United Service Journal. There was a 
significant focus on engineering work both for static and field defences.  In 
comparison there was little published for the other functions, the infantry, 
cavalry or artillery. 
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The focus of many writers on education within the Board of Ordnance has been 
on the negative, the suspension of examinations, the poor discipline at the 
Academy, the perceived focus on theory rather than practical learning.  This 
has overshadowed the positives, which whilst not perfect, were producing 
officers with a grounding of education that could be used to build competent 
officers when combined with practical experience.  It is unrealistic to believe 
that practising siege work at Chatham would ever make an officer ready for the 
brutal realities of a real siege.  It should also be taken into account that Royal 
Artillery officers were following the same syllabus at Chatham and there were 
few complaints about their competence.  The main difference was that they 
were present in larger numbers which gave the junior officers more time to 
increase their experience. 
 
Did the training the engineers received make a difference?  The evidence 
suggests that it did.  The formation of the School of Military Engineering 
benefited both artificers and recently commissioned officers.  In addition, the 
results of seven years of continuous war meant that there were many officers 
with substantial military experience.   The final stages of the Napoleonic wars 
and the American campaign of 1814-15 show a much more effective military 
engineering organisation in place.  There is no doubt that in the Waterloo 
campaign, for the first time the British army had a proper military engineering 
establishment.   
 
One final comment on the professionalism and training of the Royal Engineer 
officer is that there were no engineer officers sent home from the Peninsula for 
poor performance.  There were no major complaints about their work.  This was 
a much better record than that in the army.   
 
OPERATIONS 
 
One thing that has become apparent during this research is how little 
understood are the role and activities of the Royal Engineers. Haythornthwaite 
wrote as recently as 1988 that they Ôtended to be consulted only on special 
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occasionsÕ.3  This is the common but mistaken view of the role of the Royal 
Engineers in the Peninsular War, which completely undervalues their 
contribution.  The analysis above describes the other work they did.  This 
includes the static and field based defensive work, the work on road and river 
communications, the surveying and reconnaissance work and their supporting 
work as unofficial staff officers.  This wider role has not been well understood 
and is where they made the major contribution to the Peninsular War.  Like the 
Royal Navy they provided often unseen support to WellingtonÕs campaigns.  
This support did make a significant contribution to the final success.  Three 
areas of activity that are typically ascribed to other groups are surveying,  
bridging work and field defences.  In each of these areas, the Royal Engineers 
played a larger role than has been previously thought.  Particularly in the area 
of bridging, the analysis demonstrates that the Royal Engineers performed most 
bridging work during the Peninsular War.  Although the formal responsibility for 
survey and reconnaissance work rested with the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs 
department, the journals, diaries and letters of the engineers show significant 
evidence of them being involved in this type of work.  There is also a consistent 
level of involvement through the war in constructing field works, which would 
normally have been attributed to the Royal Staff Corps.   
 
The comprehensive review of the sieges above shows a different picture from 
that normally found in history books. The typical complaints of poor decisions 
and poor execution by the engineers are not supported.  There are some 
common themes running through the sieges, which typically show limited time 
and limited resources as being the primary contributory factors to the failures.    
The limited number of Royal Engineer officers and artificers had an effect but 
were not the main cause of failures.  The criticism of the decisions made by the 
engineers appears to neglect the facts that invariably the senior army officers 
accepted the recommendations made.  Whilst it is easy to criticise decisions 
with the benefit of hindsight, the senior officers present at the time were not 
advocating the alternative suggestions put forward by the historians of the war.   
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 P. Haythornthwaite, WellingtonÕs Specialist Troops, p. 22. 
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One common theme which has not been addressed fully by any writer is the 
progressive degradation of discipline in the army.  The excesses after the 
assaults at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and San Sebastian along with the poor 
attitude displayed at Burgos do no credit to the British army.  With the 
indiscipline shown after the battle of Vitoria, there is evidence that the behaviour 
of the troops put Wellington in unnecessary positions of risk.  It is probable that 
had the French Governor at San Sebastian made a counter attack after the 
town was taken, the French would have successfully evicted the Allied army.  
The high casualties at the sieges were caused by two main reasons: the 
assaults being made before the defences had been sufficiently weakened, and 
the rash behaviour of troops following through attacks which served no 
purpose.4 
 
There is no doubt that Wellington and his senior commanders gained hugely 
from the education and intelligence of the Royal Engineer (and Royal Staff 
Corps) officers. Apart from their engineering responsibilities, their contribution 
included : 
− surveying and reconnaissance work; 
− work as unofficial ADCÕs in battle and as part of a generalÕs staff; 
− work as staff officers; 
− use as  messengers / emissaries particularly in the early part of the 
Peninsular War; 
− liaison officers with the Spanish armies; 
− providing engineering support to the Spanish armies; 
− language skills for communication with Spanish, Portuguese and French. 
 
The evidence shows that the superior education of the engineer officers made a 
difference to the outcome of the war and that their education whilst not perfect 
did continue to improve through the Napoleonic Wars and after.   The Royal 
Engineers contribution to the war needs re-evaluating by many writers.  The 
research suggests that the lack of trained army officers available for staff duties 
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 I am particularly thinking of the counter-attack on San Christoval during the first siege of 
Badajoz and the attack on the convent at the first siege of San Sebastian.  Wellington lost 
several hundred men for no purpose. 
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was masked by the availability of Ordnance officers (usually engineers) to carry 
out these roles in an unofficial capacity.  Their role has been consistently 
undervalued with them contributing more than has been previously understood.  
Consideration of the trust that Wellington placed in officers like Dickson, 
Burgoyne, Sturgeon and Jones to show that he greatly valued the contribution 
of the ÔScientific soldiersÕ although he never really accepted that the education 
should be completed before an officer received his first commission. 
 
The Napoleonic Wars were the first wars where the British army could field a 
number of officers who had received formal military training.  These officers 
from the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Staff Corps with a small 
number of trained staff officers in the Quarter-Master-GeneralÕs department 
made a significant contribution to the war effort.  The experiences of the 
Peninsular War convinced the Board of Ordnance that changes were needed in 
the training and education of officer and artificer and these had been 
implemented before the end of the war.  The Royal Engineer officers 
themselves recognised the need for improvements in their skills and the period 
following the Napoleonic wars saw the publication of many English language 
books and journals to encourage study in military engineering.   
 
Whilst it was still a small step the engineers who served in the Peninsula made 
a demonstrable improvement to the professionalism of the British army and one 
that would be built upon over the next forty years. 
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APPENDIX A Ð ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY SYLLABUS 1792. 
 
Source : WD Jones, Records of the Royal Military Academy. (Woolwich, 
1851).   
p. 45, Detail of Course studies, 11th Feb 1792  
 
The Lieut.-Governor transmitted the following detail of the course of studies, 
which a Gentleman Cadet is to go through, before he is reported fit for a 
public examination for a commission in the Royal Corps of Artillery and 
Engineers. 
 
FORTIFICATION 
 
1. The definitions and explanations of the works of both Regular and 
Irregular Fortification, correctly wrote and understood. 
2. The construction of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd systems of M. De Vauban, 
described on paper. 
3. The same of M. CoehornÕs system 
4. The same of M. de CormontaigneÕs system 
5. Irregular Fortifications described on paper. 
6. The Attack and Defence of Fortified places 
7. The art of Mining 
8. The elements of Field Fortification 
9. How to Trace on the ground, Permanent and Field Fortification, with 
and without mathematical instruments 
10. To take Plans with and without instruments 
11. Theory and practice of Levelling 
12. How to estimate the works of a Fortification, viz., Revetements, 
Ramparts, Ditches, Batardeaux, Powder Magazines, turned and 
groined arches 
13. To produce a fair copy of the book containing Calculations, Plans and 
Sections relative to the Estimates 
14. To produce a complete course of the above neatly drawn, containing 
the Plans, Sections and Geometrical Elevations, composed of 68 
plates. 
15. To produce the Field Book containing the practice on the ground, the 
Tracing of Works of Permanent and Field Fortification, Surveying and 
Levelling. 
 
Printed and manuscript books made use of in the above course 
 
− The Course of Fortification from M. Landmann, comprised in 68 
plates, 
− The estimates from M. LandmannÕs manuscripts, 
− Surveying and Tracing outworks on the ground, from M. LandmannÕs 
Manuscripts, 
− PleydellÕs Field Fortification. 
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ARTILLERY 
 
1. The definitions and explanations of the several parts of Artillery; also, 
tables containing the general dimensions and construction of Guns 
and Mortars, correctly wrote and understood 
2. The general construction of Brass and Iron Guns, Sea and Land 
Mortars and Howitzers, described on paper. 
3. The general construction of Ship and Garrison carriages, Travelling 
carriages, Land and Sea Mortar beds, described as above 
4. The same of the Iron Work for Ship, Garrison and Travelling carriages 
5. The different kinds of wood made use of for the several sorts of gun 
carriages and Mortar Beds 
6. How to find the weight of Guns, Mortars and Howitzers 
7. To find the quantity of powder which a chamber contains 
8. To find the diameter of Shot and Bores of guns 
9. To find the weight of Shot and Shells 
10. To find the number of Shot and Shells contained in a pile 
11. To ascertain the number of horses necessary to draw the different 
natures of Ordnance 
12. The number of men required to construct a Battery in one night 
13. To produce a complete course of the above neatly drawn, containing 
the plans, sections, and Geometrical Elevations, composed of 57 
plates. 
 
Printed and manuscript books made use of in the above course 
 
− The Course of Artillery from M. Landmann in 57 plates, 
− The Construction of Artillery from Major Bloomfield, Inspector of Royal 
Artillery, 
− Mullers Artillery. 
 
MATHEMATICS 
 
1. Arithmetic, in all its parts, 
2. Logarithms, their nature, use and construction, 
3. Geometry, the theory from EuclidÕs Elements 4 first books, 
4. Algebra, from the first elements, to the solution of cubic and higher 
equations 
5. Trigonometry, with heights and distances, 
6. Mensuration, in Superfices and Solids, in Theory and Practice, with 
Surveying and Measuring of Artificers works, Buildings, Timber, etc, 
7. Conic Sections, 
8. Mechanics, including motions equable and variable, Forces, Constant, 
variable and percussive, Gravity, Sound and distances, Inclined 
Planes, Projectiles, Practical Gunnery, Pendulums, Centers [sic] of 
Gravity, Percussion, Oscillation and Gyration, Ballistic Pendulum, &c, 
9. Fluxions, 
10. Hydrostatics and Hydraulics, including the pressure, motion, and 
issuing of Fluids, the filling and exhausting of Vessels, &c, Specific 
Gravities of Bodies, Syphons, Pumps and Diving Bells, &c., 
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11. Pneumatics, including the nature, properties, and effects of the Air 
and the Atmosphere, with the Air Pumps, Syringes, Condensing 
Engine, Thermometer, Barometer, with the method of measuring 
altitudes by the Barometer and Thermometer, 
12. Practical Exercises, concerning these and various other branches, as 
the weight and dimensions, and piling of shot and shells, bulk or 
capacities of various vessels or figures to contain certain weights of 
powder, distances by the motion of sound, Concerning the effects of 
variable and constant forces &c., 
13. Resistance of Fluids, as water, Air, &c, with their action on bodies in 
motion, &c., 
14. Gunnery, RobinÕs new principles of gunnery, Experiments, particularly 
with the ballistic pendulum. 
 
Printed and manuscript books made use of in the above course 
 
Books Ð Dr HuttonsÕs Arithmetic, Logarithms, Mensuration, Conic Sections 
and Select Exercises; Tracts; Mr RobinÕs Gunnery; the 1st volume of his 
works; Professor Simpsons (of Glasgow) Elements of Algebra; RossignalÕs 
Geometry; BonnycastleÕs Algebra; SimpsonÕs Algebra for Application to 
Geometry. 
 
The above course of mathematics is correctly wrote down by the Gentleman 
Cadets in their books, with Drawings, applicable to the several parts of it. 
 
DRAWING  
with the 2nd Drawing Master 
 
Figure Drawing, the several parts of the human figure, from drawing by the 
Master. 
Perspective, in Theory and Practice, 1st, Theory of Perspective, 2nd, Putting 
Planes in Perspective; 3rd, Elevations; 4th, Measures and Proportions of 
figures at different distances; 5th, Lights and Shadows; thus far with the 
Jesuits Perspective. 
 
with the 1st Drawing Master 
 
With Mr P Sandby, putting perspective in practice by copying from Drawings, 
which Qualifies them for Drawing from Nature, teaches them the effects of 
Light and Shade, and makes them acquaint also with Aerial Perspective; 
then to proceed to take views about Woolwich and other places, which 
teaches them at the same time to break ground, and forms the eye to the 
knowledge of it. 
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THE FRENCH LANGUAGE 
 
Grammar and Pronunciation,  thoroughly learned, and the practical 
application of it. 
Translation, from English into French, and from French into English, the 
translation wrote down and made correct. 
Exercises, particular exercises to be given them to perform in the language, 
chiefly on the subjects that have a military tendency. 
 
CHEMISTRY 
 
The Gentlemen Cadets generally attend two, and often three course of 
lectures in Chemistry, the theory and practice of it, they make notes during 
the Lectures, which are thirty-two in number, then they enter into fair books, 
which are given them for that purpose, and which are most copious on the 
heads relative to Artillery, as gun powder, the materials that compose it, 
metals, &c. 
 
The Gentlemen Cadets are also taught Fencing and Dancing, the exercises 
of small arms, and light field pieces. 
 
APPENDIX B Royal Engineer Operational Experience prior to the Peninsular War
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Holland 1793 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
West Indies 1794 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Corsica 1794 0 0 0 3
Capture of Cape 1795 0 1
Minorca 1798 0 0 2
Holland 1799 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Siege of Malta 1800 0 0 0 3
Egypt 1800/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Surinam 1804 0 1
Cape 1805 0  0 0 0 4
Weser 1805-6 0 0 0 3
Naples Bay 1805-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Egypt 1807 0 0 0 0 0 5
Copenhagen 1807 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Buenos Ayres 1806 0
Monte Video 1807 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Sweden 1808  0 0 2
Walcheren 1809 0 0 0  0 0 0  0  0 0  0  0  0  0 0  0 0  0  0 0  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 28
No of Operations 3 6 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1  
NOTE : Only contains engineers who were alive at the commencement of the Peninsular War in 1808
Total 69   
0 campaigns 0
1 campaign 44  
2 campaigns 15
3 campaigns 7
4 campaigns 1
5 campaigns 1
6 campaigns 1
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Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
Barou Richard John
Barry Philip
Birch James      
Birch John Francis 0 0 0 0 0
Blanshard Thomas
Bolton Daniel
Boothby Charles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Boteler Richard  0 0 0 0 0 0
Burgoyne John Fox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
By John
Chapman Stephen Remnant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cheyne Alexander 0 0 0 0
Collyer George (K)
Davy Henry (K) 0 0 0 0
De Salaberry Edward (K)
Dickens Thomas Mark
Dickenson Sebastian (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ellicombe Charles Grene
Elliot Theodore Henry
Elphinstone Howard  0 0
Elton Isaac Marmaduke
Emmett Anthony 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
English Frederick 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fanshaw Edward 0 0 0 0
Fletcher Richard (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Forster William Frederick (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fyers Edward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fyers Thomas 0 0 0 0
Gilbert Francis Yarde
Gipps George
Goldfinch Henry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grierson Crighton
Hamilton George (K) 0 0 0 0
Harding George Judd
1808 1809 1810
Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1808 1809 1810
Henderson George H
Holloway William Cuthbert 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hulme John Lyon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hunt Richard (K)
Hustler Robert Samuel 0 0 0
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham 0 0 0 0
Jones Harry David
Jones John Thomas 0 0 0 0 0      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jones Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Landmann George Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lascelles Thomas (K)
Lefebure Charles (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lewis Griffith George
Macaulay John Simcoe
MacCulloch William
Machell Lancelot (K)
Macleod George Francis
Marshall Anthony
Matson Edward
Melhuish Samuel Camplin
Melville David (K)
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse 0 0 0 0
Mudge Richard Zachary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mulcaster Edmund R (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nicholas William (K) 
Ord William Redman
Parker Edward (K)
Pasley Charles William 0 0 0 0
Patton Peter (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Piper Robert Sloper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt (K)
Power Robert
Pringle John Watson
Reid William 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhodes Charles Steech
Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1808 1809 1810
Rivers Charles
Robe Alexander Watt
Roberts Thomas
Ross George Charles (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Savage Henry John
Scott Richard Evans
Skelton Thomas (K)
Slade William Henry
Smith Charles Feli0
Smith Henry Nelson
Smith William Davies 0 0 0 0 0 0
Smyth James Carmichael 0 0 0 0
Squire John (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stanway Frank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tapp Hammond Astley 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thackeray Frederick Rennell
Thomson Alexander 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tinling George Vaughan
Trench Samuel (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vetch James
Victor James Conway
Ward William Cuthbert
Wells John Neave 0 0 0 0 0 0
West George Innes Perry
Williams John Archer (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wortham Hale Young
Wright Peter
York Frederick August 0 0 0 0
Total by month 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 18 19 26 24 24 25 4 10 15 15 16 16 15 15 14 14 14 14 14 21 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22
Annual average 19 14 21
Average length of time months)
Longest (months)
Note : This covers mainland and East coast campaigns, but does not include Engineers  in the Mediterranean, Cadiz and Gibraltar
(K) denotes killed in the Peninsula
Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Barou Richard John
Barry Philip
Birch James
Birch John Francis
Blanshard Thomas
Bolton Daniel
Boothby Charles
Boteler Richard
Burgoyne John Fox
By John
Chapman Stephen Remnant
Cheyne Alexander
Collyer George (K)
Davy Henry (K)
De Salaberry Edward (K)
Dickens Thomas Mark
Dickenson Sebastian (K)
Ellicombe Charles Grene
Elliot Theodore Henry
Elphinstone Howard
Elton Isaac Marmaduke
Emmett Anthony
English Frederick
Fanshaw Edward
Fletcher Richard (K) 
Forster William Frederick (K)
Fyers Edward
Fyers Thomas
Gilbert Francis Yarde
Gipps George
Goldfinch Henry
Grierson Crighton
Hamilton George (K)
Harding George Judd
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
     
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Name
Henderson George H
Holloway William Cuthbert
Hulme John Lyon
Hunt Richard (K)
Hustler Robert Samuel
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham
Jones Harry David
Jones John Thomas
Jones Rice
Landmann George Thomas
Lascelles Thomas (K)
Lefebure Charles (K)
Lewis Griffith George
Macaulay John Simcoe
MacCulloch William
Machell Lancelot (K)
Macleod George Francis
Marshall Anthony
Matson Edward
Melhuish Samuel Camplin
Melville David (K)
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse
Mudge Richard Zachary
Mulcaster Edmund R (K) 
Nicholas William (K) 
Ord William Redman
Parker Edward (K)
Pasley Charles William
Patton Peter (K)
Piper Robert Sloper
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt (K)
Power Robert
Pringle John Watson
Reid William
Rhodes Charles Steech
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1812 18131811
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Rivers Charles
Robe Alexander Watt
Roberts Thomas
Ross George Charles (K)
Savage Henry John
Scott Richard Evans
Skelton Thomas (K)
Slade William Henry
Smith Charles Feli0
Smith Henry Nelson
Smith William Davies
Smyth James Carmichael
Squire John (K)
Stanway Frank
Tapp Hammond Astley
Thackeray Frederick Rennell
Thomson Alexander
Tinling George Vaughan
Trench Samuel (K)
Vetch James
Victor James Conway
Ward William Cuthbert
Wells John Neave
West George Innes Perry
Williams John Archer (K)
Wortham Hale Young
Wright Peter
York Frederick August
Total by month
Annual average
Average length of time months)
Longest (months)
Note : This covers mainland and East coast campaigns, but does not include Engineers  in the Mediterranean, Cadiz and Gibraltar
(K) denotes killed in the Peninsula
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1812 18131811
0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 23 29 31 31 32 30 30 29 29 29 30 33 30 33 33 27 26 28 30 33 32 32 37 37 41 42 43 43 43 45 45 42 40 39 44
29 31 42
Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Barou Richard John
Barry Philip
Birch James
Birch John Francis
Blanshard Thomas
Bolton Daniel
Boothby Charles
Boteler Richard
Burgoyne John Fox
By John
Chapman Stephen Remnant
Cheyne Alexander
Collyer George (K)
Davy Henry (K)
De Salaberry Edward (K)
Dickens Thomas Mark
Dickenson Sebastian (K)
Ellicombe Charles Grene
Elliot Theodore Henry
Elphinstone Howard
Elton Isaac Marmaduke
Emmett Anthony
English Frederick
Fanshaw Edward
Fletcher Richard (K) 
Forster William Frederick (K)
Fyers Edward
Fyers Thomas
Gilbert Francis Yarde
Gipps George
Goldfinch Henry
Grierson Crighton
Hamilton George (K)
Harding George Judd
J F M A M J J A S O N D
TOTAL 
(months)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
12
0 0 0 0 16
5
0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
0 0 0 0 0 0 69
5
21
25
1
4
11
0 0 0 0 8
15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
26
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
0 0 0 0 0 0 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 48
0 0 0 0 0 0 13
4
56
31
7
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 19
0 0 0 0 0 0 38
0 0 0 0 0 58
0 0 0 0 10
4
0 0 0 0 0 24
1814
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Name
Henderson George H
Holloway William Cuthbert
Hulme John Lyon
Hunt Richard (K)
Hustler Robert Samuel
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham
Jones Harry David
Jones John Thomas
Jones Rice
Landmann George Thomas
Lascelles Thomas (K)
Lefebure Charles (K)
Lewis Griffith George
Macaulay John Simcoe
MacCulloch William
Machell Lancelot (K)
Macleod George Francis
Marshall Anthony
Matson Edward
Melhuish Samuel Camplin
Melville David (K)
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse
Mudge Richard Zachary
Mulcaster Edmund R (K) 
Nicholas William (K) 
Ord William Redman
Parker Edward (K)
Pasley Charles William
Patton Peter (K)
Piper Robert Sloper
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt (K)
Power Robert
Pringle John Watson
Reid William
Rhodes Charles Steech
J F M A M J J A S O N D
TOTAL 
(months)
1814
0 0 0 0 0 21
14
0 0 0 0 0 0 51
4
0 0 0 0 24
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 28
40
36
23
10
6
6
7
12
8
13
32
0 0 0 0 17
0 0 0 0 35
3
4
15
43
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  33
0 0 15
4
35
0 0 0 0 0 0 52
0 0 24
11
0 0 0 0 0 0 40
0 0 0 0 0 0 52
13
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Name
Rivers Charles
Robe Alexander Watt
Roberts Thomas
Ross George Charles (K)
Savage Henry John
Scott Richard Evans
Skelton Thomas (K)
Slade William Henry
Smith Charles Feli0
Smith Henry Nelson
Smith William Davies
Smyth James Carmichael
Squire John (K)
Stanway Frank
Tapp Hammond Astley
Thackeray Frederick Rennell
Thomson Alexander
Tinling George Vaughan
Trench Samuel (K)
Vetch James
Victor James Conway
Ward William Cuthbert
Wells John Neave
West George Innes Perry
Williams John Archer (K)
Wortham Hale Young
Wright Peter
York Frederick August
Total by month
Annual average
Average length of time months)
Longest (months)
Note : This covers mainland and East coast campaigns, but does not include Engineers  in the Mediterranean, Cadiz and Gibraltar
(K) denotes killed in the Peninsula
J F M A M J J A S O N D
TOTAL 
(months)
1814
0 0 0 0 0 0 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 7
0 0 0 27
30
0 0 0 0 0 0 6
0 0 0 0 21
13
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29
6
0 0 0 0 14
6
4
34
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73
0 0 0 0 0 0 52
0 0 0 20
39
0 0 0 0 0 0 7
16
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 17
15
0 0 0 0 0 0 20
0 0 0 0 0 18
51
0 0 0 0 0 0 11
0 0 0 0 0 0  40
4
43 43 43 41 33 29 8 5 2 0 0 0  
21
20.7
73.0
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APPENDIX D - PAY AND ALLOWANCES 
 
Source Ð Haldane H.  Official Letters written by Lieut-Col. Henry Haldane to 
the Masters-General of his MajestyÕs Ordnance since the year 1802. 
(London, 1807), p. 125. 
 
ÔWe have therefore thought proper, and do hereby direct, that the following 
Allowances of extra pay shall in future be granted to the officers of Our 
Corps of Royal Engineers, viz. . . . To each of Our Royal Engineers, who 
shall be employed with our armies in the field, or in any part of Our Foreign 
Dominions , Gibraltar excepted, an Allowance equal to the pay which, 
according to his Rank in Our Corps of Royal Engineers, he is entitled to 
receive on the establishment above ordered to take placeÕ. 
 
At Gibraltar, or the UK or Ireland, or the islands of Jersey, Guernsey or the 
Isle of Man, an allowance equal to half of his pay. 
 
On the coast of Africa, where a higher extra pay than usual has been 
commonly granted, and allowance of 20 shillings per day. 
 
Allowance start when an officer received his orders, subject to a certificate 
being signed saying that the officer Ôlost no timeÕ in proceeding to his station.  
Foreign allowance are paid until the officer returns to England.  Allowances 
are stopped when on leave of absence. 
 
Pay Rates 
 
 Royal Engineers 
1802 
Cavalry 1800 
(no change in 
1815) 
Infantry 1800 
(1815) 
2 Col-Comm 44s   
2 Colonel 24s 32s 10d 22s 6d 
2 Colonel 20s   
4 Lt-Colonel 17s 23s 13s 11d (17s) 
2 Lt-Colonel 15s   
20 Captains 10s 14s 7d 9s 5d (10s 6d) 
20 Capt-Lieut 7s   
40 1st Lieutenant 6s 9s 4s 8d (6s 6d) 
20 2nd Lieutenant 5s   
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APPENDIX E Ð ROYAL ENGINEER COMMISSIONS BY YEAR, 
1758-1822 
 
Year Still active Totals Year Still active Totals 
1758 1 8 1794 5 6 
1759 1 16 1795 3 5 
1760  4 1796 1 5 
1761  1 1797 4 9 
1762  3 1798 9 13 
1763 2 6 1799 4 5 
1765  3 1800 2 3 
1766  1 1801 13 13 
1769  2 1802 3 5 
1770  5 1803 6 6 
1771 3 6 1804 17 20 
1772  2 1805 6 7 
1773 1 1 1806 20 20 
1774  4 1807 13 14 
1775  3 1808 26 26 
1776 7 11 1809 18 18 
1777  1 1810 14 14 
1779 1 4 1811 19 18 
1780 2 6 1812 13 13 
1781 1 5 1813 24 24 
1783 0  1814 23 23 
1787 1 4 Total 279 391 
1788 2 2 1815  22 
1789 2 2 1816  23 
1790 2 5 1817  2 
1791  1 1820  1 
1792 1 3 1822  3 
1793 9 15    
 
NOTES 
1. Nearly 60% were commissioned between 1800-14. 
2. A  third of total were commissioned between 1808-14. 
3. The figures are from the actual Corps Returns in have been used 
4. ÔStill activeÕ means number who served during the Peninsular war. 
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APPENDIX F - TIME TAKEN TO REACH LIEUTENANT-COLONEL. 
   Avge 
(yrs) 
 RM 
(133) 
AM 
(145) 
GM 
(165) 
WT 
(168) 
JE 
(170) 
BF 
(180) 
CS 
(181)  
2L-1L 5.1 1.6 3.3 8.1 7.4 5.3 4.9 4.9  
1L-2C 7.7 3.7 8.8 5.9 7.7 8 9.5 10  
2C-C 8.2 12.6 8 8.5 7.3 7.7 6.7 6.6  
C-LC 6.6 7.3 8.4 8.3 6.3 5.7 4.8 5.1  
Total 27.5 25.2 28.5 30.8 28.7 26.7 25.9 26.6  
Age-LC  40  46e 46 49  41e  43e  45e  
Year LC  1783 1787 1793 1794 1794 1797 1798  
          
  Avge 
(yrs) 
 TN 
(183) 
WF 
(188) 
WJ 
(194) 
 WK 
(195) 
CH 
(197) 
 JH 
(199) 
RD 
(203) 
 GB 
(206) 
2L-1L 6.8 2.9 5.5 7 7 7 7 8.7 9.3 
1L-2C 8.6 7.9 7.9 7.3 9.3 10 10 8.8 7.5 
2C-C 4.5 6.4 6.6 6.4 3.6 2.9 2.8 3.7 3.5 
C-LC 7.7 4.6 6.7 7.7 8.6 8.6 9.3 8 8 
Total 27.6 21.8 26.7 28.4 28.5 28.5 29.1 29.2 28.3 
Age-LC   49?  45e  44e  46e 55  47e  47e  47e 
Year LC  1797 1800 1802 1804 1804 1805 1805 1805 
          
  Avge 
(yrs) 
STD 
(217) 
JM 
(218) 
RHB 
(223) 
JR 
(226) 
ADB 
(228) 
WF 
(229) 
AB 
(230) 
RP 
(231) 
2L-1L 5.9 9 8.7 8.4 4.7 4.3 4.5 3.8 3.5 
1L-2C 4.5 5.6 4 5.6 4.1 4.3 3.7 4.2 4.4 
2C-C 3.9 3.8 5.2 3.6 3.9 3.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 
C-LC 6.7 6.6 6.9 7 4.2 6 6.4 8.3 8.2 
Total 21.0 25 24.8 24.6 16.9 17.9 18.5 20.2 20 
Age-LC   43e 46 41  37e 36 37e 38e 44 
Year LC  1805 1805 1806 1806 1806 1807 1809 1809 
          
  Avge 
(yrs) 
RF 
(233) 
HE 
(235) 
GH 
(239) 
FWH 
(241) 
FWM 
(243) 
WG 
(244) 
CWR 
(248) 
HE 
(254) 
2L-1L 1.4 2.5 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 2.3 
1L-2C 5.1 4.5 5.5 4.9 4.7 4.8 5.6 6.1 4.4 
2C-C 3.8 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.9 4 3.4 4.2 3.9 
C-LC 8.1 8 7.7 7.8 8.8 8.6 8.4 7.6 8.1 
Total 18.4 18.7 18.9 17.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.9 18.7 
Age-LC  40 37 36 36 39 36e 37e 40 
Year LC  1809 1809 1810 1811 1811 1811 1812 1813 
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  Avge 
(yrs) 
 EWD 
(255) 
GW 
(256) 
FRT 
(258) 
HAM 
(259) 
JFB 
(260) 
SRC 
(261) 
JH 
(263) 
GN 
(264) 
2L-1L 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.2 
1L-2C 5.0 5 5 4.8 4.4 5.6 5.6 4.6 5 
2C-C 3.1 3.9 4.1 3.3 3.9 0.7 0.7 3.9 4.3 
C-LC 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 7.8 7.2 
Total 18.7 19.5 19.5 18.8 19.5 17.5 17.5 18.7 18.7 
Age-LC  39 38 39e 39 38 37 34e 34e 
Year LC  1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 
          
  Avge 
(yrs) 
JCS 
(265) 
GL 
(266) 
CM 
(271) 
GW 
(278) 
JH 
(280) 
CWP 
(283) 
HG 
(285) 
JRA 
(287) 
2L-1L 1.8 2 2.1 2.5 0.9 1.5 1.3 2 2 
1L-2C 5.2 5.3 5.1 4.3 5.7 5.8 5.5 4.8 4.8 
2C-C 3.3 4 4 3.7 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 
C-LC 7.4 7.3 7.8 8.3 7.4 7.1 7 7 7 
Total 17.6 18.6 19 18.8 17.3 17.7 16.4 16.5 16.6 
Age-LC  34e 34 36  35e  35e 34 33 33 
Year LC  1813 1814 1814 1814 1814 1814 1814 1814 
          
  Avge 
(yrs) 
JFB 
(288) 
BM 
(289) 
JTJ 
(290) 
GC 
(292) 
WG 
(293) 
JB 
(298) 
TF 
(300) 
HMV 
(302) 
2L-1L 1.7 2 2 2 2.3 2.3 1.3 0.9 0.8 
1L-2C 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.5 4 3.9 3.9 4.4 5.3 
2C-C 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.6 3.8 
C-LC 10.0 5.5 6.5 7.5 7.5 7.7 15.5 14.9 14.8 
Total 20.4 16.5 17.5 18.3 18.1 18.2 25 24.8 24.7 
Age-LC  32 35e 33 36e 37e 45 45e 52 
Year LC  1814 1815 1816 1816 1817 1824 1825 1825 
 
NOTE 1. Column references are officers initials and the Roll reference in Connolly & 
Edwards Roll of the Royal Engineers. 
NOTE 2. There were no appointments to LC between Feb 1817 and Dec 1824.  19 
were appointed in the next year (as part of the clear up of ranks).  The average time 
gradually increased from 25 years to 35 years for the last commissions during the 
Napoleonic wars. 
NOTE 3. Same for Captains.  No appointments between 1817 and 1825.  Then 25 
were appointed in 1825, with a further 2 in 1826. 
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As a comparison : 
 
Time to reach Lieut.-Colonel in the Army (years) 
 
 Horse Foot 
1773 19.0 29 
1777 25.0 30 
1785 28.5 26.5 
1789 27.5 23 
1791 28.0 30 
 
Taken from J.A.Houlding , Fit for service. The training of the British Army, (Oxford, 
1981). 
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 Appendix G - Royal Engineers by Name. 
 
 Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Abbey Charles 01/02/1810 432 
Alderson Ralph Carr 14/12/1811 463 
Alexander Charles Carson 20/07/1813 496 
Arnold James Robertson 29/08/1798 287 
Baddeley Frederick Henry 01/01/1814 509 
Barney George 11/07/1808 402 
Barou Richard John 01/06/1810 441 
Barry Philip 10/02/1809 417 
Battersbee Thomas 20/03/1813 480 
Beague Charles Heard 01/08/1814 515 
Bennett William 20/12/1798 294 
Berrington Charles 07/10/1806 366 
Birch James 12/07/1809 424 
Birch John Francis 18/09/1793 260 
Biscoe Vincent Joseph 01/08/1814 520 
Blackiston Thomas Henry 01/08/1814 514 
Blanshard Thomas 28/09/1807 386 
Boldero Henry G 01/08/1814 517 
Bolton Daniel 14/12/1811 459 
Bonnycastle Richard Henry 28/09/1808 407 
Boothby Charles 01/01/1804 331 
Boteler Richard 01/01/1804 334 
Brandreth Henry R 20/03/1813 486 
Bridges George 01/12/1776 206 
Briscoe Henry 20/07/1813 494 
Brown Alexander 01/02/1808 389 
Bruyeres Ralph Henry 22/12/1781 223 
Bryce Alexander 12/03/1789 230 
Buchanan Gilbert 01/07/1801 305 
Buckeridge Henry Mark 01/01/1814 504 
Bugden Thomas 01/08/1814 518 
Burgoyne John Fox 29/08/1798 288 
Burt Charles 01/08/1814 512 
By John 20/12/1799 298 
Calder Patrick Doull 01/08/1806 361 
Cardew George 20/12/1798 292 
Cardew Henry 01/10/1808 408 
Catty James Patrick 01/07/1812 471 
Chapman Stephen Remnant 01/01/1794 261 
Cheyne Alexander 01/05/1806 360 
Clavering Rawdon Forbes 01/08/1814 521 
Colby Henry Augustus 12/07/1808 403 
Colby Thomas Frederick 21/12/1801 314 
Cole Pennel 01/02/1810 433 
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 Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Collyer George 01/11/1806 368 
Cooper Robert Henry Spencer 20/03/1813 481 
Covey Edward 20/03/1813 493 
Cox William N 21/07/1813 483 
Cunningham Thomas 02/07/1801 311 
Dalton George 01/01/1814 511 
D'Arcy Robert 17/01/1776 203 
Davy Henry 01/11/1807 387 
Dawson William Francis 01/04/1807 375 
De Butts Augustus 11/07/1788 228 
De Salaberry Edward 27/07/1810 442 
Dickens Samuel Trevor 15/03/1780 217 
Dickens Thomas Mark 15/03/1803 323 
Dickenson Sebastian 01/10/1804 344 
Dixon Charles 01/09/1806 363 
Dixon Matthew Charles 02/04/1806 359 
Douglas William 01/07/1801 310 
Duplat Gustavus Charles 01/08/1814 516 
Durnford Elias Walker 17/10/1793 255 
Duvernet William Henry 01/02/1810 434 
Ellicombe Charles Grene 01/07/1801 306 
Elliot Francis Edward 01/08/1814 523 
Elliot Theodore Henry 07/05/1810 437 
Elphinstone Howard 17/10/1793 254 
Elton Isaac Marmaduke 14/12/1811 453 
Emmett Anthony 16/12/1808 391 
English Frederick 08/09/1807 384 
Evatt Henry 01/07/1790 235 
Evelegh John 01/04/1771 170 
Eyre James William 01/07/1812 475 
Fanshaw Edward 01/07/1801 307 
Faris William 01/01/1814 506 
Fenwick Thomas Howard 21/07/1810 444 
Fenwick William 12/07/1788 229 
Figg Edward 21/12/1801 313 
Fisher Benjamin 17/01/1776 180 
Fletcher Richard 29/06/1790 233 
Ford William Henry 16/01/1793 241 
Forster William Frederick 21/07/1807 381 
Fraser Alexander 02/07/1804 343 
Fyers Edward 23/04/1808 396 
Fyers Thomas 02/05/1800 300 
Fyers William 11/11/1773 188 
Gilbert Francis Yarde 01/05/1811 450 
Gipps George 11/01/1809 416 
Goldfinch Henry 24/06/1798 285 
Gordon James A 11/07/1808 401 
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 Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Gosset William Matthew 14/12/1811 454 
Gossett William 20/12/1798 293 
Graham Charles 01/01/1797 275 
Grant John 20/12/1806 373 
Gravatt William 16/01/1793 244 
Graydon George 01/06/1804 341 
Gregory William 20/07/1813 495 
Grierson Crighton 01/06/1810 440 
Haigh William Preston 11/07/1808 399 
Halberton Richard Rosdew 10/05/1805 348 
Hall Louis Alexander 21/07/1810 445 
Hamilton George 07/05/1803 325 
Handfield John 09/10/1794 263 
Harding George Judd 01/10/1802 319 
Harper John 10/11/1806 369 
Harris John Brenchley 07/10/1806 365 
Hassard John 03/03/1797 280 
Hayter George 21/11/1792 239 
Hayter Thomas Baskerville 14/12/1811 462 
Head Francis Bond 01/05/1811 448 
Heath Macclesfield William 01/08/1814 519 
Henderson Alexander 20/03/1813 479 
Henderson George H 20/12/1799 299 
Henryson John 02/04/1806 357 
Hobbs Henry 01/01/1804 327 
Hobbs John 01/01/1804 328 
Holloway Charles 16/01/1776 197 
Holloway William Cuthbert 01/01/1804 333 
Hoste George Charles 20/12/1802 320 
Hughes Philip 25/09/1793 253 
Hulme John Lyon 24/06/1809 422 
Humfrey John 17/01/1776 199 
Hunt Richard 01/10/1808 411 
Hunt Robert 01/07/1812 468 
Hustler Robert Samuel 01/03/1806 355 
Hutchinson Thomas  15/01/1808 388 
Kitchingham   
Jebb Joshua 01/07/1812 476 
Johnston William 17/01/1776 194 
Jones Harry David 17/06/1808 406 
Jones John Thomas 30/08/1798 290 
Jones Rice 01/02/1806 354 
Jones William Herbert 06/04/1808 394 
Kay Arthur 20/07/1813 498 
Kelsall Roger 12/07/1809 426 
Kerr John 20/07/1813 492 
Kersteman William 17/01/1776 195 
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 Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Kilvington Henry Medley 01/07/1801 304 
Kitson John Sykes 01/02/1810 435 
Lancey Thomas Furbor 14/12/1811 456 
Landmann George Thomas 01/05/1795 266 
Lascelles Thomas 05/05/1807 377 
Lawson Hugh 01/08/1806 362 
Lefebure Charles 25/09/1793 252 
Lewis George Charles Degen 01/08/1814 513 
Lewis Griffith George 15/03/1803 322 
Lewis Thomas Locke 20/03/1813 487 
Longley Joseph 11/07/1808 400 
Luxmoore Thomas Coryndon 01/01/1814 503 
Macaulay John Simcoe 12/07/1809 425 
MacCulloch William 01/08/1805 349 
Machell Lancelot 21/07/1810 443 
Mackelcan John 15/03/1780 218 
Mackenzie Colin 20/07/1813 501 
Macleod George Francis 01/07/1801 308 
Mann Cornelius 05/02/1796 271 
Mann Gother 27/02/1763 165 
Marlow Benjamin 30/08/1798 289 
Marshall Anthony 01/10/1808 409 
Matson Edward 07/05/1810 438 
M'Donald Donald 12/09/1808 404 
Melhuish Samuel Camplin 25/04/1809 420 
Melville David 12/07/1809 427 
Mercer Alexander 17/03/1759 145 
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse 01/03/1805 342 
Minchin Charles Humphrey 01/01/1814 505 
M'Lauchlan James 01/11/1803 326 
Moody Thomas 01/04/1806 356 
Morse Robert 08/02/1758 133 
Morshead Henry Anderson 01/01/1794 259 
Mudge John 20/03/1813 489 
Mudge Richard Zachary 04/05/1807 376 
Mulcaster Edmund R 01/03/1804 337 
Mulcaster Frederick William 16/01/1793 243 
Nepean Thomas 01/04/1771 183 
Nicholas William 21/12/1801 312 
Nicolls Gustavus 04/01/1795 264 
Oldfield John 02/04/1806 358 
Ord William Redman 25/04/1809 421 
Page George Curry 20/07/1813 499 
Parker Edward 01/01/1804 332 
Pasley Charles William 01/04/1798 283 
Patten Edward Bullock 01/01/1814 508 
Patton Peter 01/04/1799 295 
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 Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Payne William Robert 01/04/1804 340 
Peake Loyalty 16/02/1808 390 
Phillpotts George 01/05/1811 449 
Phipps George William 21/04/1779 211 
Pilkington George 01/04/1805 347 
Pilkington Robert 05/06/1789 231 
Piper Robert Sloper 10/01/1809 414 
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt 21/09/1807 385 
Portlock Joseph Ellison 20/07/1813 491 
Power Robert 10/01/1809 415 
Prince Charles Edward 07/10/1809 431 
Pringle John Watson 23/08/1809 428 
Rawlinson Lawrence Rawstone 22/03/1808 393 
Reid William 10/02/1809 419 
Renny Henry Laws 20/07/1813 490 
Rhodes Charles Steech 01/07/1801 303 
Rivers Charles 01/07/1812 467 
Robe Alexander Watt 14/12/1811 461 
Roberts Thomas 02/11/1804 346 
Robertson Charles 21/03/1808 392 
Rogers William 01/01/1814 510 
Romilly Samuel 01/04/1804 339 
Ross George Charles 01/07/1799 297 
Ross John C 12/09/1808 405 
Rowley John 23/08/1787 226 
Rudyerd Charles William 14/06/1793 248 
Rutherford James Hunter 20/07/1813 497 
Salkeld William James 01/01/1814 507 
Sanders Christopher Knight 01/01/1814 502 
Sandham Henry 20/07/1813 500 
Savage Henry John 30/09/1809 429 
Scott Richard Evans 22/02/1811 446 
Selwyn Charles Jasper 01/05/1811 452 
Shipley Charles 01/04/1771 181 
Shipley Robert John 09/12/1806 371 
Skelton Thomas 01/10/1808 412 
Skene Philip Orkney 14/12/1811 455 
Slade William Henry 01/11/1806 367 
Smart Henry 15/03/1803 324 
Smith Charles Felix 01/10/1802 318 
Smith Henry Nelson 01/03/1810 436 
Smith John Marke Frederick 01/12/1805 353 
Smith Robert 21/12/1801 315 
Smith William Davies 10/08/1807 383 
Smyth James Carmichael 13/03/1795 265 
Smyth John 01/07/1812 477 
Sperling John 14/12/1811 457 
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 Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Squire John 01/01/1797 273 
Stanway Frank 01/06/1807 378 
Stewart Matthew 01/03/1804 338 
Stocker Ives 14/12/1811 464 
Streatfield Charles Ogle 20/03/1813 488 
Tait George 20/03/1813 485 
Tapp Hammond Astley 10/02/1809 418 
Thackeray Frederick Rennell 01/01/1794 258 
Thompson Arthur 01/05/1811 451 
Thompson George Forbes 01/10/1808 413 
Thomson Alexander 12/04/1808 395 
Thomson Francis Ringler 01/07/1812 469 
Thomson Robert 01/11/1804 345 
Tinling George Vaughan 01/07/1812 473 
Trench Samuel 10/05/1808 398 
Tweed James Thomas 01/08/1814 524 
Twiss William 01/11/1763 168 
Tylden William Burton 19/11/1806 370 
Vavasour Henry William 01/02/1804 336 
Vetch James 01/07/1807 379 
Vicars Richard John 20/03/1813 484 
Victor James Conway 01/06/1810 439 
Vigoureux Henry Mordaunt Gage 01/07/1800 302 
Wade Peter 01/07/1801 309 
Walker Archibald 21/07/1807 380 
Walpole Arthur 20/03/1813 482 
Ward William Cuthbert 10/05/1808 397 
Waters Marcus Antonius 30/09/1809 430 
Watson George 07/10/1806 364 
Watson George O 01/10/1808 410 
Wells John Neave 20/12/1806 372 
West George Innes Perry 01/05/1812 465 
Whinyates Frederick William 14/12/1811 460 
White Andrew Douglas 01/07/1812 474 
Whitmore George 01/01/1794 256 
Williams John Archer 01/01/1804 330 
Williams Montgomery 24/03/1815 525 
Williams Sherburne Hodgkinson 21/07/1807 382 
Willson Henry Hill 20/03/1813 478 
Worsley James White 01/07/1812 472 
Wortham Hale Young 01/07/1812 470 
Wright Charles 01/07/1812 466 
Wright George 27/09/1797 278 
Wright John Ross 01/03/1803 321 
Wright Peter 24/06/1809 423 
Wulff Henry Powell 01/08/1814 522 
York Frederick August 01/09/1805 350 
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 Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Young Richard Sparkman 14/12/1811 458 
Yule Patrick 01/05/1811 447 
 
NOTE : C&E reference is the position of the officer in Connolly and Edwards 
Roll of Officers in the Royal Engineers. 
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 Appendix H - Seniority in Royal Engineers 1808-1815 
 
Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Morse Robert 08/02/1758 133 
Mercer Alexander 17/03/1759 145 
Mann Gother 27/02/1763 165 
Twiss William 01/11/1763 168 
Evelegh John 01/04/1771 170 
Fisher Benjamin 17/01/1776 180 
Shipley Charles 01/04/1771 181 
Nepean Thomas 01/04/1771 183 
Fyers William 11/11/1773 188 
Johnston William 17/01/1776 194 
Kersteman William 17/01/1776 195 
Holloway Charles 16/01/1776 197 
Humfrey John 17/01/1776 199 
D'Arcy Robert 17/01/1776 203 
Bridges George 01/12/1776 206 
Phipps George William 21/04/1779 211 
Dickens Samuel Trevor 15/03/1780 217 
Mackelcan John 15/03/1780 218 
Bruyeres Ralph Henry 22/12/1781 223 
Rowley John 23/08/1787 226 
De Butts Augustus 11/07/1788 228 
Fenwick William 12/07/1788 229 
Bryce Alexander 12/03/1789 230 
Pilkington Robert 05/06/1789 231 
Fletcher Richard 29/06/1790 233 
Evatt Henry 01/07/1790 235 
Hayter George 21/11/1792 239 
Ford William Henry 16/01/1793 241 
Mulcaster Frederick William 16/01/1793 243 
Gravatt William 16/01/1793 244 
Rudyerd Charles William 14/06/1793 248 
Lefebure Charles 25/09/1793 252 
Hughes Philip 25/09/1793 253 
Elphinstone Howard 17/10/1793 254 
Durnford Elias Walker 17/10/1793 255 
Whitmore George 01/01/1794 256 
Thackeray Frederick Rennell 01/01/1794 258 
Morshead Henry Anderson 01/01/1794 259 
Birch John Francis 18/09/1793 260 
Chapman Stephen Remnant 01/01/1794 261 
Handfield John 09/10/1794 263 
Nicolls Gustavus 04/01/1795 264 
Smyth James Carmichael 13/03/1795 265 
Landmann George Thomas 01/05/1795 266 
Mann Cornelius 05/02/1796 271 
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Squire John 01/01/1797 273 
Graham Charles 01/01/1797 275 
Wright George 27/09/1797 278 
Hassard John 03/03/1797 280 
Pasley Charles William 01/04/1798 283 
Goldfinch Henry 24/06/1798 285 
Arnold James Robertson 29/08/1798 287 
Burgoyne John Fox 29/08/1798 288 
Marlow Benjamin 30/08/1798 289 
Jones John Thomas 30/08/1798 290 
Cardew George 20/12/1798 292 
Gossett William 20/12/1798 293 
Bennett William 20/12/1798 294 
Patton Peter 01/04/1799 295 
Ross George Charles 01/07/1799 297 
By John 20/12/1799 298 
Henderson George H 20/12/1799 299 
Fyers Thomas 02/05/1800 300 
Vigoureux Henry Mordaunt Gage 01/07/1800 302 
Rhodes Charles Steech 01/07/1801 303 
Kilvington Henry Medley 01/07/1801 304 
Buchanan Gilbert 01/07/1801 305 
Ellicombe Charles Grene 01/07/1801 306 
Fanshaw Edward 01/07/1801 307 
Macleod George Francis 01/07/1801 308 
Wade Peter 01/07/1801 309 
Douglas William 01/07/1801 310 
Cunningham Thomas 02/07/1801 311 
Nicholas William 21/12/1801 312 
Figg Edward 21/12/1801 313 
Colby Thomas Frederick 21/12/1801 314 
Smith Robert 21/12/1801 315 
Smith Charles Felix 01/10/1802 318 
Harding George Judd 01/10/1802 319 
Hoste George Charles 20/12/1802 320 
Wright John Ross 01/03/1803 321 
Lewis Griffith George 15/03/1803 322 
Dickens Thomas Mark 15/03/1803 323 
Smart Henry 15/03/1803 324 
Hamilton George 07/05/1803 325 
M'Lauchlan James 01/11/1803 326 
Hobbs Henry 01/01/1804 327 
Hobbs John 01/01/1804 328 
Williams John Archer 01/01/1804 330 
Boothby Charles 01/01/1804 331 
Parker Edward 01/01/1804 332 
Holloway William Cuthbert 01/01/1804 333 
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Boteler Richard 01/01/1804 334 
Vavasour Henry William 01/02/1804 336 
Mulcaster Edmund R 01/03/1804 337 
Stewart Matthew 01/03/1804 338 
Romilly Samuel 01/04/1804 339 
Payne William Robert 01/04/1804 340 
Graydon George 01/06/1804 341 
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse 01/03/1805 342 
Fraser Alexander 02/07/1804 343 
Dickenson Sebastian 01/10/1804 344 
Thomson Robert 01/11/1804 345 
Roberts Thomas 02/11/1804 346 
Pilkington George 01/04/1805 347 
Halberton Richard Rosdew 10/05/1805 348 
MacCulloch William 01/08/1805 349 
York Frederick August 01/09/1805 350 
Smith John Marke Frederick 01/12/1805 353 
Jones Rice 01/02/1806 354 
Hustler Robert Samuel 01/03/1806 355 
Moody Thomas 01/04/1806 356 
Henryson John 02/04/1806 357 
Oldfield John 02/04/1806 358 
Dixon Matthew Charles 02/04/1806 359 
Cheyne Alexander 01/05/1806 360 
Calder Patrick Doull 01/08/1806 361 
Lawson Hugh 01/08/1806 362 
Dixon Charles 01/09/1806 363 
Watson George 07/10/1806 364 
Harris John Brenchley 07/10/1806 365 
Berrington Charles 07/10/1806 366 
Slade William Henry 01/11/1806 367 
Collyer George 01/11/1806 368 
Harper John 10/11/1806 369 
Tylden William Burton 19/11/1806 370 
Shipley Robert John 09/12/1806 371 
Wells John Neave 20/12/1806 372 
Grant John 20/12/1806 373 
Dawson William Francis 01/04/1807 375 
Mudge Richard Zachary 04/05/1807 376 
Lascelles Thomas 05/05/1807 377 
Stanway Frank 01/06/1807 378 
Vetch James 01/07/1807 379 
Walker Archibald 21/07/1807 380 
Forster William Frederick 21/07/1807 381 
Williams Sherburne Hodgkinson 21/07/1807 382 
Smith William Davies 10/08/1807 383 
English Frederick 08/09/1807 384 
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Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt 21/09/1807 385 
Blanshard Thomas 28/09/1807 386 
Davy Henry 01/11/1807 387 
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham 15/01/1808 388 
Brown Alexander 01/02/1808 389 
Peake Loyalty 16/02/1808 390 
Emmett Anthony 16/12/1808 391 
Robertson Charles 21/03/1808 392 
Rawlinson Lawrence Rawstone 22/03/1808 393 
Jones William Herbert 06/04/1808 394 
Thomson Alexander 12/04/1808 395 
Fyers Edward 23/04/1808 396 
Ward William Cuthbert 10/05/1808 397 
Trench Samuel 10/05/1808 398 
Haigh William Preston 11/07/1808 399 
Longley Joseph 11/07/1808 400 
Gordon James A 11/07/1808 401 
Barney George 11/07/1808 402 
Colby Henry Augustus 12/07/1808 403 
M'Donald Donald 12/09/1808 404 
Ross John C 12/09/1808 405 
Jones Harry David 17/06/1808 406 
Bonnycastle Richard Henry 28/09/1808 407 
Cardew Henry 01/10/1808 408 
Marshall Anthony 01/10/1808 409 
Watson George O 01/10/1808 410 
Hunt Richard 01/10/1808 411 
Skelton Thomas 01/10/1808 412 
Thompson George Forbes 01/10/1808 413 
Piper Robert Sloper 10/01/1809 414 
Power Robert 10/01/1809 415 
Gipps George 11/01/1809 416 
Barry Philip 10/02/1809 417 
Tapp Hammond Astley 10/02/1809 418 
Reid William 10/02/1809 419 
Melhuish Samuel Camplin 25/04/1809 420 
Ord William Redman 25/04/1809 421 
Hulme John Lyon 24/06/1809 422 
Wright Peter 24/06/1809 423 
Birch James 12/07/1809 424 
Macaulay John Simcoe 12/07/1809 425 
Kelsall Roger 12/07/1809 426 
Melville David 12/07/1809 427 
Pringle John Watson 23/08/1809 428 
Savage Henry John 30/09/1809 429 
Waters Marcus Antonius 30/09/1809 430 
Prince Charles Edward 07/10/1809 431 
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Abbey Charles 01/02/1810 432 
Cole Pennel 01/02/1810 433 
Duvernet William Henry 01/02/1810 434 
Kitson John Sykes 01/02/1810 435 
Smith Henry Nelson 01/03/1810 436 
Elliot Theodore Henry 07/05/1810 437 
Matson Edward 07/05/1810 438 
Victor James Conway 01/06/1810 439 
Grierson Crighton 01/06/1810 440 
Barou Richard John 01/06/1810 441 
De Salaberry Edward 27/07/1810 442 
Machell Lancelot 21/07/1810 443 
Fenwick Thomas Howard 21/07/1810 444 
Hall Louis Alexander 21/07/1810 445 
Scott Richard Evans 22/02/1811 446 
Yule Patrick 01/05/1811 447 
Head Francis Bond 01/05/1811 448 
Phillpotts George 01/05/1811 449 
Gilbert Francis Yarde 01/05/1811 450 
Thompson Arthur 01/05/1811 451 
Selwyn Charles Jasper 01/05/1811 452 
Elton Isaac Marmaduke 14/12/1811 453 
Gosset William Matthew 14/12/1811 454 
Skene Philip Orkney 14/12/1811 455 
Lancey Thomas Furbor 14/12/1811 456 
Sperling John 14/12/1811 457 
Young Richard Sparkman 14/12/1811 458 
Bolton Daniel 14/12/1811 459 
Whinyates Frederick William 14/12/1811 460 
Robe Alexander Watt 14/12/1811 461 
Hayter Thomas Baskerville 14/12/1811 462 
Alderson Ralph Carr 14/12/1811 463 
Stocker Ives 14/12/1811 464 
West George Innes Perry 01/05/1812 465 
Wright Charles 01/07/1812 466 
Rivers Charles 01/07/1812 467 
Hunt Robert 01/07/1812 468 
Thomson Francis Ringler 01/07/1812 469 
Wortham Hale Young 01/07/1812 470 
Catty James Patrick 01/07/1812 471 
Worsley James White 01/07/1812 472 
Tinling George Vaughan 01/07/1812 473 
White Andrew Douglas 01/07/1812 474 
Eyre James William 01/07/1812 475 
Jebb Joshua 01/07/1812 476 
Smyth John 01/07/1812 477 
Willson Henry Hill 20/03/1813 478 
Appendix H - Seniority in Royal Engineers 1808-1815 
  289
Name Commissioned C&E Ref 
Henderson Alexander 20/03/1813 479 
Battersbee Thomas 20/03/1813 480 
Cooper Robert Henry Spencer 20/03/1813 481 
Walpole Arthur 20/03/1813 482 
Cox William N 21/07/1813 483 
Vicars Richard John 20/03/1813 484 
Tait George 20/03/1813 485 
Brandreth Henry R 20/03/1813 486 
Lewis Thomas Locke 20/03/1813 487 
Streatfield Charles Ogle 20/03/1813 488 
Mudge John 20/03/1813 489 
Renny Henry Laws 20/07/1813 490 
Portlock Joseph Ellison 20/07/1813 491 
Kerr John 20/07/1813 492 
Covey Edward 20/03/1813 493 
Briscoe Henry 20/07/1813 494 
Gregory William 20/07/1813 495 
Alexander Charles Carson 20/07/1813 496 
Rutherford James Hunter 20/07/1813 497 
Kay Arthur 20/07/1813 498 
Page George Curry 20/07/1813 499 
Sandham Henry 20/07/1813 500 
Mackenzie Colin 20/07/1813 501 
Sanders Christopher Knight 01/01/1814 502 
Luxmoore Thomas Coryndon 01/01/1814 503 
Buckeridge Henry Mark 01/01/1814 504 
Minchin Charles Humphrey 01/01/1814 505 
Faris William 01/01/1814 506 
Salkeld William James 01/01/1814 507 
Patten Edward Bullock 01/01/1814 508 
Baddeley Frederick Henry 01/01/1814 509 
Rogers William 01/01/1814 510 
Dalton George 01/01/1814 511 
Burt Charles 01/08/1814 512 
Lewis George Charles Degen 01/08/1814 513 
Blackiston Thomas Henry 01/08/1814 514 
Beague Charles Heard 01/08/1814 515 
Duplat Gustavus Charles 01/08/1814 516 
Boldero Henry G 01/08/1814 517 
Bugden Thomas 01/08/1814 518 
Heath Macclesfield William 01/08/1814 519 
Biscoe Vincent Joseph 01/08/1814 520 
Clavering Rawdon Forbes 01/08/1814 521 
Wulff Henry Powell 01/08/1814 522 
Elliot Francis Edward 01/08/1814 523 
Tweed James Thomas 01/08/1814 524 
Williams Montgomery 24/03/1815 525 
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APPENDIX I - KEY ENGINEER OFFICERS DURING THE PERIOD 
1808-1815 
 
Name Involvement 
Burgoyne, John Present for most of the war.  Trusted by 
Wellington.  Present at most of the sieges 
during the war, commanding at the siege of 
Burgos in 1812.  Commanded the engineers in 
the America campaign of 1814-15. 
Chapman, Stephen Took initial command of building of Lines of 
Torres Vedras.  Went home in 1811 to take up 
position as Secretary to the Master General of 
Ordnance.   He was a friend of  Henry Torrens 
and was liked by Wellington. 
Chatham, Earl of Master General of Ordnance, 1807-1810 
Dickson, Alexander Organised much of the artillery for the sieges.  
Given command of the artillery in 1813, even 
though he was not most senior artillery officer.  
Trusted by Wellington.  
Elphinstone, Howard Commanded briefly at the start of the 
campaign before being wounded at the battle 
of Vimiero.  Took command when Fletcher 
killed in 1813 
Fletcher, Richard Commanded the Royal Engineers from August 
1808 until he was killed in August 1813. 
Fyers William Deputy Inspector General of Fortifications 
Handfield, John 
 
Brigade Major for Royal Engineers Ð based at 
headquarters 
Jones, John Thomas In Peninsula until being wounded at Burgos in 
1812. Took over final stages of the 
construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras after 
Chapman left.  Author of definitive journal of 
the sieges.  Engineer Brigade Major for much 
of the war. 
Mann, Gother Inspector General of Fortifications from 1811-
1830 
Morse, Robert Inspector General of Fortifications from 1801-
1811 
Mulgrave, Earl of Master General of Ordnance, 1810-1819 
Nepean, Thomas 
 
Secretary to the Master General of Ordnance 
up to 1811 
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Pasley, Charles Served in Corunna campaign before being 
wounded at Walcheren.  Highly critical of the 
organisation of the Board of Ordnance. Pushed 
for establishment of the School of Military 
Engineering and was its first commander.  Kept 
up regular correspondence with officers on 
campaign. 
Rowley, John Secretary to the Inspector General of 
Fortifications 
Squire, John Present from 1810 until he died in May 1812.  
Commanded at the siege of Olivenza, present 
at all other sieges until his death.  Wrote many 
letters home which give an insight into the 
activities and feelings of the engineers. 
 
 
APPENDIX J - TIME TO REACH BREVET RANKS - Sample 
  292 
APPENDIX J - TIME TO REACH BREVET RANKS - SAMPLE 
 
Name Comm - 
issioned 
Major Time to 
Major 
(years) 
Lt-Col Time 
to Lt-
Col 
(years) 
Colonel Time to 
Colonel 
Maj-Gen Time to 
Maj-
Gen 
(years) 
Morse R 1758       1793 35 
Mann G 1763   1797 34 1797 34 1803 40 
Twiss W 1763 1794 31     1800 37 1805 42 
Fyers W 1773 1795 22 1800 27    1811 38 
D'Arcy 1776 1802 26     1813 37 1819 43 
Dickens ST 1780 1805 25     1813 33 1819 39 
Mackelcan J 1780 1794 14 1798 18 1808 28 1811 31 
Mulcaster FW 1793 1810 17       1825 32 
Elphinstone H 1793 1812 19       1837 44 
Thackeray FR 1794 1810 16       1837 43 
Birch J 1794 1811 17       1837 43 
Chapman SR 1794 1810 16 1812 18    1837 43 
Carmichael Smyth J 1795 1813 18 1813 18 1815 20 1825 30 
Pasley CW 1798 1812 14 1813 15 1830 32 1841 43 
Goldfinch H 1798 1812 14 1813 15 1830 32 1841 43 
Burgoyne JF 1798 1812 14 1812 14 1830 32 1838 40 
Jones JT 1798 1812 14 1812 14 1825 27 1837 39 
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APPENDIX K Ð SIEGES DURING THE PENINSULAR WAR. 
 
 Sieges during the Peninsular War 
 
Place Besiegers Besieged Start Date End date Duration 
(days) 
Taken? Outcome 
Almeida French Portuguese 15/8/1810 29/8/1810 14 Y Surrendered after 
magazine exploded (Es, 
P323) 
Almeida 
(Blockade) 
British French 7/4/1811 10/5/1811 34 Y Blockaded, garrison 
escaped and blew up 
fortress 
Astorga French Spanish 21/3/1810 22/4/1810 30 Y Surrendered after breech 
practicable. Assaulted and 
running out of ammunition 
Badajoz French Spanish 27/1/1811 10/3/1811 42 Y Surrendered (too soon) 
Badajoz 1 British French 6/5/1811 15/5/1811 11 N Lifted, to fight Soult at 
Albuera 
Badajoz 2 British French 29/5/1811 10/6/1811 12 N Lifted after failed assault 
Badajoz 3 British French 16/3/1812 6/4/1812 21 Y Stormed, and sacked 
Burgos British French 19/9/1812 19/10/1812 30 N Lifted 
Cadiz French Spanish/British 1809 1812  N Lifted 
Campo 
Mayor 
French Portuguese 14/3/1811 21/3/1811 7 Y Surrendered, after breach 
practicable 
Castro-
Urdiales 
French Spanish 4/5/1813 12/5/1813 8 Y Garrison escaped 
Ciudad 
Rodrigo 
French Spanish 26/4/1810 9/7/1810 75  Y Surrendered,  when breach 
practicable 
Ciudad 
Rodrigo 
British French 8/1/1812 19/1/1812 12 Y Stormed. And sacked (new 
iron siege train) 
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Place Besiegers Besieged Start Date End date Duration 
(days) 
Taken? Outcome 
Figueras Spanish French 9/4/1811 9/4/1811 0 Y Taken; let in at gate 
Figueras French Spanish 10/4/1811 19/8/1811 130 Y Surrendered, starved out. 
O.V.p538 
Gerona 1 French Spanish 20/6/1808 23/6/1808 3 N Lifted, insufficient 
resources 
Gerona 2 French Spanish 22/7/1808 16/8/1808 25 N Lifted, relief approaching 
Gerona 3 French Spanish 24/5/1809 11/12/1809 200 Y Stormed 
Hostalrich French Spanish 16/1/1810 12/5/1810 86 Y Governor Estrada broke 
out and 800 of 1100 
garrison escaped after 
supplies exhausted. 
Lerida French Spanish 13/4/1810 14/5/1810 7 Y Surrendered, after French 
bombarded civilian 
population 
Mequinenza French Spanish 15/5/1810 18/6/1810 34 Y Surrendered after breech 
practical. 
Olivenza French Spanish 11/1/1811 21/1/1811 10 Y Surrendered, after breach 
practical. 
Olivenza British French 9/4/1811 15/4/1811 6 Y Surrendered, after breach 
practicable 
Pamplona 
(Blockade) 
British French 25/6/1813 31/10/1813 128 Y Blockade, surrendered 
when supplies ran out 
Pensicola French Spanish 20/1/1812 2/2/1812 13 Y Surrendered (by Governor 
to obtain good personal 
terms)  
Rosas French Spanish 7/11/1808 5/12/1808 28 Y Surrendered after breach 
made 
Salamanca 
Forts 
British French 17/6/1812 27/6/1812 10 Y Surrendered 
Santander Spanish French 14/8/1811 15/8/1811 0 Y Stormed by Porlier 
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Place Besiegers Besieged Start Date End date Duration 
(days) 
Taken? Outcome 
O.IV,p472 
Saguntum French Spanish 23/9/1811 26/10/1811 33 Y Surrendered, walls 
crumbling 
San 
Sebastian 1 
British French 14/7/1813 25/7/1813 11 N Lifted after failed assault. 
Ran out of ammunition. 
San 
Sebastian 2 
British French 26/8/1813 8/9/1813 12 Y Stormed town 31 Aug; 
castle held out until 8 Sep 
1813. 
Saragossa 1 French Spanish 15/6/1808 14/8/1808 60 N Lifted 
Saragossa 2 French Spanish 20/12/1808 20/2/1809 62 Y Stormed 
Tarifa French Spanish/British 20/12/1811 4/1/1812 15 N Lifted, insufficient 
resources. 
Tarragona French Spanish 3/5/1811 28/6/1811 56 Y Stormed and sacked 
Tarragona 2 British French 3/6/1813 15/6/1813 12 N Abandoned by Murray 
Tarragona 3 
(Blockade) 
British French 30/7/1813 15/8/1813 16 N Blockade by Bentinck 
Tortosa French Spanish 19/12/1810 2/1/1811 14 Y Surrendered, with no good 
reason 
Valencia French Spanish 25/12/1811 8/1/1812 14 Y Surrendered, starved out 
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APPENDIX L - GLOSSARY OF ENGINEERING TERMS. 
 
 
Bastion 
Towers placed at regular intervals around a fortress 
 
Chevaux-de-Frize 
Large pieces of timber studded with blades and spikes, designed to block 
breaches in walls against attackers 
 
Curtain 
Wall connecting bastions in a fortress perimeter 
 
Fascines 
are rough bundle of small branches used for strengthening an earthen 
structure or marking out ground.  
 
Gabions 
are round baskets with open tops and bottoms, made from wickerwork and 
filled with earth for use as military fortifications. These were used to protect 
artillery batteries of troops in trenches.  
 
Glacis 
is an artificial slope of earth constructed to keep attackers under the fire of 
the defenders until the last possible moment. The glacis consists of a slope 
with a low grade inclined towards the top of the wall. This gave defenders a 
direct line of sight into the assaulting force right up to the walls of the 
fortress.  
 
Parallel 
Trenches dug by attacking forces near fortresses to protect themselves from 
defenders fire 
 
Platform 
Wooden flooring within a battery on which the artillery pieces were placed 
 
Sap 
Trenches dug forward from the main parallels to advance nearer the 
defenders position 
 
 
Note : with thanks to Wikipaedia and FletcherÕs In Hell before daylight, pp. 
129-130. 
Appendix M. British activities on River Crossings in the Peninsular War 1808-14
Name  Action BY Year Month Day Event Campaign Reference
Landmann George ThomasB RE 1808 12 0 Assisted in building boat bridges at Abrantes and Punhete and flying bridge 
at Villa Velha
Strategic RMC, v.5,  p. 27; REM, 4201-305,  10 Feb 
1809; ADD57544, f.204.
Davy Henry D RE 1808 12 10 Destroyed bridge at Betanzos. Killed in process. Retreat to Corunna Porter, p. 247
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1808 12 26 Blew bridge over River Esla at Benavente. Retreat to Corunna Wrottesley, v1, p. 30
Williams John Archer R RE 1809 4 0 Examined bridge across Vonga which had been destroyed by Portuguese 
milita.
Wrottesley,  v.1, p. 38
Fletcher Richard B RE 1809 5 12 Built bridge across the River Douro at Oporto Shore, p.22; Wrottesley, vol.1, p.41; 
Connelly, vol.1, p.165.
B RSC 1809 6 Built temporary bridge over River Tietar Talavera campaign Garwood, p. 83.
Stanway Frank D RE 1809 6 0 Mined bridge at Alcantara; blown 10/6/1809 when French advanced. Talavera campaign Shore, p. 29.
B RSC 1810 ??? Built flying bridge across River Tagus at Villa Velha Strategic Garwood, p. 85. See Wd, to Stuart, 31 Mar 
1811, suggests Portuguese made bridge not 
RSC
B NK 1810 ??? Built bridge of country boats across River Tagus at Abrantes Strategic Garwood, p. 86.
B NK 1810 ??? Flying bridge across River Tagus at Villa Velha replaced by bridge of 
country boats.
Strategic Garwood, p. 86.
B NK 1810 ??? Built bridge of boats across River Zezere at Punhete. Strategic Garwood, p. 86.
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1810 7 28 Destroyed bridges at Ponte de Murcella, Val des Pinos on the Alva, Foz 
d'Aronce and Espinhal.
Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras Wrottesley, v1, p. 97
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1810 8 0 Mined several bridges on likely routes of french advance Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras REM, 4201-68, Burgoyne's diary 1810-11
Mulcaster Edmund R D RE 1810 9 19 Ordered to accompany Brig-Gen Pack to destroy bridges of Santa 
Combadao and Criz
Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras Wrottesley, v.1. p. 108
NK 1810 10 Removed bdridge at Punhete Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras
NK 1810 10 Removed bridge at Villa Velha Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras
Reid William D RE 1810 12 15 Mined bridge over Rio Gingo at Miahaldas Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras REM - JTJ MS Journal
Forster William B RE 1811 1 Built bridge of boats across the river at Benavente Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras WD, To Beresford & Berkeley 18 Jan 1811
R RSC 1811 3 Repaired bridge at Pirnes Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 86.
B RSC 1811 3 Built trestle bridge over River Ceira near Foz d'Arance[sp?] Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 86.
B RSC 1811 3 18 Built flying bridge across River Alva at Ponte Murcella Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 86.
R RSC 1811 3 Repaired bridge over River Coa at Almeida Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 87.
1811 3 Replaced bridge at Villa Velha
1811 3 Replaced bridge at Punhete
Squire John B RE 1811 4 0 Constructed bridges across the River Guadiana at Jerumenha.  First 
combined trestle/pontoon bridge; second, flying bridges when river rose 
and swept away bridge; third,  bridge fo casks for infantry only.
First siege of Badajoz
B RE 1811 5 25 Flying bridge constructed across Guadiana near Badajoz Second siege of Badajoz Jones, vol. 1, p. 34.
B RSC 1811 5 5 Built two temporary bridges over Coa to provide retreat route for Wellington 
at Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro
Fuentes campaign Garwood, p. 89.
B OTH 1811 6 Col. Austin built bridge across Guadiana at San Lucar for Spanish force 
under Penne Villemur to cross
WD, To Liverpool, 11 Jul 1811.
Macleod George Francis R RE 1811 8 0 Repaired bridges at Val des Pinos and Ponte Murcella. Porter, p. 294; WD, 30 Jun 1811
Piper Robert Sloper P RE 1811 8? Laid Pontoon bridge over River Tagus at Almarez. Siege of Cidad Rodrigo Webber, p. 65.
Reid William D RE 1811 11 12 Mined bridges on the Veltes river to secure the flank of Don Carlos 
D'Espana.
REM, 5501-59-2
Sturgeon Henry B RSC 1811 11 18 Built trestle bridge over Agueda at Marialva for siege of Cuidad Rodrigo Siege of Cidad Rodrigo Garwood, p. 86.
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Piper Robert Sloper P RE 1812 3 14 Laid pontoon bridge across River Guadiana above Badajoz.  Washed away 
22 Mar 1811 and eleven pontoon sunk.
Third siege of Badajoz Jones, Sieges, vol. 1, p. 148
B RE 1812 3 15 Flying bridge constructed across Guadiana using two Spanish boats Third siege of Badajoz Jones, Sieges, vol. 1, pp. 148, 168.
Lascelles Thomas P RE 1812 3 22 Sent to 're-establish' bridge of communication over Tagus at Villa Velha 
when pontoon bridge at Badajoz swept away by floods.
Third siege of Badajoz Porter, p. 297; 5501-59-3.
Burgoyne John Fox P RE 1812 4 10 Ordered to go to Villa Velha and take up pontoon bridge if French approach Third siege of Badajoz 4601-72 f. 1812/5
Sturgeon Henry R RSC 1812 4 Constructed suspension bridge across River Tagus at Alcantara Strategic Garwood, p. 91.
Squire John R RE 1812 5 0 Repaired bridge at Merida,  Two fallen arches of stone bridge replaced with 
timber.
BL, Add63106 ff. 57-8
Sturgeon Henry R RSC 1812 ??? Constructed suspension bridge across River Tagus at Almarez Strategic Garwood, p. 90.
Goldfinch Henry R RE 1812 10 0 Repaired bridge at Royal Palace, Madrid Webber, p. 84
Pitts Thomas James HeblethwaytD RE 1812 10 25 Destroyed bridge at Duenas Tariego (which had been mistaken reported as 
in French possession the previous day). First attempt failed due to being 
rushed by the French.  A later attempt  blew out 13 feet of the arch.
Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, pp. 241-2
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1812 10 26 Mined bridge on the River Piseurga at Cabezon . Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 242
Goldfinch Henry B RE 1812 10 27 Constructed temporary bridge across Tagus near Aranjuez Retreat from Burgos Webber, p. 98
Pitts Thomas James HeblethwaytD RE 1812 10 28 Blew bridge on the River Douro at Tordesillas. Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Reid William D RE 1812 10 28 Blew bridge on the River Pisuerga at Simancas. Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. . 243
Reid William D RE 1812 10 29 Mined bridge over River Douro at Quintanilla (above Tudela).  Wooden arch 
destroyed in the evening.
Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. . 243
Pitts Thomas James HeblethwaytD RE 1812 10 29 Mined bridge at Zamora Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Barney George D RE 1812 10 29 Destroyed bridge at Valladolid on Piseurga. Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1812 10 29 Destroyed bridge over River Piseurga at Cabezon Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Jones Harry David D RE 1812 10 30 Destroyed repaired arch of bridge at Castronuno (near Toro) Retreat from Burgos RE JNL Jan 1890, p. 3
Pitts Thomas James HeblethwaytD RE 1812 10 31 Destroyed bridge at Zamora Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 244
Pitts Thomas James HeblethwaytD RE 1812 11 8 Mined bridge over River Tormes at Congosta Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 245
Barney George D RE 1812 11 8 Mined bridge over River Tormes at Barco de Avila Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 245
Slade William Henry D RE 1812 12 0 Went to destroy bridge at Merida WD, 20 Dec1812
Matson Edward R RE 1813 0 0 Repaired bridge over Toro Vitoria campaign Connelly, vol.1, p.194.
West George Innes Perry R RE 1813 0 0 Repaired bridge at Puente de Douro de Simancas and five other bridges Vitoria campaign Shore, p. 96
Wright Peter B RE 1813 2 0 Built bridge of trestles over River Alagon at ford of Las Campanas near 
Galisteo
REM, 4201-68, Burgoyne Bridges. P. 19.
P RE 1813 Laid a number bridges for passage of army, including over the Esla. RSC 
also present.
Vitoria campaign Connelly, vol.1, p.193.
Piper Robert Sloper P RE 1813 10 7 Laid pontoon bridge across River Bidassoa near Irun Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.197.
R RE 1813 10 Repaired wooden bridge at Irun Campaign in Pyrenees REM, 4201-68, Burgoyne Bridges. p. 14.
Dickens Thomas B RE 1813 10 Built trestle bridge over River Bidassos near Irun Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.197.
Pitts Thomas James HeblethwaytB RE 1813 11 11 Built trestle bridge over River Bidassos near Sarre Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
Hendersen B RE 1813 12 Laid  bridge of 11 bays? over River Nive at Ustaritz Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
 B RE 1813 12 Built bridge of wine barrels and skiffs Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
Boteler Richard P RE 1813 12 Laid Pontoon bridge over River Nive at Ustaritz Campaign in Pyrenees Oman. Vol. 7, p.228; Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
R RE 1813 12 Repaired old wooded bridge at Ustaritz Campaign in Pyrenees Oman. Vol. 7, p.228.
P RE 1813 12 Laid pontoon bridge over River Nive at Villefranque. Campaign in Pyrenees Oman. Vol. 7, p.262.
Appendix M. British activities on River Crossings in the Peninsular War 1808-14
B RE 1814 1 Built cask bridge across the River Nive near Cambo Campaign in France Connelly, vol.1, p.202.
Tod Alexander B RSC 1814 2 Built bridge of boats over River Adour Campaign in France Garwood, p. 90.
R RE 1814 26 Repaired bridge at Berenx Campaign in France Connelly, vol.1, p.202.
P RE 1814 3 Laid pontoon bridge over River Garonne at ??? Campaign in France Burnham, pp. 266-269.
P RE 1814 3 formed several pontoon and flying bridges on march from Orthez to 
Toulouse
Campaign in France Connelly, vol.1, p.203.
INDEX 24 B Build bridge
21 D Destroy bridge
9 P Lay/move/lift Pontoon bridge
13 R Repair bridge
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52 Carried out by Royal Engineers (RE).
11 Carried out by Royal Staff Corps (RSC).
5 Not known who carried out work
1 Built by other corps
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